#tim-oreilly — Public Fediverse posts

“Technology doesn’t force us… it merely opens the door”*…

The estimable Tim O’Reilly reminds us to think deeply about how AI could and should turn out. He suggests that Jeff Ding‘s diffusion theory of the role of technology in great-power competition also applies to AI adoption– and that it suggests that companies obsessed with the frontier might be optimizing for the wrong thing…

In the 1980s, Japan led the world in semiconductors, consumer electronics, and computer hardware, the industries everyone assumed would decide the next phase of economic power. Japan won them and still did not overtake the United States in the information revolution that followed. Jeff Ding, a political scientist at George Washington University, opens his book Technology and the Rise of Great Powers with the history of the first and second industrial revolutions and the third, the information revolution. The explanation he gives for who wins and who loses applies to companies as well as it does to nations, and very much to the current trajectory of AI.

Ding contrasts two theories of how technological revolutions reshape economic power. The conventional one he calls the leading sector model, or LS theory. It goes like this: New technologies create fast-growing new industries like steel and railroads and automobiles and semiconductors, and the country that dominates invention in those sectors captures the monopoly profits and the upstream and downstream economic linkages that come with them. As the story goes, if you win the leading sector, you win the era. Britain won in the first industrial revolution through its mastery of steam power, and then was surpassed by the US in the second through its leadership in electrification, the internal combustion engine, and mass manufacturing. The US kept its lead over Japan in the information systems revolution not by competing in the “leading sector” of electronic hardware but by diffusing “up the stack” via software that took the power of computing into every sector of the economy. (OK, that last bit is my explanation of what happened rather than Ding’s, but it’s consistent with his theory.)

Leading Sector theory is pretty clearly the working hypothesis of today’s AI industry and the national strategy that is forming around that industry. The company and the country with the biggest and best models wins. Everyone else is an also-ran.

Ding offers another explanation, which he calls diffusion theory. He points out that general-purpose technologies, foundational ones like the steam engine, electricity, and the computer, don’t just create massive profits and productivity gains in a single industry but instead spread across the whole economy. National economic leadership comes not from inventing the new sector but from diffusing the general-purpose technology more quickly and more broadly than your rivals. This happens over decades. The win goes to whoever most successfully embeds the technology into a wide range of ordinary productive work. This is how the US kept its lead over Japan rather than being surpassed by it.

This is obviously aligned with the thinking of Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor in “AI as Normal Technology,” which Ding cites in his book.

A big part of what enables diffusion is what Ding calls skill infrastructure, the education and training systems that widen the pool of people who can actually work with the technology. When the priority is widespread adoption rather than invention, he argues, the institutions that matter are the ones that build engineering skill at scale, standardize good practice, and tie research to industry. He writes:

GPT diffusion theory highlights the importance of GPT [General Purpose Technology] skill infrastructure. Education and training systems that widen the pool of engineering skills and knowledge linked to a GPT. When widespread adoption of GPTs is the priority, it is ordinary engineers, not heroic inventors, who matter.

Music to my ears, as it should be to yours: “It is ordinary engineers, not heroic inventors, who matter.”

That is not how the current AI narrative goes. Everyone is fixated on the labs, the frontier models, and the most famous researchers. And that fixation shapes enterprise strategy. Inside many companies AI strategy is a procurement decision: Which model and which vendor and which flagship tool should we choose? Or it’s a moonshot to stand up a lab and build an impressive demo and hire your own famous developer. Both approaches treat AI as a sector to be won. Ding’s argument is that the breakthrough sector itself is not where the long-term value for national power lives. And I believe that the same applies to corporate success. The value is in how widely and how well the technology gets embedded into the work of the people you already employ. The company that puts AI to work in finance and support and legal and sales and operations, across every unglamorous process, as well as in product and engineering, outperforms its competitors and drives its industry forward.

The reason diffusion takes a long time is that it is an organizational problem and not a technical one…

[Tim elaborates, and specifies the requirements for successful management of what is an “enterprise transformation problem”; he then unpacks the geopolitics of AI. He concludes…]

… Sovereign AI is not just a matter of national power. It is a predictable consequence of diffusion. A technology that diffuses widely will be adapted by different societies, firms, and institutions to suit their own needs, values, and constraints. Sovereign AI is AI designed for diffusion, not just raw increases in capability.

This is one reason the arms-race framing is unhelpful. It encourages us to treat AI as if it were a weapons system or a scarce strategic asset. But if AI is closer to electrification, computing, or the written word, the important thing is how the technology is embedded into the ordinary life of economies and institutions, and whether that embedding happens in ways that increase agency broadly rather than concentrating it in a few hyperpowerful companies.

There are a few additional lessons we can take from the history of electrification. While motors became decentralized, factories stopped generating their own power and bought it from a centralized grid. The unit-drive revolution decentralized application, not generation. This limitation, which we are now working to overcome to some extent with decentralized solar generation, is perhaps ironically showing up most strongly in the strain that AI data centers are placing on the grid. Let’s learn from that misstep. You can diffuse AI into every workflow via API calls to a big centralized model, or it can be diffused by a network of smaller models that turbocharge every part of the economy.

We should design for a future of multiple AIs, not a single universal system. Different countries will want systems shaped by different legal regimes, languages, histories, and cultural assumptions. So will companies. So will professions and communities of practice. The instinct of some frontier labs is to imagine that the right answer is to homogenize the technology, purge it of bias, and offer a single sanitized intelligence layer for the world. But AI is a social and cultural technology. The differences are not a defect to be smoothed away.

We do need to think about standards and interoperability. The historical analogy that comes to mind is railroad gauge. When real world systems are built to incompatible standards, the result is not healthy diversity but decades of friction, kludges, and retrofitting. The same may prove true for AI. If we force the future into a choice between one universal model and a patchwork of disconnected sovereign systems, we will get the worst of both worlds. We need a layer between uniformity and fragmentation, which can come from standardized protocols that allow different models, tools, and institutions to interoperate without requiring them to become identical.

This is also why open source matters, but only if it is properly understood. Open source is not just about licenses. My earliest introduction to the shared development of software that now goes by that name came from the research community that grew up around Bell Labs’ Unix operating system despite AT&T’s proprietary (albeit permissive) licensing. Because of that experience, I became convinced that it was the modular, protocol-centric architecture of Unix that was a key driver of collaborative, internet-enabled software development.

Open source AI depends on far more than open models. It depends on the architecture of participation built into the systems above and around them: the protocols, servers, interfaces, and shared technical conventions that let many different actors build on common foundations. The Open Source AI Gap Map shows just how rich that open source AI ecosystem is becoming. But open source can also coexist with proprietary, de facto standards like the OpenAI and Anthropic APIs. Like the electric grid we are now beginning to rebuild, the AI future will be a mix of centralized and decentralized systems. Cooperation and competition can coexist. Different actors can build different systems, for different purposes, under different forms of governance, while still participating in a shared technical and economic order.

This is how the future can belong not just to the inventors of AI but to the people who make it usable, adaptable, interoperable, and worth adopting.

Eminently worth reading in full. AI for all of us: “Ordinary Engineers, Not Heroic Inventors,” from @timoreilly.bsky.social

Apposite: “How to talk about “AI” without adding to the anthropomorphization“

* Allan Dafoe

###

As we amplify access, we might we might spare a thought for someone who launched more than one central technology into braod diffusion: the Serbian-American electrical engineer and inventor Nikola Tesla; he died on this date in 1943.  Tesla is probably best remembered for his rivalry with Thomas Edison:  Tesla invented and patented the first AC motor and generator (c.f.: Niagara Falls); Edison promoted DC power… and went to great lengths to discredit Tesla and his approach.  In the end, of course, Tesla was right.

Tesla patented over 300 inventions worldwide, though he kept many of his creations out of the patent system to protect their confidentiality.  His work ranged widely, from technology critical to the development of radio to the first remote control.  At the turn of the century, Tesla designed and began planning a “worldwide wireless communications system” that was backed by J.P. Morgan…  until Morgan lost confidence and pulled out.  “Cyberspace,” as described by the likes of William Gibson and Neal Stephenson, is largely prefigured in Tesla’s plan.  On Tesla’s 75th birthday in 1931, Time put him on its cover, captioned “All the world’s his power house.”  He received congratulatory letters from Albert Einstein and more than 70 other pioneers in science and engineering.  But Tesla’s talent ran far, far ahead of his luck.  He died penniless in Room 3327 of the New Yorker Hotel.

 source

“Technology doesn’t force us… it merely opens the door”*…

The estimable Tim O’Reilly reminds us to think deeply about how AI could and should turn out. He suggests that Jeff Ding‘s diffusion theory of the role of technology in great-power competition also applies to AI adoption– and that it suggests that companies obsessed with the frontier might be optimizing for the wrong thing…

In the 1980s, Japan led the world in semiconductors, consumer electronics, and computer hardware, the industries everyone assumed would decide the next phase of economic power. Japan won them and still did not overtake the United States in the information revolution that followed. Jeff Ding, a political scientist at George Washington University, opens his book Technology and the Rise of Great Powers with the history of the first and second industrial revolutions and the third, the information revolution. The explanation he gives for who wins and who loses applies to companies as well as it does to nations, and very much to the current trajectory of AI.

Ding contrasts two theories of how technological revolutions reshape economic power. The conventional one he calls the leading sector model, or LS theory. It goes like this: New technologies create fast-growing new industries like steel and railroads and automobiles and semiconductors, and the country that dominates invention in those sectors captures the monopoly profits and the upstream and downstream economic linkages that come with them. As the story goes, if you win the leading sector, you win the era. Britain won in the first industrial revolution through its mastery of steam power, and then was surpassed by the US in the second through its leadership in electrification, the internal combustion engine, and mass manufacturing. The US kept its lead over Japan in the information systems revolution not by competing in the “leading sector” of electronic hardware but by diffusing “up the stack” via software that took the power of computing into every sector of the economy. (OK, that last bit is my explanation of what happened rather than Ding’s, but it’s consistent with his theory.)

Leading Sector theory is pretty clearly the working hypothesis of today’s AI industry and the national strategy that is forming around that industry. The company and the country with the biggest and best models wins. Everyone else is an also-ran.

Ding offers another explanation, which he calls diffusion theory. He points out that general-purpose technologies, foundational ones like the steam engine, electricity, and the computer, don’t just create massive profits and productivity gains in a single industry but instead spread across the whole economy. National economic leadership comes not from inventing the new sector but from diffusing the general-purpose technology more quickly and more broadly than your rivals. This happens over decades. The win goes to whoever most successfully embeds the technology into a wide range of ordinary productive work. This is how the US kept its lead over Japan rather than being surpassed by it.

This is obviously aligned with the thinking of Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor in “AI as Normal Technology,” which Ding cites in his book.

A big part of what enables diffusion is what Ding calls skill infrastructure, the education and training systems that widen the pool of people who can actually work with the technology. When the priority is widespread adoption rather than invention, he argues, the institutions that matter are the ones that build engineering skill at scale, standardize good practice, and tie research to industry. He writes:

GPT diffusion theory highlights the importance of GPT [General Purpose Technology] skill infrastructure. Education and training systems that widen the pool of engineering skills and knowledge linked to a GPT. When widespread adoption of GPTs is the priority, it is ordinary engineers, not heroic inventors, who matter.

Music to my ears, as it should be to yours: “It is ordinary engineers, not heroic inventors, who matter.”

That is not how the current AI narrative goes. Everyone is fixated on the labs, the frontier models, and the most famous researchers. And that fixation shapes enterprise strategy. Inside many companies AI strategy is a procurement decision: Which model and which vendor and which flagship tool should we choose? Or it’s a moonshot to stand up a lab and build an impressive demo and hire your own famous developer. Both approaches treat AI as a sector to be won. Ding’s argument is that the breakthrough sector itself is not where the long-term value for national power lives. And I believe that the same applies to corporate success. The value is in how widely and how well the technology gets embedded into the work of the people you already employ. The company that puts AI to work in finance and support and legal and sales and operations, across every unglamorous process, as well as in product and engineering, outperforms its competitors and drives its industry forward.

The reason diffusion takes a long time is that it is an organizational problem and not a technical one…

[Tim elaborates, and specifies the requirements for successful management of what is an “enterprise transformation problem”; he then unpacks the geopolitics of AI. He concludes…]

… Sovereign AI is not just a matter of national power. It is a predictable consequence of diffusion. A technology that diffuses widely will be adapted by different societies, firms, and institutions to suit their own needs, values, and constraints. Sovereign AI is AI designed for diffusion, not just raw increases in capability.

This is one reason the arms-race framing is unhelpful. It encourages us to treat AI as if it were a weapons system or a scarce strategic asset. But if AI is closer to electrification, computing, or the written word, the important thing is how the technology is embedded into the ordinary life of economies and institutions, and whether that embedding happens in ways that increase agency broadly rather than concentrating it in a few hyperpowerful companies.

There are a few additional lessons we can take from the history of electrification. While motors became decentralized, factories stopped generating their own power and bought it from a centralized grid. The unit-drive revolution decentralized application, not generation. This limitation, which we are now working to overcome to some extent with decentralized solar generation, is perhaps ironically showing up most strongly in the strain that AI data centers are placing on the grid. Let’s learn from that misstep. You can diffuse AI into every workflow via API calls to a big centralized model, or it can be diffused by a network of smaller models that turbocharge every part of the economy.

We should design for a future of multiple AIs, not a single universal system. Different countries will want systems shaped by different legal regimes, languages, histories, and cultural assumptions. So will companies. So will professions and communities of practice. The instinct of some frontier labs is to imagine that the right answer is to homogenize the technology, purge it of bias, and offer a single sanitized intelligence layer for the world. But AI is a social and cultural technology. The differences are not a defect to be smoothed away.

We do need to think about standards and interoperability. The historical analogy that comes to mind is railroad gauge. When real world systems are built to incompatible standards, the result is not healthy diversity but decades of friction, kludges, and retrofitting. The same may prove true for AI. If we force the future into a choice between one universal model and a patchwork of disconnected sovereign systems, we will get the worst of both worlds. We need a layer between uniformity and fragmentation, which can come from standardized protocols that allow different models, tools, and institutions to interoperate without requiring them to become identical.

This is also why open source matters, but only if it is properly understood. Open source is not just about licenses. My earliest introduction to the shared development of software that now goes by that name came from the research community that grew up around Bell Labs’ Unix operating system despite AT&T’s proprietary (albeit permissive) licensing. Because of that experience, I became convinced that it was the modular, protocol-centric architecture of Unix that was a key driver of collaborative, internet-enabled software development.

Open source AI depends on far more than open models. It depends on the architecture of participation built into the systems above and around them: the protocols, servers, interfaces, and shared technical conventions that let many different actors build on common foundations. The Open Source AI Gap Map shows just how rich that open source AI ecosystem is becoming. But open source can also coexist with proprietary, de facto standards like the OpenAI and Anthropic APIs. Like the electric grid we are now beginning to rebuild, the AI future will be a mix of centralized and decentralized systems. Cooperation and competition can coexist. Different actors can build different systems, for different purposes, under different forms of governance, while still participating in a shared technical and economic order.

This is how the future can belong not just to the inventors of AI but to the people who make it usable, adaptable, interoperable, and worth adopting.

Eminently worth reading in full. AI for all of us: “Ordinary Engineers, Not Heroic Inventors,” from @timoreilly.bsky.social

Apposite: “How to talk about “AI” without adding to the anthropomorphization“

* Allan Dafoe

###

As we amplify access, we might we might spare a thought for someone who launched more than one central technology into braod diffusion: the Serbian-American electrical engineer and inventor Nikola Tesla; he died on this date in 1943.  Tesla is probably best remembered for his rivalry with Thomas Edison:  Tesla invented and patented the first AC motor and generator (c.f.: Niagara Falls); Edison promoted DC power… and went to great lengths to discredit Tesla and his approach.  In the end, of course, Tesla was right.

Tesla patented over 300 inventions worldwide, though he kept many of his creations out of the patent system to protect their confidentiality.  His work ranged widely, from technology critical to the development of radio to the first remote control.  At the turn of the century, Tesla designed and began planning a “worldwide wireless communications system” that was backed by J.P. Morgan…  until Morgan lost confidence and pulled out.  “Cyberspace,” as described by the likes of William Gibson and Neal Stephenson, is largely prefigured in Tesla’s plan.  On Tesla’s 75th birthday in 1931, Time put him on its cover, captioned “All the world’s his power house.”  He received congratulatory letters from Albert Einstein and more than 70 other pioneers in science and engineering.  But Tesla’s talent ran far, far ahead of his luck.  He died penniless in Room 3327 of the New Yorker Hotel.

 source

The title of this video is clickbait, but Tim O'Reilly presents some ideas in a measured and thoughtful manner. Which is nice to see.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrQu3MRSQgc

#Capitalism #Enshittification #Economics #TimOReilly #PeopleTalkingLikeGrownups

The title of this video is clickbait, but Tim O'Reilly presents some ideas in a measured and thoughtful manner. Which is nice to see.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrQu3MRSQgc

#Capitalism #Enshittification #Economics #TimOReilly #PeopleTalkingLikeGrownups

“The present is pregnant with the future”*…

The estimable Tim O’Reilly uses scenario planning to create an insightful look at AI, our futures, and the choices that will define them…

We all read it in the daily news. The New York Times reports that economists who once dismissed the AI job threat are now taking it seriously. In February, Jack Dorsey cut 40% of Block’s workforce, telling shareholders that “intelligence tools have changed what it means to build and run a company.” Block’s stock rose 20%. Salesforce has shed thousands of customer support workers, saying AI was already doing half the work. And a Stanford study found that software developers aged 22 to 25 saw employment drop nearly 20% from its peak, while developers over 26 were doing fine.

But how are we to square this news with a Vanguard study that found that the 100 occupations most exposed to AI were actually outperforming the rest of the labor market in both job growth and wages, and a rigorous NBER study of 25,000 Danish workers that found zero measurable effect of AI on earnings or hours?

Other studies could contribute to either side of the argument. For example, PwC’s 2025 Global AI Jobs Barometer, analyzing close to a billion job ads across six continents, found that workers with AI skills earn a 56% wage premium, and that productivity growth has nearly quadrupled in the industries most exposed to AI.

This is exactly the kind of contradictory, uncertain landscape that scenario planning was designed for. Scenario planning doesn’t ask you to predict what the future will be. It asks you to imagine divergent possible futures and to develop a strategy that improves your odds of success across all of them. I’ve used it many times at O’Reilly and have written about it before with COVID and climate change as illustrative examples. The argument between those who say AI will cause mass unemployment and those who insist technology always creates more jobs than it destroys is a debate that will only be resolved by time. Both sides have evidence. Both are probably right at some level. And both framings are not terribly helpful for anyone trying to figure out what to do next…

[O’Reilly explains the scenario approach, then applies it to our future with AI (see the image above), astutely assessing the conflicting signals that we’ve experiencing; he explores the “robust strategy” for our uncertian future (strategic choices that make sense regardless of which future unfolds); then he concludes…

… I’ll return to the theme that I sounded in my book WTF? What’s the Future and Why It’s Up To Us.

Every time a company uses AI to do what it was already doing with fewer people, it is making a choice for the lower half of the scenario grid. Every time a company uses AI to do something that wasn’t previously possible, to serve a customer who wasn’t previously served, to solve a problem that wasn’t previously solvable, it is making a choice for the upper half. These choices compound, for good or ill. An economy that uses AI primarily for efficiency will slowly hollow itself out.

Looking at the news from the future, both sets of signals are present. The question is which will dominate. AI will give us both the Augmentation Economy and the Displacement Crisis, in different measures in different places, depending on the choices we make.

Scenario planning teaches us that we don’t have to predict which future we’ll get. We do have to prepare for a very uncertain future. But the robust strategy, the one that works across every quadrant, is to focus on doing more, not just doing the same with less, and to find ways that human taste still matters in what is created. As long as there is unmet demand, as long as there are problems we haven’t solved and people we haven’t served, AI will augment human work rather than replacing it. It’s only when we stop looking for new things to do that the machines come for the jobs…

Eminently worth reading in full. Indeed, speaking as a long-time scenario planner, your correspondent can only wish that everyone who wields “scenarios” applies the approach as appropriately, adriotly, and acutely as Tim has: “Scenario Planning for AI and the ‘Jobless Future‘,” from @timoreilly.bsky.social.

* Voltaire

###

As we take the long view, we might send formative birthday greetings to Mark Pinsker; he was born on this date in 1923. A mathematician, he made impoprtant contributions to the fields of information theory, probability theory, coding theory, ergodic theory, mathematical statistics, and communication networks. This work, which helped lay the foundation for AI-as-we-know-it, earned him the IEEE Claude E. Shannon Award in 1978, and the IEEE Richard W. Hamming Medal in 1996, among other honors.

source

“The present is pregnant with the future”*…

The estimable Tim O’Reilly uses scenario planning to create an insightful look at AI, our futures, and the choices that will define them…

We all read it in the daily news. The New York Times reports that economists who once dismissed the AI job threat are now taking it seriously. In February, Jack Dorsey cut 40% of Block’s workforce, telling shareholders that “intelligence tools have changed what it means to build and run a company.” Block’s stock rose 20%. Salesforce has shed thousands of customer support workers, saying AI was already doing half the work. And a Stanford study found that software developers aged 22 to 25 saw employment drop nearly 20% from its peak, while developers over 26 were doing fine.

But how are we to square this news with a Vanguard study that found that the 100 occupations most exposed to AI were actually outperforming the rest of the labor market in both job growth and wages, and a rigorous NBER study of 25,000 Danish workers that found zero measurable effect of AI on earnings or hours?

Other studies could contribute to either side of the argument. For example, PwC’s 2025 Global AI Jobs Barometer, analyzing close to a billion job ads across six continents, found that workers with AI skills earn a 56% wage premium, and that productivity growth has nearly quadrupled in the industries most exposed to AI.

This is exactly the kind of contradictory, uncertain landscape that scenario planning was designed for. Scenario planning doesn’t ask you to predict what the future will be. It asks you to imagine divergent possible futures and to develop a strategy that improves your odds of success across all of them. I’ve used it many times at O’Reilly and have written about it before with COVID and climate change as illustrative examples. The argument between those who say AI will cause mass unemployment and those who insist technology always creates more jobs than it destroys is a debate that will only be resolved by time. Both sides have evidence. Both are probably right at some level. And both framings are not terribly helpful for anyone trying to figure out what to do next…

[O’Reilly explains the scenario approach, then applies it to our future with AI (see the image above), astutely assessing the conflicting signals that we’ve experiencing; he explores the “robust strategy” for our uncertian future (strategic choices that make sense regardless of which future unfolds); then he concludes…

… I’ll return to the theme that I sounded in my book WTF? What’s the Future and Why It’s Up To Us.

Every time a company uses AI to do what it was already doing with fewer people, it is making a choice for the lower half of the scenario grid. Every time a company uses AI to do something that wasn’t previously possible, to serve a customer who wasn’t previously served, to solve a problem that wasn’t previously solvable, it is making a choice for the upper half. These choices compound, for good or ill. An economy that uses AI primarily for efficiency will slowly hollow itself out.

Looking at the news from the future, both sets of signals are present. The question is which will dominate. AI will give us both the Augmentation Economy and the Displacement Crisis, in different measures in different places, depending on the choices we make.

Scenario planning teaches us that we don’t have to predict which future we’ll get. We do have to prepare for a very uncertain future. But the robust strategy, the one that works across every quadrant, is to focus on doing more, not just doing the same with less, and to find ways that human taste still matters in what is created. As long as there is unmet demand, as long as there are problems we haven’t solved and people we haven’t served, AI will augment human work rather than replacing it. It’s only when we stop looking for new things to do that the machines come for the jobs…

Eminently worth reading in full. Indeed, speaking as a long-time scenario planner, your correspondent can only wish that everyone who wields “scenarios” applies the approach as appropriately, adriotly, and acutely as Tim has: “Scenario Planning for AI and the ‘Jobless Future‘,” from @timoreilly.bsky.social.

* Voltaire

###

As we take the long view, we might send formative birthday greetings to Mark Pinsker; he was born on this date in 1923. A mathematician, he made impoprtant contributions to the fields of information theory, probability theory, coding theory, ergodic theory, mathematical statistics, and communication networks. This work, which helped lay the foundation for AI-as-we-know-it, earned him the IEEE Claude E. Shannon Award in 1978, and the IEEE Richard W. Hamming Medal in 1996, among other honors.

source

“The best way to predict the future is to invent it”*…

Dario Amodei, the CEO of AI purveyor Anthropic, has recently published a long (nearly 20,000 word) essay on the risks of artificial intelligence that he fears: Will AI become autonomous (and if so, to what ends)? Will AI be used for destructive pursposes (e.g., war or terrorism)? Will AI allow one or a small number of “actors” (corporations or states) to seize power? Will AI cause economic disruption (mass unemployment, radically-concentrated wealth, disruption in capital flows)? Will AI indirect effects (on our societies and individual lives) be destabilizing? (Perhaps tellingly, he doesn’t explore the prospect of an economic crash on the back of an AI bubble, should one burst– but that might be considered an “indirect effect,” as AI development would likely continue, but in fewer hands [consolidation] and on the heels of destabilizing financial turbulence.)

The essay is worth reading. At the same time, as Matt Levine suggests, we might wonder why pieces like this come not from AI nay-sayers, but from those rushing to build it…

… in fact there seems to be a surprisingly strong positive correlation between noisily worrying about AI and being good at building AI. Probably the three most famous AI worriers in the world are Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, and Elon Musk, who are also the chief executive officers of three of the biggest AI labs; they take time out from their busy schedules of warning about the risks of AI to raise money to build AI faster. And they seem to hire a lot of their best researchers from, you know, worrying-about-AI forums on the internet. You could have different models here too. “Worrying about AI demonstrates the curiosity and epistemic humility and care that make a good AI researcher,” maybe. Or “performatively worrying about AI is actually a perverse form of optimism about the power and imminence of AI, and we want those sorts of optimists.” I don’t know. It’s just a strange little empirical fact about modern workplace culture that I find delightful, though I suppose I’ll regret saying this when the robots enslave us.

Anyway if you run an AI lab and are trying to recruit the best researchers, you might promise them obvious perks like “the smartest colleagues” and “the most access to chips” and “$50 million,” but if you are creative you might promise the less obvious perks like “the most opportunities to raise red flags.” They love that…

– source

In any case, precaution and prudence in the pursuit of AI advances seems wise. But perhaps even more, Tim O’Reilly and Mike Loukides suggest, we’d profit from some disciplined foresight:

The market is betting that AI is an unprecedented technology breakthrough, valuing Sam Altman and Jensen Huang like demigods already astride the world. The slow progress of enterprise AI adoption from pilot to production, however, still suggests at least the possibility of a less earthshaking future. Which is right?

At O’Reilly, we don’t believe in predicting the future. But we do believe you can see signs of the future in the present. Every day, news items land, and if you read them with a kind of soft focus, they slowly add up. Trends are vectors with both a magnitude and a direction, and by watching a series of data points light up those vectors, you can see possible futures taking shape…

For AI in 2026 and beyond, we see two fundamentally different scenarios that have been competing for attention. Nearly every debate about AI, whether about jobs, about investment, about regulation, or about the shape of the economy to come, is really an argument about which of these scenarios is correct…

[Tim and Mike explore an “AGI is an economic singularity” scenario (see also here, here, and Amodei’s essay, linked above), then an “AI is a normal technology” future (see also here); they enumerate signs and indicators to track; then consider 10 “what if” questions in order to explore the implications of the scenarios, honing in one “robust” implications for each– answers that are smart whichever way the future breaks. They conclude…]

The future isn’t something that happens to us; it’s something we create. The most robust strategy of all is to stop asking “What will happen?” and start asking “What future do we want to build?”

As Alan Kay once said, “The best way to predict the future is to invent it.” Don’t wait for the AI future to happen to you. Do what you can to shape it. Build the future you want to live in…

Read in full– the essay is filled with deep insight. Taking the long view: “What If? AI in 2026 and Beyond,” from @timoreilly.bsky.social and @mikeloukides.hachyderm.io.ap.brid.gy.

[Image above: source]

* Alan Kay

###

As we pave our own paths, we might send world-changing birthday greetings to a man who personified Alan’s injunction, Doug Engelbart; he was born on this date in 1925.  An engineer and inventor who was a computing and internet pioneer, Doug is best remembered for his seminal work on human-computer interface issues, and for “the Mother of All Demos” in 1968, at which he demonstrated for the first time the computer mouse, hypertext, networked computers, and the earliest versions of graphical user interfaces… that’s to say, computing as we know it, and all that computing enables.

https://youtu.be/B6rKUf9DWRI?si=nL09hD5GQD670AQO

“The best way to predict the future is to invent it”*…

Dario Amodei, the CEO of AI purveyor Anthropic, has recently published a long (nearly 20,000 word) essay on the risks of artificial intelligence that he fears: Will AI become autonomous (and if so, to what ends)? Will AI be used for destructive pursposes (e.g., war or terrorism)? Will AI allow one or a small number of “actors” (corporations or states) to seize power? Will AI cause economic disruption (mass unemployment, radically-concentrated wealth, disruption in capital flows)? Will AI indirect effects (on our societies and individual lives) be destabilizing? (Perhaps tellingly, he doesn’t explore the prospect of an economic crash on the back of an AI bubble, should one burst– but that might be considered an “indirect effect,” as AI development would likely continue, but in fewer hands [consolidation] and on the heels of destabilizing financial turbulence.)

The essay is worth reading. At the same time, as Matt Levine suggests, we might wonder why pieces like this come not from AI nay-sayers, but from those rushing to build it…

… in fact there seems to be a surprisingly strong positive correlation between noisily worrying about AI and being good at building AI. Probably the three most famous AI worriers in the world are Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, and Elon Musk, who are also the chief executive officers of three of the biggest AI labs; they take time out from their busy schedules of warning about the risks of AI to raise money to build AI faster. And they seem to hire a lot of their best researchers from, you know, worrying-about-AI forums on the internet. You could have different models here too. “Worrying about AI demonstrates the curiosity and epistemic humility and care that make a good AI researcher,” maybe. Or “performatively worrying about AI is actually a perverse form of optimism about the power and imminence of AI, and we want those sorts of optimists.” I don’t know. It’s just a strange little empirical fact about modern workplace culture that I find delightful, though I suppose I’ll regret saying this when the robots enslave us.

Anyway if you run an AI lab and are trying to recruit the best researchers, you might promise them obvious perks like “the smartest colleagues” and “the most access to chips” and “$50 million,” but if you are creative you might promise the less obvious perks like “the most opportunities to raise red flags.” They love that…

– source

In any case, precaution and prudence in the pursuit of AI advances seems wise. But perhaps even more, Tim O’Reilly and Mike Loukides suggest, we’d profit from some disciplined foresight:

The market is betting that AI is an unprecedented technology breakthrough, valuing Sam Altman and Jensen Huang like demigods already astride the world. The slow progress of enterprise AI adoption from pilot to production, however, still suggests at least the possibility of a less earthshaking future. Which is right?

At O’Reilly, we don’t believe in predicting the future. But we do believe you can see signs of the future in the present. Every day, news items land, and if you read them with a kind of soft focus, they slowly add up. Trends are vectors with both a magnitude and a direction, and by watching a series of data points light up those vectors, you can see possible futures taking shape…

For AI in 2026 and beyond, we see two fundamentally different scenarios that have been competing for attention. Nearly every debate about AI, whether about jobs, about investment, about regulation, or about the shape of the economy to come, is really an argument about which of these scenarios is correct…

[Tim and Mike explore an “AGI is an economic singularity” scenario (see also here, here, and Amodei’s essay, linked above), then an “AI is a normal technology” future (see also here); they enumerate signs and indicators to track; then consider 10 “what if” questions in order to explore the implications of the scenarios, honing in one “robust” implications for each– answers that are smart whichever way the future breaks. They conclude…]

The future isn’t something that happens to us; it’s something we create. The most robust strategy of all is to stop asking “What will happen?” and start asking “What future do we want to build?”

As Alan Kay once said, “The best way to predict the future is to invent it.” Don’t wait for the AI future to happen to you. Do what you can to shape it. Build the future you want to live in…

Read in full– the essay is filled with deep insight. Taking the long view: “What If? AI in 2026 and Beyond,” from @timoreilly.bsky.social and @mikeloukides.hachyderm.io.ap.brid.gy.

[Image above: source]

* Alan Kay

###

As we pave our own paths, we might send world-changing birthday greetings to a man who personified Alan’s injunction, Doug Engelbart; he was born on this date in 1925.  An engineer and inventor who was a computing and internet pioneer, Doug is best remembered for his seminal work on human-computer interface issues, and for “the Mother of All Demos” in 1968, at which he demonstrated for the first time the computer mouse, hypertext, networked computers, and the earliest versions of graphical user interfaces… that’s to say, computing as we know it, and all that computing enables.

https://youtu.be/B6rKUf9DWRI?si=nL09hD5GQD670AQO

The End of Programming as We Know It https://buff.ly/4gu7GVi

"It is not the end of programming. It is the end of programming as we know it today." -- #TimOReilly

#genAI #programming

The End of Programming as We Know It https://buff.ly/4gu7GVi

"It is not the end of programming. It is the end of programming as we know it today." -- #TimOReilly

#genAI #programming

Remember “Open APIs?” How Tim O’Reilly told us they were how we would build the “open web” in “Web 2.0?”

Turns out an Open API is open in the sense that a gate owned by someone else is open. In that it can just as easily be closed and locked at their whim.

#open #APIs #openAPIs #web2 #openWeb #SiliconValley #openWashing #timOReilly #freedom

Remember “Open APIs?” How Tim O’Reilly told us they were how we would build the “open web” in “Web 2.0?”

Turns out an Open API is open in the sense that a gate owned by someone else is open. In that it can just as easily be closed and locked at their whim.

#open #APIs #openAPIs #web2 #openWeb #SiliconValley #openWashing #timOReilly #freedom

#TIL about Inner Source, which is basically Open Source minus the Software Freedoms. Coined by (surprise, surprise) that great friend of Free Software, Tim O'Reilly, Inner Source is the parasitic use of Open Source development practices by proprietary software companies, with no respect for the software freedoms of the people using the resulting software. *shudder*

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inner_source

#SoftwareFreedom #InnerSource #TimOReilly #ProprietarySoftware

#TIL about Inner Source, which is basically Open Source minus the Software Freedoms. Coined by (surprise, surprise) that great friend of Free Software, Tim O'Reilly, Inner Source is the parasitic use of Open Source development practices by proprietary software companies, with no respect for the software freedoms of the people using the resulting software. *shudder*

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inner_source

#SoftwareFreedom #InnerSource #TimOReilly #ProprietarySoftware

Alert watchfulness

We equate being smart and being driven as the ways to get ahead. But sometimes, an attitude of alert watchfulness is far wiser and more effective. Learning to follow your nose, pulling on threads of curiosity or interest, may take you places that being driven will never lead you to.

~ Tim O’Reilly

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Not previously possible

The idea that we should focus on disruption rather than the new value that we can create is at the heart of the current economic malaise, income inequality, and political upheaval. The secret to building a better future is to use technology to do things that were previously impossible. The point of technology isn’t to make money. It’s to solve problems!

~ Tim O’Reilly

slip:4a673.

Forethought

Forethought is a virtue; remember that one day, that distant future will be now, and the choices you make today will have shaped the choices you are able to make then.

~ Tim O’Reilly

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