#サイバーセキュリティ — Public Fediverse posts on home.social

YAYAFA @[email protected] · 2026-05-18 · 16:00 UTC

2位とトリプルスコア～ AnthropicバグバウンティプログラムでGMO Flatt SecurityのRyotaK氏が1位を記録 https://www.yayafa.com/2803268/ #AgenticAi #AI #Anthropic #ArtificialGeneralIntelligence #ArtificialIntelligence #エージェント型AI #サイバーセキュリティ #セミナー #レポート #事件 #人工知能 #国際 #汎用人工知能 #脅威と脆弱性

#agenticai #ai #anthropic #artificialgeneralintelligence #artificialintelligence #エージェント型ai

YAYAFA @[email protected] · 2026-05-18 · 16:00 UTC

2位とトリプルスコア～ AnthropicバグバウンティプログラムでGMO Flatt SecurityのRyotaK氏が1位を記録 https://www.yayafa.com/2803268/ #AgenticAi #AI #Anthropic #ArtificialGeneralIntelligence #ArtificialIntelligence #エージェント型AI #サイバーセキュリティ #セミナー #レポート #事件 #人工知能 #国際 #汎用人工知能 #脅威と脆弱性

#agenticai #ai #anthropic #artificialgeneralintelligence #artificialintelligence #エージェント型ai

YAYAFA @[email protected] · 2026-05-18 · 16:00 UTC

2位とトリプルスコア～ AnthropicバグバウンティプログラムでGMO Flatt SecurityのRyotaK氏が1位を記録 https://www.yayafa.com/2803268/ #AgenticAi #AI #Anthropic #ArtificialGeneralIntelligence #ArtificialIntelligence #エージェント型AI #サイバーセキュリティ #セミナー #レポート #事件 #人工知能 #国際 #汎用人工知能 #脅威と脆弱性

#脅威と脆弱性 #汎用人工知能 #国際 #人工知能 #事件 #レポート

YAYAFA @[email protected] · 2026-05-18 · 16:00 UTC

2位とトリプルスコア～ AnthropicバグバウンティプログラムでGMO Flatt SecurityのRyotaK氏が1位を記録 https://www.yayafa.com/2803268/ #AgenticAi #AI #Anthropic #ArtificialGeneralIntelligence #ArtificialIntelligence #エージェント型AI #サイバーセキュリティ #セミナー #レポート #事件 #人工知能 #国際 #汎用人工知能 #脅威と脆弱性

#agenticai #ai #anthropic #artificialgeneralintelligence #artificialintelligence #エージェント型ai

Infoblox Threat Intel @[email protected] · 2026-05-07 · 15:22 UTC

WhatsApp, Japan, and a 500% Traffic Spike! 💹 🚨

To be honest, we thought threat actors were tripping when we saw a new WhatsApp phishing campaign targeting Japanese citizens. Don't they know LINE is the app in Japan? Well, we were surprised because this campaign is actually working…

The campaign doesn't only impersonate WhatsApp through its phishing page, but also through the lookalike domains it uses. Around 2k "WhatsApp" domain name variations are involved. The actor also leverages RDGAs – mostly for subdomains. Domains like web-rka-whatsapp[.]com[.]cn have up to 32 RDGA subdomains!

Upon visiting one of these lookalike domains, the user is fingerprinted and only forwarded to the phishing page if they match the intended profile — otherwise they get redirected to sites like bing[.]com or microsoft[.]com. As we show at the image below (with an AI-translated version), the malicious landing page simulates the WhatsApp login screen and encourages victims to scan a malicious QR code with their phone to log in.

When we found the cluster, we genuinely didn't think this campaign would land in Japan — but we were wrong. In the last 6 months, traffic to these domains has increased more than 500%, and it continues to rise.

What impact would these top quality lookalikes have if the campaigns were directed at countries where WhatsApp is actually the preferred messaging app?

Domain sample:
whatsappweb[.]net
whatapapp[.]com
whatsptapp[.]com
leropaxi-whatsapp[.]com[.]cn

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #Phishing #Quishing #WhatsApp #LINE #Japan #脅威情報 #フィッシング詐欺 #QRコード詐欺 #DNSセキュリティ #Infoblox脅威情報 #WhatsApp #LINEセキュリティ #日本 #サイバーセキュリティ

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec

Infoblox Threat Intel @[email protected] · 2026-05-07 · 15:22 UTC

WhatsApp, Japan, and a 500% Traffic Spike! 💹 🚨

To be honest, we thought threat actors were tripping when we saw a new WhatsApp phishing campaign targeting Japanese citizens. Don't they know LINE is the app in Japan? Well, we were surprised because this campaign is actually working…

The campaign doesn't only impersonate WhatsApp through its phishing page, but also through the lookalike domains it uses. Around 2k "WhatsApp" domain name variations are involved. The actor also leverages RDGAs – mostly for subdomains. Domains like web-rka-whatsapp[.]com[.]cn have up to 32 RDGA subdomains!

Upon visiting one of these lookalike domains, the user is fingerprinted and only forwarded to the phishing page if they match the intended profile — otherwise they get redirected to sites like bing[.]com or microsoft[.]com. As we show at the image below (with an AI-translated version), the malicious landing page simulates the WhatsApp login screen and encourages victims to scan a malicious QR code with their phone to log in.

When we found the cluster, we genuinely didn't think this campaign would land in Japan — but we were wrong. In the last 6 months, traffic to these domains has increased more than 500%, and it continues to rise.

What impact would these top quality lookalikes have if the campaigns were directed at countries where WhatsApp is actually the preferred messaging app?

Domain sample:
whatsappweb[.]net
whatapapp[.]com
whatsptapp[.]com
leropaxi-whatsapp[.]com[.]cn

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #Phishing #Quishing #WhatsApp #LINE #Japan #脅威情報 #フィッシング詐欺 #QRコード詐欺 #DNSセキュリティ #Infoblox脅威情報 #WhatsApp #LINEセキュリティ #日本 #サイバーセキュリティ

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec

Infoblox Threat Intel @[email protected] · 2026-05-07 · 15:22 UTC

WhatsApp, Japan, and a 500% Traffic Spike! 💹 🚨

To be honest, we thought threat actors were tripping when we saw a new WhatsApp phishing campaign targeting Japanese citizens. Don't they know LINE is the app in Japan? Well, we were surprised because this campaign is actually working…

The campaign doesn't only impersonate WhatsApp through its phishing page, but also through the lookalike domains it uses. Around 2k "WhatsApp" domain name variations are involved. The actor also leverages RDGAs – mostly for subdomains. Domains like web-rka-whatsapp[.]com[.]cn have up to 32 RDGA subdomains!

Upon visiting one of these lookalike domains, the user is fingerprinted and only forwarded to the phishing page if they match the intended profile — otherwise they get redirected to sites like bing[.]com or microsoft[.]com. As we show at the image below (with an AI-translated version), the malicious landing page simulates the WhatsApp login screen and encourages victims to scan a malicious QR code with their phone to log in.

When we found the cluster, we genuinely didn't think this campaign would land in Japan — but we were wrong. In the last 6 months, traffic to these domains has increased more than 500%, and it continues to rise.

What impact would these top quality lookalikes have if the campaigns were directed at countries where WhatsApp is actually the preferred messaging app?

Domain sample:
whatsappweb[.]net
whatapapp[.]com
whatsptapp[.]com
leropaxi-whatsapp[.]com[.]cn

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #Phishing #Quishing #WhatsApp #LINE #Japan #脅威情報 #フィッシング詐欺 #QRコード詐欺 #DNSセキュリティ #Infoblox脅威情報 #WhatsApp #LINEセキュリティ #日本 #サイバーセキュリティ

#サイバーセキュリティ #日本 #lineセキュリティ #infoblox脅威情報 #dnsセキュリティ #qrコード詐欺

Infoblox Threat Intel @[email protected] · 2026-05-07 · 15:22 UTC

WhatsApp, Japan, and a 500% Traffic Spike! 💹 🚨

To be honest, we thought threat actors were tripping when we saw a new WhatsApp phishing campaign targeting Japanese citizens. Don't they know LINE is the app in Japan? Well, we were surprised because this campaign is actually working…

The campaign doesn't only impersonate WhatsApp through its phishing page, but also through the lookalike domains it uses. Around 2k "WhatsApp" domain name variations are involved. The actor also leverages RDGAs – mostly for subdomains. Domains like web-rka-whatsapp[.]com[.]cn have up to 32 RDGA subdomains!

Upon visiting one of these lookalike domains, the user is fingerprinted and only forwarded to the phishing page if they match the intended profile — otherwise they get redirected to sites like bing[.]com or microsoft[.]com. As we show at the image below (with an AI-translated version), the malicious landing page simulates the WhatsApp login screen and encourages victims to scan a malicious QR code with their phone to log in.

When we found the cluster, we genuinely didn't think this campaign would land in Japan — but we were wrong. In the last 6 months, traffic to these domains has increased more than 500%, and it continues to rise.

What impact would these top quality lookalikes have if the campaigns were directed at countries where WhatsApp is actually the preferred messaging app?

Domain sample:
whatsappweb[.]net
whatapapp[.]com
whatsptapp[.]com
leropaxi-whatsapp[.]com[.]cn

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #Phishing #Quishing #WhatsApp #LINE #Japan #脅威情報 #フィッシング詐欺 #QRコード詐欺 #DNSセキュリティ #Infoblox脅威情報 #WhatsApp #LINEセキュリティ #日本 #サイバーセキュリティ

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec

Infoblox Threat Intel @[email protected] · 2026-05-07 · 15:22 UTC

WhatsApp, Japan, and a 500% Traffic Spike! 💹 🚨

To be honest, we thought threat actors were tripping when we saw a new WhatsApp phishing campaign targeting Japanese citizens. Don't they know LINE is the app in Japan? Well, we were surprised because this campaign is actually working…

The campaign doesn't only impersonate WhatsApp through its phishing page, but also through the lookalike domains it uses. Around 2k "WhatsApp" domain name variations are involved. The actor also leverages RDGAs – mostly for subdomains. Domains like web-rka-whatsapp[.]com[.]cn have up to 32 RDGA subdomains!

Upon visiting one of these lookalike domains, the user is fingerprinted and only forwarded to the phishing page if they match the intended profile — otherwise they get redirected to sites like bing[.]com or microsoft[.]com. As we show at the image below (with an AI-translated version), the malicious landing page simulates the WhatsApp login screen and encourages victims to scan a malicious QR code with their phone to log in.

When we found the cluster, we genuinely didn't think this campaign would land in Japan — but we were wrong. In the last 6 months, traffic to these domains has increased more than 500%, and it continues to rise.

What impact would these top quality lookalikes have if the campaigns were directed at countries where WhatsApp is actually the preferred messaging app?

Domain sample:
whatsappweb[.]net
whatapapp[.]com
whatsptapp[.]com
leropaxi-whatsapp[.]com[.]cn

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #Phishing #Quishing #WhatsApp #LINE #Japan #脅威情報 #フィッシング詐欺 #QRコード詐欺 #DNSセキュリティ #Infoblox脅威情報 #WhatsApp #LINEセキュリティ #日本 #サイバーセキュリティ