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#stryker — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #stryker, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Why US multinationals keep choosing Ireland. It’s not just the tax or workforce – The Irish Times

    If you ask US multinationals why they choose Ireland as a base for investment, they’ll talk about the…
    #NewsBeep #News #Economy #AbbVie #Alphabet #Apple #Business #feargal-orourke #GileadSciences #ida-ireland #merck #Microsoft #stryker #UK #UnitedKingdom
    newsbeep.com/uk/684198/

  2. DATE: July 1, 2026 at 05:26PM
    SOURCE: HEALTHCARE INFO SECURITY

    Direct article link at end of text block below.

    Workers Withdraw Claims in #Stryker Wiper #CyberAttack Lawsuit t.co/9FIxg2VvUN

    Here are any URLs found in the article text:

    t.co/9FIxg2VvUN

    Articles can be found by scrolling down the page at healthcareinfosecurity.com/ under the title "Latest"

    -------------------------------------------------

    Private, vetted email list for mental health professionals: clinicians-exchange.org

    Healthcare security & privacy posts not related to IT or infosec are at @HIPAABot . Even so, they mix in some infosec with the legal & regulatory information.

    -------------------------------------------------

    #security #healthcare #doctors #itsecurity #hacking #doxxing #psychotherapy #securitynews #psychotherapist #mentalhealth #psychiatry #hospital #socialwork #datasecurity #webbeacons #cookies #HIPAA #privacy #datanalytics #healthcaresecurity #healthitsecurity #patientrecords @infosec #telehealth #netneutrality #socialengineering

  3. DATE: July 1, 2026 at 05:26PM
    SOURCE: HEALTHCARE INFO SECURITY

    Direct article link at end of text block below.

    Workers Withdraw Claims in #Stryker Wiper #CyberAttack Lawsuit t.co/9FIxg2VvUN

    Here are any URLs found in the article text:

    t.co/9FIxg2VvUN

    Articles can be found by scrolling down the page at healthcareinfosecurity.com/ under the title "Latest"

    -------------------------------------------------

    Private, vetted email list for mental health professionals: clinicians-exchange.org

    Healthcare security & privacy posts not related to IT or infosec are at @HIPAABot . Even so, they mix in some infosec with the legal & regulatory information.

    -------------------------------------------------

    #security #healthcare #doctors #itsecurity #hacking #doxxing #psychotherapy #securitynews #psychotherapist #mentalhealth #psychiatry #hospital #socialwork #datasecurity #webbeacons #cookies #HIPAA #privacy #datanalytics #healthcaresecurity #healthitsecurity #patientrecords @infosec #telehealth #netneutrality #socialengineering

  4. DATE: June 24, 2026 at 04:05PM
    SOURCE: HEALTHCARE INFO SECURITY

    Direct article link at end of text block below.

    #Stryker Seeks to Dismiss Class Action Lawsuit in #Cyberattack t.co/7OeJOMmr6B #HIPAA #PII #PHI

    Here are any URLs found in the article text:

    t.co/7OeJOMmr6B

    Articles can be found by scrolling down the page at healthcareinfosecurity.com/ under the title "Latest"

    -------------------------------------------------

    Private, vetted email list for mental health professionals: clinicians-exchange.org

    Healthcare security & privacy posts not related to IT or infosec are at @HIPAABot . Even so, they mix in some infosec with the legal & regulatory information.

    -------------------------------------------------

    #security #healthcare #doctors #itsecurity #hacking #doxxing #psychotherapy #securitynews #psychotherapist #mentalhealth #psychiatry #hospital #socialwork #datasecurity #webbeacons #cookies #HIPAA #privacy #datanalytics #healthcaresecurity #healthitsecurity #patientrecords @infosec #telehealth #netneutrality #socialengineering

  5. DATE: June 24, 2026 at 04:05PM
    SOURCE: HEALTHCARE INFO SECURITY

    Direct article link at end of text block below.

    #Stryker Seeks to Dismiss Class Action Lawsuit in #Cyberattack t.co/7OeJOMmr6B #HIPAA #PII #PHI

    Here are any URLs found in the article text:

    t.co/7OeJOMmr6B

    Articles can be found by scrolling down the page at healthcareinfosecurity.com/ under the title "Latest"

    -------------------------------------------------

    Private, vetted email list for mental health professionals: clinicians-exchange.org

    Healthcare security & privacy posts not related to IT or infosec are at @HIPAABot . Even so, they mix in some infosec with the legal & regulatory information.

    -------------------------------------------------

    #security #healthcare #doctors #itsecurity #hacking #doxxing #psychotherapy #securitynews #psychotherapist #mentalhealth #psychiatry #hospital #socialwork #datasecurity #webbeacons #cookies #HIPAA #privacy #datanalytics #healthcaresecurity #healthitsecurity #patientrecords @infosec #telehealth #netneutrality #socialengineering

  6. DATE: June 24, 2026 at 04:05PM
    SOURCE: HEALTHCARE INFO SECURITY

    Direct article link at end of text block below.

    #Stryker Seeks to Dismiss Class Action Lawsuit in #Cyberattack t.co/7OeJOMmr6B #HIPAA #PII #PHI

    Here are any URLs found in the article text:

    t.co/7OeJOMmr6B

    Articles can be found by scrolling down the page at healthcareinfosecurity.com/ under the title "Latest"

    -------------------------------------------------

    Private, vetted email list for mental health professionals: clinicians-exchange.org

    Healthcare security & privacy posts not related to IT or infosec are at @HIPAABot . Even so, they mix in some infosec with the legal & regulatory information.

    -------------------------------------------------

    #security #healthcare #doctors #itsecurity #hacking #doxxing #psychotherapy #securitynews #psychotherapist #mentalhealth #psychiatry #hospital #socialwork #datasecurity #webbeacons #cookies #HIPAA #privacy #datanalytics #healthcaresecurity #healthitsecurity #patientrecords @infosec #telehealth #netneutrality #socialengineering

  7. DATE: June 24, 2026 at 04:05PM
    SOURCE: HEALTHCARE INFO SECURITY

    Direct article link at end of text block below.

    #Stryker Seeks to Dismiss Class Action Lawsuit in #Cyberattack t.co/7OeJOMmr6B #HIPAA #PII #PHI

    Here are any URLs found in the article text:

    t.co/7OeJOMmr6B

    Articles can be found by scrolling down the page at healthcareinfosecurity.com/ under the title "Latest"

    -------------------------------------------------

    Private, vetted email list for mental health professionals: clinicians-exchange.org

    Healthcare security & privacy posts not related to IT or infosec are at @HIPAABot . Even so, they mix in some infosec with the legal & regulatory information.

    -------------------------------------------------

    #security #healthcare #doctors #itsecurity #hacking #doxxing #psychotherapy #securitynews #psychotherapist #mentalhealth #psychiatry #hospital #socialwork #datasecurity #webbeacons #cookies #HIPAA #privacy #datanalytics #healthcaresecurity #healthitsecurity #patientrecords @infosec #telehealth #netneutrality #socialengineering

  8. [Перевод] Мы дали ИИ написать код и тесты: что обнаружило мутационное тестирование

    AI-агент самостоятельно создавал приложение и по ходу работы покрывал его тестами, а качество кода оценивали автоматические проверки. На первый взгляд всё выглядело надёжно: покрытие росло, тесты проходили. Однако мутационное тестирование показало, что часть тестов лишь выполняет код, почти не защищая его от реальных поломок. В статье разберём, какие сенсоры действительно помогают находить регрессии, а какие создают ложное чувство уверенности.

    habr.com/ru/companies/otus/art

    #мутационное_тестирование #ИИагенты #генерация_тестов #качество_кода #сопровождаемость #статический_анализ #ESLint #Stryker #регрессионное_тестирование #архитектура_кода

  9. M1126 "Striker"

    A mix of a Striker from a Helluva Boss and an M1126 Stryker APC. There are two options available - the original and the military.

    No, this is not a transformer, or a technomorph, to whom it will seem for the first time...

    #robot #military #mecha #characterdesign #weapon #antenna #apc #cable #carmine #combat #eyepiece #fan_art #grass #hell #mechanical_arms #spine #striker #stryker #tail #vehicle #wheel #m1126 #mechanical_legs #helluva_boss #striker_helluva_boss

  10. Microsoft Intune als Einfallstor! Der Medizintechnikkonzern Stryker wurde Opfer eines Cyberangriffs und die Angreifer nutzten Microsoft Intune als Hebel. Die Folge: globale Betriebsausfälle. Intune ist kein Nischenprodukt. Es ist in Zehntausenden Unternehmen weltweit das zentrale Werkzeug für Geräteverwaltung, Zugriffssteuerung und Softwareverteilung – von KMU bis Konzern, quer durch alle Branchen. #MicrosoftIntune #Stryker #Microsoft #Endpointsecurity #Intune #MDM

  11. The Stryker data wiping attack via Intune and the attempted attack on the Polish National Centre for Nuclear Research (NCBJ) show that geopolitical affairs also play a big role in cyber security.

    In the Stryker data wiping attack via Intune that wiped “over 200,000 systems, servers, and mobile devices,” there are anonymous reports and rumours that employees’ own mobile devices, enrolled under a BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) initiative, were affected. Under that initiative an employee’s personal mobile device, such as a tablet or smartphone, can be enrolled via an Intune MDM profile, policies were supposedly applied and the devices were fully wiped to factory state, so personal data, apps, and pictures were unfortunately lost.

    In a properly configured environment, an administrator would configure BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) via Intune to use a segmented work partition, otherwise known as a Work Profile. This solution creates a separate, segmented space that is secure for work‑related data and apps while keeping users’ personal data separate and inaccessible to the Work Profile. In the case of a remote wipe by either the company administrator or a malicious actor, only the Work Profile and its space would be wiped while users’ personal data would remain intact.

    To further secure your Intune environment against wiper attacks like the one that affected Stryker, there are two controls you can implement:

    The first control I would recommend is to require the use of either PassKeys or YubiKeys for all highly privileged accounts that each employee uses to perform sensitive and critical tasks. Combine this with a policy that such accounts cannot be used unless a PassKey or YubiKey is enrolled. This ensures that sensitive accounts are compliant and helps prevent MFA phishing, since an attacker would need physical access to the smartphone or the YubiKey device.

    While both PassKeys and YubiKeys accomplish the same goals, there are minor differences between them:

    PassKeys do not require dedicated hardware and can be used entirely via the Microsoft Authenticator app. PassKeys also allow syncing authentication method between devices, so when one device is lost you can still authenticate via another device. When an employee logs into a sensitive system, they are asked to authenticate via face recognition, fingerprint, or PIN and to scan a QR code to approve the login request using Bluetooth and an internet connection.

    YubiKey require the dedicated hardware and the company to purchase a physical key. The private keys used for authentication are stored on the device itself in a dedicated, hardened chip that cannot be read by the user or a malicious actor. Because of how the private keys are stored and hardened, you cannot sync or backup them, however, if a privileged user loses their key or it breaks, an administrator can reset the affected account’s authentication method to enrol a newly issued key. While this method comes at a cost and some inconvenience, it offers a higher level of security than other methods. When an employee logs into a sensitive system, they need to insert the YubiKey into a USB port, enter the YubiKey PIN, and physically touch the YubiKey to complete authentication.

    The second control would be to require approval from another employee when a wipe command is issued. This would stop an attack in its tracks if a highly privileged account is compromised and an attacker attempts to wipe devices in the environment. However, if PassKeys or YubiKeys are used for account authentication, the likelihood of a privileged account compromise is very low. To further lock down your environment, you can put the same type of control in place for other similarly sensitive actions or commands.

    #Stryker #Intune #MDM #BYOD #Policy #Prevention #CyberPrevention #Cyber #CyberSecurity #CyberAttack

  12. The Stryker data wiping attack via Intune and the attempted attack on the Polish National Centre for Nuclear Research (NCBJ) show that geopolitical affairs also play a big role in cyber security.

    In the Stryker data wiping attack via Intune that wiped “over 200,000 systems, servers, and mobile devices,” there are anonymous reports and rumours that employees’ own mobile devices, enrolled under a BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) initiative, were affected. Under that initiative an employee’s personal mobile device, such as a tablet or smartphone, can be enrolled via an Intune MDM profile, policies were supposedly applied and the devices were fully wiped to factory state, so personal data, apps, and pictures were unfortunately lost.

    In a properly configured environment, an administrator would configure BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) via Intune to use a segmented work partition, otherwise known as a Work Profile. This solution creates a separate, segmented space that is secure for work‑related data and apps while keeping users’ personal data separate and inaccessible to the Work Profile. In the case of a remote wipe by either the company administrator or a malicious actor, only the Work Profile and its space would be wiped while users’ personal data would remain intact.

    To further secure your Intune environment against wiper attacks like the one that affected Stryker, there are two controls you can implement:

    The first control I would recommend is to require the use of either PassKeys or YubiKeys for all highly privileged accounts that each employee uses to perform sensitive and critical tasks. Combine this with a policy that such accounts cannot be used unless a PassKey or YubiKey is enrolled. This ensures that sensitive accounts are compliant and helps prevent MFA phishing, since an attacker would need physical access to the smartphone or the YubiKey device.

    While both PassKeys and YubiKeys accomplish the same goals, there are minor differences between them:

    PassKeys do not require dedicated hardware and can be used entirely via the Microsoft Authenticator app. PassKeys also allow syncing authentication method between devices, so when one device is lost you can still authenticate via another device. When an employee logs into a sensitive system, they are asked to authenticate via face recognition, fingerprint, or PIN and to scan a QR code to approve the login request using Bluetooth and an internet connection.

    YubiKey require the dedicated hardware and the company to purchase a physical key. The private keys used for authentication are stored on the device itself in a dedicated, hardened chip that cannot be read by the user or a malicious actor. Because of how the private keys are stored and hardened, you cannot sync or backup them, however, if a privileged user loses their key or it breaks, an administrator can reset the affected account’s authentication method to enrol a newly issued key. While this method comes at a cost and some inconvenience, it offers a higher level of security than other methods. When an employee logs into a sensitive system, they need to insert the YubiKey into a USB port, enter the YubiKey PIN, and physically touch the YubiKey to complete authentication.

    The second control would be to require approval from another employee when a wipe command is issued. This would stop an attack in its tracks if a highly privileged account is compromised and an attacker attempts to wipe devices in the environment. However, if PassKeys or YubiKeys are used for account authentication, the likelihood of a privileged account compromise is very low. To further lock down your environment, you can put the same type of control in place for other similarly sensitive actions or commands.

    #Stryker #Intune #MDM #BYOD #Policy #Prevention #CyberPrevention #Cyber #CyberSecurity #CyberAttack

  13. Parliamo del fonte cyber Iran-USA: Handala contro Stryker

    E' da un po' che non riuscivo a prendere del tempo per aggiornare questo blog e, visti gli avvenimenti che hanno determinato e stanno determinando la sicurezza nelle ultime settimane, riapro con un post sull'Iran. L’11 marzo 2026 Stryker, uno dei colossi mondiali della tecnologia medicale, ha scoperto cosa significa avere l’intero ambiente Microsoft trasformato in un kill‑switch remoto, azionato da un gruppo hacktivista filo‑iraniano che si firma Handala Hack e che l’intelligence […]

    insicurezzadigitale.com/parlia

  14. Parliamo del fonte cyber Iran-USA: Handala contro Stryker

    E' da un po' che non riuscivo a prendere del tempo per aggiornare questo blog e, visti gli avvenimenti che hanno determinato e stanno determinando la sicurezza nelle ultime settimane, riapro con un post sull'Iran. L’11 marzo 2026 Stryker, uno dei colossi mondiali della tecnologia medicale, ha scoperto cosa significa avere l’intero ambiente Microsoft trasformato in un kill‑switch remoto, azionato da un gruppo hacktivista filo‑iraniano che si firma Handala Hack e che l’intelligence […]

    insicurezzadigitale.com/parlia

  15. The Stryker outage confirms a shift in Handala’s tactics: moving from regional hacktivism to destructive global operations. By abusing Microsoft Intune, they bypassed traditional EDR to wipe 200k devices. Identity, not malware, was the vector.

    Read More: security.land/stryker-cyberatt

    #SecurityLand #News #Stryker #Handala #Wiper #MicrosoftIntune #Cybersecurity

  16. The Stryker outage confirms a shift in Handala’s tactics: moving from regional hacktivism to destructive global operations. By abusing Microsoft Intune, they bypassed traditional EDR to wipe 200k devices. Identity, not malware, was the vector.

    Read More: security.land/stryker-cyberatt

    #SecurityLand #News #Stryker #Handala #Wiper #MicrosoftIntune #Cybersecurity

  17. When bombs fall, keyboards follow. The #Handala attack on #Stryker — 200,000 systems claimed wiped, 50TB stolen, timed explicitly to the US-Israeli assault on Iran — is textbook retaliation hacktivist logic. But here's the thing nobody wants to say out loud: it barely matters whether the group is genuinely aggrieved civilians or a state front wearing a keffiyeh. The effect is identical. The deniability is the point.

    Governments have learned that a "spontaneous" hacktivist campaign does more reputational work than an official cyberunit ever could — and when the targeting is this clean, "spontaneous" deserves serious scare quotes. We saw it with pro-Russian groups after #Ukraine. We saw it with pro-Palestinian groups after #Gaza. We're seeing it again now with #Iran. The pattern is consistent enough to be a doctrine at this point.

    What makes it strategically interesting — and analytically treacherous — is the deliberate ambiguity it manufactures. A group claiming to represent bombed civilians carries far more narrative weight than one that's transparently state-linked. Attribution becomes a second-order problem: even if the group is genuinely independent, states benefit from the chaos and quietly let it run. Sometimes they seed it. Sometimes they just watch. The outcome for the victim is the same either way.

    The targeting logic follows a reliable playbook too. Not purely military or intelligence targets — those carry too much legal and escalatory risk. Instead: corporations with visible ties to the aggressor country, ideally ones with symbolic weight or defense adjacency. #Stryker, with its $450M U.S. military contract and the same name as an Army armored carrier, checked every box. The selection wasn't random. It was a message dressed as an attack.

    For defenders, none of this is new — but the tempo is accelerating. Geopolitical flashpoints are now predictable threat amplifiers with a measurable lag between event and campaign. Your company's government contracts, your country of incorporation, your defense-adjacent partnerships — these are part of your attack surface whether you've modelled them that way or not. The groups carrying the flag may be real, fake, or somewhere in the uncomfortable middle. It doesn't matter. The wiper doesn't care about the ideology behind it.

    → Week #11/2026 also covers:

    🇺🇸 FBI hacked,

    🇨🇳 Salt Typhoon goes global,

    🤯 🔓️ 💬 #Instagram dropping E2E encryption

    🤖 ⏱️ An #AI agent hacked McKinsey's #chatbot in two hours.

    Full issue 👉 infosec-mashup.santolaria.net/

    If you find it useful, subscribe to get it in your inbox every weekend 📨 #infosecMASHUP #cybersecurity #infosec #threatintel

  18. When bombs fall, keyboards follow. The #Handala attack on #Stryker — 200,000 systems claimed wiped, 50TB stolen, timed explicitly to the US-Israeli assault on Iran — is textbook retaliation hacktivist logic. But here's the thing nobody wants to say out loud: it barely matters whether the group is genuinely aggrieved civilians or a state front wearing a keffiyeh. The effect is identical. The deniability is the point.

    Governments have learned that a "spontaneous" hacktivist campaign does more reputational work than an official cyberunit ever could — and when the targeting is this clean, "spontaneous" deserves serious scare quotes. We saw it with pro-Russian groups after #Ukraine. We saw it with pro-Palestinian groups after #Gaza. We're seeing it again now with #Iran. The pattern is consistent enough to be a doctrine at this point.

    What makes it strategically interesting — and analytically treacherous — is the deliberate ambiguity it manufactures. A group claiming to represent bombed civilians carries far more narrative weight than one that's transparently state-linked. Attribution becomes a second-order problem: even if the group is genuinely independent, states benefit from the chaos and quietly let it run. Sometimes they seed it. Sometimes they just watch. The outcome for the victim is the same either way.

    The targeting logic follows a reliable playbook too. Not purely military or intelligence targets — those carry too much legal and escalatory risk. Instead: corporations with visible ties to the aggressor country, ideally ones with symbolic weight or defense adjacency. #Stryker, with its $450M U.S. military contract and the same name as an Army armored carrier, checked every box. The selection wasn't random. It was a message dressed as an attack.

    For defenders, none of this is new — but the tempo is accelerating. Geopolitical flashpoints are now predictable threat amplifiers with a measurable lag between event and campaign. Your company's government contracts, your country of incorporation, your defense-adjacent partnerships — these are part of your attack surface whether you've modelled them that way or not. The groups carrying the flag may be real, fake, or somewhere in the uncomfortable middle. It doesn't matter. The wiper doesn't care about the ideology behind it.

    → Week #11/2026 also covers:

    🇺🇸 FBI hacked,

    🇨🇳 Salt Typhoon goes global,

    🤯 🔓️ 💬 #Instagram dropping E2E encryption

    🤖 ⏱️ An #AI agent hacked McKinsey's #chatbot in two hours.

    Full issue 👉 infosec-mashup.santolaria.net/

    If you find it useful, subscribe to get it in your inbox every weekend 📨 #infosecMASHUP #cybersecurity #infosec #threatintel

  19. 🚨 The recent cyberattack on Michigan-based medical tech manufacturer Stryker shows that threats now come not only from state actors but also from opportunistic hacktivist groups with geopolitical motives.

    In this blog, we explore what the attack reveals about how global conflict is reshaping OT and cyber-physical systems (CPS) security, with impacts that go far beyond IT—threatening operational continuity, supply chains, and safety in #industrial environments.

    Stay informed on these evolving risks and learn how to strengthen your organization’s resilience.

    📖 Read here:
    claroty.com/blog/stryker-cyber

    #CyberPhysicalSystems #OTSecurity #ManufacturingSecurity #CyberThreats #CriticalInfrastructureSecurity #Stryker #Handala

  20. 🚨 The recent cyberattack on Michigan-based medical tech manufacturer Stryker shows that threats now come not only from state actors but also from opportunistic hacktivist groups with geopolitical motives.

    In this blog, we explore what the attack reveals about how global conflict is reshaping OT and cyber-physical systems (CPS) security, with impacts that go far beyond IT—threatening operational continuity, supply chains, and safety in #industrial environments.

    Stay informed on these evolving risks and learn how to strengthen your organization’s resilience.

    📖 Read here:
    claroty.com/blog/stryker-cyber

    #CyberPhysicalSystems #OTSecurity #ManufacturingSecurity #CyberThreats #CriticalInfrastructureSecurity #Stryker #Handala

  21. Stryker is a medical technology company offering everything from surgical robots and implants to operating room lighting and recovery beds and used by over 150 million patients across more than 75 countries.

    #Handala has just wiped a lot of their systems including:

    * All #Stryker laptops and desktops
    * Over 200,000 systems, servers, and mobile devices worldwide
    * Employee smartphones and personal devices enrolled in the company’s mobile device management
    * Datacenter servers, rendering them inaccessible
    * Work profiles on personal phones, particularly those using Outlook or other Stryker apps, which led to complete data loss on those devices
    * Internal login and admin pages, which were defaced with the Handala logo

    Kevin Beaumont has been tracking Handala for years, and shares their statement on a years long thread about the group here:

    cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog

    This was a proof of concept attack. And it worked.

    (Edit to fix link)

  22. Stryker is a medical technology company offering everything from surgical robots and implants to operating room lighting and recovery beds and used by over 150 million patients across more than 75 countries.

    #Handala has just wiped a lot of their systems including:

    * All #Stryker laptops and desktops
    * Over 200,000 systems, servers, and mobile devices worldwide
    * Employee smartphones and personal devices enrolled in the company’s mobile device management
    * Datacenter servers, rendering them inaccessible
    * Work profiles on personal phones, particularly those using Outlook or other Stryker apps, which led to complete data loss on those devices
    * Internal login and admin pages, which were defaced with the Handala logo

    Kevin Beaumont has been tracking Handala for years, and shares their statement on a years long thread about the group here:

    cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog

    This was a proof of concept attack. And it worked.

    (Edit to fix link)

  23. Geschichte zum Freitag: US-Medizinanbieter #Stryker wurde von iranischen Angreifern gehackt. Mutmaßlich haben die über Microsoft #Intune alle verwalteten 200.000 Geräte gelöscht - alles digital ausgeknipst

    borncity.com/blog/2026/03/13/u

  24. Geschichte zum Freitag: US-Medizinanbieter #Stryker wurde von iranischen Angreifern gehackt. Mutmaßlich haben die über Microsoft #Intune alle verwalteten 200.000 Geräte gelöscht - alles digital ausgeknipst

    borncity.com/blog/2026/03/13/u

  25. Was at a local ISSA event last night and was fascinating conversation around #InTune and the whole #Stryker event. Lots of people being asked by the leadership if their InTune config is secure and how they can make it better. It was a good discussion

  26. Was at a local ISSA event last night and was fascinating conversation around #InTune and the whole #Stryker event. Lots of people being asked by the leadership if their InTune config is secure and how they can make it better. It was a good discussion

  27. “[…] the threat actors accessed #Stryker's #InTune interface through an access broker or other means and used the tool to issue deletion commands throughout the company's Windows network.”

    Who would have thought that if you design a single kill switch for all your corporate devices, malicious actors would try to hit that button?

    Apparently security is more complicated than subscribing to off the shelf software and turning it on. 🤯

    arstechnica.com/security/2026/

  28. If you're reading up on #Stryker and the wipe that was done on their systems, you can get a pretty good idea of your threat landscape by navigating to the Intune admin center > Tenant Administration > Roles >Roles by Permission > Category: "Remote Tasks" Permission "Wipe"

    This should show Help Desk Operator and School Administrator. You can click through to see who's in those roles.

    #CTI #InfoSec #Microsoft #Intune #Iran #Cybersecurity

  29. If you're reading up on #Stryker and the wipe that was done on their systems, you can get a pretty good idea of your threat landscape by navigating to the Intune admin center > Tenant Administration > Roles >Roles by Permission > Category: "Remote Tasks" Permission "Wipe"

    This should show Help Desk Operator and School Administrator. You can click through to see who's in those roles.

    #CTI #InfoSec #Microsoft #Intune #Iran #Cybersecurity

  30. اختراق إلكترونى ضخم يضرب شركة Stryker الأمريكية ويعطل أنظمتها

    misryoum.com/technology/khtraq

    
 تعرضت شركة Stryker الأمريكية، إحدى أكبر الشركات العالمية في مجال التكنولوجيا والمعدات الطبية، لهجوم إلكتروني كبير أدى إلى تعطيل بعض أنظمتها الداخلية وتأثر عملياتها حول العالم، ويُعتقد أن الهجوم مرتبط بجهات قرصنة مدعومة من إيران، في ظل التوترات...

    #اختراق #إلكترونى #ضخم #يضرب #شركة #Stryker #الأمريكية #ويعطل #أنظمتها #منصة_مصر_اليوم_الاخبارية #misryoum_com

  31. Iran-Backed #Hackers Claim #WiperAttack on #Medtech Firm #Stryker

    A #hacktivist group with links to Iran’s intelligence agencies is claiming responsibility for a data-wiping attack against Stryker, a global #medical technology company based in #Michigan. News reports out of #Ireland , Stryker’s largest hub outside of the United States, said the company sent home more than 5,000 workers there today.
    #iran #security #privacy

    krebsonsecurity.com/2026/03/ir

  32. Iran-Backed #Hackers Claim #WiperAttack on #Medtech Firm #Stryker

    A #hacktivist group with links to Iran’s intelligence agencies is claiming responsibility for a data-wiping attack against Stryker, a global #medical technology company based in #Michigan. News reports out of #Ireland , Stryker’s largest hub outside of the United States, said the company sent home more than 5,000 workers there today.
    #iran #security #privacy

    krebsonsecurity.com/2026/03/ir