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#asyncrat — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #asyncrat, aggregated by home.social.

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  1. Illegal Streaming Fronts a $7M Dropcatch Domain Operation

    Sable Squirrel operates a massive criminal enterprise controlling over 10,000 domains, spending an estimated $7 million acquiring expired domains to inherit their reputation and traffic. The actor runs illegal Asian sports streaming services under brands like Xoilac, Cakhia, and 90phut, which funnel viewers to gambling platforms including VSBet and 8xbet. Analysis reveals over 31,000 malware samples connecting to Sable Squirrel infrastructure, including Quasar RAT, AsyncRAT, DCRat, and ransomware variants, with the same domains simultaneously hosting streaming content and serving as command-and-control servers. Despite Vietnamese law enforcement actions in early 2026, including arrests and asset seizures, the operation quickly recovered and expanded for the World Cup, demonstrating resilience through domain rotation and shared technical infrastructure spanning multiple Asian markets.

    Pulse ID: 6a7deb5d13e63e6a0ff237b2
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a7de
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-08-13 16:05:49

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Asia #AsyncRAT #CyberSecurity #DCRat #InfoSec #LawEnforcement #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #RCE #RansomWare #Squirrel #Troll #Vietnam #bot #AlienVault

  2. 💧 🫴 Dropcatching isn't just for domain squatters, it's a goldmine for threat actors looking to hijack established trust. Some registrars make it shockingly easy to snipe high-value domains at auction, even serving up backlink metrics on a silver platter to help buyers find the best targets. A threat actor we track as Sable Squirrel took full advantage of this, spending over 💸 $7 million on dropcaught domains to push malware, run illegal sports streams, and operate a betting ring. That is the highest domain budget we've ever tracked from a single group.

    Here's a wild example of what that money buys. In January 2024, they snatched up veinteractive[.]com (previously registered with CSC Digital Brand Services) for $5.7k. It used to belong to a large London-based adtech firm. Sable Squirrel immediately turned it into an ☣️ AsyncRAT C2 and streaming hub. Because of the domain's history, tens of thousands of sites are still reaching out to it, trying to load a legacy tracking script (tag.js) and providing real-time telemetry. If Sable Squirrel was just slightly more creative, they could have easily hosted their malware on that exact URI path and pulled off a massive supply chain attack. And that's just one domain.

    We just dropped Part 2 of our series on dropcatching, breaking down Sable Squirrel's entire operation. We're sharing over 10,000 of their domains, including ones that used to belong to the US government, Fortune 100s, and major charities.

    Read the full teardown here: infoblox.com/blog/threat-intel

    Some Sable Squirrel dropcatch domains:

    thebreastcancercharities[.]org
    andromda[.]org
    d-rev[.]org
    churchofreality[.]org
    swradioafrica[.]com
    americansecuritytoday[.]com
    2026worldcupnorthamerica[.]com
    poweredbyclear[.]com
    fora[.]tv

    #dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #dropcatch #tds #scam #malware #asyncrat #quasarrat #hiddentear #ransomware #rat #vietnam #sportsbetting #gambling #worldcup #streaming #sports #illegal #adtech #backlink

  3. Integrating AI into Attack Operations, From AI-Generated Decoy Documents to a Local LLM

    The Kimsuky threat group has integrated artificial intelligence capabilities into its attack operations, establishing local large language model environments using Ollama, GPT4All, and Msty. Evidence indicates the group is accumulating technologies to incorporate AI across attack operations, including AI-generated decoy documents and retrieval-augmented generation for document analysis. The campaign, dubbed Operation GitPower, continues targeting foreign diplomatic missions and sectors including military, security, and virtual assets. Attacks utilize malicious LNK files contained in ZIP archives, executing obfuscated PowerShell scripts that abuse Git-based repositories as command-and-control infrastructure. The group distributes encrypted AsyncRAT payloads disguised as image files through GitHub. Linguistic indicators including North Korean vocabulary patterns such as "싸이트", "가입리력", and "로출되였는지" support attribution to North Korean state-sponsored operations under the Reconnaissance General Bureau.

    Pulse ID: 6a79d612a1f9e2ac4e744aa8
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a79d
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-08-10 13:45:54

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #AsyncRAT #CyberSecurity #GitHub #InfoSec #Kimsuky #Korea #LNK #Military #NorthKorea #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PowerShell #RAT #UK #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

  4. Kimsuky Uses Local LLMs, AI-Generated Lures and GitHub C2 to Deploy AsyncRAT

    Indicators extracted from public reporting. Source: genians.co.kr/en/blog/threat_i

    Pulse ID: 6a79ac473fe6b48d51cf0725
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a79a
    Pulse Author: CyberHunter_NL
    Created: 2026-08-10 10:47:35

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #AsyncRAT #CyberSecurity #GitHub #HTTP #HTTPS #InfoSec #Kimsuky #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #RCE #UK #bot #CyberHunter_NL

  5. @malware_traffic Thank you for sharing Brad!
    The TLS traffic to 173.232.146.62:25658 looks like #AsyncRAT or possibly #PureRAT. Can you confirm if it was generated by the powershell script with MD5 90389d2988cce2fe508087618dd2f519 from fnjnbehjangelkd[.]top?

  6. A domain registration is more like a lease rather than a deed. You get the exclusive right to use a domain name for a fixed term, but if you miss renewal, someone else can swoop in. What's scary is that with dropcatch services, cybercriminals can automate monitoring of pending‑delete domains and fire off registrations the split‑second a name is deleted by the registry and becomes available again. Think hawks circling for high‑value prey. 🦅

    That's what happened to fita[.]org, a popular website owned by the Federation of International Trade Associations (FITA) and referenced by many government bodies including the International Trade Administration (trade.gov). The domain now sits behind Cloudflare and functions as a command-and-control (C2) for the AsyncRAT malware. The actor controlling it also stood up these C2 endpoints:

    90phutif[.]cc,90phutis[.]cc,90phutiv[.]cc,90phuttn[.]cc,xoilaclinkf[.]cc,xoilactivi[.]uk,xoilactivik[.]cc,xoilactivil[.]cc,xoilactivim[.]cc,xoilactivin[.]cc,xoilactivio[.]cc,xoilactivip[.]cc,xoilactiviq[.]cc,xoilactivir[.]cc,xoilactivis[.]cc,xoilactivit[.]cc,xoilactiviu[.]cc,xoilactiviv[.]cc,xoilactiviw[.]cc,xoilactivix[.]cc,xoilactiviy[.]cc,xoilactiviz[.]cc,xoilacvnnc[.]tv,xoilacvnnf[.]tv,xoilacvzb[.]cc,xoilacvzc[.]cc,xoilacvze[.]cc,xoilacvzi[.]cc,xoilacvzk[.]cc,xoilacvzn[.]cc,xoilacvzp[.]cc,xoilacvzq[.]cc,xoilacvzz[.]cc,xoilacyys[.]cc,xoilaczc[.]mobi,xoilaczzbb[.]cc,xoilaczzczz[.]tv,xoilaczzdd[.]cc,xoilaczzdzz[.]tv,xoilaczziz[.]tv,xoilaczzszz[.]tv,xoilaczzvzz[.]tv

    So make sure to set auto pay for any valuable domains you possess 💳 otherwise you could risk losing them. Proactive IT governance is also part of security.

    #InfobloxThreatIntel #dns #async #threatintel #threatintelligence #infosec #cybersecurity #cybercrime #infoblox #rat #asyncrat #malware #dropcatch #domain #cloudflare #remoteaccesstrojan #infostealer #c2

  7. I finished compiling the information for #Kongtuke #ClickFix activity using the finger command on 2025-12-11, and it's now live at www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2025/12/11/index2.html

    I'd already posted the #SmartApeSG ClickFix activity using finger that same day, so now both are available.

    I had to run the ClickFix command on a physical host because the C2 server didn't like me when I initially tried it on a VM.

    Post-infection traffic looks like the same type of #AsyncRAT I've seen before, and some Tor traffic from whatever the follow-up malware is.

    It's a 221 MB zip archive containing the #pcap for the full infection, and it's about the same size as the zip archive containing forensic artifacts from the infected host.

  8. #xworm #asyncrat #purehvnc at:

    https:// locale-respondent-realtor-excellent.trycloudflare\.com