#blueteam — Public Fediverse posts

🔐 Formation Hackfest 2026 : Sécurité Physique 101-201-202

Cette formation s'attaque à la sécurité physique, souvent négligé ou mal compris, même s'il précède l'infosécurité.

🔵 Lundi 26 oct : 101 - #blueTeam
🔴 Mardi 27 & mercredi 28 oct : 201 - #redTeam
🛠️ Jeudi 29 oct : 202 - Rétro-ingénierie systèmes de sécurité électroniques

Infos & inscription 👉 https://hackfest.ca/formations/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=socmed&utm_campaign=securitePhysique_sept2026

#cybersecurity #hacking

🔐 Formation Hackfest 2026 : Sécurité Physique 101-201-202

Cette formation s'attaque à la sécurité physique, souvent négligé ou mal compris, même s'il précède l'infosécurité.

🔵 Lundi 26 oct : 101 - #blueTeam
🔴 Mardi 27 & mercredi 28 oct : 201 - #redTeam
🛠️ Jeudi 29 oct : 202 - Rétro-ingénierie systèmes de sécurité électroniques

Infos & inscription 👉 https://hackfest.ca/formations/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=socmed&utm_campaign=securitePhysique_sept2026

#cybersecurity #hacking

🔐 Formation Hackfest 2026 : Sécurité Physique 101-201-202

Cette formation s'attaque à la sécurité physique, souvent négligé ou mal compris, même s'il précède l'infosécurité.

🔵 Lundi 26 oct : 101 - #blueTeam
🔴 Mardi 27 & mercredi 28 oct : 201 - #redTeam
🛠️ Jeudi 29 oct : 202 - Rétro-ingénierie systèmes de sécurité électroniques

Infos & inscription 👉 https://hackfest.ca/formations/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=socmed&utm_campaign=securitePhysique_sept2026

#cybersecurity #hacking

🔐 Formation Hackfest 2026 : Sécurité Physique 101-201-202

Cette formation s'attaque à la sécurité physique, souvent négligé ou mal compris, même s'il précède l'infosécurité.

🔵 Lundi 26 oct : 101 - #blueTeam
🔴 Mardi 27 & mercredi 28 oct : 201 - #redTeam
🛠️ Jeudi 29 oct : 202 - Rétro-ingénierie systèmes de sécurité électroniques

Infos & inscription 👉 https://hackfest.ca/formations/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=socmed&utm_campaign=securitePhysique_sept2026

#cybersecurity #hacking

🔐 Formation Hackfest 2026 : Sécurité Physique 101-201-202

Cette formation s'attaque à la sécurité physique, souvent négligé ou mal compris, même s'il précède l'infosécurité.

🔵 Lundi 26 oct : 101 - #blueTeam
🔴 Mardi 27 & mercredi 28 oct : 201 - #redTeam
🛠️ Jeudi 29 oct : 202 - Rétro-ingénierie systèmes de sécurité électroniques

Infos & inscription 👉 https://hackfest.ca/formations/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=socmed&utm_campaign=securitePhysique_sept2026

#cybersecurity #hacking

RE: https://ioc.exchange/@Mookie/117278421247278484

#BlueTeam
#RedTeam
#DFIR
#Malware

RE: https://ioc.exchange/@Mookie/117278421247278484

#BlueTeam
#RedTeam
#DFIR
#Malware

The Rhysida ransomware group claims it breached the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, demanding 10 BTC after disrupting education and administrative systems.

Governor Reggie Wassana confirmed refusal to negotiate.

Rhysida has a history of targeting public-sector networks, including state and municipal infrastructure.

Technical considerations:
• Initial access vector? Phishing vs exposed RDP?
• Backup segmentation and immutability
• Insurance-driven IR workflows
• Data exfiltration + double extortion tactics
• Public-sector attack surface mapping
Should smaller governments move toward managed detection and response (MDR) as a baseline requirement?

Source: https://therecord.media/cheyenne-arapaho-ransomware-rhysida

Share your technical insights below.

Follow @technadu for advanced ransomware intelligence.

#Ransomware #ThreatHunting #IncidentResponse #PublicSectorSecurity #CyberResilience #BlueTeam #Infosec #GovTech #DigitalForensics #CyberThreatIntel #DataProtection #SOC #ZeroTrust

The Rhysida ransomware group claims it breached the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, demanding 10 BTC after disrupting education and administrative systems.

Governor Reggie Wassana confirmed refusal to negotiate.

Rhysida has a history of targeting public-sector networks, including state and municipal infrastructure.

Technical considerations:
• Initial access vector? Phishing vs exposed RDP?
• Backup segmentation and immutability
• Insurance-driven IR workflows
• Data exfiltration + double extortion tactics
• Public-sector attack surface mapping
Should smaller governments move toward managed detection and response (MDR) as a baseline requirement?

Source: https://therecord.media/cheyenne-arapaho-ransomware-rhysida

Share your technical insights below.

Follow @technadu for advanced ransomware intelligence.

#Ransomware #ThreatHunting #IncidentResponse #PublicSectorSecurity #CyberResilience #BlueTeam #Infosec #GovTech #DigitalForensics #CyberThreatIntel #DataProtection #SOC #ZeroTrust

The Rhysida ransomware group claims it breached the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, demanding 10 BTC after disrupting education and administrative systems.

Governor Reggie Wassana confirmed refusal to negotiate.

Rhysida has a history of targeting public-sector networks, including state and municipal infrastructure.

Technical considerations:
• Initial access vector? Phishing vs exposed RDP?
• Backup segmentation and immutability
• Insurance-driven IR workflows
• Data exfiltration + double extortion tactics
• Public-sector attack surface mapping
Should smaller governments move toward managed detection and response (MDR) as a baseline requirement?

Source: https://therecord.media/cheyenne-arapaho-ransomware-rhysida

Share your technical insights below.

Follow @technadu for advanced ransomware intelligence.

#Ransomware #ThreatHunting #IncidentResponse #PublicSectorSecurity #CyberResilience #BlueTeam #Infosec #GovTech #DigitalForensics #CyberThreatIntel #DataProtection #SOC #ZeroTrust

The Rhysida ransomware group claims it breached the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, demanding 10 BTC after disrupting education and administrative systems.

Governor Reggie Wassana confirmed refusal to negotiate.

Rhysida has a history of targeting public-sector networks, including state and municipal infrastructure.

Technical considerations:
• Initial access vector? Phishing vs exposed RDP?
• Backup segmentation and immutability
• Insurance-driven IR workflows
• Data exfiltration + double extortion tactics
• Public-sector attack surface mapping
Should smaller governments move toward managed detection and response (MDR) as a baseline requirement?

Source: https://therecord.media/cheyenne-arapaho-ransomware-rhysida

Share your technical insights below.

Follow @technadu for advanced ransomware intelligence.

#Ransomware #ThreatHunting #IncidentResponse #PublicSectorSecurity #CyberResilience #BlueTeam #Infosec #GovTech #DigitalForensics #CyberThreatIntel #DataProtection #SOC #ZeroTrust

According to Dragos, Volt Typhoon continues active operations inside U.S. utilities, shifting toward direct OT interaction and sensor data theft in 2025.

Notable elements:
• Pre-positioning in ICS environments
• Exploitation of Ivanti & Trimble Cityworks vulnerabilities
• GIS data harvesting for infrastructure mapping
• Access broker activity attributed to SYLVANITE
• Long-term persistence objectives
CEO Rob Lee stated some compromised sites may never be identified.

Technical question:
If adversaries maintain low-and-slow OT access, how should defenders adapt detection engineering?
– Network baselining?
– Sensor telemetry validation?
– Asset-level anomaly detection?
– Zero trust for OT?

Drop your technical analysis below.
Follow @technadu for advanced threat coverage.

#ICSsecurity #OTsecurity #ThreatHunting #DetectionEngineering #VoltTyphoon #InfrastructureDefense #CyberResilience #EnergyGrid #WaterUtilities #NationalSecurity #BlueTeam #CyberThreatIntel

According to Dragos, Volt Typhoon continues active operations inside U.S. utilities, shifting toward direct OT interaction and sensor data theft in 2025.

Notable elements:
• Pre-positioning in ICS environments
• Exploitation of Ivanti & Trimble Cityworks vulnerabilities
• GIS data harvesting for infrastructure mapping
• Access broker activity attributed to SYLVANITE
• Long-term persistence objectives
CEO Rob Lee stated some compromised sites may never be identified.

Technical question:
If adversaries maintain low-and-slow OT access, how should defenders adapt detection engineering?
– Network baselining?
– Sensor telemetry validation?
– Asset-level anomaly detection?
– Zero trust for OT?

Drop your technical analysis below.
Follow @technadu for advanced threat coverage.

#ICSsecurity #OTsecurity #ThreatHunting #DetectionEngineering #VoltTyphoon #InfrastructureDefense #CyberResilience #EnergyGrid #WaterUtilities #NationalSecurity #BlueTeam #CyberThreatIntel

According to Dragos, Volt Typhoon continues active operations inside U.S. utilities, shifting toward direct OT interaction and sensor data theft in 2025.

Notable elements:
• Pre-positioning in ICS environments
• Exploitation of Ivanti & Trimble Cityworks vulnerabilities
• GIS data harvesting for infrastructure mapping
• Access broker activity attributed to SYLVANITE
• Long-term persistence objectives
CEO Rob Lee stated some compromised sites may never be identified.

Technical question:
If adversaries maintain low-and-slow OT access, how should defenders adapt detection engineering?
– Network baselining?
– Sensor telemetry validation?
– Asset-level anomaly detection?
– Zero trust for OT?

Drop your technical analysis below.
Follow @technadu for advanced threat coverage.

#ICSsecurity #OTsecurity #ThreatHunting #DetectionEngineering #VoltTyphoon #InfrastructureDefense #CyberResilience #EnergyGrid #WaterUtilities #NationalSecurity #BlueTeam #CyberThreatIntel

According to Dragos, Volt Typhoon continues active operations inside U.S. utilities, shifting toward direct OT interaction and sensor data theft in 2025.

Notable elements:
• Pre-positioning in ICS environments
• Exploitation of Ivanti & Trimble Cityworks vulnerabilities
• GIS data harvesting for infrastructure mapping
• Access broker activity attributed to SYLVANITE
• Long-term persistence objectives
CEO Rob Lee stated some compromised sites may never be identified.

Technical question:
If adversaries maintain low-and-slow OT access, how should defenders adapt detection engineering?
– Network baselining?
– Sensor telemetry validation?
– Asset-level anomaly detection?
– Zero trust for OT?

Drop your technical analysis below.
Follow @technadu for advanced threat coverage.

#ICSsecurity #OTsecurity #ThreatHunting #DetectionEngineering #VoltTyphoon #InfrastructureDefense #CyberResilience #EnergyGrid #WaterUtilities #NationalSecurity #BlueTeam #CyberThreatIntel

Best thing I heard today:
“This is going to keep us employed for a while”

https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/introducing-python-in-excel-the-best-of-both-worlds-for-data/ba-p/3905482
#blueteam #dfir #python #excel #sectoot #infosec

Best thing I heard today:
“This is going to keep us employed for a while”

https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/introducing-python-in-excel-the-best-of-both-worlds-for-data/ba-p/3905482
#blueteam #dfir #python #excel #sectoot #infosec

Best thing I heard today:
“This is going to keep us employed for a while”

https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/introducing-python-in-excel-the-best-of-both-worlds-for-data/ba-p/3905482
#blueteam #dfir #python #excel #sectoot #infosec

Best thing I heard today:
“This is going to keep us employed for a while”

https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/introducing-python-in-excel-the-best-of-both-worlds-for-data/ba-p/3905482
#blueteam #dfir #python #excel #sectoot #infosec

Best thing I heard today:
“This is going to keep us employed for a while”

https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/introducing-python-in-excel-the-best-of-both-worlds-for-data/ba-p/3905482
#blueteam #dfir #python #excel #sectoot #infosec