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#pkcs11 — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #pkcs11, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Как защитить ключи LUKS с помощью Рутокен ЭЦП 3.0 и алгоритмов ГОСТ Р 34.10-2012. Часть 4

    Безопасная эксплуатация ноутбуков, или Защита пользовательского ключа с помощью алгоритмов ГОСТ Р 34.10-2012 В третьей части мы настроили защиту мастер-ключа с помощью USB-токена, используя RSA, но теперь мы перейдем на алгоритмы ГОСТ Р 34.10-2012. Жаркие. Зимние. Твои. А еще они основаны на более перспективных эллиптических кривых, которым не нужны такие большие ключи, чтобы обеспечить более высокий уровень безопасности.

    habr.com/ru/companies/aktiv-co

    #linux #luks #полнодисковое_шифрование #рутокен #plymouth #openssl #pkcs11 #encrypt #bitlocker #гост_34102012

  2. Как защитить ключи LUKS с помощью Рутокен ЭЦП 3.0 и алгоритмов ГОСТ Р 34.10-2012. Часть 3

    Безопасная эксплуатация ноутбуков, или Защита пользовательского ключа с помощью USB-токена на примере Рутокен ЭЦП 3.0 Из второй части мы узнали, как настроить загрузку компьютера таким образом, чтобы для разблокирования системного диска использовались ключи, размещенные на внешнем USB-накопителе. Однако при краже компьютера вместе с этим накопителем злоумышленник сможет получить доступ к данным так, как если бы они не были защищены вовсе, поэтому наиболее привлекательным способом решения поставленной задачи видится использование USB-токенов и смарт-карт, таких как Рутокен ЭЦП 3.0 или JaCarta-2 ГОСТ. Токены представляют собой защищенные микроконтроллеры со встроенной энергонезависимой памятью, поэтому способны выполнять все вычисления самостоятельно без использования ресурсов центрального процессора, не допуская копирование закрытого ключа с устройства, что обеспечивает максимально высокий уровень безопасности.

    habr.com/ru/companies/aktiv-co

    #linux #luks #полнодисковое_шифрование #рутокен #plymouth #rsa #openssl #pkcs11 #encrypt #bitlocker

  3. I was told that my idea already exists:

    words.filippo.io/passage/

    Same name, same approach by @filippo.

    I should've done the research before developing an idea that already exists.

    Well, it's too late, I've got the same thing, same name, but implemented in go. To be fair, my approach works with any hardware token that supports PKCS#11 and not only yubikey.

    #age #pkcs11 #pass #passwordmanager

  4. system is relatively interesting thing. I lack some support for storing private keys in a format good for applications. Can it do URI provider or token authentication? It seems current implementation focuses on shared secrets - passwords. If we have integrated support with TPM2 chip, I think we should aim for instead.

  5. @iX_Magazin Gibt es eigentlich ein PDF-Tool mit dem man Formulare über #PKCS11 digital signieren kann? Dafür brauche ich bisher nämlich leider immer noch ein Windows mit Acrobat-Reader auf das ich per RDP zugreife.

  6. #Ubuntu24 verweigerte heute nach einem Reboot die Nutzung meines #Yubikeys.
    Ich konnte mich als mit #pkcs11 nicht mehr an meinen Servern per ssh anmelden.

    Eine hängengebliebene Filesystem-Action eines Remote-Filesystems verhinderte offenbar, dass Linux meinen Laptop nicht schlafen schicken konnte... Totem ließ sich nicht beenden vom Kernel... aber das ist eine andere Geschichte. Jedenfalls schaltete sich mein Laptop nicht ab bis der Akku leer war.

    In einem Anfall seniler Bettflucht hab ich meinen Laptop hergenommen und wollte checken, warum Friendica nur mehr blurred Vorschaubilder anzeigt (Spoiler, das Debuglog eines anderen Services füllte mir die Platte an...) und mein ssh-agent verweigerte das Hinzufügen des Yubikeys. Standhaft.

    Ein Blick ins Journal ergab dann folgende Seltsamkeit:

    Sep 12 04:34:02 AET-1931 pcscd[24807]: 99999999 auth.c:143:IsClientAuthorized() Process 36310 (user: 2000) is NOT authorized for action: access_pcsc
    Sep 12 04:34:02 AET-1931 pcscd[24807]: 00000197 winscard_svc.c:355:ContextThread() Rejected unauthorized PC/SC client

    Ein Restart von pcscd brachte keine Erlösung.
    Ein Reboot übrigens auch nicht.

    Also weitersuchen. Aufgrund der Recherchen einmal

    opensc-tool --list-readers
    No smart card readers found.

    Shice... und was sagt gpg?

    gpg --card-status
    gpg: selecting card failed: Kein passendes Gerät gefunden
    gpg: OpenPGP Karte ist nicht vorhanden: Kein passendes Gerät gefunden

    Das Journal dazu befragt... scdaemon erkennt meine Smartcards, aber pcscd verweigert meinem User den Zugriff.

    Also mal als Root... ja, da liefert opensc-tool meine Smartcards.

    Dann eine noch seltsamere Erkenntnis...
    In tmux ausgeführt, verweigert pcscd die Abfrage mit opensc-tool, in der normalen Bash gibts aber ein Ergebnis... meine Token sind da.

    Dann hab ich meinen SafeNet eToken ausprobiert... der ließ sich wunderbar zum ssh-agent hinzufügen... gut, der nutzt aber auch den scdaemon bzw. pcscd nicht (extra Ausnahme in der Config).

    Schließlich wurde ich auf bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugrep… fündig. Offenbar wurden bei Polkit Rules entfernt, die es Usern erlauben, pcscd/Smartcards zu nutzen... am 8. September beim Update wurde /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d/sssd-pcsc.rules so geändert, dass die Rule nur mehr für Root zieht. Da wurde das File zumindest aktualisert.
    Und heut erst wurde die Änderung durch den Zwangsreboot schlagend...

    Die Lösung war auf jeden Fall folgende:
    Ich hab ein File /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/40-allow-pcscd.rules

    # cat 40-allow-pcscd.rules 
    polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
        if (
            subject.isInGroup("plugdev")
            && (
                action.id === "org.debian.pcsc-lite.access_pcsc"
                || action.id === "org.debian.pcsc-lite.access_card"
            )
        ) {
            return polkit.Result.YES;
        }
    
        return polkit.Result.NOT_HANDLED;
    });

    erstellt und meinen User der Gruppe plugdev hinzugefügt. Ab/Anmelden, damit die Gruppenänderung zieht... und schon konnte ich meinen Yubikey wieder für die Authentifikation für ssh-Verbindungen nutzen.

    Aber warum gpg am Yubikey nicht mehr funktioniert... bleibt mir auch ein Rätsel.

  7. Wow is the documentation for Smartcards shit. Like it impossible to even figure the basics out.

    Like e.g. how do I delete the private key from this card? Why does "pkcs11-tool -b" not work? Why does it reply with a login error when I enter the correct pin and with an internal error if I enter an invalid one?
    ????

    #smartcard #gpg #pkcs11 #opensc

  8. Wow is the documentation for Smartcards shit. Like it impossible to even figure the basics out.

    Like e.g. how do I delete the private key from this card? Why does "pkcs11-tool -b" not work? Why does it reply with a login error when I enter the correct pin and with an internal error if I enter an invalid one?
    ????

    #smartcard #gpg #pkcs11 #opensc

  9. Wow is the documentation for Smartcards shit. Like it impossible to even figure the basics out.

    Like e.g. how do I delete the private key from this card? Why does "pkcs11-tool -b" not work? Why does it reply with a login error when I enter the correct pin and with an internal error if I enter an invalid one?
    ????

    #smartcard #gpg #pkcs11 #opensc

  10. Wow is the documentation for Smartcards shit. Like it impossible to even figure the basics out.

    Like e.g. how do I delete the private key from this card? Why does "pkcs11-tool -b" not work? Why does it reply with a login error when I enter the correct pin and with an internal error if I enter an invalid one?
    ????

    #smartcard #gpg #pkcs11 #opensc

  11. Wow is the documentation for Smartcards shit. Like it impossible to even figure the basics out.

    Like e.g. how do I delete the private key from this card? Why does "pkcs11-tool -b" not work? Why does it reply with a login error when I enter the correct pin and with an internal error if I enter an invalid one?
    ????

    #smartcard #gpg #pkcs11 #opensc

  12. Siamo nel #2025 e con #Firefox sulle *buntu #Opensc e tutti i certificati #PKCS11 (quindi anche robe come la #CNS) continuano a *NON* funzionare grazie al fantastico sistema #SNAP che qualcuno nello staff di #Ubuntu ha detto semplicemente "freghiamocene", nonostante sia stato segnalato da ANNI il problema

    Vediamo quanti anni devono passare ancora... Io sono senza parole 😞

  13. Siamo nel #2025 e con #Firefox sulle *buntu #Opensc e tutti i certificati #PKCS11 (quindi anche robe come la #CNS) continuano a *NON* funzionare grazie al fantastico sistema #SNAP che qualcuno nello staff di #Ubuntu ha detto semplicemente "freghiamocene", nonostante sia stato segnalato da ANNI il problema

    Vediamo quanti anni devono passare ancora... Io sono senza parole 😞

  14. Siamo nel #2025 e con #Firefox sulle *buntu #Opensc e tutti i certificati #PKCS11 (quindi anche robe come la #CNS) continuano a *NON* funzionare grazie al fantastico sistema #SNAP che qualcuno nello staff di #Ubuntu ha detto semplicemente "freghiamocene", nonostante sia stato segnalato da ANNI il problema

    Vediamo quanti anni devono passare ancora... Io sono senza parole 😞

  15. Siamo nel #2025 e con #Firefox sulle *buntu #Opensc e tutti i certificati #PKCS11 (quindi anche robe come la #CNS) continuano a *NON* funzionare grazie al fantastico sistema #SNAP che qualcuno nello staff di #Ubuntu ha detto semplicemente "freghiamocene", nonostante sia stato segnalato da ANNI il problema

    Vediamo quanti anni devono passare ancora... Io sono senza parole 😞

  16. Siamo nel #2025 e con #Firefox sulle *buntu #Opensc e tutti i certificati #PKCS11 (quindi anche robe come la #CNS) continuano a *NON* funzionare grazie al fantastico sistema #SNAP che qualcuno nello staff di #Ubuntu ha detto semplicemente "freghiamocene", nonostante sia stato segnalato da ANNI il problema

    Vediamo quanti anni devono passare ancora... Io sono senza parole 😞

  17. Siamo nel #2025 e con #Firefox sulle *buntu #Opensc e tutti i certificati #PKCS11 (quindi anche robe come la #CNS) continuano a *NON* funzionare grazie al fantastico sistema #SNAP che qualcuno nello staff di #Ubuntu ha detto semplicemente "freghiamocene", nonostante sia stato segnalato da ANNI il problema

    Vediamo quanti anni devono passare ancora... Io sono senza parole 😞

  18. Siamo nel #2025 e con #Firefox sulle *buntu #Opensc e tutti i certificati #PKCS11 (quindi anche robe come la #CNS) continuano a *NON* funzionare grazie al fantastico sistema #SNAP che qualcuno nello staff di #Ubuntu ha detto semplicemente "freghiamocene", nonostante sia stato segnalato da ANNI il problema

    Vediamo quanti anni devono passare ancora... Io sono senza parole 😞

  19. Siamo nel #2025 e con #Firefox sulle *buntu #Opensc e tutti i certificati #PKCS11 (quindi anche robe come la #CNS) continuano a *NON* funzionare grazie al fantastico sistema #SNAP che qualcuno nello staff di #Ubuntu ha detto semplicemente "freghiamocene", nonostante sia stato segnalato da ANNI il problema

    Vediamo quanti anni devono passare ancora... Io sono senza parole 😞

  20. Siamo nel #2025 e con #Firefox sulle *buntu #Opensc e tutti i certificati #PKCS11 (quindi anche robe come la #CNS) continuano a *NON* funzionare grazie al fantastico sistema #SNAP che qualcuno nello staff di #Ubuntu ha detto semplicemente "freghiamocene", nonostante sia stato segnalato da ANNI il problema

    Vediamo quanti anni devono passare ancora... Io sono senza parole 😞

  21. Siamo nel #2025 e con #Firefox sulle *buntu #Opensc e tutti i certificati #PKCS11 (quindi anche robe come la #CNS) continuano a *NON* funzionare grazie al fantastico sistema #SNAP che qualcuno nello staff di #Ubuntu ha detto semplicemente "freghiamocene", nonostante sia stato segnalato da ANNI il problema

    Vediamo quanti anni devono passare ancora... Io sono senza parole 😞

  22. @jpmens Read that too and also had a look at #cznic #Knot for a #dnssec bump-in-the-wire signer.
    Also seen that @nitrokey also has doc for #Knot: docs.nitrokey.com/nethsm/knotd
    One operational question I have is the the ability to pre-generate keys once on the HSM, lock the #pkcs11 interface and have #Knot use them for automatic roll-overs according to policy w/o creating new keys automatically.
    My understanding of #Knot manual mode is that key timing has to be done… well, manually!

  23. CW: CW PKCS11 Smartcard Hausaufgabenhilfe

    Ich bereite einen Bugreport vor für einen proprietären Smartcardtreiber, der allein dadurch, dass er geladen wird, #pcscd abspacken lässt, egal ob eine #Smartcard im Reader steckt oder nicht.

    Mit dem "normalen" onepin-opensc-pkcs11.so tritt das Problem nicht auf.

    Jetzt kommts: Kann jemand einen frei downloadbaren proprietären #PKCS11-Smartcardtreiber eines namhaften Anbieters 🤡 empfehlen, den ich daneben halten kann, ob er sich genauso erratisch verhält?

  24. What could cause #Firefox (after opening a new tab) to try to unlock a #PKCS11 by asking for PIN? #security #infosec

  25. Morgen, am 14.06.2024 um 18:30 gibt es wieder ein #VALUG-Treffen im Alten Schl8hof in #Wels. @hkrat wird diesmal Einblicke in die Thematik "#HSM (#TPM, #CAAM) & #PKCS11" gewähren. valug.at/events/2024-06-14-hsm

  26. While exploring use of PKCS #11 devices in contexts, I stumbled over a bug (and potential security issue) in the yubihsm_pkcs11.so driver for devices.

    Long form text by Christian Reitter (who walked me through the coordinated disclosure process with , and did amazing work analyzing and writing up the issue):
    blog.inhq.net/posts/yubico-yub

    Yubico advisory: yubico.com/support/security-ad

    : cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.

    (Thanks again to @sovtechfund for funding my work)

  27. Over the last half year, I've spent time with PKCS #11 and PIV hardware security devices. In particular, using such devices in the context.

    Entry points for results of this work:

    - codeberg.org/heiko/openpgp-pkc
    - codeberg.org/heiko/openpgp-piv
    - codeberg.org/heiko/pkcs11-open

    One particular focus was building CI testing infrastructure (including gitlab.com/hkos/virtual-piv/), to make future work on these codebases easier (and hopefully fun).

    [This work was funded by @sovtechfund]

  28. OASIS Open is a cosponsor of this year's International Cryptographic Module Conference (#ICMC23) in Ottawa this September; two of our technical committees, #KMIP and #PKCS11, are on the agenda.
    More details: icmconference.org
    #cryptography #security #standards

    RT @[email protected]: Agenda Announced! The Industry Reconvenes this Fall in Ottawa to Review Changing Global Standards ... in commercial cryptography.

  29. Today I spent a bit of time with the and its driver (the yubihsm_pkcs11.so driver had exhibited some confusing-to-me behavior, during occasional experiments over the past few weeks).

    After a closer look, I believe that "yubihsm_pkcs11.so" version 2.4.0 has introduced a number of rather confusing regressions around object IDs (see github.com/Yubico/yubihsm-shel ).

    This investigation was a side-quest of my @sovtechfund financed project "PKCS#11 support for @sequoiapgp".

  30. What are good #opensource #certificate authorities which allows #PKCS11? #PKI #CA This need to be deployed for smaller orgs.

    @filippo any tips?

  31. Any experts who want to chime in on this discussion, whether or not to mark private keys as unmodifiable? github.com/NLnetLabs/krill/iss

  32. As the adoption of Delegated and Hybrid grows, so are the number of Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) out in the field that people store Krill's key material on.

    is pretty straight forward, but especially can be quite finicky. So we're keeping a public list of interoperability information. github.com/NLnetLabs/krill/iss

    Learn more about the option to use HSMs here: krill.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/sta

  33. When playing with my 5 key, I have hit a wall. OTP keys were not straight forward, but worked. works fine. But moving secret key from to the key became blocker. It just doesn't work! Gitlab's or GitHub's works like charm though.