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#biometry — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #biometry, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Adam H. Sparks :rstats: @[email protected] ·

    "Bayesian Ordinal Regression for Crop Development and Disease Assessment" a slide deck by Dr Zhanglong Cao presented at Biometrics in the Bush Capital conference last November. A fresh look at analysing ordinal agronomic data. biometricsociety.org.au/confer #RStats #Statstodon #Bayesian #AgData #Biometry #Agriculture

    #rstats #statstodon #bayesian #agdata #biometry #agriculture
  2. Adam H. Sparks :rstats: @[email protected] ·

    "Bayesian Ordinal Regression for Crop Development and Disease Assessment" a slide deck by Dr Zhanglong Cao presented at Biometrics in the Bush Capital conference last November. A fresh look at analysing ordinal agronomic data. biometricsociety.org.au/confer #RStats #Statstodon #Bayesian #AgData #Biometry #Agriculture

    #rstats #statstodon #bayesian #agdata #biometry #agriculture
  3. Adam H. Sparks :rstats: @[email protected] ·

    "Bayesian Ordinal Regression for Crop Development and Disease Assessment" a slide deck by Dr Zhanglong Cao presented at Biometrics in the Bush Capital conference last November. A fresh look at analysing ordinal agronomic data. biometricsociety.org.au/confer #RStats #Statstodon #Bayesian #AgData #Biometry #Agriculture

    #rstats #statstodon #bayesian #agdata #biometry #agriculture
  4. Adam H. Sparks :rstats: @[email protected] ·

    "Bayesian Ordinal Regression for Crop Development and Disease Assessment" a slide deck by Dr Zhanglong Cao presented at Biometrics in the Bush Capital conference last November. A fresh look at analysing ordinal agronomic data. biometricsociety.org.au/confer #RStats #Statstodon #Bayesian #AgData #Biometry #Agriculture

    #agriculture #biometry #agdata #bayesian #statstodon #rstats
  5. Adam H. Sparks :rstats: @[email protected] ·

    "Bayesian Ordinal Regression for Crop Development and Disease Assessment" a slide deck by Dr Zhanglong Cao presented at Biometrics in the Bush Capital conference last November. A fresh look at analysing ordinal agronomic data. biometricsociety.org.au/confer #RStats #Statstodon #Bayesian #AgData #Biometry #Agriculture

    #agriculture #rstats #statstodon #bayesian #agdata #biometry
  6. _mu @[email protected] ·

    #DE

    CCC fordert Notbremse für den Überwachungskatalog im Koalitionsvertrag

    "CDU, CSU und SPD lassen alle Hemmungen fallen. Sie planen #Massenüberwachung auf gleich drei Ebenen: Telekommunikations-, Autokennzeichen- und #Biometriedaten. Die alten und neuen riesigen Datenhalden sollen mit „automatisierter Datenrecherche und -analyse“ durchkämmt werden dürfen. Staatliches #Hacken soll ebenfalls ausgeweitet werden.

    Der Koalitionsvertrag, den die schwarz-schwarz-rote Regierung abschließen will, strotzt so vor Überwachungsvorhaben, dass jeder Einzelne betroffen sein wird. Ob man im Netz kommuniziert, #Auto fährt oder Fotos mit Gesichtern ins Netz stellt: All das soll massenhaft aufgezeichnet und bei Bedarf ausgewertet werden."

    (...)

    ccc.de/de/updates/2025/ueberwa

    "Der #CCC ruft daher SPD-Mitglieder dazu auf, den Koalitionsvertrag abzulehnen. Die Abstimmung läuft vom 15. bis 29. April und ist, Stand jetzt, das einzige wirkliche Hindernis, das die Koalition noch verhindern könnte." (t.me/jugendinfo/6709)

    #uberwachen #surveillance #vorratsdatenpeichung #biometry #spd @SPDde @CCC

    #ccc #spd #de #massenuberwachung #biometriedaten #hacken
  7. _mu @[email protected] ·

    #DE

    CCC fordert Notbremse für den Überwachungskatalog im Koalitionsvertrag

    "CDU, CSU und SPD lassen alle Hemmungen fallen. Sie planen #Massenüberwachung auf gleich drei Ebenen: Telekommunikations-, Autokennzeichen- und #Biometriedaten. Die alten und neuen riesigen Datenhalden sollen mit „automatisierter Datenrecherche und -analyse“ durchkämmt werden dürfen. Staatliches #Hacken soll ebenfalls ausgeweitet werden.

    Der Koalitionsvertrag, den die schwarz-schwarz-rote Regierung abschließen will, strotzt so vor Überwachungsvorhaben, dass jeder Einzelne betroffen sein wird. Ob man im Netz kommuniziert, #Auto fährt oder Fotos mit Gesichtern ins Netz stellt: All das soll massenhaft aufgezeichnet und bei Bedarf ausgewertet werden."

    (...)

    ccc.de/de/updates/2025/ueberwa

    "Der #CCC ruft daher SPD-Mitglieder dazu auf, den Koalitionsvertrag abzulehnen. Die Abstimmung läuft vom 15. bis 29. April und ist, Stand jetzt, das einzige wirkliche Hindernis, das die Koalition noch verhindern könnte." (t.me/jugendinfo/6709)

    #uberwachen #surveillance #vorratsdatenpeichung #biometry #spd @SPDde @CCC

    #ccc #spd #massenuberwachung #biometriedaten #hacken #auto
  8. _mu @[email protected] ·

    #DE

    CCC fordert Notbremse für den Überwachungskatalog im Koalitionsvertrag

    "CDU, CSU und SPD lassen alle Hemmungen fallen. Sie planen #Massenüberwachung auf gleich drei Ebenen: Telekommunikations-, Autokennzeichen- und #Biometriedaten. Die alten und neuen riesigen Datenhalden sollen mit „automatisierter Datenrecherche und -analyse“ durchkämmt werden dürfen. Staatliches #Hacken soll ebenfalls ausgeweitet werden.

    Der Koalitionsvertrag, den die schwarz-schwarz-rote Regierung abschließen will, strotzt so vor Überwachungsvorhaben, dass jeder Einzelne betroffen sein wird. Ob man im Netz kommuniziert, #Auto fährt oder Fotos mit Gesichtern ins Netz stellt: All das soll massenhaft aufgezeichnet und bei Bedarf ausgewertet werden."

    (...)

    ccc.de/de/updates/2025/ueberwa

    "Der #CCC ruft daher SPD-Mitglieder dazu auf, den Koalitionsvertrag abzulehnen. Die Abstimmung läuft vom 15. bis 29. April und ist, Stand jetzt, das einzige wirkliche Hindernis, das die Koalition noch verhindern könnte." (t.me/jugendinfo/6709)

    #uberwachen #surveillance #vorratsdatenpeichung #biometry #spd @SPDde @CCC

    #spd #ccc #de #biometry #vorratsdatenpeichung #surveillance
  9. Oliver Brendel @[email protected] ·

    Traceability of Quercus petraea and Quercus robur logs: the Biomtrace database was created with the aim of developing algorithms for the biometric traceability of logs, involving artificial intelligence approaches that require large databases.
    annforsci.biomedcentral.com/ar
    #Forests #AI #Biometry #Wood #Woodtracing

    #forests #ai #biometry #wood #woodtracing
  10. Oliver Brendel @[email protected] ·

    Traceability of Quercus petraea and Quercus robur logs: the Biomtrace database was created with the aim of developing algorithms for the biometric traceability of logs, involving artificial intelligence approaches that require large databases.
    annforsci.biomedcentral.com/ar
    #Forests #AI #Biometry #Wood #Woodtracing

    #forests #ai #biometry #wood #woodtracing
  11. Oliver Brendel @[email protected] ·

    Traceability of Quercus petraea and Quercus robur logs: the Biomtrace database was created with the aim of developing algorithms for the biometric traceability of logs, involving artificial intelligence approaches that require large databases.
    annforsci.biomedcentral.com/ar
    #Forests #AI #Biometry #Wood #Woodtracing

    #forests #ai #biometry #wood #woodtracing
  12. Oliver Brendel @[email protected] ·

    Traceability of Quercus petraea and Quercus robur logs: the Biomtrace database was created with the aim of developing algorithms for the biometric traceability of logs, involving artificial intelligence approaches that require large databases.
    annforsci.biomedcentral.com/ar
    #Forests #AI #Biometry #Wood #Woodtracing

    #woodtracing #wood #biometry #ai #forests
  13. Oliver Brendel @[email protected] ·

    Traceability of Quercus petraea and Quercus robur logs: the Biomtrace database was created with the aim of developing algorithms for the biometric traceability of logs, involving artificial intelligence approaches that require large databases.
    annforsci.biomedcentral.com/ar
    #Forests #AI #Biometry #Wood #Woodtracing

    #forests #ai #biometry #wood #woodtracing
  14. TEDIC @[email protected] ·

    Did you know that a technology could keep you off the field? #NotWithMyFace

    The use of facial recognition technologies in football stadiums is already a reality in Paraguay. This raises many questions and concerns: What are the risks of this technology? Who controls our biometric data? For what purposes? If I haven’t done anything wrong, why are the

    tedic.org/en/notwithmyface/

    #Blog #DigitalCampaigns #PersonalData #biometry #FacialRecognition #fanID #privacidad #Privacy

    #notwithmyface #blog #digitalcampaigns #personaldata #biometry #facialrecognition
  15. TEDIC @[email protected] ·

    Did you know that a technology could keep you off the field? #NotWithMyFace

    The use of facial recognition technologies in football stadiums is already a reality in Paraguay. This raises many questions and concerns: What are the risks of this technology? Who controls our biometric data? For what purposes? If I haven’t done anything wrong, why are the

    tedic.org/en/notwithmyface/

    #Blog #DigitalCampaigns #PersonalData #biometry #FacialRecognition #fanID #privacidad #Privacy

    #notwithmyface #blog #digitalcampaigns #personaldata #biometry #facialrecognition
  16. TEDIC @[email protected] ·

    Did you know that a technology could keep you off the field? #NotWithMyFace

    The use of facial recognition technologies in football stadiums is already a reality in Paraguay. This raises many questions and concerns: What are the risks of this technology? Who controls our biometric data? For what purposes? If I haven’t done anything wrong, why are the

    tedic.org/en/notwithmyface/

    #Blog #DigitalCampaigns #PersonalData #biometry #FacialRecognition #fanID #privacidad #Privacy

    #privacy #privacidad #fanid #facialrecognition #biometry #personaldata
  17. TEDIC @[email protected] ·

    Did you know that a technology could keep you off the field? #NotWithMyFace

    The use of facial recognition technologies in football stadiums is already a reality in Paraguay. This raises many questions and concerns: What are the risks of this technology? Who controls our biometric data? For what purposes? If I haven’t done anything wrong, why are the

    tedic.org/en/notwithmyface/

    #Blog #DigitalCampaigns #PersonalData #biometry #FacialRecognition #fanID #privacidad #Privacy

    #notwithmyface #blog #digitalcampaigns #personaldata #biometry #facialrecognition
  18. Adam H. Sparks @[email protected] ·

    Great to see our biometricians being recognised for their contributions to our organisation’s work! #biometry #statistics

    #biometry #statistics
  19. Adam H. Sparks @[email protected] ·

    Great to see our biometricians being recognised for their contributions to our organisation’s work! #biometry #statistics

    #biometry #statistics
  20. Adam H. Sparks @adamhsparks ·

    Great to see our biometricians being recognised for their contributions to our organisation’s work!

    #biometry #statistics
  21. Adam H. Sparks @[email protected] ·

    Great to see our biometricians being recognised for their contributions to our organisation’s work! #biometry #statistics

    #statistics #biometry
  22. Erik Jonker @[email protected] ·

    Very interesting, palm identification, more reliable then iris identification, not trained on personal but synthetic data, if it works as advertised Amazon has made something great.
    youtu.be/r_zsS9daZZs?si=jAUduI
    #AI #identification #biometry #Amazon

    #ai #identification #biometry #amazon
  23. Erik Jonker @[email protected] ·

    Very interesting, palm identification, more reliable then iris identification, not trained on personal but synthetic data, if it works as advertised Amazon has made something great.
    youtu.be/r_zsS9daZZs?si=jAUduI
    #AI #identification #biometry #Amazon

    #ai #identification #biometry #amazon
  24. Erik Jonker @[email protected] ·

    Very interesting, palm identification, more reliable then iris identification, not trained on personal but synthetic data, if it works as advertised Amazon has made something great.
    youtu.be/r_zsS9daZZs?si=jAUduI
    #AI #identification #biometry #Amazon

    #ai #identification #biometry #amazon
  25. Erik Jonker @[email protected] ·

    Very interesting, palm identification, more reliable then iris identification, not trained on personal but synthetic data, if it works as advertised Amazon has made something great.
    youtu.be/r_zsS9daZZs?si=jAUduI
    #AI #identification #biometry #Amazon

    #amazon #biometry #identification #ai
  26. Erik Jonker @[email protected] ·

    Very interesting, palm identification, more reliable then iris identification, not trained on personal but synthetic data, if it works as advertised Amazon has made something great.
    youtu.be/r_zsS9daZZs?si=jAUduI
    #AI #identification #biometry #Amazon

    #ai #identification #biometry #amazon
  27. Markus Feilner (has moved) @[email protected] ·

    @escamoteur ... but that's not the worst failure of #biometry . The worst is: You have an unlimited amount of passphrases or keys. But each biometric feature only exists once. If stolen/compromised, it cannot be used again or re-created. It's gone. :-)

    #biometry
  28. Markus Feilner (has moved) @[email protected] ·

    @escamoteur ... but that's not the worst failure of #biometry . The worst is: You have an unlimited amount of passphrases or keys. But each biometric feature only exists once. If stolen/compromised, it cannot be used again or re-created. It's gone. :-)

    #biometry
  29. Markus Feilner (has moved) @[email protected] ·

    @escamoteur ... but that's not the worst failure of #biometry . The worst is: You have an unlimited amount of passphrases or keys. But each biometric feature only exists once. If stolen/compromised, it cannot be used again or re-created. It's gone. :-)

    #biometry
  30. Markus Feilner (has moved) @[email protected] ·

    I may repeat myself over and over again, but even after three (?) decades, #biometry still is wrong. It's not a security-enhancing feature, it's a feature for lazy people who are not interested in security. #toldyouso.
    (Danke, Fefe)
    theguardian.com/technology/202

    #biometry #toldyouso
  31. Markus Feilner (has moved) @[email protected] ·

    I may repeat myself over and over again, but even after three (?) decades, #biometry still is wrong. It's not a security-enhancing feature, it's a feature for lazy people who are not interested in security. #toldyouso.
    (Danke, Fefe)
    theguardian.com/technology/202

    #biometry #toldyouso
  32. Markus Feilner (has moved) @[email protected] ·

    I may repeat myself over and over again, but even after three (?) decades, #biometry still is wrong. It's not a security-enhancing feature, it's a feature for lazy people who are not interested in security. #toldyouso.
    (Danke, Fefe)
    theguardian.com/technology/202

    #biometry #toldyouso
  33. RC Trustworthy Data Science @[email protected] ·

    📢 #SaveTheDate for the invited talk of Anne-Laure Boulesteix, Professor for #Biometry in Molecular #Medicine @[email protected]

    📜Towards Reliable Empirical Evidence in Methodological Computational Research

    📅Mon 16 Jan, 16:15 CET
    📍Online Event (Zoom)
    ➡️t1p.de/trustworthy

    @[email protected] #research #methods #researchmethods #computational #statistics #data #datascience #ruhrgebiet #ruhrvalley #invitedtalk

    #savethedate #biometry #medicine #research #methods #researchmethods
  34. hakan “:verified:” @[email protected] ·

    Researchers with the Chaos Computer Club bought items on eBay that turned out to have stored iris scans of 2,632 people, mostly from people living in Iraq and Afghanistan. But also data from members of the U.S. Army:

    From the NYT:
    "detailed descriptions of individuals in addition to their photograph and biometric data, could be enough to target people who were previously unknown to have worked with U.S. military forces should the information fall into the wrong hands"

    NYT has a writeup here: nytimes.com/2022/12/27/technol (the utm ensures you can read the article without subscription)

    My former colleagues at BR have been working on this story for many months now. If you understand the German language, I encourage you to listen to their hourlong feature on #biometry ardaudiothek.de/episode/ard-ra It includes the case of the military database but much more as well

    #biometry
  35. hakan “:verified:” @[email protected] ·

    Researchers with the Chaos Computer Club bought items on eBay that turned out to have stored iris scans of 2,632 people, mostly from people living in Iraq and Afghanistan. But also data from members of the U.S. Army:

    From the NYT:
    "detailed descriptions of individuals in addition to their photograph and biometric data, could be enough to target people who were previously unknown to have worked with U.S. military forces should the information fall into the wrong hands"

    NYT has a writeup here: nytimes.com/2022/12/27/technol (the utm ensures you can read the article without subscription)

    My former colleagues at BR have been working on this story for many months now. If you understand the German language, I encourage you to listen to their hourlong feature on #biometry ardaudiothek.de/episode/ard-ra It includes the case of the military database but much more as well

    #biometry
  36. hakan “:verified:” @[email protected] ·

    Researchers with the Chaos Computer Club bought items on eBay that turned out to have stored iris scans of 2,632 people, mostly from people living in Iraq and Afghanistan. But also data from members of the U.S. Army:

    From the NYT:
    "detailed descriptions of individuals in addition to their photograph and biometric data, could be enough to target people who were previously unknown to have worked with U.S. military forces should the information fall into the wrong hands"

    NYT has a writeup here: nytimes.com/2022/12/27/technol (the utm ensures you can read the article without subscription)

    My former colleagues at BR have been working on this story for many months now. If you understand the German language, I encourage you to listen to their hourlong feature on #biometry ardaudiothek.de/episode/ard-ra It includes the case of the military database but much more as well

    #biometry
  37. hakan “:verified:” @[email protected] ·

    Researchers with the Chaos Computer Club bought items on eBay that turned out to have stored iris scans of 2,632 people, mostly from people living in Iraq and Afghanistan. But also data from members of the U.S. Army:

    From the NYT:
    "detailed descriptions of individuals in addition to their photograph and biometric data, could be enough to target people who were previously unknown to have worked with U.S. military forces should the information fall into the wrong hands"

    NYT has a writeup here: nytimes.com/2022/12/27/technol (the utm ensures you can read the article without subscription)

    My former colleagues at BR have been working on this story for many months now. If you understand the German language, I encourage you to listen to their hourlong feature on #biometry ardaudiothek.de/episode/ard-ra It includes the case of the military database but much more as well

    #biometry
  38. hakan “:verified:” @[email protected] ·

    Researchers with the Chaos Computer Club bought items on eBay that turned out to have stored iris scans of 2,632 people, mostly from people living in Iraq and Afghanistan. But also data from members of the U.S. Army:

    From the NYT:
    "detailed descriptions of individuals in addition to their photograph and biometric data, could be enough to target people who were previously unknown to have worked with U.S. military forces should the information fall into the wrong hands"

    NYT has a writeup here: nytimes.com/2022/12/27/technol (the utm ensures you can read the article without subscription)

    My former colleagues at BR have been working on this story for many months now. If you understand the German language, I encourage you to listen to their hourlong feature on #biometry ardaudiothek.de/episode/ard-ra It includes the case of the military database but much more as well

    #biometry
  39. Zack @[email protected] ·

    Amazon's official #keylogger:
    inputmag.com/tech/amazon-will-

    -) customer service employees, including #homeworkers
    -) #behavioral #biometry, #proprietary technologies
    -) because 4 #impostor cases were reported...

    #amazon
    #masssurveillance
    #WorkersUnited
    #spyware
    #malware
    #surveillance
    #monitoring
    #tracking
    #privacy

    #keylogger #homeworkers #behavioral #biometry #proprietary #impostor