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#supply-chain-attack — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #supply-chain-attack, aggregated by home.social.

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  1. Jscrambler’s npm Package Got Backdoored. The Malware Ran Before Your App Ever Started.

    Jscrambler npm 8.14.0 shipped a Rust infostealer via preinstall hook, targeting cloud keys, wallets, and AI tool configs. Full technical breakdown and IOCs

    thecybersecguru.com/news/jscra

  2. Jscrambler’s npm Package Got Backdoored. The Malware Ran Before Your App Ever Started.

    Jscrambler npm 8.14.0 shipped a Rust infostealer via preinstall hook, targeting cloud keys, wallets, and AI tool configs. Full technical breakdown and IOCs

    thecybersecguru.com/news/jscra

  3. Jscrambler’s npm Package Got Backdoored. The Malware Ran Before Your App Ever Started.

    Jscrambler npm 8.14.0 shipped a Rust infostealer via preinstall hook, targeting cloud keys, wallets, and AI tool configs. Full technical breakdown and IOCs

    thecybersecguru.com/news/jscra

  4. Jscrambler’s npm Package Got Backdoored. The Malware Ran Before Your App Ever Started.

    Jscrambler npm 8.14.0 shipped a Rust infostealer via preinstall hook, targeting cloud keys, wallets, and AI tool configs. Full technical breakdown and IOCs

    thecybersecguru.com/news/jscra

  5. Jscrambler’s npm Package Got Backdoored. The Malware Ran Before Your App Ever Started.

    Jscrambler npm 8.14.0 shipped a Rust infostealer via preinstall hook, targeting cloud keys, wallets, and AI tool configs. Full technical breakdown and IOCs

    thecybersecguru.com/news/jscra

  6. Basta un npm install: la 8.14.0 di jscrambler distribuiva un infostealer Rust nelle pipeline di sviluppo

    La versione 8.14.0 del popolare pacchetto npm jscrambler è stata compromessa con un preinstall hook che eseguiva silenziosamente un infostealer Rust multipiattaforma, mirato a credenziali cloud, wallet crypto e chiavi API di strumenti AI come Claude Desktop e Cursor.

    insicurezzadigitale.com/basta-

  7. Basta un npm install: la 8.14.0 di jscrambler distribuiva un infostealer Rust nelle pipeline di sviluppo

    La versione 8.14.0 del popolare pacchetto npm jscrambler è stata compromessa con un preinstall hook che eseguiva silenziosamente un infostealer Rust multipiattaforma, mirato a credenziali cloud, wallet crypto e chiavi API di strumenti AI come Claude Desktop e Cursor.

    insicurezzadigitale.com/basta-

  8. Basta un npm install: la 8.14.0 di jscrambler distribuiva un infostealer Rust nelle pipeline di sviluppo

    La versione 8.14.0 del popolare pacchetto npm jscrambler è stata compromessa con un preinstall hook che eseguiva silenziosamente un infostealer Rust multipiattaforma, mirato a credenziali cloud, wallet crypto e chiavi API di strumenti AI come Claude Desktop e Cursor.

    insicurezzadigitale.com/basta-

  9. Basta un npm install: la 8.14.0 di jscrambler distribuiva un infostealer Rust nelle pipeline di sviluppo

    La versione 8.14.0 del popolare pacchetto npm jscrambler è stata compromessa con un preinstall hook che eseguiva silenziosamente un infostealer Rust multipiattaforma, mirato a credenziali cloud, wallet crypto e chiavi API di strumenti AI come Claude Desktop e Cursor.

    insicurezzadigitale.com/basta-

  10. Basta un npm install: la 8.14.0 di jscrambler distribuiva un infostealer Rust nelle pipeline di sviluppo

    La versione 8.14.0 del popolare pacchetto npm jscrambler è stata compromessa con un preinstall hook che eseguiva silenziosamente un infostealer Rust multipiattaforma, mirato a credenziali cloud, wallet crypto e chiavi API di strumenti AI come Claude Desktop e Cursor.

    insicurezzadigitale.com/basta-

  11. 📰 North Korean Hackers Escalate 'PolinRider' Supply Chain Attack on Devs

    🇰🇵 North Korean hackers are escalating the 'PolinRider' supply chain attack, publishing 108 malicious npm, PHP, and Go packages to steal developer credentials from CI/CD pipelines. Developers, be vigilant! #SupplyChainAttack #CyberSecurity #NorthKo...

    🌐 cyber[.]netsecops[.]io

    🔗 cyber.netsecops.io/articles/no

  12. This will increase a lot of uncertainty in all areas:

    «Artificial Intelligence — Decades-Old Bash Tricks Expose AI Coding Agents to Supply Chain Attacks:
    Decades-old Bash shell tricks can bypass safeguards in most open source AI coding agents, potentially turning malicious repositories into supply chain attack vectors.»

    🤜 securityweek.com/decades-old-b

    #bash #decates #hacking #ai #bypass #itsec #itsecurity #supplychain #aicoding #supplychainattack #gnu #linux #unix #aws #guardfall

  13. This will increase a lot of uncertainty in all areas:

    «Artificial Intelligence — Decades-Old Bash Tricks Expose AI Coding Agents to Supply Chain Attacks:
    Decades-old Bash shell tricks can bypass safeguards in most open source AI coding agents, potentially turning malicious repositories into supply chain attack vectors.»

    🤜 securityweek.com/decades-old-b

    #bash #decates #hacking #ai #bypass #itsec #itsecurity #supplychain #aicoding #supplychainattack #gnu #linux #unix #aws #guardfall

  14. This will increase a lot of uncertainty in all areas:

    «Artificial Intelligence — Decades-Old Bash Tricks Expose AI Coding Agents to Supply Chain Attacks:
    Decades-old Bash shell tricks can bypass safeguards in most open source AI coding agents, potentially turning malicious repositories into supply chain attack vectors.»

    🤜 securityweek.com/decades-old-b

    #bash #decates #hacking #ai #bypass #itsec #itsecurity #supplychain #aicoding #supplychainattack #gnu #linux #unix #aws #guardfall

  15. This will increase a lot of uncertainty in all areas:

    «Artificial Intelligence — Decades-Old Bash Tricks Expose AI Coding Agents to Supply Chain Attacks:
    Decades-old Bash shell tricks can bypass safeguards in most open source AI coding agents, potentially turning malicious repositories into supply chain attack vectors.»

    🤜 securityweek.com/decades-old-b

    #bash #decates #hacking #ai #bypass #itsec #itsecurity #supplychain #aicoding #supplychainattack #gnu #linux #unix #aws #guardfall

  16. This will increase a lot of uncertainty in all areas:

    «Artificial Intelligence — Decades-Old Bash Tricks Expose AI Coding Agents to Supply Chain Attacks:
    Decades-old Bash shell tricks can bypass safeguards in most open source AI coding agents, potentially turning malicious repositories into supply chain attack vectors.»

    🤜 securityweek.com/decades-old-b

    #bash #decates #hacking #ai #bypass #itsec #itsecurity #supplychain #aicoding #supplychainattack #gnu #linux #unix #aws #guardfall

  17. In Anbetracht der aktuellen Angriffe auf das #AUR Repository, sehe ich dunkle Wolken auch für andere Repositories aufziehen. #AUR schätze ich als verhältnismäßig leichtes Ziel ein, aber die Unsympathen üben möglicherweise nur.

    Die Bedrohungslage ist nicht nur gefühlt ziemlich hoch.

    #OSS #OpenSource #SupplyChain #SupplyChainAttack #Risiko

  18. In Anbetracht der aktuellen Angriffe auf das #AUR Repository, sehe ich dunkle Wolken auch für andere Repositories aufziehen. #AUR schätze ich als verhältnismäßig leichtes Ziel ein, aber die Unsympathen üben möglicherweise nur.

    Die Bedrohungslage ist nicht nur gefühlt ziemlich hoch.

    #OSS #OpenSource #SupplyChain #SupplyChainAttack #Risiko

  19. In Anbetracht der aktuellen Angriffe auf das #AUR Repository, sehe ich dunkle Wolken auch für andere Repositories aufziehen. #AUR schätze ich als verhältnismäßig leichtes Ziel ein, aber die Unsympathen üben möglicherweise nur.

    Die Bedrohungslage ist nicht nur gefühlt ziemlich hoch.

    #OSS #OpenSource #SupplyChain #SupplyChainAttack #Risiko

  20. In Anbetracht der aktuellen Angriffe auf das #AUR Repository, sehe ich dunkle Wolken auch für andere Repositories aufziehen. #AUR schätze ich als verhältnismäßig leichtes Ziel ein, aber die Unsympathen üben möglicherweise nur.

    Die Bedrohungslage ist nicht nur gefühlt ziemlich hoch.

    #OSS #OpenSource #SupplyChain #SupplyChainAttack #Risiko

  21. In Anbetracht der aktuellen Angriffe auf das #AUR Repository, sehe ich dunkle Wolken auch für andere Repositories aufziehen. #AUR schätze ich als verhältnismäßig leichtes Ziel ein, aber die Unsympathen üben möglicherweise nur.

    Die Bedrohungslage ist nicht nur gefühlt ziemlich hoch.

    #OSS #OpenSource #SupplyChain #SupplyChainAttack #Risiko

  22. RE: fosstodon.org/@archlinux/11673

    #Archlinux Supply chain incident shows the thing that always ignored by common people:

    Expecting you are not the target, because people rarely used it.

    Which points to: Attackers will do things where it is the place you are least expect.

    #cybersecurity #supplychainattack

  23. RE: fosstodon.org/@archlinux/11673

    #Archlinux Supply chain incident shows the thing that always ignored by common people:

    Expecting you are not the target, because people rarely used it.

    Which points to: Attackers will do things where it is the place you are least expect.

    #cybersecurity #supplychainattack

  24. RE: fosstodon.org/@archlinux/11673

    #Archlinux Supply chain incident shows the thing that always ignored by common people:

    Expecting you are not the target, because people rarely used it.

    Which points to: Attackers will do things where it is the place you are least expect.

    #cybersecurity #supplychainattack

  25. RE: fosstodon.org/@archlinux/11673

    #Archlinux Supply chain incident shows the thing that always ignored by common people:

    Expecting you are not the target, because people rarely used it.

    Which points to: Attackers will do things where it is the place you are least expect.

    #cybersecurity #supplychainattack

  26. 📣🚨 Over 20 Linux packages were compromised in the campaign, which abuses AUR ownership transfers to drop rootkit-like malware.

    Read: hackread.com/atomic-arch-hijac

  27. “Atomic Arch”: Nearly 900 AUR Packages Backdoored with a Developer-Targeting Infostealer and eBPF Rootkit

    On June 11, 2026, the Atomic Arch supply chain attack backdoored 900+ Arch Linux AUR packages with the 'deps' infostealer and an eBPF rootkit

    thecybersecguru.com/news/atomi

  28. @sodiboo @ifin @threatintel Made a consolidated AUR malware checker for the atomic-lockfile supply-chain attack now on GitHub.

    Merges detection scripts from the gist[1] and Kidev, BrianCArnold, commonsourcecs, Kacper-Kondracki, quantenProjects, Andre Herbst, ioctl.fail, and Kusoneko into a single repo. Checks known compromised packages, scans pacman.log history, checks for systemd persistence and eBPF rootkit artifacts.

    github.com/lenucksi/aur-malwar

    [1] gist.github.com/Kidev/59bf9f5f

    #AUR #ArchLinux #SupplyChainAttack #Malware #InfoSec #atomiclockfile

  29. @sodiboo @ifin @threatintel Made a consolidated AUR malware checker for the atomic-lockfile supply-chain attack now on GitHub.

    Merges detection scripts from the gist[1] and Kidev, BrianCArnold, commonsourcecs, Kacper-Kondracki, quantenProjects, Andre Herbst, ioctl.fail, and Kusoneko into a single repo. Checks known compromised packages, scans pacman.log history, checks for systemd persistence and eBPF rootkit artifacts.

    github.com/lenucksi/aur-malwar

    UPDATE 7/13/26: Friendly contributors added a 'download official arch hedgedoc list' and the new new bun package and I added some more convenience features.

    [1] gist.github.com/Kidev/59bf9f5f

    #AUR #ArchLinux #SupplyChainAttack #Malware #InfoSec #atomiclockfile

  30. @sodiboo @ifin @threatintel Made a consolidated AUR malware checker for the atomic-lockfile supply-chain attack now on GitHub.

    Merges detection scripts from the gist[1] and Kidev, BrianCArnold, commonsourcecs, Kacper-Kondracki, quantenProjects, Andre Herbst, ioctl.fail, and Kusoneko into a single repo. Checks known compromised packages, scans pacman.log history, checks for systemd persistence and eBPF rootkit artifacts.

    github.com/lenucksi/aur-malwar

    UPDATE 7/13/26: Friendly contributors added a 'download official arch hedgedoc list' and the new new bun package and I added some more convenience features.

    [1] gist.github.com/Kidev/59bf9f5f

    #AUR #ArchLinux #SupplyChainAttack #Malware #InfoSec #atomiclockfile

  31. @sodiboo @ifin @threatintel Made a consolidated AUR malware checker for the atomic-lockfile supply-chain attack now on GitHub.

    Merges detection scripts from the gist[1] and Kidev, BrianCArnold, commonsourcecs, Kacper-Kondracki, quantenProjects, Andre Herbst, ioctl.fail, and Kusoneko into a single repo. Checks known compromised packages, scans pacman.log history, checks for systemd persistence and eBPF rootkit artifacts.

    github.com/lenucksi/aur-malwar

    UPDATE 7/13/26: Friendly contributors added a 'download official arch hedgedoc list' and the new new bun package and I added some more convenience features.

    [1] gist.github.com/Kidev/59bf9f5f

    #AUR #ArchLinux #SupplyChainAttack #Malware #InfoSec #atomiclockfile

  32. @sodiboo @ifin @threatintel Made a consolidated AUR malware checker for the atomic-lockfile supply-chain attack now on GitHub.

    Merges detection scripts from the gist[1] and Kidev, BrianCArnold, commonsourcecs, Kacper-Kondracki, quantenProjects, Andre Herbst, ioctl.fail, and Kusoneko into a single repo. Checks known compromised packages, scans pacman.log history, checks for systemd persistence and eBPF rootkit artifacts.

    github.com/lenucksi/aur-malwar

    UPDATE 7/13/26: Friendly contributors added a 'download official arch hedgedoc list' and the new new bun package and I added some more convenience features.

    [1] gist.github.com/Kidev/59bf9f5f

    #AUR #ArchLinux #SupplyChainAttack #Malware #InfoSec #atomiclockfile

  33. 📰 "Hades Cluster" PyPI Worm Abuses Python Startup Hooks for Stealthy Credential Theft

    🐍 New PyPI supply chain attack 'Hades Cluster' hits 19 packages. The worm uses a stealthy trick, abusing Python's .pth startup hooks for persistence and credential theft. #PyPI #SupplyChainAttack #Python #HadesCluster #InfoSec

    🌐 cyber[.]netsecops[.]io

    🔗 cyber.netsecops.io/articles/ha

  34. Miasma Worm Exposes GitHub Repositories in Supply Chain Attack

    A sneaky Miasma worm has infiltrated 73 Microsoft GitHub repositories, putting countless projects at risk in a self-replicating supply chain attack. This malicious campaign is a stark reminder of the rapidly evolving threats lurking in the shadows of our digital supply chains.

    osintsights.com/miasma-worm-ex

    #MiasmaWorm #SupplyChainAttack #Github #Microsoft #Azure

  35. Campagna Hades colpisce PyPI: 37 pacchetti malevoli della famiglia Shai-Hulud/Miasma rubano credenziali sviluppatori

    Socket Research Team ha scoperto 37 wheel artifact malevoli su 19 pacchetti PyPI, parte della campagna Hades — ramo evolutivo di Shai-Hulud/Miasma. Il vettore è un file *-setup.pth che esegue silenziosamente uno stealer basato su Bun JavaScript runtime, colpendo credenziali di sviluppatori, pipeline CI/CD e ambienti cloud (AWS, GCP, Azure, GitHub, Kubernetes).

    insicurezzadigitale.com/campag

  36. Campagna Hades colpisce PyPI: 37 pacchetti malevoli della famiglia Shai-Hulud/Miasma rubano credenziali sviluppatori

    Socket Research Team ha scoperto 37 wheel artifact malevoli su 19 pacchetti PyPI, parte della campagna Hades — ramo evolutivo di Shai-Hulud/Miasma. Il vettore è un file *-setup.pth che esegue silenziosamente uno stealer basato su Bun JavaScript runtime, colpendo credenziali di sviluppatori, pipeline CI/CD e ambienti cloud (AWS, GCP, Azure, GitHub, Kubernetes).

    insicurezzadigitale.com/campag

  37. Campagna Hades colpisce PyPI: 37 pacchetti malevoli della famiglia Shai-Hulud/Miasma rubano credenziali sviluppatori

    Socket Research Team ha scoperto 37 wheel artifact malevoli su 19 pacchetti PyPI, parte della campagna Hades — ramo evolutivo di Shai-Hulud/Miasma. Il vettore è un file *-setup.pth che esegue silenziosamente uno stealer basato su Bun JavaScript runtime, colpendo credenziali di sviluppatori, pipeline CI/CD e ambienti cloud (AWS, GCP, Azure, GitHub, Kubernetes).

    insicurezzadigitale.com/campag

  38. Campagna Hades colpisce PyPI: 37 pacchetti malevoli della famiglia Shai-Hulud/Miasma rubano credenziali sviluppatori

    Socket Research Team ha scoperto 37 wheel artifact malevoli su 19 pacchetti PyPI, parte della campagna Hades — ramo evolutivo di Shai-Hulud/Miasma. Il vettore è un file *-setup.pth che esegue silenziosamente uno stealer basato su Bun JavaScript runtime, colpendo credenziali di sviluppatori, pipeline CI/CD e ambienti cloud (AWS, GCP, Azure, GitHub, Kubernetes).

    insicurezzadigitale.com/campag

  39. Campagna Hades colpisce PyPI: 37 pacchetti malevoli della famiglia Shai-Hulud/Miasma rubano credenziali sviluppatori

    Socket Research Team ha scoperto 37 wheel artifact malevoli su 19 pacchetti PyPI, parte della campagna Hades — ramo evolutivo di Shai-Hulud/Miasma. Il vettore è un file *-setup.pth che esegue silenziosamente uno stealer basato su Bun JavaScript runtime, colpendo credenziali di sviluppatori, pipeline CI/CD e ambienti cloud (AWS, GCP, Azure, GitHub, Kubernetes).

    insicurezzadigitale.com/campag