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#verisign — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #verisign, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Exploring some insights of the #DNS root servers, and I discovered this small bump of NOTIMP repsonse codes of a.root-servers.net, operated by #Verisign. I checked other server instances with public statistics, and also k.root-servers.net, operated by #RIPE observed an uptick in REFUSED responses at around that time.

    Does anyone have a clue what was going on last year shortly before the Christmas days?

    #DNS #rootservers

  2. Exploring some insights of the #DNS root servers, and I discovered this small bump of NOTIMP repsonse codes of a.root-servers.net, operated by #Verisign. I checked other server instances with public statistics, and also k.root-servers.net, operated by #RIPE observed an uptick in REFUSED responses at around that time.

    Does anyone have a clue what was going on last year shortly before the Christmas days?

    #DNS #rootservers

  3. Exploring some insights of the #DNS root servers, and I discovered this small bump of NOTIMP repsonse codes of a.root-servers.net, operated by #Verisign. I checked other server instances with public statistics, and also k.root-servers.net, operated by #RIPE observed an uptick in REFUSED responses at around that time.

    Does anyone have a clue what was going on last year shortly before the Christmas days?

    #DNS #rootservers

  4. Exploring some insights of the #DNS root servers, and I discovered this small bump of NOTIMP repsonse codes of a.root-servers.net, operated by #Verisign. I checked other server instances with public statistics, and also k.root-servers.net, operated by #RIPE observed an uptick in REFUSED responses at around that time.

    Does anyone have a clue what was going on last year shortly before the Christmas days?

    #DNS #rootservers

  5. Exploring some insights of the #DNS root servers, and I discovered this small bump of NOTIMP repsonse codes of a.root-servers.net, operated by #Verisign. I checked other server instances with public statistics, and also k.root-servers.net, operated by #RIPE observed an uptick in REFUSED responses at around that time.

    Does anyone have a clue what was going on last year shortly before the Christmas days?

    #DNS #rootservers

  6. I am just wondering, and this is a question to the #infosec community:

    Can't you migrate a #TLD from one server to another including #DNSSEC by first testing your setup with a #canary zone? #Cloudflare speaks about challenges in having RSA/SHA256 on #Verisign's end, but ECDSA P-256 on their end.

    I am just thinking, can't you kick this off by constructing a canary zone with similar parameters and test the migration & key-roll-over prior to touching any relevant zones?

    Alternatively, sample the zone into chunks and migrate chunk by chunk?

    Just a few thoughts on how to reduce risk of #DNSSEC during the migration from zones.

  7. I am just wondering, and this is a question to the #infosec community:

    Can't you migrate a #TLD from one server to another including #DNSSEC by first testing your setup with a #canary zone? #Cloudflare speaks about challenges in having RSA/SHA256 on #Verisign's end, but ECDSA P-256 on their end.

    I am just thinking, can't you kick this off by constructing a canary zone with similar parameters and test the migration & key-roll-over prior to touching any relevant zones?

    Alternatively, sample the zone into chunks and migrate chunk by chunk?

    Just a few thoughts on how to reduce risk of #DNSSEC during the migration from zones.

  8. I am just wondering, and this is a question to the #infosec community:

    Can't you migrate a #TLD from one server to another including #DNSSEC by first testing your setup with a #canary zone? #Cloudflare speaks about challenges in having RSA/SHA256 on #Verisign's end, but ECDSA P-256 on their end.

    I am just thinking, can't you kick this off by constructing a canary zone with similar parameters and test the migration & key-roll-over prior to touching any relevant zones?

    Alternatively, sample the zone into chunks and migrate chunk by chunk?

    Just a few thoughts on how to reduce risk of #DNSSEC during the migration from zones.

  9. I am just wondering, and this is a question to the #infosec community:

    Can't you migrate a #TLD from one server to another including #DNSSEC by first testing your setup with a #canary zone? #Cloudflare speaks about challenges in having RSA/SHA256 on #Verisign's end, but ECDSA P-256 on their end.

    I am just thinking, can't you kick this off by constructing a canary zone with similar parameters and test the migration & key-roll-over prior to touching any relevant zones?

    Alternatively, sample the zone into chunks and migrate chunk by chunk?

    Just a few thoughts on how to reduce risk of #DNSSEC during the migration from zones.

  10. I am just wondering, and this is a question to the #infosec community:

    Can't you migrate a #TLD from one server to another including #DNSSEC by first testing your setup with a #canary zone? #Cloudflare speaks about challenges in having RSA/SHA256 on #Verisign's end, but ECDSA P-256 on their end.

    I am just thinking, can't you kick this off by constructing a canary zone with similar parameters and test the migration & key-roll-over prior to touching any relevant zones?

    Alternatively, sample the zone into chunks and migrate chunk by chunk?

    Just a few thoughts on how to reduce risk of #DNSSEC during the migration from zones.

  11. In January 2023, #Cloudflare replaced #Verisign in providing #DNS #registry services for the .gov #TLD. Besides the registry, they also run the authoritative #nameservers.

    Verisign ran it for 12 years, and cost the #US #government apparently just half as much as Cloudflare charges ($7.2M).

    Verisign loses prestive .gov contract to Cloudflare

  12. In January 2023, #Cloudflare replaced #Verisign in providing #DNS #registry services for the .gov #TLD. Besides the registry, they also run the authoritative #nameservers.

    Verisign ran it for 12 years, and cost the #US #government apparently just half as much as Cloudflare charges ($7.2M).

    Verisign loses prestive .gov contract to Cloudflare

  13. In January 2023, #Cloudflare replaced #Verisign in providing #DNS #registry services for the .gov #TLD. Besides the registry, they also run the authoritative #nameservers.

    Verisign ran it for 12 years, and cost the #US #government apparently just half as much as Cloudflare charges ($7.2M).

    Verisign loses prestive .gov contract to Cloudflare

  14. In January 2023, #Cloudflare replaced #Verisign in providing #DNS #registry services for the .gov #TLD. Besides the registry, they also run the authoritative #nameservers.

    Verisign ran it for 12 years, and cost the #US #government apparently just half as much as Cloudflare charges ($7.2M).

    Verisign loses prestive .gov contract to Cloudflare

  15. In January 2023, #Cloudflare replaced #Verisign in providing #DNS #registry services for the .gov #TLD. Besides the registry, they also run the authoritative #nameservers.

    Verisign ran it for 12 years, and cost the #US #government apparently just half as much as Cloudflare charges ($7.2M).

    Verisign loses prestive .gov contract to Cloudflare

  16. Företagen som äger internets toppdomäner är inte många. I alla fall är de företag som äger många toppdomäner väldigt få. Toppdomäner är bland annat de olika ländernas domäner som exempelvis .dk eller .se liksom domäner som .com och ,org. Väldigt många av dem ägs av ett litet antal företag. De företag som äger toppdomäner kallas registry-företag vilket skiljer sig från registrars som är företag som säljer domäner till företag, föreningar och personer.

    https://blog.zaramis.se/2025/06/16/foretagen-som-ager-internets-toppdomaner/

  17. Företagen som äger internets toppdomäner är inte många. I alla fall är de företag som äger många toppdomäner väldigt få. Toppdomäner är bland annat de olika ländernas domäner som exempelvis .dk eller .se liksom domäner som .com och ,org. Väldigt många av dem ägs av ett litet antal företag. De företag som äger toppdomäner kallas registry-företag vilket skiljer sig från registrars som är företag som säljer domäner till företag, föreningar och personer.

    https://blog.zaramis.se/2025/06/16/foretagen-som-ager-internets-toppdomaner/

  18. Berkshire Hathaway reaffirms strategic investment in VeriSign, highlighting the company's critical role in global internet infrastructure and stable cash flow generation. #VeriSign #InvestmentStrategy

  19. Digital Ocean's long outage on 28-Nov-2024 caused by a Network Solutions blunder they didn't know how to fix

    feddit.online/post/141754

  20. Digital Ocean's long outage on 28-Nov-2024 caused by a Network Solutions blunder they didn't know how to fix

    feddit.online/post/141754

  21. Digital Ocean's long outage on 28-Nov-2024 caused by a Network Solutions blunder they didn't know how to fix

    feddit.online/post/141754

  22. Digital Ocean's long outage on 28-Nov-2024 caused by a Network Solutions blunder they didn't know how to fix

    feddit.online/post/141754

  23. #DigitalOcean outage on 28-Nov-2024 caused by, perhaps, an incompetent #NetworkSolutions person, followed by equally incompetent clueless #VeriSign executives, none of whom seemed to know how to order a fix to reverse a single mistake made by one person that lead to a major corporation bleeding revenue and reputation.

    It took hours and hours, and many VeriSign executives getting involved, just to remove a single erroneous clientHold on a single domain. Really? None of them had any idea which manager to call?

    Imagine if Network Solutions accidentally put a clientHold on your domain. You'd have to just kiss your domain goodbye because a lot of VeriSign executives will not be helping you.

    "DigitalOcean is working with Network Solutions to understand what happened on their end that resulted in the clientHold being applied to our domain incorrectly. In addition, we are reviewing other domain registrars as possible new homes for our domains."

    status.digitalocean.com/incide

  24. #DigitalOcean outage on 28-Nov-2024 caused by, perhaps, an incompetent #NetworkSolutions person, followed by equally incompetent clueless #VeriSign executives, none of whom seemed to know how to order a fix to reverse a single mistake made by one person that lead to a major corporation bleeding revenue and reputation.

    It took hours and hours, and many VeriSign executives getting involved, just to remove a single erroneous clientHold on a single domain. Really? None of them had any idea which manager to call?

    Imagine if Network Solutions accidentally put a clientHold on your domain. You'd have to just kiss your domain goodbye because a lot of VeriSign executives will not be helping you.

    "DigitalOcean is working with Network Solutions to understand what happened on their end that resulted in the clientHold being applied to our domain incorrectly. In addition, we are reviewing other domain registrars as possible new homes for our domains."

    status.digitalocean.com/incide

  25. #DigitalOcean outage on 28-Nov-2024 caused by, perhaps, an incompetent #NetworkSolutions person, followed by equally incompetent clueless #VeriSign executives, none of whom seemed to know how to order a fix to reverse a single mistake made by one person that lead to a major corporation bleeding revenue and reputation.

    It took hours and hours, and many VeriSign executives getting involved, just to remove a single erroneous clientHold on a single domain. Really? None of them had any idea which manager to call?

    Imagine if Network Solutions accidentally put a clientHold on your domain. You'd have to just kiss your domain goodbye because a lot of VeriSign executives will not be helping you.

    "DigitalOcean is working with Network Solutions to understand what happened on their end that resulted in the clientHold being applied to our domain incorrectly. In addition, we are reviewing other domain registrars as possible new homes for our domains."

    status.digitalocean.com/incide

  26. #DigitalOcean outage on 28-Nov-2024 caused by, perhaps, an incompetent #NetworkSolutions person, followed by equally incompetent clueless #VeriSign executives, none of whom seemed to know how to order a fix to reverse a single mistake made by one person that lead to a major corporation bleeding revenue and reputation.

    It took hours and hours, and many VeriSign executives getting involved, just to remove a single erroneous clientHold on a single domain. Really? None of them had any idea which manager to call?

    Imagine if Network Solutions accidentally put a clientHold on your domain. You'd have to just kiss your domain goodbye because a lot of VeriSign executives will not be helping you.

    "DigitalOcean is working with Network Solutions to understand what happened on their end that resulted in the clientHold being applied to our domain incorrectly. In addition, we are reviewing other domain registrars as possible new homes for our domains."

    status.digitalocean.com/incide

  27. #DigitalOcean outage on 28-Nov-2024 caused by, perhaps, an incompetent #NetworkSolutions person, followed by equally incompetent clueless #VeriSign executives, none of whom seemed to know how to order a fix to reverse a single mistake made by one person that lead to a major corporation bleeding revenue and reputation.

    It took hours and hours, and many VeriSign executives getting involved, just to remove a single erroneous clientHold on a single domain. Really? None of them had any idea which manager to call?

    Imagine if Network Solutions accidentally put a clientHold on your domain. You'd have to just kiss your domain goodbye because a lot of VeriSign executives will not be helping you.

    "DigitalOcean is working with Network Solutions to understand what happened on their end that resulted in the clientHold being applied to our domain incorrectly. In addition, we are reviewing other domain registrars as possible new homes for our domains."

    status.digitalocean.com/incide

  28. I am sorry. But what is Congress's obsession with internet monopolies that aren't real? Why do they think that the internet consists of only one thing all the time? .com is not a monopoly and Verisign does not have a monopoly on TLDs.

    #tld #verisign #uspol #monopoly
    arstechnica.com/tech-policy/20

  29. I am sorry. But what is Congress's obsession with internet monopolies that aren't real? Why do they think that the internet consists of only one thing all the time? .com is not a monopoly and Verisign does not have a monopoly on TLDs.

    #tld #verisign #uspol #monopoly
    arstechnica.com/tech-policy/20

  30. I am sorry. But what is Congress's obsession with internet monopolies that aren't real? Why do they think that the internet consists of only one thing all the time? .com is not a monopoly and Verisign does not have a monopoly on TLDs.

    #tld #verisign #uspol #monopoly
    arstechnica.com/tech-policy/20

  31. I am sorry. But what is Congress's obsession with internet monopolies that aren't real? Why do they think that the internet consists of only one thing all the time? .com is not a monopoly and Verisign does not have a monopoly on TLDs.

    #tld #verisign #uspol #monopoly
    arstechnica.com/tech-policy/20

  32. I am sorry. But what is Congress's obsession with internet monopolies that aren't real? Why do they think that the internet consists of only one thing all the time? .com is not a monopoly and Verisign does not have a monopoly on TLDs.

    #tld #verisign #uspol #monopoly
    arstechnica.com/tech-policy/20