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#proof-theory — Public Fediverse posts

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  1. My *next* talk in this spring/summer of research combines some longstanding interests of mine (Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox) and more recent interests (natural deduction and the sequent calculus). I bet you didn’t think that you could creatively apply Gentzen’s thoroughly standard rules of natural deduction to give you a sound and complete calculus for Priest’s LP, but it turns out that you can.

    consequently.org/presentation/

    #prooftheory #NaturalDeduction #paradox #philosophy

  2. It’s neat to see that an old (fiddly, complicated) decidability argument I wrote up in the 1990s is getting some attention. Here, Raj Goré and Anthony Peigné formalise (and generalise) my decidability argument for display formulations of some substructural logics. This is interesting work, worth looking into.

    link.springer.com/article/10.1

    #logic #prooftheory #rocqprover

  3. I’m looking forward to spending time today with @ohad, @modaltype and other folks at the LFCS at Edinburgh, and getting to talk about some weird substructural modal logic.

    consequently.org/presentation/

    #logic #prooftheory

  4. Oh, look! In a few weeks time I’m going to be over in Edinburgh, giving a talk the LFCS. informatics.ed.ac.uk/lfcs/lfcs

    If you’re in town on May 5 and like crazy proof theory, this could be fun. I’ll be talking about what happens when you take a hypersequent calculus for the modal logic S5, and *thoroughly* linearise it, removing all traces of contraction and weakening. The result is stranger than you might think. (Well, it was stranger than I first thought, anyway.) Along the journey we experience strange algebras, cut elimination and decidability arguments, and weird local/global perspective shifts. I learned a lot when thinking about this stuff, so hopefully the audience gets something out of it, too.

    #logic #prooftheory

  5. Propositions As Types Analogy • 1
    inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/01

    One of my favorite mathematical tricks — it almost seems too tricky to be true — is the Propositions As Types Analogy. And I see hints the 2‑part analogy can be extended to a 3‑part analogy, as follows.

    Proof Hint ∶ Proof ∶ Proposition

    Untyped Term ∶ Typed Term ∶ Type

    or

    Proof Hint ∶ Untyped Term

    Proof ∶ Typed Term

    Proposition ∶ Type

    See my working notes on the Propositions As Types Analogy —
    oeis.org/wiki/Propositions_As_

    #Mathematics #CategoryTheory #ProofTheory #TypeTheory
    #Logic #Analogy #Isomorphism #PropositionalCalculus
    #CombinatorCalculus #CombinatoryLogic #LambdaCalculus
    #Peirce #LogicalGraphs #GraphTheory #RelationTheory

  6. I was recently reading Turing's essay "Intelligent Machinery" (<archive.org/details/turing1948>, <doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198250>), and Turing says something very interesting:

    "Recently the theorem of Gödel and related results (Gödel, Church, Turing) have shown that if one tries to use machines for such purposes as determining the truth or falsity of mathematical theorems *and one is not willing to tolerate an occasional wrong result*, then any given machine will in some cases be unable to give an answer at all."

    the emphasis is mine. I didn't know about that clause, "and one is not willing to tolerate an occasional wrong result". Can any mathematician or logician here tell me where I can find more technical details about this and what it's meant by Turing? Thank you!

    #mathematics #logic #prooftheory

  7. Hi everyone — I’m Carlos Tomas Grahm, an independent mathematician with a background in continuum mechanics and mathematical logic.

    I started in modeling under an NSF-funded Texas A&M grant, developing what’s still the most accurate carotid-artery model in the literature.

    These days I’m exploring how the structure of definitions shapes proofs — from ordered vs. non-ordered reasoning to broader questions in complexity theory.

    I’m here to share occasional notes (and probably too many thoughts) on proof structure, modeling, and the weirdly human process of finding rigor.

    Looking forward to meeting others who love the math side of things — whether it’s theory, teaching, or applied modeling.

    #Mathematics #Logic #Modeling #Complexity #ProofTheory #Mathstodon

  8. Tomorrow, I get to give the last of my three talks on inferentialism. It’s time to buckle up your λs, and join in the search for some unicorns…

    consequently.org/presentation/

    #prooftheory #semantics #linguistics

  9. My very first package on CRAN! <cran.r-project.org/package=Pin>
    I hope it may be of use especially to teachers of the basics of probability and of symbolic logic and proof theory.

    Uncountable thanks to all R people here who kindly helped with all my problems along the way. 🙏

    #rstats #probability #logic #prooftheory

  10. Coming up this afternoon, I’m giving the talk “Inferentialism for Everyone” for the local Arché Metaphysics and Logic crew here in St Andrews.

    This talk attempts to distill material I’ve been thinking about for the last decade or so down to a concentrated but accessible form. I look forward to discovering how successful the distillation efforts are…

    consequently.org/presentation/

    #logic #prooftheory #inferentialism #semantics

  11. I've followed these odd reductions back to the original source, 'Ideas and Results in Proof Theory' by Prawitz (1971); see attached image. These rules are introduced alongside the more usual ones, but not really discussed later as far as I can tell, except implicitly in a section when he notes that not everyone would accept rules beyond beta reduction as capturing the notion of 'the same proof'. He asserts uniqueness of normalisation, which these rules clearly break. Despite this being a quite heavily cited paper (~1000 cites), no one seems to have explicitly noted there is anything odd here until a paper by Dyckhoff in 2014, as best as I can tell! #logic #proofTheory

  12. I am going to make an attempt to #blog a bit again, reading and writing about papers and books, old and new, that are cited by recent work in my area. This week, we look at a #proofTheory #logic textbook. blogs.fediscience.org/the-upda

  13. #proofTheory / simple #typeTheory question: I'm reading Troelstra & Schwichtenberg's 'Basic Proof Theory' and they discuss 'simplification contractions' on natural deductions, which cover cases where an auxiliary premise of an elimination rule does not use the local variable it is given.

    e.g.if we have an or-elimination 'case t:A ∨ B of x₁.t₁; x₂.t₂', but xᵢ is not free in tᵢ for either i = 1 or 2, then we may reduce to tᵢ.

    Is this a style of reduction that is ever seen in simple type theory or implemented in languages? What are the implications of including it? I'm not used to seeing anything (in the propositional fragment) except beta, eta, and commuting conversions.

  14. New: pmGenerator, since version 1.2.2, can
    - compress Hilbert-style proofs via exhaustive search on user-provided proof data
    - convert Fitch-style natural deduction proofs into any sufficiently explored Hilbert system

    #Logic #HilbertSystems #NaturalDeduction #FormalMethods #ProofTheory #Mathematics

    github.com/xamidi/pmGenerator/

  15. I’m in Amsterdam, about to give a talk about proof theory for modal predicate logic at the ILLC, the home base of the modal industrial complex. I have no idea how this is going to go over, but it should be a fun ride, however it turns out.

    consequently.org/presentation/

    #prooftheory #modalLogic

  16. This Thursday, I’ll be down in London giving a talk about defining rules for quantifiers and identity, at the PPLV group in Computer Science at UCL. If you happen to be in the area, and are interested in proof theory, semantics and hints of metaphysics, I’d love to see you there.

    consequently.org/presentation/

    #prooftheory #logic #semantics

  17. I'm glad to have space to get to writing, and the first writing project of my sabbatical has reached first-draft stage. If you're interested in modal logic, proof theory, and the metaphysics of contingent existence, have I got the paper for you!

    consequently.org/writing/mlce-

    I've got to say, I think the hypersequent calculus in this paper is pretty neat.

    #ProofTheory #ModalLogic #Metaphysics

  18. It’s a cloudy and cold Tuesday, and I’m inside writing about refinement.

    At least I *think* I understand what I’m doing a bit better than Mark S and his team of macrodata refiners do.

    (That’s an inappropriate #Severance, #prooftheory #ModalLogic and #ClickyKeyboard crossover post. I’m sorry about that.)

  19. (The proof with alternatives does have a bit of a round-about feel, with having to store the conclusion as an alternative twice to then retrieve both in one go. This gives you the effect of contraction in conclusion position, which is required because the natural deduction introduction rule for disjunction is additive, while the elimination rule is multiplicative. In this format, your only device for contraction in conclusion position is to hoist the conclusion into the assumption context (as an alternative, under the slash) and to then retrieve two or more copies of that assumption back as a conclusion.)

    #prooftheory #bureaucracy

  20. This morning, one of my hardworking intermediate logic students (prepping for her exam next week), came to me with a query about how to prove the constructively invalid quantifier negation inference (from ∀x(A(x)∨B(x)) to ∀xA(x)∨∃xB(x)) in natural deduction with Double Negation Elimination.

    It was natural that she would struggle with this exercise, since any proof of this (in that natural deduction framework at least), requires a quite bit of fancy footwork.

    After we worked through that, I wondered whether the proof is much simpler in classical natural deduction with alternatives (basically the λμ calculus). If you help yourself to the derivable (and simpler to work with) ∨E* variant rule, it turns out that the proof shrinks from 14 steps to 10, and it seems much more direct.

    #prooftheory #logic

  21. I think my paper on Dummett, proof assistants and pluralism has shaped up rather nicely, and it will be good to see it out in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in a few months’ time. You can read the preprint now.

    Thanks to everyone who gave me feedback on earlier drafts, and discussed these issues along the way.

    There's more to be done, but I hope to have clarified some issues around how we can think about the relationship between constructive and classical reasoning, and how philosophers might engage with what is going on in the application of dependent type theory in proof assistants, programming language design, and the formalisation and mechanisation of reasoning.

    consequently.org/writing/what-

    #logic #prooftheory #typetheory #philosophy

  22. Another week, another research presentation. Coming up on Saturday, I’ll be hanging out in Munich, talking about free logic and rules for quantifiers. consequently.org/presentation/

    #logic #prooftheory

  23. @loopspace @tao For me, the most natural approach would be in the context of formal logic. Start with the set of all proofs for a given statement (in a specified formal system, with some axioms given, for example) and then introduce some transformations that transform a proof into an equivalent one. Changing the order of the proof steps is a possible transformation, and the morst trivial one. Then these transformations define an equivalence relation, and voilà!, you have a concept for proof equivalence.

    The challenges here are of course (1) to find a definition that is meaningful in the real life of mathematicians, and (2) to prove interesting things with these concepts. One would try to define invariants, for example.

    I have done nothing concrete in this direction and do not know whether anyone else has, but maybe there is something.

    #Logic #Proofs #ProofTheory

  24. Next week it’s our last Arché Metaphysics and Logic seminar for the academic year, and I’m going to have a go at addressing some of the big questions in the foundations of logic, with a contemporary twist.

    consequently.org/presentation/

    #philosophy #logic #prooftheory #typetheory

  25. "A major function [of deductive #logic is in] assessing exactly what is involved in asserting some set of propositions. […] By omitting some premiss without which the deduction of some conclusion is not valid, it misrepresents the premiss from which this conclusion is obtained, and hence responsibility for the conclusion. To agree to accept partial responsibility as good enough here is like agreeing to say that somebody was responsible for the dinner when he peeled potatoes and the cook did the rest. The first statement cannot be accepted as an elliptical, but allowable, way of making the second statement. And similarly suppression [of some premiss] enables us to obtain as causally responsible a partially sufficient rather than a fully sufficient causal condition."

    Valerie Plumwood in Australasian Journal of Logic, 2023: ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/issue/v v @rrrichardzach

    #Plumwood #causality #correlations #economics #reason #ProofTheory #PhilSci #truth #science #ethics #ecofeminism #freedom

  26. The Nordic Logic Summer School is now in full swing here in Reykjavík. I’ve given my first proof theory class, and Rineke Verbrugge is introducing modal logic and social cognition.

    consequently.org/class/2024/nl

    #ProofTheory #ModalLogic