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#asyncrat — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #asyncrat, aggregated by home.social.

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  1. #asyncrat #darkcrystal #opendir at:
    https:// interactions-according-reports-syndication\.trycloudflare.com

    https:// periods-genetic-stones-government\.trycloudflare.com

  2. #asyncrat #darkcrystal #opendir at:
    https:// interactions-according-reports-syndication\.trycloudflare.com

    https:// periods-genetic-stones-government\.trycloudflare.com

  3. #asyncrat #darkcrystal #opendir at:
    https:// interactions-according-reports-syndication\.trycloudflare.com

    https:// periods-genetic-stones-government\.trycloudflare.com

  4. #asyncrat #darkcrystal #opendir at:
    https:// interactions-according-reports-syndication\.trycloudflare.com

    https:// periods-genetic-stones-government\.trycloudflare.com

  5. Hackers Abuse AutoIt to Inject AsyncRAT Into Microsoft-Signed Windows Process

    Indicators extracted from public reporting. Source: pointwild.com/threat-intellige

    Pulse ID: 6aa7a88342ad718ae208e629
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa7a
    Pulse Author: CyberHunter_NL
    Created: 2026-09-14 07:55:47

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #AsyncRAT #Autoit #Microsoft #Windows #OTX #CyberHunter_NL

  6. Hackers Abuse AutoIt to Inject AsyncRAT Into Microsoft-Signed Windows Process

    Indicators extracted from public reporting. Source: pointwild.com/threat-intellige

    Pulse ID: 6aa7a88342ad718ae208e629
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa7a
    Pulse Author: CyberHunter_NL
    Created: 2026-09-14 07:55:47

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #AsyncRAT #Autoit #Microsoft #Windows #OTX #CyberHunter_NL

  7. Hackers Abuse AutoIt to Inject AsyncRAT Into Microsoft-Signed Windows Process

    Indicators extracted from public reporting. Source: pointwild.com/threat-intellige

    Pulse ID: 6aa7a88342ad718ae208e629
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa7a
    Pulse Author: CyberHunter_NL
    Created: 2026-09-14 07:55:47

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #AsyncRAT #Autoit #Microsoft #Windows #OTX #CyberHunter_NL

  8. Hackers Abuse AutoIt to Inject AsyncRAT Into Microsoft-Signed Windows Process

    Indicators extracted from public reporting. Source: pointwild.com/threat-intellige

    Pulse ID: 6aa7a88342ad718ae208e629
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa7a
    Pulse Author: CyberHunter_NL
    Created: 2026-09-14 07:55:47

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #AsyncRAT #Autoit #Microsoft #Windows #OTX #CyberHunter_NL

  9. 💧 🫴 Dropcatching isn't just for domain squatters, it's a goldmine for threat actors looking to hijack established trust. Some registrars make it shockingly easy to snipe high-value domains at auction, even serving up backlink metrics on a silver platter to help buyers find the best targets. A threat actor we track as Sable Squirrel took full advantage of this, spending over 💸 $7 million on dropcaught domains to push malware, run illegal sports streams, and operate a betting ring. That is the highest domain budget we've ever tracked from a single group.

    Here's a wild example of what that money buys. In January 2024, they snatched up veinteractive[.]com (previously registered with CSC Digital Brand Services) for $5.7k. It used to belong to a large London-based adtech firm. Sable Squirrel immediately turned it into an ☣️ AsyncRAT C2 and streaming hub. Because of the domain's history, tens of thousands of sites are still reaching out to it, trying to load a legacy tracking script (tag.js) and providing real-time telemetry. If Sable Squirrel was just slightly more creative, they could have easily hosted their malware on that exact URI path and pulled off a massive supply chain attack. And that's just one domain.

    We just dropped Part 2 of our series on dropcatching, breaking down Sable Squirrel's entire operation. We're sharing over 10,000 of their domains, including ones that used to belong to the US government, Fortune 100s, and major charities.

    Read the full teardown here: infoblox.com/blog/threat-intel

    Some Sable Squirrel dropcatch domains:

    thebreastcancercharities[.]org
    andromda[.]org
    d-rev[.]org
    churchofreality[.]org
    swradioafrica[.]com
    americansecuritytoday[.]com
    2026worldcupnorthamerica[.]com
    poweredbyclear[.]com
    fora[.]tv

    #dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #dropcatch #tds #scam #malware #asyncrat #quasarrat #hiddentear #ransomware #rat #vietnam #sportsbetting #gambling #worldcup #streaming #sports #illegal #adtech #backlink

  10. 💧 🫴 Dropcatching isn't just for domain squatters, it's a goldmine for threat actors looking to hijack established trust. Some registrars make it shockingly easy to snipe high-value domains at auction, even serving up backlink metrics on a silver platter to help buyers find the best targets. A threat actor we track as Sable Squirrel took full advantage of this, spending over 💸 $7 million on dropcaught domains to push malware, run illegal sports streams, and operate a betting ring. That is the highest domain budget we've ever tracked from a single group.

    Here's a wild example of what that money buys. In January 2024, they snatched up veinteractive[.]com (previously registered with CSC Digital Brand Services) for $5.7k. It used to belong to a large London-based adtech firm. Sable Squirrel immediately turned it into an ☣️ AsyncRAT C2 and streaming hub. Because of the domain's history, tens of thousands of sites are still reaching out to it, trying to load a legacy tracking script (tag.js) and providing real-time telemetry. If Sable Squirrel was just slightly more creative, they could have easily hosted their malware on that exact URI path and pulled off a massive supply chain attack. And that's just one domain.

    We just dropped Part 2 of our series on dropcatching, breaking down Sable Squirrel's entire operation. We're sharing over 10,000 of their domains, including ones that used to belong to the US government, Fortune 100s, and major charities.

    Read the full teardown here: infoblox.com/blog/threat-intel

    Some Sable Squirrel dropcatch domains:

    thebreastcancercharities[.]org
    andromda[.]org
    d-rev[.]org
    churchofreality[.]org
    swradioafrica[.]com
    americansecuritytoday[.]com
    2026worldcupnorthamerica[.]com
    poweredbyclear[.]com
    fora[.]tv

    #dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #dropcatch #tds #scam #malware #asyncrat #quasarrat #hiddentear #ransomware #rat #vietnam #sportsbetting #gambling #worldcup #streaming #sports #illegal #adtech #backlink

  11. 💧 🫴 Dropcatching isn't just for domain squatters, it's a goldmine for threat actors looking to hijack established trust. Some registrars make it shockingly easy to snipe high-value domains at auction, even serving up backlink metrics on a silver platter to help buyers find the best targets. A threat actor we track as Sable Squirrel took full advantage of this, spending over 💸 $7 million on dropcaught domains to push malware, run illegal sports streams, and operate a betting ring. That is the highest domain budget we've ever tracked from a single group.

    Here's a wild example of what that money buys. In January 2024, they snatched up veinteractive[.]com (previously registered with CSC Digital Brand Services) for $5.7k. It used to belong to a large London-based adtech firm. Sable Squirrel immediately turned it into an ☣️ AsyncRAT C2 and streaming hub. Because of the domain's history, tens of thousands of sites are still reaching out to it, trying to load a legacy tracking script (tag.js) and providing real-time telemetry. If Sable Squirrel was just slightly more creative, they could have easily hosted their malware on that exact URI path and pulled off a massive supply chain attack. And that's just one domain.

    We just dropped Part 2 of our series on dropcatching, breaking down Sable Squirrel's entire operation. We're sharing over 10,000 of their domains, including ones that used to belong to the US government, Fortune 100s, and major charities.

    Read the full teardown here: infoblox.com/blog/threat-intel

    Some Sable Squirrel dropcatch domains:

    thebreastcancercharities[.]org
    andromda[.]org
    d-rev[.]org
    churchofreality[.]org
    swradioafrica[.]com
    americansecuritytoday[.]com
    2026worldcupnorthamerica[.]com
    poweredbyclear[.]com
    fora[.]tv

    #dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #dropcatch #tds #scam #malware #asyncrat #quasarrat #hiddentear #ransomware #rat #vietnam #sportsbetting #gambling #worldcup #streaming #sports #illegal #adtech #backlink

  12. 💧 🫴 Dropcatching isn't just for domain squatters, it's a goldmine for threat actors looking to hijack established trust. Some registrars make it shockingly easy to snipe high-value domains at auction, even serving up backlink metrics on a silver platter to help buyers find the best targets. A threat actor we track as Sable Squirrel took full advantage of this, spending over 💸 $7 million on dropcaught domains to push malware, run illegal sports streams, and operate a betting ring. That is the highest domain budget we've ever tracked from a single group.

    Here's a wild example of what that money buys. In January 2024, they snatched up veinteractive[.]com (previously registered with CSC Digital Brand Services) for $5.7k. It used to belong to a large London-based adtech firm. Sable Squirrel immediately turned it into an ☣️ AsyncRAT C2 and streaming hub. Because of the domain's history, tens of thousands of sites are still reaching out to it, trying to load a legacy tracking script (tag.js) and providing real-time telemetry. If Sable Squirrel was just slightly more creative, they could have easily hosted their malware on that exact URI path and pulled off a massive supply chain attack. And that's just one domain.

    We just dropped Part 2 of our series on dropcatching, breaking down Sable Squirrel's entire operation. We're sharing over 10,000 of their domains, including ones that used to belong to the US government, Fortune 100s, and major charities.

    Read the full teardown here: infoblox.com/blog/threat-intel

    Some Sable Squirrel dropcatch domains:

    thebreastcancercharities[.]org
    andromda[.]org
    d-rev[.]org
    churchofreality[.]org
    swradioafrica[.]com
    americansecuritytoday[.]com
    2026worldcupnorthamerica[.]com
    poweredbyclear[.]com
    fora[.]tv

    #dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #dropcatch #tds #scam #malware #asyncrat #quasarrat #hiddentear #ransomware #rat #vietnam #sportsbetting #gambling #worldcup #streaming #sports #illegal #adtech #backlink

  13. 📢 Kimsuky / Operation GitPower : LLM locaux, AsyncRAT chiffré et C2 GitHub

    Ce rapport de threat intelligence documente Operation GitPower, une campagne attribuée au groupe nord-coréen Kimsuky (opérant sous le Reconnaissance General Bureau). Il s'inscrit dans la continuité de la campagne FlowerPower (2023) et d'une campagne de 2024 déguisée en éditorial…

    📖 cyberveille : cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-08-1
    🌐 source : genians.co.kr/en/blog/threat_i
    🟡 vérification factuelle moyenne
    #AsyncRAT #Kimsuky #Cyberveille

  14. 📢 Écosystème malware Telegram : 9 898 bots C2 cartographiés via VirusTotal et Bot API
    📝 📰 **Source** : Ransom-ISAC (ransom-isac.org), publié le 27 juillet 2026.
    📖 cyberveille : cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-07-2
    🌐 source : ransom-isac.org/blog/the-teleg
    #AgentTesla #AsyncRAT #Cyberveille

  15. 📢 Trois campagnes AiTM exposées via un serveur mal configuré : codemado, mail-argenta, saroula01
    📝 ## 🔍 Contexte

    Le 13 juillet 2026, l'équipe CTI de Lexfo publie une analyse approfondie issue de la découverte, fin avril 2026, d'un *...
    📖 cyberveille : cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-07-1
    🌐 source : blog.lexfo.fr/opendir-to-phish
    #AiTM #AsyncRAT #Cyberveille

  16. 📢 ClickFix : une méthodologie d'attaque industrialisée invisible aux EDR et antivirus
    📝 ## 🔍 Contexte

    Article de recherche publié le 16 juillet 2026 par Toni Dujmović, analyste chez ReversingLabs, basé sur une investigation réelle...
    📖 cyberveille : cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-07-1
    🌐 source : reversinglabs.com/blog/clickfi
    #AsyncRAT #ClickFix #Cyberveille

  17. 📢 Millenium RAT v4 : migration vers C++, MaaS à 50$/mois, 62 000 endpoints compromis
    📝 ## 🔍 Contexte

    Publié le 25 juin 2026 par Group-IB (blog officiel), cet article présente une analyse technique approfondie du **Millenium RAT version 4.***, un cheval d...
    📖 cyberveille : cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-06-2
    🌐 source : group-ib.com/blog/millenium-ra
    #AsyncRAT #IOC #Cyberveille

  18. @malware_traffic Thank you for sharing Brad!
    The TLS traffic to 173.232.146.62:25658 looks like #AsyncRAT or possibly #PureRAT. Can you confirm if it was generated by the powershell script with MD5 90389d2988cce2fe508087618dd2f519 from fnjnbehjangelkd[.]top?

  19. @malware_traffic Thank you for sharing Brad!
    The TLS traffic to 173.232.146.62:25658 looks like #AsyncRAT or possibly #PureRAT. Can you confirm if it was generated by the powershell script with MD5 90389d2988cce2fe508087618dd2f519 from fnjnbehjangelkd[.]top?

  20. A domain registration is more like a lease rather than a deed. You get the exclusive right to use a domain name for a fixed term, but if you miss renewal, someone else can swoop in. What's scary is that with dropcatch services, cybercriminals can automate monitoring of pending‑delete domains and fire off registrations the split‑second a name is deleted by the registry and becomes available again. Think hawks circling for high‑value prey. 🦅

    That's what happened to fita[.]org, a popular website owned by the Federation of International Trade Associations (FITA) and referenced by many government bodies including the International Trade Administration (trade.gov). The domain now sits behind Cloudflare and functions as a command-and-control (C2) for the AsyncRAT malware. The actor controlling it also stood up these C2 endpoints:

    90phutif[.]cc,90phutis[.]cc,90phutiv[.]cc,90phuttn[.]cc,xoilaclinkf[.]cc,xoilactivi[.]uk,xoilactivik[.]cc,xoilactivil[.]cc,xoilactivim[.]cc,xoilactivin[.]cc,xoilactivio[.]cc,xoilactivip[.]cc,xoilactiviq[.]cc,xoilactivir[.]cc,xoilactivis[.]cc,xoilactivit[.]cc,xoilactiviu[.]cc,xoilactiviv[.]cc,xoilactiviw[.]cc,xoilactivix[.]cc,xoilactiviy[.]cc,xoilactiviz[.]cc,xoilacvnnc[.]tv,xoilacvnnf[.]tv,xoilacvzb[.]cc,xoilacvzc[.]cc,xoilacvze[.]cc,xoilacvzi[.]cc,xoilacvzk[.]cc,xoilacvzn[.]cc,xoilacvzp[.]cc,xoilacvzq[.]cc,xoilacvzz[.]cc,xoilacyys[.]cc,xoilaczc[.]mobi,xoilaczzbb[.]cc,xoilaczzczz[.]tv,xoilaczzdd[.]cc,xoilaczzdzz[.]tv,xoilaczziz[.]tv,xoilaczzszz[.]tv,xoilaczzvzz[.]tv

    So make sure to set auto pay for any valuable domains you possess 💳 otherwise you could risk losing them. Proactive IT governance is also part of security.

    #InfobloxThreatIntel #dns #async #threatintel #threatintelligence #infosec #cybersecurity #cybercrime #infoblox #rat #asyncrat #malware #dropcatch #domain #cloudflare #remoteaccesstrojan #infostealer #c2

  21. A domain registration is more like a lease rather than a deed. You get the exclusive right to use a domain name for a fixed term, but if you miss renewal, someone else can swoop in. What's scary is that with dropcatch services, cybercriminals can automate monitoring of pending‑delete domains and fire off registrations the split‑second a name is deleted by the registry and becomes available again. Think hawks circling for high‑value prey. 🦅

    That's what happened to fita[.]org, a popular website owned by the Federation of International Trade Associations (FITA) and referenced by many government bodies including the International Trade Administration (trade.gov). The domain now sits behind Cloudflare and functions as a command-and-control (C2) for the AsyncRAT malware. The actor controlling it also stood up these C2 endpoints:

    90phutif[.]cc,90phutis[.]cc,90phutiv[.]cc,90phuttn[.]cc,xoilaclinkf[.]cc,xoilactivi[.]uk,xoilactivik[.]cc,xoilactivil[.]cc,xoilactivim[.]cc,xoilactivin[.]cc,xoilactivio[.]cc,xoilactivip[.]cc,xoilactiviq[.]cc,xoilactivir[.]cc,xoilactivis[.]cc,xoilactivit[.]cc,xoilactiviu[.]cc,xoilactiviv[.]cc,xoilactiviw[.]cc,xoilactivix[.]cc,xoilactiviy[.]cc,xoilactiviz[.]cc,xoilacvnnc[.]tv,xoilacvnnf[.]tv,xoilacvzb[.]cc,xoilacvzc[.]cc,xoilacvze[.]cc,xoilacvzi[.]cc,xoilacvzk[.]cc,xoilacvzn[.]cc,xoilacvzp[.]cc,xoilacvzq[.]cc,xoilacvzz[.]cc,xoilacyys[.]cc,xoilaczc[.]mobi,xoilaczzbb[.]cc,xoilaczzczz[.]tv,xoilaczzdd[.]cc,xoilaczzdzz[.]tv,xoilaczziz[.]tv,xoilaczzszz[.]tv,xoilaczzvzz[.]tv

    So make sure to set auto pay for any valuable domains you possess 💳 otherwise you could risk losing them. Proactive IT governance is also part of security.

    #InfobloxThreatIntel #dns #async #threatintel #threatintelligence #infosec #cybersecurity #cybercrime #infoblox #rat #asyncrat #malware #dropcatch #domain #cloudflare #remoteaccesstrojan #infostealer #c2

  22. I finished compiling the information for #Kongtuke #ClickFix activity using the finger command on 2025-12-11, and it's now live at www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2025/12/11/index2.html

    I'd already posted the #SmartApeSG ClickFix activity using finger that same day, so now both are available.

    I had to run the ClickFix command on a physical host because the C2 server didn't like me when I initially tried it on a VM.

    Post-infection traffic looks like the same type of #AsyncRAT I've seen before, and some Tor traffic from whatever the follow-up malware is.

    It's a 221 MB zip archive containing the #pcap for the full infection, and it's about the same size as the zip archive containing forensic artifacts from the infected host.

  23. I finished compiling the information for #Kongtuke #ClickFix activity using the finger command on 2025-12-11, and it's now live at www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2025/12/11/index2.html

    I'd already posted the #SmartApeSG ClickFix activity using finger that same day, so now both are available.

    I had to run the ClickFix command on a physical host because the C2 server didn't like me when I initially tried it on a VM.

    Post-infection traffic looks like the same type of #AsyncRAT I've seen before, and some Tor traffic from whatever the follow-up malware is.

    It's a 221 MB zip archive containing the #pcap for the full infection, and it's about the same size as the zip archive containing forensic artifacts from the infected host.

  24. #xworm #asyncrat #purehvnc at:

    https:// locale-respondent-realtor-excellent.trycloudflare\.com