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  1. Oíche deireanach do Michael D. Higgins mar Uachtarán na hÉireann anocht. Bhí mé ag labhairt lena iar-bhearbóir ansin. Dúirt sé go nglacfadh sé a áit sa scuaine i gcónaí, agus go raibh sé béasach agus cairdiúil.
    Go raibh maith agaibh Michael, Sabina agus na madraí
    #MichaelDHiggins

  2. @oecherbibo Unser #Heiligabend wurde dann letztendlich viersprachig: Englisch, Deutsch, Arabisch, Baby. In dieser Reihenfolge. Auch wenn dann nicht immer Alle alles verstanden haben. Aber Allen hat es gefallen. OK, dem Baby nicht immer. Und der deutsche #Kartoffelsalat hat weitere Fans in der Welt gefunden.

    In dem Zusammenhang habe ich gelernt, dass es für Menschen, die im Alltag eine #Fremdsprache sprechen, sehr schwer sein kann, auf eine andere Fremdsprache zu wechseln.

  3. #Ukraine analysis of #Russia infantry tactics - translated from[^1] (all below text is a quote)

    Russian ‘banzai charges’ on the #Pokrovsk direction

    This very ‘banzai charge’[^2] term has already been used in some places by some observers. And it seems to me that it is mostly perceived as purely suicidal attacks without meaning and content. I understand it a little differently.

    Recently, Mashovets had a review of Russian forces in the Pokrovske direction. Tens of thousands of personnel, more than 300 tanks, etc. So, all this force is being used in an extended period of time. Having large resources, i.e. equipment, combat vehicles and people, the Russians are still limited in their simultaneous use in a small area, due to the peculiarities of the terrain and the nature of the fighting.

    They have to advance along a limited number of roads and forest plantations. Accordingly, it makes no sense to accumulate dozens of vehicles in one wave. Instead, a certain set, a combination of forces and means is used for a specific attack. At the same time, the enemy obviously has a certain calculation of what it can afford to lose over a certain period of time and can calculate the use of it.

    The less visible the assets are, the closer they can be pulled up and accumulated. They try to keep large equipment away from the contact line or well camouflaged in #Ocheretyne and the surrounding areas. Mortars, towed artillery, ammunition depots and infantry are also concentrated there.

    According to my observations, in one of the areas where an active offensive is taking place, in addition to the usual infiltration of soldiers through the landings and folds of the terrain for replenishment/rotation, there is an average of one concentrated attack with a combination of means every day.

    Armoured vehicles include BMPs/BMDs or APCs that deliver personnel, tanks that support and cover them, all synchronised with artillery fire to nail the defenders to the ground, hide our art and drones. Sometimes even synchronised air strikes. All of this is spiced up with powerful electronic warfare systems on armour to combat FPV drones.

    They are also trying to cover the main routes of approach to the conditional attack line with electronic warfare. Ocheretyno is used as an intermediate stronghold, where they bring BCs and sometimes try to hide equipment. Obviously, everything is coordinated with the support of UAVs.

    Everything happens in a short period of time. Quickly, so that the defence has a minimum of time to react. In particular, a certain conditional brigade RUBAK 15 km from the contact line already knows about the movement of the group. Sometimes earlier, sometimes later. This distance must be covered in a flash.

    The armour drops the troops - or doesn’t, if the artillery and drones are accurate enough. Tanks shoot back and run away if they can. Armour also, if it manages to survive. Infantry runs into the landing and tries to disperse and hide in the greenery. They approach their lines in small groups.

    At first glance, it really looks like a suicide attack, because we almost always inflict losses on them. The equipment either burns down irretrievably or suffers damage that requires repair. But in general, the task is accomplished to a certain extent. The attack often ends with a certain number of personnel surviving and reaching the position. This is followed by losses during assault operations and from drones that are constantly chasing the occupiers. Regardless of whether they attack or try to hide.

    Sometimes the armour that moves to the front line on a mission becomes the object of close attention of artillery and fpv units. If the enemy realises that it is impossible to get through, they sometimes try to hide their equipment. In the same Ocheretyne.

    The video (https://t.me/silukr/370) shows an example of the destruction of an armoured personnel carrier and a car that the racists tried to hide.

    Even without reinforcements in the area, the Russians can conduct hundreds more such assaults. What is important here is not only that they are trying to break through to the road from Pokrovsk to Kostiantynivka, but also that they are constantly honing the organisation and coordination of such attacks with a combination of their necessary means. In other words, they continue to adapt. That is why repelling such attacks is a very difficult task. Each unit of destroyed armour, logistics vehicles and personnel is the result of enormous efforts.

  4. #Ukraine analysis of #Russia infantry tactics - translated from[^1] (all below text is a quote)

    Russian ‘banzai charges’ on the #Pokrovsk direction

    This very ‘banzai charge’[^2] term has already been used in some places by some observers. And it seems to me that it is mostly perceived as purely suicidal attacks without meaning and content. I understand it a little differently.

    Recently, Mashovets had a review of Russian forces in the Pokrovske direction. Tens of thousands of personnel, more than 300 tanks, etc. So, all this force is being used in an extended period of time. Having large resources, i.e. equipment, combat vehicles and people, the Russians are still limited in their simultaneous use in a small area, due to the peculiarities of the terrain and the nature of the fighting.

    They have to advance along a limited number of roads and forest plantations. Accordingly, it makes no sense to accumulate dozens of vehicles in one wave. Instead, a certain set, a combination of forces and means is used for a specific attack. At the same time, the enemy obviously has a certain calculation of what it can afford to lose over a certain period of time and can calculate the use of it.

    The less visible the assets are, the closer they can be pulled up and accumulated. They try to keep large equipment away from the contact line or well camouflaged in #Ocheretyne and the surrounding areas. Mortars, towed artillery, ammunition depots and infantry are also concentrated there.

    According to my observations, in one of the areas where an active offensive is taking place, in addition to the usual infiltration of soldiers through the landings and folds of the terrain for replenishment/rotation, there is an average of one concentrated attack with a combination of means every day.

    Armoured vehicles include BMPs/BMDs or APCs that deliver personnel, tanks that support and cover them, all synchronised with artillery fire to nail the defenders to the ground, hide our art and drones. Sometimes even synchronised air strikes. All of this is spiced up with powerful electronic warfare systems on armour to combat FPV drones.

    They are also trying to cover the main routes of approach to the conditional attack line with electronic warfare. Ocheretyno is used as an intermediate stronghold, where they bring BCs and sometimes try to hide equipment. Obviously, everything is coordinated with the support of UAVs.

    Everything happens in a short period of time. Quickly, so that the defence has a minimum of time to react. In particular, a certain conditional brigade RUBAK 15 km from the contact line already knows about the movement of the group. Sometimes earlier, sometimes later. This distance must be covered in a flash.

    The armour drops the troops - or doesn’t, if the artillery and drones are accurate enough. Tanks shoot back and run away if they can. Armour also, if it manages to survive. Infantry runs into the landing and tries to disperse and hide in the greenery. They approach their lines in small groups.

    At first glance, it really looks like a suicide attack, because we almost always inflict losses on them. The equipment either burns down irretrievably or suffers damage that requires repair. But in general, the task is accomplished to a certain extent. The attack often ends with a certain number of personnel surviving and reaching the position. This is followed by losses during assault operations and from drones that are constantly chasing the occupiers. Regardless of whether they attack or try to hide.

    Sometimes the armour that moves to the front line on a mission becomes the object of close attention of artillery and fpv units. If the enemy realises that it is impossible to get through, they sometimes try to hide their equipment. In the same Ocheretyne.

    The video (https://t.me/silukr/370) shows an example of the destruction of an armoured personnel carrier and a car that the racists tried to hide.

    Even without reinforcements in the area, the Russians can conduct hundreds more such assaults. What is important here is not only that they are trying to break through to the road from Pokrovsk to Kostiantynivka, but also that they are constantly honing the organisation and coordination of such attacks with a combination of their necessary means. In other words, they continue to adapt. That is why repelling such attacks is a very difficult task. Each unit of destroyed armour, logistics vehicles and personnel is the result of enormous efforts.

  5. #Ukraine analysis of #Russia infantry tactics - translated from[^1] (all below text is a quote)

    Russian ‘banzai charges’ on the #Pokrovsk direction

    This very ‘banzai charge’[^2] term has already been used in some places by some observers. And it seems to me that it is mostly perceived as purely suicidal attacks without meaning and content. I understand it a little differently.

    Recently, Mashovets had a review of Russian forces in the Pokrovske direction. Tens of thousands of personnel, more than 300 tanks, etc. So, all this force is being used in an extended period of time. Having large resources, i.e. equipment, combat vehicles and people, the Russians are still limited in their simultaneous use in a small area, due to the peculiarities of the terrain and the nature of the fighting.

    They have to advance along a limited number of roads and forest plantations. Accordingly, it makes no sense to accumulate dozens of vehicles in one wave. Instead, a certain set, a combination of forces and means is used for a specific attack. At the same time, the enemy obviously has a certain calculation of what it can afford to lose over a certain period of time and can calculate the use of it.

    The less visible the assets are, the closer they can be pulled up and accumulated. They try to keep large equipment away from the contact line or well camouflaged in #Ocheretyne and the surrounding areas. Mortars, towed artillery, ammunition depots and infantry are also concentrated there.

    According to my observations, in one of the areas where an active offensive is taking place, in addition to the usual infiltration of soldiers through the landings and folds of the terrain for replenishment/rotation, there is an average of one concentrated attack with a combination of means every day.

    Armoured vehicles include BMPs/BMDs or APCs that deliver personnel, tanks that support and cover them, all synchronised with artillery fire to nail the defenders to the ground, hide our art and drones. Sometimes even synchronised air strikes. All of this is spiced up with powerful electronic warfare systems on armour to combat FPV drones.

    They are also trying to cover the main routes of approach to the conditional attack line with electronic warfare. Ocheretyno is used as an intermediate stronghold, where they bring BCs and sometimes try to hide equipment. Obviously, everything is coordinated with the support of UAVs.

    Everything happens in a short period of time. Quickly, so that the defence has a minimum of time to react. In particular, a certain conditional brigade RUBAK 15 km from the contact line already knows about the movement of the group. Sometimes earlier, sometimes later. This distance must be covered in a flash.

    The armour drops the troops - or doesn’t, if the artillery and drones are accurate enough. Tanks shoot back and run away if they can. Armour also, if it manages to survive. Infantry runs into the landing and tries to disperse and hide in the greenery. They approach their lines in small groups.

    At first glance, it really looks like a suicide attack, because we almost always inflict losses on them. The equipment either burns down irretrievably or suffers damage that requires repair. But in general, the task is accomplished to a certain extent. The attack often ends with a certain number of personnel surviving and reaching the position. This is followed by losses during assault operations and from drones that are constantly chasing the occupiers. Regardless of whether they attack or try to hide.

    Sometimes the armour that moves to the front line on a mission becomes the object of close attention of artillery and fpv units. If the enemy realises that it is impossible to get through, they sometimes try to hide their equipment. In the same Ocheretyne.

    The video (https://t.me/silukr/370) shows an example of the destruction of an armoured personnel carrier and a car that the racists tried to hide.

    Even without reinforcements in the area, the Russians can conduct hundreds more such assaults. What is important here is not only that they are trying to break through to the road from Pokrovsk to Kostiantynivka, but also that they are constantly honing the organisation and coordination of such attacks with a combination of their necessary means. In other words, they continue to adapt. That is why repelling such attacks is a very difficult task. Each unit of destroyed armour, logistics vehicles and personnel is the result of enormous efforts.

  6. An interesting yet unpleasant read - an analysis of the disruption of the #Ukraine defensive lines at #Ocheretyne in April 2024, material long heralded by “DeepState” OSINT group. The group clearly explained that these details are well-known in the military circles and their publication serves preventing such problems in the future where they are caused by political interventions (read at the end).

    The article gives many details of command and logistics that I can’t even repeat correctly due to military speak so I encourage you to read the original, even with automatic translation.

    In a nutshell, the defence of Ocheretyne was based on, going from the west, brigades 47, 115 and 23. The key passage was defended by three battalions of the 115th brigade, which worked poorly together and consisted of troops, including the TrO (territorial defence) , which had been added at various stages.

    It was this kind of TrO unit, on contact with 23 brigade, that ran away in first after relatively poor battle reconnaissance by the Russians. The problem, however, was that the second line of defence of the 115th also consisted of rear troops and unprepared for battle, and the fortifications at Ocheretyne were virtually non-existent.

    The consequence was that when the 2nd battalion of the 115th brigade in the first line heroically tried to salvage the situation by suffering heavy losses, the Russians were already coming out to its rear, which was covered by troops not ready for it (see map). The consequence was the breaking of the defence line, heavy losses in the 115th and a change of command of the entire brigade.

    The whole story with details here: https://t.me/DeepStateUA/19660 (first part)

    https://t.me/DeepStateUA/19661 (second part)

    Adding spice to the whole story is the fact that the TrO (territorial defence) unit in charge of the critical episode was Oleg Liashko, a former politician and council member who, within two years of joining the army, had reached the rank of colonel (!) despite, to put it mildly, doubts about his competence expressed by many in the military. Below is material on Liashko from April this year. If what TSN and DeepState write is true, we have a pretty good case study of how political appointments in the military can literally lay down entire battles

    https://tsn.ua/exclusive/odiozniy-lyashko-zagrimiv-u-skandal-viyskovi-zlili-pravdu-pro-eksnardepa-v-armiyi-2560828.html (in Ukrainian)

  7. An interesting yet unpleasant read - an analysis of the disruption of the #Ukraine defensive lines at #Ocheretyne in April 2024, material long heralded by “DeepState” OSINT group. The group clearly explained that these details are well-known in the military circles and their publication serves preventing such problems in the future where they are caused by political interventions (read at the end).

    The article gives many details of command and logistics that I can’t even repeat correctly due to military speak so I encourage you to read the original, even with automatic translation.

    In a nutshell, the defence of Ocheretyne was based on, going from the west, brigades 47, 115 and 23. The key passage was defended by three battalions of the 115th brigade, which worked poorly together and consisted of troops, including the TrO (territorial defence) , which had been added at various stages.

    It was this kind of TrO unit, on contact with 23 brigade, that ran away in first after relatively poor battle reconnaissance by the Russians. The problem, however, was that the second line of defence of the 115th also consisted of rear troops and unprepared for battle, and the fortifications at Ocheretyne were virtually non-existent.

    The consequence was that when the 2nd battalion of the 115th brigade in the first line heroically tried to salvage the situation by suffering heavy losses, the Russians were already coming out to its rear, which was covered by troops not ready for it (see map). The consequence was the breaking of the defence line, heavy losses in the 115th and a change of command of the entire brigade.

    The whole story with details here: https://t.me/DeepStateUA/19660 (first part)

    https://t.me/DeepStateUA/19661 (second part)

    Adding spice to the whole story is the fact that the TrO (territorial defence) unit in charge of the critical episode was Oleg Liashko, a former politician and council member who, within two years of joining the army, had reached the rank of colonel (!) despite, to put it mildly, doubts about his competence expressed by many in the military. Below is material on Liashko from April this year. If what TSN and DeepState write is true, we have a pretty good case study of how political appointments in the military can literally lay down entire battles

    https://tsn.ua/exclusive/odiozniy-lyashko-zagrimiv-u-skandal-viyskovi-zlili-pravdu-pro-eksnardepa-v-armiyi-2560828.html (in Ukrainian)

  8. An interesting yet unpleasant read - an analysis of the disruption of the #Ukraine defensive lines at #Ocheretyne in April 2024, material long heralded by “DeepState” OSINT group. The group clearly explained that these details are well-known in the military circles and their publication serves preventing such problems in the future where they are caused by political interventions (read at the end).

    The article gives many details of command and logistics that I can’t even repeat correctly due to military speak so I encourage you to read the original, even with automatic translation.

    In a nutshell, the defence of Ocheretyne was based on, going from the west, brigades 47, 115 and 23. The key passage was defended by three battalions of the 115th brigade, which worked poorly together and consisted of troops, including the TrO (territorial defence) , which had been added at various stages.

    It was this kind of TrO unit, on contact with 23 brigade, that ran away in first after relatively poor battle reconnaissance by the Russians. The problem, however, was that the second line of defence of the 115th also consisted of rear troops and unprepared for battle, and the fortifications at Ocheretyne were virtually non-existent.

    The consequence was that when the 2nd battalion of the 115th brigade in the first line heroically tried to salvage the situation by suffering heavy losses, the Russians were already coming out to its rear, which was covered by troops not ready for it (see map). The consequence was the breaking of the defence line, heavy losses in the 115th and a change of command of the entire brigade.

    The whole story with details here: https://t.me/DeepStateUA/19660 (first part)

    https://t.me/DeepStateUA/19661 (second part)

    Adding spice to the whole story is the fact that the TrO (territorial defence) unit in charge of the critical episode was Oleg Liashko, a former politician and council member who, within two years of joining the army, had reached the rank of colonel (!) despite, to put it mildly, doubts about his competence expressed by many in the military. Below is material on Liashko from April this year. If what TSN and DeepState write is true, we have a pretty good case study of how political appointments in the military can literally lay down entire battles

    https://tsn.ua/exclusive/odiozniy-lyashko-zagrimiv-u-skandal-viyskovi-zlili-pravdu-pro-eksnardepa-v-armiyi-2560828.html (in Ukrainian)

  9. Diese Rothalsige Silphe (#Oiceoptoma thoracicum) hat Glück und das kaputte Fasanen-Ei zuerst gefunden. Bald werden sich noch mehr #Käfer am großen Schmaus beteiligen. Auch die Larven ernähren sich schon von Aas.

    #Naturbeobachtung.at #Käfermittwoch #beetleswednesday #insect #insekt #artenkenntnis

  10. VfB-Fans sorgen mit Orchester für Gänsehaut beim DFB-Pokalfinale

    Auf den Tribünen im Berliner Olympiastadion haben die VfB-Fans grandios abgeliefert. Vor dem Anpfiff sorgten die Stuttgarter – begleitet von einem Orchester – für große Momente.

    swr3.de/aktuell/nachrichten/vf

    #DFB #DFBPokal #DFBPokalfinale #Fußball #VfB #VfBStuttgart #BayernMunchen #Orchester

  11. @classicalmusic
    Johannes Brahms: Konzert für Klavier und Orchester Nr. 1 d-Moll op. 15;

    Ludwig van Beethoven: Symphonie Nr. 3 Es-Dur op. 55, "Eroica"

    Rotterdam Philharmonic,
    Dirigent: Lahav Shani;
    Rudolf Buchbinder, Klavier

    @Pierrette ?

    oe1.orf.at/programm/20260904/8

    #music #classic #concert

  12. @classicalmusic
    Johannes Brahms: Konzert für Klavier und Orchester Nr. 1 d-Moll op. 15;

    Ludwig van Beethoven: Symphonie Nr. 3 Es-Dur op. 55, "Eroica"

    Rotterdam Philharmonic,
    Dirigent: Lahav Shani;
    Rudolf Buchbinder, Klavier

    @Pierrette ?

    oe1.orf.at/programm/20260904/8

    #music #classic #concert

  13. @classicalmusic
    Johannes Brahms: Konzert für Klavier und Orchester Nr. 1 d-Moll op. 15;

    Ludwig van Beethoven: Symphonie Nr. 3 Es-Dur op. 55, "Eroica"

    Rotterdam Philharmonic,
    Dirigent: Lahav Shani;
    Rudolf Buchbinder, Klavier

    @Pierrette ?

    oe1.orf.at/programm/20260904/8

    #music #classic #concert

  14. @classicalmusic
    Johannes Brahms: Konzert für Klavier und Orchester Nr. 1 d-Moll op. 15;

    Ludwig van Beethoven: Symphonie Nr. 3 Es-Dur op. 55, "Eroica"

    Rotterdam Philharmonic,
    Dirigent: Lahav Shani;
    Rudolf Buchbinder, Klavier

    @Pierrette ?

    oe1.orf.at/programm/20260904/8

    #music #classic #concert

  15. 🎵La inconfundible voz de Olivia Newton-John y este temazo ochentero titulado "Xanadu" son de esas joyas que te transportan al instante.
    Qué barbaridad de directo y qué carisma tenía en el escenario.

    🎵🎶🎵🎶

    #xanadu #olivianewtonjohn #80smusic #directo #joyasmusicales

  16. 📢 Heute stellen wir euch die Challenge des Bundesverbands Chor & Orchester vor.
    💪 Herausforderung
    Rund 10.000 unsortierte Bilder sollen systematisch strukturiert, mit Metadaten versehen und durchsuchbar gemacht werden.
    🧭 Handlungsfeld
    #Arbeitskultur
    🛠️ Nutzen
    Zeitersparnis bei der Bildsuche und professionellere Öffentlichkeitsarbeit.
    Wer profitiert? Mitarbeitende sowie langfristig auch andere Organisationen.
    🔗 Diese & weitere Challenges findet ihr hier: civic-coding.de/angebote/accel

  17. #Ucraina
    Questa è un'area in cui le truppe russe avanzano mentre quelle ucraine vengono accerchiate. L'area è a nord di #Ocheretyne.
    #analisimilitare

  18. #Ucraina
    Questa è un'area in cui le truppe russe avanzano mentre quelle ucraine vengono accerchiate. L'area è a nord di #Ocheretyne.
    #analisimilitare

  19. #Ucraina
    Questa è un'area in cui le truppe russe avanzano mentre quelle ucraine vengono accerchiate. L'area è a nord di #Ocheretyne.
    #analisimilitare

  20. #Ucraina
    Questa è un'area in cui le truppe russe avanzano mentre quelle ucraine vengono accerchiate. L'area è a nord di #Ocheretyne.
    #analisimilitare

  21. #Ucraina
    Questa è un'area in cui le truppe russe avanzano mentre quelle ucraine vengono accerchiate. L'area è a nord di #Ocheretyne.
    #analisimilitare

  22. #Ucraina e i #soldati che non sparano e abbandonano le postazioni
    ---
    La perdita del villaggio di #Prohres il mese scorso nella regione di #Pokrovsk è l'esempio più recente di perdita territoriale attribuita ai nuovi reclutati, hanno detto i #comandanti. Le unità della 31ª Brigata sono andate via in una frenesia mal coordinata, spingendo la 47ª Brigata a entrare in battaglia e tentare di stabilizzare la linea. Uno scenario simile si è verificato nel villaggio di #Ocheretyne a maggio. (#AP)

  23. #Russia 🇷🇺 continues small (hundreds of meters) advances on #Ocheretyne axis, controlling #Timofiivka

    Intense fighting continues in the direction of #Pokrovsk (55 attacks), #Toretsk (26 attacks), #Kurakhove (13 attacks)

    🇷🇺 Mi-8 helicopter destroyed near #Donetsk

  24. #Russia 🇷🇺 continues small (hundreds of meters) advances on #Ocheretyne axis, controlling #Timofiivka

    Intense fighting continues in the direction of #Pokrovsk (55 attacks), #Toretsk (26 attacks), #Kurakhove (13 attacks)

    🇷🇺 Mi-8 helicopter destroyed near #Donetsk