#onionservices — Public Fediverse posts

Using #Onionservatory to scan my #Tor #OnionServices so I can see where I need to improve the configurations.

Thank you @h03k

http://mlrrgovihfhangc7alm7c3wrwffyuou3anfnfoe4r37ujmdkroik7xyd.onion

Built another Tor thing because apparently checking the Onion Service itself was only half the problem.

Onionspector shows what an Onion Service can observe about your browser — server-visible signals first, then local fingerprint checks when JavaScript is available.

No fingerprint database. No third-party tracking. Just a look at what your browser is exposing.

https://0ut3r.space/2026/09/06/onionspector/

#Tor #TorBrowser #OnionServices #Privacy #BrowserFingerprinting #CyberSecurity #InfoSec

Built another small thing because apparently Onion Services also deserve to be judged.

Onionservatory is a passive security, privacy, Tor compatibility and performance scanner for v3 Onion Services — inspired by Mozilla Observatory, SecurityHeaders, Lighthouse and SSL Labs, but with Tor-specific logic.

No pentesting. No crawling. No JavaScript. Just useful checks and grades.

https://0ut3r.space/2026/09/05/onionservatory/

#Tor #OnionServices #CyberSecurity #Privacy #InfoSec #WebSecurity

Infinito.Nexus 13.0: A Sovereign Cloud on Clearnet or Tor

https://blog.infinito.nexus/blog/2026/08/26/infinito-nexus-13-0-a-sovereign-cloud-on-clearnet-or-tor/

The Double-Edged Sword of Digital Freedom: The Risks of Infinito.Nexus with Native Tor Support

⚠️ Disclaimer

This article was generated entirely by artificial intelligence without editorial review.

To publish this analysis quickly, I deliberately chose to release it without manual editing or fact-checking. The purpose of this article is not to provide a polished technical specification, but to stimulate discussion about the societal, ethical, and security implications of the next generation of Infinito.Nexus with native Tor support.

Some technical assumptions, predictions, or conclusions may therefore be incomplete, inaccurate, or open to debate. They should be understood as informed analysis rather than verified fact.

The scenarios described in this article are intended to illustrate both the opportunities and the risks of increasingly accessible privacy-preserving infrastructure. They do not advocate, encourage, or endorse illegal activity. The same technologies that can strengthen digital sovereignty, protect journalists, human rights organizations, researchers, and political opposition operating under censorship can also be misused by malicious actors.

The goal of this article is to encourage an open discussion about the consequences of making powerful decentralized infrastructure available to a much broader audience. As with encryption, Linux, Git, peer-to-peer networks, and the Internet itself, technological progress creates both new freedoms and new responsibilities.

Please read this article critically, verify important claims independently, and view it as a starting point for discussion rather than a definitive statement on the future of decentralized infrastructure.

Technology is neutral.

Whether it empowers democratic resistance or enables organized crime depends on the people using it.

With native Tor integration, Infinito.Nexus has the potential to fundamentally change how self-hosted infrastructure is deployed. It could become possible for anyone to create a completely private digital ecosystem with only minimal technical knowledge.

That prospect is both exciting — and concerning.

A World Beyond Traditional Surveillance

Today’s Internet relies heavily on centralized infrastructure.

Governments can subpoena cloud providers.

Internet Service Providers can monitor traffic.

Hosting companies know where servers are located.

DNS providers can suspend domains.

Payment providers can freeze accounts.

Social media platforms can remove communities.

Tor changes that equation.

By integrating Tor directly into the infrastructure layer instead of treating it as an optional add-on, organizations could operate entirely within Onion Services.

No public IP addresses.

No public DNS.

No visible server locations.

No conventional attack surface.

Infrastructure that was previously easy to discover suddenly becomes practically invisible to anyone outside the Tor network.

From Old Smartphones to Invisible Infrastructure

Perhaps the most disruptive consequence of native Tor support is that almost anyone could become an anonymous infrastructure operator.

Instead of renting a VPS or purchasing expensive server hardware, users could simply take an old smartphone, install a Linux distribution such as Droidian, deploy Infinito.Nexus, and immediately have a functional server reachable exclusively through Tor.

Modern smartphones already contain everything traditionally required for a small server:

• multicore ARM processors
• flash storage
• Wi-Fi and LTE connectivity
• extremely low power consumption
• integrated batteries acting as an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)

Unlike conventional servers, smartphones can continue operating during short power outages without requiring any additional hardware.

Because all communication occurs through Onion Services, the physical location of the device becomes significantly harder to determine than traditionally hosted infrastructure.

A server could operate from:

• an apartment
• an office
• a vehicle
• a backpack
• a cabin
• virtually anywhere with Internet access

Instead of racks in a datacenter, entire organizations could operate from inexpensive commodity hardware.

Infrastructure that once required thousands of dollars could eventually fit inside a jacket pocket.

Organization Beyond Censorship

Perhaps the most transformative consequence of native Tor support is not anonymity itself — it is organization.

Modern democratic movements require far more than encrypted messaging. They need complete digital infrastructure.

Imagine a group deploying the following services exclusively as Onion Services:

• Matrix for encrypted communication
• Nextcloud for document sharing
• OpenProject for task management
• Git for software development
• Wiki systems for documentation
• forums for public discussion
• video conferencing
• identity management with single sign-on

Every service is accessible only through Tor.

There are no public IP addresses.

There are no publicly reachable domains.

There is no central cloud provider that can simply terminate the infrastructure.

For political opposition movements operating under authoritarian governments, this could fundamentally change what is possible.

In countries such as Russia or Iran, governments have repeatedly attempted to restrict independent media, block communication platforms, and pressure hosting providers into taking services offline. A decentralized infrastructure based on Tor Onion Services makes these traditional forms of censorship considerably more difficult.

If one server disappears, another can be brought online using the same deployment automation and cryptographic identities.

Instead of relying on a single datacenter, an organization could distribute its infrastructure across many independently operated devices, including repurposed smartphones running Linux distributions such as Droidian. Every device becomes part of the organization’s digital backbone while remaining reachable only through the Tor network.

This significantly lowers the barrier to building resilient communication networks for journalists, NGOs, researchers, humanitarian organizations, and democratic opposition movements.

Building Invisible Organizations

Imagine an organization deploying:

• Identity Management
• Matrix
• Nextcloud
• Git
• Email
• Video Conferencing
• Project Management
• Forums
• Social Networks
• AI Infrastructure

Every service exists exclusively as an Onion Service.

Employees connect only through Tor.

No public domains.

No public IP addresses.

No externally visible services.

From the perspective of the public Internet, the organization barely exists.

A Powerful Tool for Democracy

For many people around the world, this would be an extraordinary step toward digital sovereignty.

Political opposition operating under authoritarian governments often faces:

• Internet censorship
• mass surveillance
• infrastructure seizures
• domain confiscation
• ISP monitoring
• targeted cyber attacks

A hidden smartphone consuming only a few watts of electricity could host secure communications for an activist movement.

Journalists could publish anonymously.

NGOs could coordinate without relying on commercial cloud providers.

Entire communities could communicate through infrastructure that is extremely difficult to discover or disable.

History repeatedly demonstrates that secure communication is one of the foundations of democratic resistance.

The Other Side of the Coin

Unfortunately, technology does not distinguish between good and bad actors.

The exact same infrastructure could also be deployed by:

• organized cybercrime
• ransomware groups
• illegal marketplaces
• extremist organizations
• terrorist networks
• large-scale fraud operations
• illegal trafficking

If deploying anonymous infrastructure becomes as simple as flashing Linux onto an old smartphone and clicking through an installation wizard, the barrier to entry changes dramatically.

What once required experienced Linux administrators could eventually become accessible to almost anyone.

A hidden smartphone server could host:

• a secure school collaboration platform

or

• an anonymous criminal marketplace.

Technically, there may be little difference.

The software cannot distinguish between them.

Risks for Democratic Societies

For democratic societies such as Germany, this presents a difficult challenge.

Security agencies often rely on information obtained from hosting providers, cloud operators, domain registries, DNS providers, or centralized communication platforms during investigations.

Infrastructure that exists exclusively as Tor Onion Services reduces the availability of these traditional investigative paths.

This can make investigations more difficult and more resource-intensive, especially when organizations are technically competent and operate their own infrastructure.

A terrorist cell, extremist group, or organized criminal network could theoretically operate:

• private Matrix servers
• encrypted file storage
• internal forums
• planning boards
• identity systems
• software repositories
• anonymous web services

all without relying on public-facing infrastructure.

That does not mean such groups become impossible to detect.

Tor does not make people invisible.

Law enforcement can still use endpoint forensics, undercover operations, financial investigations, human intelligence, surveillance of physical logistics, and mistakes made by suspects.

But the balance changes.

The stronger privacy technologies become, the harder traditional bulk surveillance and provider-based investigations become.

This is exactly why the same tools that protect dissidents in authoritarian states can also create serious challenges for law enforcement in democratic states.

The Democratization of Anonymous Infrastructure

Historically, operating Onion Services required substantial expertise.

Administrators needed to understand:

• Linux
• networking
• reverse proxies
• DNS
• Tor
• certificates
• firewalls
• application integration

Automation changes everything.

Eventually, the entire deployment process could become:

1. Install Droidian on an old smartphone.
2. Install Infinito.Nexus.
3. Select the desired applications.
4. Enable Tor support.
5. Click Deploy.

Minutes later, an entire private infrastructure could be online.

No cloud provider.

No VPS.

No static IP.

No public DNS.

Infrastructure that previously required experienced system administrators becomes accessible to ordinary users.

That democratization is both empowering and dangerous.

Open Source Has Always Faced This Dilemma

This is not a new ethical problem.

Encryption protects:

• journalists
• dissidents
• criminals

VPNs protect:

• activists
• ransomware operators

Git is used to build:

• medical software
• malware

Linux powers:

• hospitals
• botnets

Artificial Intelligence can:

• accelerate scientific discovery
• generate phishing campaigns

Technology itself has no morality.

People do.

Infinito.Nexus Is Infrastructure

Infinito.Nexus is not being developed to create hidden criminal networks.

Its purpose is to simplify the deployment of sovereign, self-hosted infrastructure.

Native Tor support simply extends that philosophy.

The software itself does not decide who uses it.

The responsibility remains with those who deploy it.

The Ethical Challenge

Should powerful privacy technologies be withheld because they could be abused?

Or should society accept that technologies capable of protecting freedom will inevitably also be exploited by malicious actors?

There is no perfect answer.

Throughout history, almost every revolutionary communication technology — from the printing press to encrypted messaging — has been used for both constructive and destructive purposes.

Tor is no different.

Neither is Infinito.Nexus.

Technical Design

Native Tor support is currently being designed as a core networking feature of Infinito.Nexus.

Instead of treating Tor as an optional add-on, every deployed application can automatically receive its own Onion Service while remaining fully integrated into the deployment framework.

The current design proposal is publicly available:

Native Tor Support Requirements
https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/infinito-nexus-core/blob/feature/svc-net-tor/docs/requirements/031-svc-net-tor-onion.md

Related projects:

Infinito.Nexus Core
https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/infinito-nexus-core

Hetzner Arch LUKS
https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/hetzner-arch-luks

Linux Image Manager
https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/linux-image-manager

These projects together lay the groundwork for a future where deploying fully encrypted, self-hosted, Tor-native infrastructure becomes almost as simple as installing a mobile app.

Conclusion

Native Tor support has the potential to fundamentally reshape how self-hosted infrastructure is deployed.

For the first time, individuals, NGOs, journalists, companies, and political opposition movements could build private digital ecosystems with remarkably little technical expertise.

At the same time, the same technology could lower the barrier for anonymous criminal infrastructure.

A discarded smartphone running Linux could become a resilient, battery-backed server hidden almost anywhere.

That reality is both inspiring and unsettling.

Like encryption, Linux, Git, VPNs, and the Internet itself, Infinito.Nexus is infrastructure.

Infrastructure does not decide how it is used.

People do.

The challenge for society is therefore not whether such technology should exist, but how we choose to live in a world where powerful privacy tools become accessible to everyone.

Unlocking Fully Encrypted Servers over Tor

Remote servers should not have to choose between security and availability.

For years, the common compromise has been to expose SSH to the public Internet or to rely on VPNs and provider-specific KVM consoles whenever a LUKS-encrypted server reboots.

I believe there is a better approach.

By combining LUKS, Tor Onion Services, and a lightweight SSH server running directly inside the initramfs, it is possible to build servers that remain fully encrypted at rest, yet can always be unlocked remotely without exposing any public management interface.

This article describes the concept and how it could evolve into a reusable feature for Infinito.Nexus.

The Problem

Full disk encryption protects data when a server is powered off.

However, after every reboot someone must enter the LUKS passphrase.

For remote dedicated servers this usually means one of the following:

• opening SSH to the Internet
• connecting through a VPN
• using a provider’s KVM/IPMI console
• booting into a rescue system

While remote unlocking via Dropbear inside the initramfs is already a well-known solution, it still typically relies on a publicly reachable IP address.

The Idea

Instead of exposing SSH publicly, start Tor directly inside the initramfs.

The boot sequence would look like this:

Server boots
        │
        ▼
Kernel + initramfs
        │
        ▼
Network initialization
        │
        ▼
Tor starts
        │
        ▼
Temporary Onion Service appears

unlock-xxxxxxxx.onion
        │
        ▼
SSH via Tor
        │
        ▼
cryptsetup luksOpen
        │
        ▼
Root filesystem unlocked
        │
        ▼
Operating system boots
        │
        ▼
Temporary Onion Service disappears

The administrator simply connects through Tor:

torsocks ssh [email protected]

After entering the LUKS passphrase, the operating system continues booting normally.

Separate Identities for Boot and Runtime

One of the strongest aspects of this design is that boot-time and runtime use different Onion identities.

Boot environment

• dedicated Ed25519 key
• dedicated Onion address
• only SSH
• exists only during boot

Example:

unlock-xxxxxxxx.onion

Runtime environment

Once the operating system has booted:

• the initramfs exits
• Tor inside initramfs stops
• a new Tor instance starts
• completely different Onion addresses become available

For example:

ssh-xxxxxxxx.onion
cloud-xxxxxxxx.onion
matrix-xxxxxxxx.onion
mail-xxxxxxxx.onion

The unlock address simply disappears.

This cleanly separates the trust boundaries between the bootloader environment and the running operating system.

Why Tor?

Using Tor instead of exposing SSH directly provides several advantages:

• no public IP address required
• no exposed SSH port
• no VPN infrastructure
• works behind NAT or Carrier-Grade NAT
• management interface is only reachable through the Tor network
• additional network privacy
• ideal for self-hosted infrastructure

This is particularly attractive for servers hosted in data centers where administrators rarely have physical access.

What Happens After a Crash?

Whenever the server reboots:

1. the initramfs starts
2. networking is initialized
3. Tor publishes the temporary Onion Service
4. you connect via SSH
5. you unlock LUKS
6. the server continues booting

No KVM console.

No VPN.

No public SSH endpoint.

Only Tor.

Of course, catastrophic failures such as a broken initramfs or missing network drivers still require traditional recovery methods such as a rescue system or KVM.

Existing Building Blocks

Most of the required components already exist today.

My repository hetzner-arch-luks demonstrates how to deploy Arch Linux with full disk encryption on Hetzner servers and configure remote unlocking via SSH during the initramfs stage.

Repository:

https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/hetzner-arch-luks

Another project, linux-image-manager, automates the creation and customization of Linux images and could serve as the foundation for embedding Tor, Dropbear/TinySSH, and the required initramfs configuration into reusable images.

Repository:

https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/linux-image-manager

Together, these repositories provide much of the groundwork required for a fully automated implementation.

Future Integration into Infinito.Nexus

I envision this becoming a native feature of Infinito.Nexus.

Provisioning a server could automatically:

• install Arch Linux
• configure LUKS full disk encryption
• generate an initramfs containing:
  • Tor
  • Dropbear or TinySSH
  • cryptsetup
• create a dedicated boot-time Onion Service
• automatically switch to permanent runtime Onion Services after successful boot

From the administrator’s perspective, recovering a rebooted server would be as simple as:

torsocks ssh root@unlock-<hostname>.onion

Enter the passphrase.

The server continues booting.

Nothing is ever exposed to the public Internet.

Looking Ahead

This concept combines three mature technologies:

• LUKS
• Tor Onion Services
• Remote initramfs unlocking

While each technology already exists independently, integrating them into a seamless provisioning workflow could significantly improve the security and usability of encrypted self-hosted infrastructure.

For projects focused on digital sovereignty and privacy, removing the need for publicly exposed management interfaces is a natural next step.

Updated my onionscout repo.

onionscout is a lightweight CLI tool for first-pass auditing of Tor hidden services (.onion): clearnet dependency checks, metadata leaks, fingerprinting indicators, basic de-anonymization risks, cookie support for authenticated scans, JSON/TXT output, and a cleaner Rich-based result table.

Repo:
https://github.com/h0ek/onionscout

#Tor #OnionServices #OSINT #InfoSec #Pentest #Python

【为什么 Hetzner 不适合Tor🧅出口节点】
https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/1m9yssc/why_hetzner_is_not_suitable_for_exit_nodes

Hetzner禁止扫描外网——Tor 出口流量来自运行出口节点的服务器——用户活动包括端口扫描和探测——违反条款——收到滥用报告

所以办法是只运行中继和网桥，而不运行出口节点：
✅ Middle Relay ✅ obfs4 Bridge ✅ Snowflake ✅ WebTunnel
❌ Exit Node

#tor #hetzner #exitnode #OnionServices #onionnetwork #洋葱网络

Discover how to use Monero GUI with Onion remote nodes to keep your XMR transactions private and anonymous. Step-by-step setup, Tor tips, and practical advice for privacy-first crypto users. Dive in and lock down your wallet! #Monero #MoneroGUI #Onion #Tor #Privacy #CryptoPrivacy #Cryptocurrency #Security #OnionServices #English
https://johnydeep.net/videos/watch/ce52c4ca-3ab0-4513-8cb2-bd7b0bfcaf02

Not everything has to use #HTTPS

A static website full of technical or historical information, a memorial website, a retro computer website which target audience's hardware can't possible support the latests version of https, any website you want to be online for a long ass time without having to actively maintain certificates, any #OnionServices or #I2P website, etc?

It's ok. You don't have to use HTTPS.

#UnpopularOpinion

🤖 I finally got around to deploying a Tor Onion Service for a website. It's something I've wanted to do for years, and I wrote about how to set it up declaratively on NixOS. #NixOS #Tor #OnionServices
https://sourcery.zone/articles/2025/11/deploying-onion-services-for-websites-on-nixos/

With regard to #Tor #OnionServices on the #Fediverse,

I've set up a Mitra instance as an onion service, with lots of help from @silverpill. From there I should be able to federate with clearnet instances that proxy via Tor.

I understand Mitra, Pleroma, and Epicyon, amont others, can proxy via Tor. Has anyone gotten a clearnet instance of Mastodon to proxy via Tor? There are tantalizing hints in the documentation. https://docs.joinmastodon.org/admin/config/#hidden-services

@evan @helge @mellifluousbox @andypiper

Certificates for Onion Services

https://onionservices.torproject.org/research/proposals/usability/certificates/

#HackerNews #Certificates #OnionServices #TorProject #Security #Usability

🚀 New Beta Launch!
We're excited to introduce Tor2Web, now available at https://tor2web.privacytools.click!

Tor2Web is a gateway to the Tor network, allowing you to access .onion (hidden) services directly from a regular browser — no Tor client needed.

🔒 Browse anonymously, stay informed, and explore securely.
🧪 Currently in beta – feedback is welcome!

Try it now → https://tor2web.privacytools.click
More info at https://privacytools.click

#Tor2Web #PrivacyTools #Tor #OnionServices #CyberPrivacy #BetaLaunch

🌱 Derecho de réplica. Hablan los pueblos 🌱 #Desinformemonos

https://hablanlospueblos.org/

"...Sobre sus territorios se pretende la construcción de diversos proyectos que promueven el desarrollo, pero, como se preguntaba Samir Flores Soberanes, defensor nahua y comunicador comunitario asesinado en febrero pasado, “desarrollo para quién”. "

#jekyll #pueblosoriginarios #mexico #trenmilitar #samirflores #OnionServices

@aral @letsencrypt Now, if only IP addresses weren't assigned in a geolocatable way… ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

but it's a start…

next how about IPv6?

After that, who knows? The normalising of base32 #OnionServices and #I2P addresses? :D

Martedì 22 aprile 2025 alle 21:30, Leandro Noferini presenterà gli #OnionServices di #Tor, all'Officina Informatica del #GOLEM.
https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/

Gli Onion Services risolvono in parte la difficoltà di gestire i nodi di uscita della rete Tor, soprattutto dal punto di vista legale, garantendo l'anonimato da ambo le parti, sia per chi naviga, che per chi ospita siti e servizi.

L'officina si trova in via Magolo 32 a #Empoli.
https://wiki.golem.linux.it/Officina_Informatica

#sapereLibero #GNU #Linux

Trying to understand how to host an #onion site. Can someone confirm if I'm understanding this correctly and maybe fill in a gap or two?

The #tor client runs on a server and (somehow) receives requests from the network. The tor client then sends those requests to a webserver (via IP:Port), where the server does its normal thing by checking the host requested and matching it to the appropriate virtual server block. The site is served by the webserver back the tor client, who in turn sends it back out over the tor network.

Is that right? What port does the tor client actually listen to for incoming requests (what would I need to allow in my firewall)? Do tor and the webserver have to run on the same machine, or can I run tor on my reverse proxy and have it point to a webserver on another machine like a standard http site? If I have multiple clearnet and onion sites on the same server, is there any risk of one exposing the other?

#selfhost #onionservices

#TorProject State of the Onion

https://inv.nadeko.net/watch?v=EODNtLqD7f8 [perfect example, G de-onions]

https://onionmobile.dev #GuardianProject

https://hushline.app

https://github.com/blueprint-freespeech/gosling

53:16 - #InternetArchive , web.archive.org/
Access to information--and the preservation of it--otherwise difficult to obtain without a congressional staff and the library of congress. #ALibraryNotTheft

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HjPdReNmf_g&t=47
#TAILS
6:00 - partition checking (data integrity)
#Onionspray - facilitate making existing websites onion addressed! 15:00 making the addressing human accessible
18:51 - #Vanguards and #Arti
28:00 "conflux" congestion control
[...a whole lot of the internet doesn't work with Vanguards if it even did work with tor in the first place..]
#OnionServices
29:29 - Network Health
#Censorship
45:00 - webtunnel transport

In case you don't know, @cwtch is a decentralized end to end encrypted chat app

there's no servers by default, meaning no central authority

transport is based completely on Tor onion services, which itself is decentralized and provides automatic and transparent end to end encryption

(though @torproject still hasn't deployed any post-quantum cryptography into Tor, Cwtch is not as robust as newer PQ Signal or iMessage)

the profile ID that you share with your people is based on the Tor onion address that your profile is using for communications. if you shut down Cwtch, your Tor onion address also gets shut down, so you can't receive messages while you're offline, by default

it's my opinion that using Tor onion services for chat apps is a no-brainer. everyone with a Cwtch profile is both a client and a server. you are your own server. because of how Tor onion services works, as a reverse proxy, you don't need to host a "public" service on the internet. and e2ee, key management, encryption is all automatic. you can't fuck it up! its crazy to me that apps like Matrix don't take advantage of this. Tor onion services is an extremely powerful tool and so many people ignore or think of FUD

#Tor #onionservices #anonymity #e2ee #cwtch