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#screenconnect — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #screenconnect, aggregated by home.social.

  1. From poisoned search results to GPU mining: A cryptojacking campaign abusing ScreenConnect and Microsoft .NET utilities

    Microsoft Defender Experts identified an active cryptojacking campaign leveraging AI-assisted delivery mechanisms alongside traditional SEO poisoning. Attackers create fake download sites impersonating trusted utilities like CrystalDiskInfo, HWMonitor, and FurMark, targeting users with high-performance GPUs. Victims download ZIP archives containing legitimate executables bundled with malicious DLLs that establish persistence via ScreenConnect remote access tools. The operation employs sophisticated techniques including DLL sideloading, process hollowing into Microsoft-signed .NET binaries, and comprehensive defense evasion. Beyond cryptocurrency mining, the campaign establishes persistent remote access that could enable data theft, lateral movement, or ransomware deployment. The threat actors deliberately target PC enthusiasts and hardware-focused users most likely to own discrete GPUs suitable for profitable mining operations.

    Pulse ID: 6a1634fbefeffa7f0c6a52f5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a163
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-27 00:04:11

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #CryptoJacking #CyberSecurity #DataTheft #InfoSec #Microsoft #MicrosoftDefender #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #RansomWare #Rust #SEOPoisoning #SMS #ScreenConnect #SideLoading #ZIP #bot #cryptocurrency #AlienVault

  2. From poisoned search results to GPU mining: A cryptojacking campaign abusing ScreenConnect and Microsoft .NET utilities

    Microsoft Defender Experts identified an active cryptojacking campaign leveraging AI-assisted delivery mechanisms alongside traditional SEO poisoning. Attackers create fake download sites impersonating trusted utilities like CrystalDiskInfo, HWMonitor, and FurMark, targeting users with high-performance GPUs. Victims download ZIP archives containing legitimate executables bundled with malicious DLLs that establish persistence via ScreenConnect remote access tools. The operation employs sophisticated techniques including DLL sideloading, process hollowing into Microsoft-signed .NET binaries, and comprehensive defense evasion. Beyond cryptocurrency mining, the campaign establishes persistent remote access that could enable data theft, lateral movement, or ransomware deployment. The threat actors deliberately target PC enthusiasts and hardware-focused users most likely to own discrete GPUs suitable for profitable mining operations.

    Pulse ID: 6a1634fbefeffa7f0c6a52f5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a163
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-27 00:04:11

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #CryptoJacking #CyberSecurity #DataTheft #InfoSec #Microsoft #MicrosoftDefender #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #RansomWare #Rust #SEOPoisoning #SMS #ScreenConnect #SideLoading #ZIP #bot #cryptocurrency #AlienVault

  3. From poisoned search results to GPU mining: A cryptojacking campaign abusing ScreenConnect and Microsoft .NET utilities

    Microsoft Defender Experts identified an active cryptojacking campaign leveraging AI-assisted delivery mechanisms alongside traditional SEO poisoning. Attackers create fake download sites impersonating trusted utilities like CrystalDiskInfo, HWMonitor, and FurMark, targeting users with high-performance GPUs. Victims download ZIP archives containing legitimate executables bundled with malicious DLLs that establish persistence via ScreenConnect remote access tools. The operation employs sophisticated techniques including DLL sideloading, process hollowing into Microsoft-signed .NET binaries, and comprehensive defense evasion. Beyond cryptocurrency mining, the campaign establishes persistent remote access that could enable data theft, lateral movement, or ransomware deployment. The threat actors deliberately target PC enthusiasts and hardware-focused users most likely to own discrete GPUs suitable for profitable mining operations.

    Pulse ID: 6a1634fbefeffa7f0c6a52f5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a163
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-27 00:04:11

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #CryptoJacking #CyberSecurity #DataTheft #InfoSec #Microsoft #MicrosoftDefender #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #RansomWare #Rust #SEOPoisoning #SMS #ScreenConnect #SideLoading #ZIP #bot #cryptocurrency #AlienVault

  4. From poisoned search results to GPU mining: A cryptojacking campaign abusing ScreenConnect and Microsoft .NET utilities

    Microsoft Defender Experts identified an active cryptojacking campaign leveraging AI-assisted delivery mechanisms alongside traditional SEO poisoning. Attackers create fake download sites impersonating trusted utilities like CrystalDiskInfo, HWMonitor, and FurMark, targeting users with high-performance GPUs. Victims download ZIP archives containing legitimate executables bundled with malicious DLLs that establish persistence via ScreenConnect remote access tools. The operation employs sophisticated techniques including DLL sideloading, process hollowing into Microsoft-signed .NET binaries, and comprehensive defense evasion. Beyond cryptocurrency mining, the campaign establishes persistent remote access that could enable data theft, lateral movement, or ransomware deployment. The threat actors deliberately target PC enthusiasts and hardware-focused users most likely to own discrete GPUs suitable for profitable mining operations.

    Pulse ID: 6a1634fbefeffa7f0c6a52f5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a163
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-27 00:04:11

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #CryptoJacking #CyberSecurity #DataTheft #InfoSec #Microsoft #MicrosoftDefender #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #RansomWare #Rust #SEOPoisoning #SMS #ScreenConnect #SideLoading #ZIP #bot #cryptocurrency #AlienVault

  5. From poisoned search results to GPU mining: A cryptojacking campaign abusing ScreenConnect and Microsoft .NET utilities

    Microsoft Defender Experts identified an active cryptojacking campaign leveraging AI-assisted delivery mechanisms alongside traditional SEO poisoning. Attackers create fake download sites impersonating trusted utilities like CrystalDiskInfo, HWMonitor, and FurMark, targeting users with high-performance GPUs. Victims download ZIP archives containing legitimate executables bundled with malicious DLLs that establish persistence via ScreenConnect remote access tools. The operation employs sophisticated techniques including DLL sideloading, process hollowing into Microsoft-signed .NET binaries, and comprehensive defense evasion. Beyond cryptocurrency mining, the campaign establishes persistent remote access that could enable data theft, lateral movement, or ransomware deployment. The threat actors deliberately target PC enthusiasts and hardware-focused users most likely to own discrete GPUs suitable for profitable mining operations.

    Pulse ID: 6a1634fbefeffa7f0c6a52f5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a163
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-27 00:04:11

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #CryptoJacking #CyberSecurity #DataTheft #InfoSec #Microsoft #MicrosoftDefender #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #RansomWare #Rust #SEOPoisoning #SMS #ScreenConnect #SideLoading #ZIP #bot #cryptocurrency #AlienVault

  6. OPERATION SILENTCANVAS: JPEG BASED MULTISTAGE POWERSHELL INTRUSION

    A sophisticated multi-stage intrusion campaign was identified leveraging a weaponized PowerShell payload disguised as a JPEG image file (sysupdate.jpeg) to deploy a trojanized ConnectWise ScreenConnect instance for covert remote access. The attack likely originates through social engineering techniques including phishing emails or malicious attachments. Upon execution, the malware establishes a staging environment, retrieves additional payloads from attacker-controlled infrastructure, and dynamically compiles a custom launcher using Microsoft's legitimate .NET compiler (csc.exe) to evade detection. The intrusion abuses ComputerDefaults.exe and a malicious ms-settings registry hijack to perform a fileless UAC bypass and obtain elevated privileges. Once elevated, the malware deploys a persistent service masquerading as OneDriveServers and launches a modified ScreenConnect framework capable of credential interception, remote command execution, surveillance operations, SYSTEM-level execution, encrypted command...

    Pulse ID: 6a008382641183db3b20fef5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a008
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-10 13:09:22

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #ConnectWise #CyberSecurity #EDR #Email #InfoSec #Malware #Microsoft #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #RCE #RemoteCommandExecution #ScreenConnect #SocialEngineering #Trojan #Troll #bot #AlienVault

  7. OPERATION SILENTCANVAS: JPEG BASED MULTISTAGE POWERSHELL INTRUSION

    A sophisticated multi-stage intrusion campaign was identified leveraging a weaponized PowerShell payload disguised as a JPEG image file (sysupdate.jpeg) to deploy a trojanized ConnectWise ScreenConnect instance for covert remote access. The attack likely originates through social engineering techniques including phishing emails or malicious attachments. Upon execution, the malware establishes a staging environment, retrieves additional payloads from attacker-controlled infrastructure, and dynamically compiles a custom launcher using Microsoft's legitimate .NET compiler (csc.exe) to evade detection. The intrusion abuses ComputerDefaults.exe and a malicious ms-settings registry hijack to perform a fileless UAC bypass and obtain elevated privileges. Once elevated, the malware deploys a persistent service masquerading as OneDriveServers and launches a modified ScreenConnect framework capable of credential interception, remote command execution, surveillance operations, SYSTEM-level execution, encrypted command...

    Pulse ID: 6a008382641183db3b20fef5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a008
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-10 13:09:22

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #ConnectWise #CyberSecurity #EDR #Email #InfoSec #Malware #Microsoft #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #RCE #RemoteCommandExecution #ScreenConnect #SocialEngineering #Trojan #Troll #bot #AlienVault

  8. OPERATION SILENTCANVAS: JPEG BASED MULTISTAGE POWERSHELL INTRUSION

    A sophisticated multi-stage intrusion campaign was identified leveraging a weaponized PowerShell payload disguised as a JPEG image file (sysupdate.jpeg) to deploy a trojanized ConnectWise ScreenConnect instance for covert remote access. The attack likely originates through social engineering techniques including phishing emails or malicious attachments. Upon execution, the malware establishes a staging environment, retrieves additional payloads from attacker-controlled infrastructure, and dynamically compiles a custom launcher using Microsoft's legitimate .NET compiler (csc.exe) to evade detection. The intrusion abuses ComputerDefaults.exe and a malicious ms-settings registry hijack to perform a fileless UAC bypass and obtain elevated privileges. Once elevated, the malware deploys a persistent service masquerading as OneDriveServers and launches a modified ScreenConnect framework capable of credential interception, remote command execution, surveillance operations, SYSTEM-level execution, encrypted command...

    Pulse ID: 6a008382641183db3b20fef5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a008
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-10 13:09:22

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #ConnectWise #CyberSecurity #EDR #Email #InfoSec #Malware #Microsoft #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #RCE #RemoteCommandExecution #ScreenConnect #SocialEngineering #Trojan #Troll #bot #AlienVault

  9. OPERATION SILENTCANVAS: JPEG BASED MULTISTAGE POWERSHELL INTRUSION

    A sophisticated multi-stage intrusion campaign was identified leveraging a weaponized PowerShell payload disguised as a JPEG image file (sysupdate.jpeg) to deploy a trojanized ConnectWise ScreenConnect instance for covert remote access. The attack likely originates through social engineering techniques including phishing emails or malicious attachments. Upon execution, the malware establishes a staging environment, retrieves additional payloads from attacker-controlled infrastructure, and dynamically compiles a custom launcher using Microsoft's legitimate .NET compiler (csc.exe) to evade detection. The intrusion abuses ComputerDefaults.exe and a malicious ms-settings registry hijack to perform a fileless UAC bypass and obtain elevated privileges. Once elevated, the malware deploys a persistent service masquerading as OneDriveServers and launches a modified ScreenConnect framework capable of credential interception, remote command execution, surveillance operations, SYSTEM-level execution, encrypted command...

    Pulse ID: 6a008382641183db3b20fef5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a008
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-10 13:09:22

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #ConnectWise #CyberSecurity #EDR #Email #InfoSec #Malware #Microsoft #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #RCE #RemoteCommandExecution #ScreenConnect #SocialEngineering #Trojan #Troll #bot #AlienVault

  10. OPERATION SILENTCANVAS: JPEG BASED MULTISTAGE POWERSHELL INTRUSION

    A sophisticated multi-stage intrusion campaign was identified leveraging a weaponized PowerShell payload disguised as a JPEG image file (sysupdate.jpeg) to deploy a trojanized ConnectWise ScreenConnect instance for covert remote access. The attack likely originates through social engineering techniques including phishing emails or malicious attachments. Upon execution, the malware establishes a staging environment, retrieves additional payloads from attacker-controlled infrastructure, and dynamically compiles a custom launcher using Microsoft's legitimate .NET compiler (csc.exe) to evade detection. The intrusion abuses ComputerDefaults.exe and a malicious ms-settings registry hijack to perform a fileless UAC bypass and obtain elevated privileges. Once elevated, the malware deploys a persistent service masquerading as OneDriveServers and launches a modified ScreenConnect framework capable of credential interception, remote command execution, surveillance operations, SYSTEM-level execution, encrypted command...

    Pulse ID: 6a008382641183db3b20fef5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a008
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-10 13:09:22

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #ConnectWise #CyberSecurity #EDR #Email #InfoSec #Malware #Microsoft #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #RCE #RemoteCommandExecution #ScreenConnect #SocialEngineering #Trojan #Troll #bot #AlienVault

  11. An unknown threat actor is abusing a remote management tool called #TiFLUX as an initial access vector, targeting a broad range of potential victims by email. The attacks using this Brasil-originated commercial utility began in February, but really ramped up in April and the beginning of this month.

    The lures employ a variety of #spam tropes, including bogus event invitations and business invoices/bills.

    TiFLUX seems uniquely vulnerable to this kind of abuse; The installer package also installs an old version of UltraVNC as well as a vulnerable #loldriver that can elevate privileges. Weirdest of all, the attackers are also using this RMM to deploy other heavily-abused RMMs, including #Splashtop and #ScreenConnect to the devices that get hit. Those RMMs are connecting to IP addresses associated with known bulletproof hosts.

    This is my first post at the @huntress blog: huntress.com/blog/tiflux-rmm-i

    #malware #RMM #RogueRMM

  12. An unknown threat actor is abusing a remote management tool called #TiFLUX as an initial access vector, targeting a broad range of potential victims by email. The attacks using this Brasil-originated commercial utility began in February, but really ramped up in April and the beginning of this month.

    The lures employ a variety of #spam tropes, including bogus event invitations and business invoices/bills.

    TiFLUX seems uniquely vulnerable to this kind of abuse; The installer package also installs an old version of UltraVNC as well as a vulnerable #loldriver that can elevate privileges. Weirdest of all, the attackers are also using this RMM to deploy other heavily-abused RMMs, including #Splashtop and #ScreenConnect to the devices that get hit. Those RMMs are connecting to IP addresses associated with known bulletproof hosts.

    This is my first post at the @huntress blog: huntress.com/blog/tiflux-rmm-i

    #malware #RMM #RogueRMM

  13. An unknown threat actor is abusing a remote management tool called #TiFLUX as an initial access vector, targeting a broad range of potential victims by email. The attacks using this Brasil-originated commercial utility began in February, but really ramped up in April and the beginning of this month.

    The lures employ a variety of #spam tropes, including bogus event invitations and business invoices/bills.

    TiFLUX seems uniquely vulnerable to this kind of abuse; The installer package also installs an old version of UltraVNC as well as a vulnerable #loldriver that can elevate privileges. Weirdest of all, the attackers are also using this RMM to deploy other heavily-abused RMMs, including #Splashtop and #ScreenConnect to the devices that get hit. Those RMMs are connecting to IP addresses associated with known bulletproof hosts.

    This is my first post at the @huntress blog: huntress.com/blog/tiflux-rmm-i

    #malware #RMM #RogueRMM

  14. An unknown threat actor is abusing a remote management tool called #TiFLUX as an initial access vector, targeting a broad range of potential victims by email. The attacks using this Brasil-originated commercial utility began in February, but really ramped up in April and the beginning of this month.

    The lures employ a variety of #spam tropes, including bogus event invitations and business invoices/bills.

    TiFLUX seems uniquely vulnerable to this kind of abuse; The installer package also installs an old version of UltraVNC as well as a vulnerable #loldriver that can elevate privileges. Weirdest of all, the attackers are also using this RMM to deploy other heavily-abused RMMs, including #Splashtop and #ScreenConnect to the devices that get hit. Those RMMs are connecting to IP addresses associated with known bulletproof hosts.

    This is my first post at the @huntress blog: huntress.com/blog/tiflux-rmm-i

    #malware #RMM #RogueRMM

  15. An unknown threat actor is abusing a remote management tool called #TiFLUX as an initial access vector, targeting a broad range of potential victims by email. The attacks using this Brasil-originated commercial utility began in February, but really ramped up in April and the beginning of this month.

    The lures employ a variety of #spam tropes, including bogus event invitations and business invoices/bills.

    TiFLUX seems uniquely vulnerable to this kind of abuse; The installer package also installs an old version of UltraVNC as well as a vulnerable #loldriver that can elevate privileges. Weirdest of all, the attackers are also using this RMM to deploy other heavily-abused RMMs, including #Splashtop and #ScreenConnect to the devices that get hit. Those RMMs are connecting to IP addresses associated with known bulletproof hosts.

    This is my first post at the @huntress blog: huntress.com/blog/tiflux-rmm-i

    #malware #RMM #RogueRMM

  16. Threat Actors Weaponize Tiflux RMMs in Malspam Attacks

    Since late February, there has been an uptick in incidents involving Tiflux, a lesser-known Brazilian commercial remote management tool being weaponized by threat actors. The attack chain begins with phishing emails containing fake document lures that deliver a malicious MSI installer. Once executed, the installer deploys multiple remote access tools including UltraVNC, Splashtop, and ScreenConnect for persistent access. The Tiflux installer contains concerning components such as outdated VNC versions from 2014, expired certificates, hardcoded passwords, and a vulnerable HwRwDrv.sys driver known for privilege escalation abuse. The threat actors leverage these tools to establish persistence, capture screenshots, and collect system profiling information. This campaign exemplifies the continuing pattern of adversaries abusing legitimate remote management software for stealthy access to victim environments while chaining multiple tools together to maintain control.

    Pulse ID: 69fd4f31a337de81bfb907d5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fd4
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-08 02:49:21

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Brazil #CyberSecurity #Email #InfoSec #MalSpam #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #Passwords #Phishing #ScreenConnect #Spam #VNC #Word #bot #AlienVault

  17. Threat Actors Weaponize Tiflux RMMs in Malspam Attacks

    Since late February, there has been an uptick in incidents involving Tiflux, a lesser-known Brazilian commercial remote management tool being weaponized by threat actors. The attack chain begins with phishing emails containing fake document lures that deliver a malicious MSI installer. Once executed, the installer deploys multiple remote access tools including UltraVNC, Splashtop, and ScreenConnect for persistent access. The Tiflux installer contains concerning components such as outdated VNC versions from 2014, expired certificates, hardcoded passwords, and a vulnerable HwRwDrv.sys driver known for privilege escalation abuse. The threat actors leverage these tools to establish persistence, capture screenshots, and collect system profiling information. This campaign exemplifies the continuing pattern of adversaries abusing legitimate remote management software for stealthy access to victim environments while chaining multiple tools together to maintain control.

    Pulse ID: 69fd4f31a337de81bfb907d5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fd4
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-08 02:49:21

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Brazil #CyberSecurity #Email #InfoSec #MalSpam #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #Passwords #Phishing #ScreenConnect #Spam #VNC #Word #bot #AlienVault

  18. Threat Actors Weaponize Tiflux RMMs in Malspam Attacks

    Since late February, there has been an uptick in incidents involving Tiflux, a lesser-known Brazilian commercial remote management tool being weaponized by threat actors. The attack chain begins with phishing emails containing fake document lures that deliver a malicious MSI installer. Once executed, the installer deploys multiple remote access tools including UltraVNC, Splashtop, and ScreenConnect for persistent access. The Tiflux installer contains concerning components such as outdated VNC versions from 2014, expired certificates, hardcoded passwords, and a vulnerable HwRwDrv.sys driver known for privilege escalation abuse. The threat actors leverage these tools to establish persistence, capture screenshots, and collect system profiling information. This campaign exemplifies the continuing pattern of adversaries abusing legitimate remote management software for stealthy access to victim environments while chaining multiple tools together to maintain control.

    Pulse ID: 69fd4f31a337de81bfb907d5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fd4
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-08 02:49:21

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Brazil #CyberSecurity #Email #InfoSec #MalSpam #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #Passwords #Phishing #ScreenConnect #Spam #VNC #Word #bot #AlienVault

  19. Threat Actors Weaponize Tiflux RMMs in Malspam Attacks

    Since late February, there has been an uptick in incidents involving Tiflux, a lesser-known Brazilian commercial remote management tool being weaponized by threat actors. The attack chain begins with phishing emails containing fake document lures that deliver a malicious MSI installer. Once executed, the installer deploys multiple remote access tools including UltraVNC, Splashtop, and ScreenConnect for persistent access. The Tiflux installer contains concerning components such as outdated VNC versions from 2014, expired certificates, hardcoded passwords, and a vulnerable HwRwDrv.sys driver known for privilege escalation abuse. The threat actors leverage these tools to establish persistence, capture screenshots, and collect system profiling information. This campaign exemplifies the continuing pattern of adversaries abusing legitimate remote management software for stealthy access to victim environments while chaining multiple tools together to maintain control.

    Pulse ID: 69fd4f31a337de81bfb907d5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fd4
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-08 02:49:21

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Brazil #CyberSecurity #Email #InfoSec #MalSpam #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #Passwords #Phishing #ScreenConnect #Spam #VNC #Word #bot #AlienVault

  20. Threat Actors Weaponize Tiflux RMMs in Malspam Attacks

    Since late February, there has been an uptick in incidents involving Tiflux, a lesser-known Brazilian commercial remote management tool being weaponized by threat actors. The attack chain begins with phishing emails containing fake document lures that deliver a malicious MSI installer. Once executed, the installer deploys multiple remote access tools including UltraVNC, Splashtop, and ScreenConnect for persistent access. The Tiflux installer contains concerning components such as outdated VNC versions from 2014, expired certificates, hardcoded passwords, and a vulnerable HwRwDrv.sys driver known for privilege escalation abuse. The threat actors leverage these tools to establish persistence, capture screenshots, and collect system profiling information. This campaign exemplifies the continuing pattern of adversaries abusing legitimate remote management software for stealthy access to victim environments while chaining multiple tools together to maintain control.

    Pulse ID: 69fd4f31a337de81bfb907d5
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fd4
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-08 02:49:21

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Brazil #CyberSecurity #Email #InfoSec #MalSpam #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #Passwords #Phishing #ScreenConnect #Spam #VNC #Word #bot #AlienVault

  21. CloudZ RAT potentially steals OTP messages using Pheno plugin

    Cisco Talos uncovered an intrusion active since January 2026 where attackers deployed CloudZ remote access tool and an undocumented plugin called Pheno to steal credentials and one-time passwords. The attack exploits Microsoft Phone Link application by intercepting synchronized mobile data including SMS and OTPs without requiring phone-level infection. CloudZ evades detection through dynamic memory execution and anti-analysis checks. The infection chain begins with a fake ScreenConnect update executable, leading to a Rust-compiled dropper that deploys a .NET loader, ultimately establishing the modular CloudZ RAT. The Pheno plugin monitors Phone Link processes and intercepts SQLite database files containing synchronized phone data. CloudZ employs ConfuserEx obfuscation, multiple configuration layers, and facilitates various commands including browser data exfiltration, shell execution, and plugin management while maintaining persistence through scheduled tasks.

    Pulse ID: 69f9f99cd352da334850ef13
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f9f
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-05 14:07:24

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Browser #Cisco #Cloud #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #Microsoft #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #Passwords #RAT #RCE #Rust #SMS #SQL #ScreenConnect #Talos #Word #bot #AlienVault

  22. CloudZ RAT potentially steals OTP messages using Pheno plugin

    Cisco Talos uncovered an intrusion active since January 2026 where attackers deployed CloudZ remote access tool and an undocumented plugin called Pheno to steal credentials and one-time passwords. The attack exploits Microsoft Phone Link application by intercepting synchronized mobile data including SMS and OTPs without requiring phone-level infection. CloudZ evades detection through dynamic memory execution and anti-analysis checks. The infection chain begins with a fake ScreenConnect update executable, leading to a Rust-compiled dropper that deploys a .NET loader, ultimately establishing the modular CloudZ RAT. The Pheno plugin monitors Phone Link processes and intercepts SQLite database files containing synchronized phone data. CloudZ employs ConfuserEx obfuscation, multiple configuration layers, and facilitates various commands including browser data exfiltration, shell execution, and plugin management while maintaining persistence through scheduled tasks.

    Pulse ID: 69f9f99cd352da334850ef13
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f9f
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-05 14:07:24

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Browser #Cisco #Cloud #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #Microsoft #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #Passwords #RAT #RCE #Rust #SMS #SQL #ScreenConnect #Talos #Word #bot #AlienVault

  23. CloudZ RAT potentially steals OTP messages using Pheno plugin

    Cisco Talos uncovered an intrusion active since January 2026 where attackers deployed CloudZ remote access tool and an undocumented plugin called Pheno to steal credentials and one-time passwords. The attack exploits Microsoft Phone Link application by intercepting synchronized mobile data including SMS and OTPs without requiring phone-level infection. CloudZ evades detection through dynamic memory execution and anti-analysis checks. The infection chain begins with a fake ScreenConnect update executable, leading to a Rust-compiled dropper that deploys a .NET loader, ultimately establishing the modular CloudZ RAT. The Pheno plugin monitors Phone Link processes and intercepts SQLite database files containing synchronized phone data. CloudZ employs ConfuserEx obfuscation, multiple configuration layers, and facilitates various commands including browser data exfiltration, shell execution, and plugin management while maintaining persistence through scheduled tasks.

    Pulse ID: 69f9f99cd352da334850ef13
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f9f
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-05 14:07:24

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Browser #Cisco #Cloud #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #Microsoft #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #Passwords #RAT #RCE #Rust #SMS #SQL #ScreenConnect #Talos #Word #bot #AlienVault

  24. CloudZ RAT potentially steals OTP messages using Pheno plugin

    Cisco Talos uncovered an intrusion active since January 2026 where attackers deployed CloudZ remote access tool and an undocumented plugin called Pheno to steal credentials and one-time passwords. The attack exploits Microsoft Phone Link application by intercepting synchronized mobile data including SMS and OTPs without requiring phone-level infection. CloudZ evades detection through dynamic memory execution and anti-analysis checks. The infection chain begins with a fake ScreenConnect update executable, leading to a Rust-compiled dropper that deploys a .NET loader, ultimately establishing the modular CloudZ RAT. The Pheno plugin monitors Phone Link processes and intercepts SQLite database files containing synchronized phone data. CloudZ employs ConfuserEx obfuscation, multiple configuration layers, and facilitates various commands including browser data exfiltration, shell execution, and plugin management while maintaining persistence through scheduled tasks.

    Pulse ID: 69f9f99cd352da334850ef13
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f9f
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-05 14:07:24

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Browser #Cisco #Cloud #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #Microsoft #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #Passwords #RAT #RCE #Rust #SMS #SQL #ScreenConnect #Talos #Word #bot #AlienVault

  25. CloudZ RAT potentially steals OTP messages using Pheno plugin

    Cisco Talos uncovered an intrusion active since January 2026 where attackers deployed CloudZ remote access tool and an undocumented plugin called Pheno to steal credentials and one-time passwords. The attack exploits Microsoft Phone Link application by intercepting synchronized mobile data including SMS and OTPs without requiring phone-level infection. CloudZ evades detection through dynamic memory execution and anti-analysis checks. The infection chain begins with a fake ScreenConnect update executable, leading to a Rust-compiled dropper that deploys a .NET loader, ultimately establishing the modular CloudZ RAT. The Pheno plugin monitors Phone Link processes and intercepts SQLite database files containing synchronized phone data. CloudZ employs ConfuserEx obfuscation, multiple configuration layers, and facilitates various commands including browser data exfiltration, shell execution, and plugin management while maintaining persistence through scheduled tasks.

    Pulse ID: 69f9f99cd352da334850ef13
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f9f
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-05 14:07:24

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Browser #Cisco #Cloud #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #Microsoft #NET #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #Passwords #RAT #RCE #Rust #SMS #SQL #ScreenConnect #Talos #Word #bot #AlienVault

  26. CISA Flags Actively Exploited ConnectWise, Windows Flaws

    The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has flagged two major vulnerabilities, including a critical flaw in ConnectWise ScreenConnect and a Microsoft Windows Shell bug, as actively exploited by hackers. These flaws could allow attackers to execute remote code, access confidential data, and compromise critical systems.

    osintsights.com/cisa-flags-act

    #Cve20241708 #Cve202632202 #Windows #Connectwise #Screenconnect

  27. CISA Flags Actively Exploited ConnectWise, Windows Flaws

    The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has flagged two major vulnerabilities, including a critical flaw in ConnectWise ScreenConnect and a Microsoft Windows Shell bug, as actively exploited by hackers. These flaws could allow attackers to execute remote code, access confidential data, and compromise critical systems.

    osintsights.com/cisa-flags-act

    #Cve20241708 #Cve202632202 #Windows #Connectwise #Screenconnect

  28. 💬 Telegram plays an important role in many underground businesses. Threat actors commonly stand up channels to market and support malicious activities such as malware-as-a-service (MaaS) subscriptions. While investigating ScreenConnect servers, a remote access support tool commonly abused by threat actors, we found an interesting business that we had never seen before. This actor used telegram as a storefront and support channel for an underground Remote Access Toolkit Online (RATO) platform. Technically RATO is a service that bundles cPanel and ScreenConnect technology to help its cyber criminal customers remotely access victim machines and manage scams, phishing, and malware (e.g. Latrodectus).

    🐀 🔴 We discovered several servers that matched a ScreenConnect signature but these instances did not serve the typical ScreenConnect web content. Instead, their service is called "RATO PLATFORM" and the portal page shows the slogan "Can't catch the RAT__". We've found several telegram channels that promote services named "RATO", use the rat head logo (see attached image), or the domain rato[.]to. Based on their telegram chat content, it's clear their business model is focused on enabling cybercrime.

    @rato_support
    @ratofaqs
    @rato_backup
    @rato_hosting
    @Rato2_bot

    Consistent with RATO’s “BulletProof & Anti-Red Hosting” feature, we saw many RATO instances on ASNs with a high concentration of malicious activity (e.g., AS202412). Additionally, RATO infrastructure shows strong ties to Indonesia including Indonesian IP addresses in passive DNS and domains within the same cloudflare account used for serving online gambling to Indonesian-speaking users. Collectively, RATO and its customers operate a large number of domains. Here are some examples:

    asakusubinitohas[.]com
    bmw320ikaka[.]co
    cpusx[.]com
    newoneazu[.]com
    ratmail[.]pro
    rato[.]page
    rato[.]to
    ratodemo[.]pro
    sesrecipt[.]com
    silk-gen[.]com
    sunostart[.]com
    viewyourstatementonline[.]com

    #dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #phishing #malware #maas #telegram #indonesia #screenconnect #latrodectus #rat #rmm #remotemonitoringmanagement #downloader #spam #rato

  29. 💬 Telegram plays an important role in many underground businesses. Threat actors commonly stand up channels to market and support malicious activities such as malware-as-a-service (MaaS) subscriptions. While investigating ScreenConnect servers, a remote access support tool commonly abused by threat actors, we found an interesting business that we had never seen before. This actor used telegram as a storefront and support channel for an underground Remote Access Toolkit Online (RATO) platform. Technically RATO is a service that bundles cPanel and ScreenConnect technology to help its cyber criminal customers remotely access victim machines and manage scams, phishing, and malware (e.g. Latrodectus).

    🐀 🔴 We discovered several servers that matched a ScreenConnect signature but these instances did not serve the typical ScreenConnect web content. Instead, their service is called "RATO PLATFORM" and the portal page shows the slogan "Can't catch the RAT__". We've found several telegram channels that promote services named "RATO", use the rat head logo (see attached image), or the domain rato[.]to. Based on their telegram chat content, it's clear their business model is focused on enabling cybercrime.

    @rato_support
    @ratofaqs
    @rato_backup
    @rato_hosting
    @Rato2_bot

    Consistent with RATO’s “BulletProof & Anti-Red Hosting” feature, we saw many RATO instances on ASNs with a high concentration of malicious activity (e.g., AS202412). Additionally, RATO infrastructure shows strong ties to Indonesia including Indonesian IP addresses in passive DNS and domains within the same cloudflare account used for serving online gambling to Indonesian-speaking users. Collectively, RATO and its customers operate a large number of domains. Here are some examples:

    asakusubinitohas[.]com
    bmw320ikaka[.]co
    cpusx[.]com
    newoneazu[.]com
    ratmail[.]pro
    rato[.]page
    rato[.]to
    ratodemo[.]pro
    sesrecipt[.]com
    silk-gen[.]com
    sunostart[.]com
    viewyourstatementonline[.]com

    #dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #phishing #malware #maas #telegram #indonesia #screenconnect #latrodectus #rat #rmm #remotemonitoringmanagement #downloader #spam #rato

  30. 💬 Telegram plays an important role in many underground businesses. Threat actors commonly stand up channels to market and support malicious activities such as malware-as-a-service (MaaS) subscriptions. While investigating ScreenConnect servers, a remote access support tool commonly abused by threat actors, we found an interesting business that we had never seen before. This actor used telegram as a storefront and support channel for an underground Remote Access Toolkit Online (RATO) platform. Technically RATO is a service that bundles cPanel and ScreenConnect technology to help its cyber criminal customers remotely access victim machines and manage scams, phishing, and malware (e.g. Latrodectus).

    🐀 🔴 We discovered several servers that matched a ScreenConnect signature but these instances did not serve the typical ScreenConnect web content. Instead, their service is called "RATO PLATFORM" and the portal page shows the slogan "Can't catch the RAT__". We've found several telegram channels that promote services named "RATO", use the rat head logo (see attached image), or the domain rato[.]to. Based on their telegram chat content, it's clear their business model is focused on enabling cybercrime.

    @rato_support
    @ratofaqs
    @rato_backup
    @rato_hosting
    @Rato2_bot

    Consistent with RATO’s “BulletProof & Anti-Red Hosting” feature, we saw many RATO instances on ASNs with a high concentration of malicious activity (e.g., AS202412). Additionally, RATO infrastructure shows strong ties to Indonesia including Indonesian IP addresses in passive DNS and domains within the same cloudflare account used for serving online gambling to Indonesian-speaking users. Collectively, RATO and its customers operate a large number of domains. Here are some examples:

    asakusubinitohas[.]com
    bmw320ikaka[.]co
    cpusx[.]com
    newoneazu[.]com
    ratmail[.]pro
    rato[.]page
    rato[.]to
    ratodemo[.]pro
    sesrecipt[.]com
    silk-gen[.]com
    sunostart[.]com
    viewyourstatementonline[.]com

    #dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #phishing #malware #maas #telegram #indonesia #screenconnect #latrodectus #rat #rmm #remotemonitoringmanagement #downloader #spam #rato

  31. 💬 Telegram plays an important role in many underground businesses. Threat actors commonly stand up channels to market and support malicious activities such as malware-as-a-service (MaaS) subscriptions. While investigating ScreenConnect servers, a remote access support tool commonly abused by threat actors, we found an interesting business that we had never seen before. This actor used telegram as a storefront and support channel for an underground Remote Access Toolkit Online (RATO) platform. Technically RATO is a service that bundles cPanel and ScreenConnect technology to help its cyber criminal customers remotely access victim machines and manage scams, phishing, and malware (e.g. Latrodectus).

    🐀 🔴 We discovered several servers that matched a ScreenConnect signature but these instances did not serve the typical ScreenConnect web content. Instead, their service is called "RATO PLATFORM" and the portal page shows the slogan "Can't catch the RAT__". We've found several telegram channels that promote services named "RATO", use the rat head logo (see attached image), or the domain rato[.]to. Based on their telegram chat content, it's clear their business model is focused on enabling cybercrime.

    @rato_support
    @ratofaqs
    @rato_backup
    @rato_hosting
    @Rato2_bot

    Consistent with RATO’s “BulletProof & Anti-Red Hosting” feature, we saw many RATO instances on ASNs with a high concentration of malicious activity (e.g., AS202412). Additionally, RATO infrastructure shows strong ties to Indonesia including Indonesian IP addresses in passive DNS and domains within the same cloudflare account used for serving online gambling to Indonesian-speaking users. Collectively, RATO and its customers operate a large number of domains. Here are some examples:

    asakusubinitohas[.]com
    bmw320ikaka[.]co
    cpusx[.]com
    newoneazu[.]com
    ratmail[.]pro
    rato[.]page
    rato[.]to
    ratodemo[.]pro
    sesrecipt[.]com
    silk-gen[.]com
    sunostart[.]com
    viewyourstatementonline[.]com

    #dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #phishing #malware #maas #telegram #indonesia #screenconnect #latrodectus #rat #rmm #remotemonitoringmanagement #downloader #spam #rato

  32. 💬 Telegram plays an important role in many underground businesses. Threat actors commonly stand up channels to market and support malicious activities such as malware-as-a-service (MaaS) subscriptions. While investigating ScreenConnect servers, a remote access support tool commonly abused by threat actors, we found an interesting business that we had never seen before. This actor used telegram as a storefront and support channel for an underground Remote Access Toolkit Online (RATO) platform. Technically RATO is a service that bundles cPanel and ScreenConnect technology to help its cyber criminal customers remotely access victim machines and manage scams, phishing, and malware (e.g. Latrodectus).

    🐀 🔴 We discovered several servers that matched a ScreenConnect signature but these instances did not serve the typical ScreenConnect web content. Instead, their service is called "RATO PLATFORM" and the portal page shows the slogan "Can't catch the RAT__". We've found several telegram channels that promote services named "RATO", use the rat head logo (see attached image), or the domain rato[.]to. Based on their telegram chat content, it's clear their business model is focused on enabling cybercrime.

    @rato_support
    @ratofaqs
    @rato_backup
    @rato_hosting
    @Rato2_bot

    Consistent with RATO’s “BulletProof & Anti-Red Hosting” feature, we saw many RATO instances on ASNs with a high concentration of malicious activity (e.g., AS202412). Additionally, RATO infrastructure shows strong ties to Indonesia including Indonesian IP addresses in passive DNS and domains within the same cloudflare account used for serving online gambling to Indonesian-speaking users. Collectively, RATO and its customers operate a large number of domains. Here are some examples:

    asakusubinitohas[.]com
    bmw320ikaka[.]co
    cpusx[.]com
    newoneazu[.]com
    ratmail[.]pro
    rato[.]page
    rato[.]to
    ratodemo[.]pro
    sesrecipt[.]com
    silk-gen[.]com
    sunostart[.]com
    viewyourstatementonline[.]com

    #dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #phishing #malware #maas #telegram #indonesia #screenconnect #latrodectus #rat #rmm #remotemonitoringmanagement #downloader #spam #rato