#fulldiskencryption — Public Fediverse posts

@snufkin_vc

Heya!!

At this moment, #OpenBSD is the easiest to get a fully-working system. FreeBSD has decent hardware compatibility, but both wifi and the GUI are a somewhat manual (although fairly trivial) affair, at least until they complete their desktop installer.

#NetBSD also gives you a usable (and actually pretty attractive) X11 system in "base," but the hardware support isn't quite as good, and it lacks #FullDiskEncryption, if that's important to you.

@snufkin_vc

Heya!!

At this moment, #OpenBSD is the easiest to get a fully-working system. FreeBSD has decent hardware compatibility, but both wifi and the GUI are a somewhat manual (although fairly trivial) affair, at least until they complete their desktop installer.

#NetBSD also gives you a usable (and actually pretty attractive) X11 system in "base," but the hardware support isn't quite as good, and it lacks #FullDiskEncryption, if that's important to you.

🐧 Hibernate & vollverschlüsseltes Linux

Definitiv eine knifflige Angelegenheit, aber: works for me! Blogge dazu später/bald mal was.

#Linux #LUKS #FullDiskEncryption #FDE #DevOps

The Double-Edged Sword of Digital Freedom: The Risks of Infinito.Nexus with Native Tor Support

⚠️ Disclaimer

This article was generated entirely by artificial intelligence without editorial review.

To publish this analysis quickly, I deliberately chose to release it without manual editing or fact-checking. The purpose of this article is not to provide a polished technical specification, but to stimulate discussion about the societal, ethical, and security implications of the next generation of Infinito.Nexus with native Tor support.

Some technical assumptions, predictions, or conclusions may therefore be incomplete, inaccurate, or open to debate. They should be understood as informed analysis rather than verified fact.

The scenarios described in this article are intended to illustrate both the opportunities and the risks of increasingly accessible privacy-preserving infrastructure. They do not advocate, encourage, or endorse illegal activity. The same technologies that can strengthen digital sovereignty, protect journalists, human rights organizations, researchers, and political opposition operating under censorship can also be misused by malicious actors.

The goal of this article is to encourage an open discussion about the consequences of making powerful decentralized infrastructure available to a much broader audience. As with encryption, Linux, Git, peer-to-peer networks, and the Internet itself, technological progress creates both new freedoms and new responsibilities.

Please read this article critically, verify important claims independently, and view it as a starting point for discussion rather than a definitive statement on the future of decentralized infrastructure.

Technology is neutral.

Whether it empowers democratic resistance or enables organized crime depends on the people using it.

With native Tor integration, Infinito.Nexus has the potential to fundamentally change how self-hosted infrastructure is deployed. It could become possible for anyone to create a completely private digital ecosystem with only minimal technical knowledge.

That prospect is both exciting — and concerning.

A World Beyond Traditional Surveillance

Today’s Internet relies heavily on centralized infrastructure.

Governments can subpoena cloud providers.

Internet Service Providers can monitor traffic.

Hosting companies know where servers are located.

DNS providers can suspend domains.

Payment providers can freeze accounts.

Social media platforms can remove communities.

Tor changes that equation.

By integrating Tor directly into the infrastructure layer instead of treating it as an optional add-on, organizations could operate entirely within Onion Services.

No public IP addresses.

No public DNS.

No visible server locations.

No conventional attack surface.

Infrastructure that was previously easy to discover suddenly becomes practically invisible to anyone outside the Tor network.

From Old Smartphones to Invisible Infrastructure

Perhaps the most disruptive consequence of native Tor support is that almost anyone could become an anonymous infrastructure operator.

Instead of renting a VPS or purchasing expensive server hardware, users could simply take an old smartphone, install a Linux distribution such as Droidian, deploy Infinito.Nexus, and immediately have a functional server reachable exclusively through Tor.

Modern smartphones already contain everything traditionally required for a small server:

• multicore ARM processors
• flash storage
• Wi-Fi and LTE connectivity
• extremely low power consumption
• integrated batteries acting as an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)

Unlike conventional servers, smartphones can continue operating during short power outages without requiring any additional hardware.

Because all communication occurs through Onion Services, the physical location of the device becomes significantly harder to determine than traditionally hosted infrastructure.

A server could operate from:

• an apartment
• an office
• a vehicle
• a backpack
• a cabin
• virtually anywhere with Internet access

Instead of racks in a datacenter, entire organizations could operate from inexpensive commodity hardware.

Infrastructure that once required thousands of dollars could eventually fit inside a jacket pocket.

Organization Beyond Censorship

Perhaps the most transformative consequence of native Tor support is not anonymity itself — it is organization.

Modern democratic movements require far more than encrypted messaging. They need complete digital infrastructure.

Imagine a group deploying the following services exclusively as Onion Services:

• Matrix for encrypted communication
• Nextcloud for document sharing
• OpenProject for task management
• Git for software development
• Wiki systems for documentation
• forums for public discussion
• video conferencing
• identity management with single sign-on

Every service is accessible only through Tor.

There are no public IP addresses.

There are no publicly reachable domains.

There is no central cloud provider that can simply terminate the infrastructure.

For political opposition movements operating under authoritarian governments, this could fundamentally change what is possible.

In countries such as Russia or Iran, governments have repeatedly attempted to restrict independent media, block communication platforms, and pressure hosting providers into taking services offline. A decentralized infrastructure based on Tor Onion Services makes these traditional forms of censorship considerably more difficult.

If one server disappears, another can be brought online using the same deployment automation and cryptographic identities.

Instead of relying on a single datacenter, an organization could distribute its infrastructure across many independently operated devices, including repurposed smartphones running Linux distributions such as Droidian. Every device becomes part of the organization’s digital backbone while remaining reachable only through the Tor network.

This significantly lowers the barrier to building resilient communication networks for journalists, NGOs, researchers, humanitarian organizations, and democratic opposition movements.

Building Invisible Organizations

Imagine an organization deploying:

• Identity Management
• Matrix
• Nextcloud
• Git
• Email
• Video Conferencing
• Project Management
• Forums
• Social Networks
• AI Infrastructure

Every service exists exclusively as an Onion Service.

Employees connect only through Tor.

No public domains.

No public IP addresses.

No externally visible services.

From the perspective of the public Internet, the organization barely exists.

A Powerful Tool for Democracy

For many people around the world, this would be an extraordinary step toward digital sovereignty.

Political opposition operating under authoritarian governments often faces:

• Internet censorship
• mass surveillance
• infrastructure seizures
• domain confiscation
• ISP monitoring
• targeted cyber attacks

A hidden smartphone consuming only a few watts of electricity could host secure communications for an activist movement.

Journalists could publish anonymously.

NGOs could coordinate without relying on commercial cloud providers.

Entire communities could communicate through infrastructure that is extremely difficult to discover or disable.

History repeatedly demonstrates that secure communication is one of the foundations of democratic resistance.

The Other Side of the Coin

Unfortunately, technology does not distinguish between good and bad actors.

The exact same infrastructure could also be deployed by:

• organized cybercrime
• ransomware groups
• illegal marketplaces
• extremist organizations
• terrorist networks
• large-scale fraud operations
• illegal trafficking

If deploying anonymous infrastructure becomes as simple as flashing Linux onto an old smartphone and clicking through an installation wizard, the barrier to entry changes dramatically.

What once required experienced Linux administrators could eventually become accessible to almost anyone.

A hidden smartphone server could host:

• a secure school collaboration platform

or

• an anonymous criminal marketplace.

Technically, there may be little difference.

The software cannot distinguish between them.

Risks for Democratic Societies

For democratic societies such as Germany, this presents a difficult challenge.

Security agencies often rely on information obtained from hosting providers, cloud operators, domain registries, DNS providers, or centralized communication platforms during investigations.

Infrastructure that exists exclusively as Tor Onion Services reduces the availability of these traditional investigative paths.

This can make investigations more difficult and more resource-intensive, especially when organizations are technically competent and operate their own infrastructure.

A terrorist cell, extremist group, or organized criminal network could theoretically operate:

• private Matrix servers
• encrypted file storage
• internal forums
• planning boards
• identity systems
• software repositories
• anonymous web services

all without relying on public-facing infrastructure.

That does not mean such groups become impossible to detect.

Tor does not make people invisible.

Law enforcement can still use endpoint forensics, undercover operations, financial investigations, human intelligence, surveillance of physical logistics, and mistakes made by suspects.

But the balance changes.

The stronger privacy technologies become, the harder traditional bulk surveillance and provider-based investigations become.

This is exactly why the same tools that protect dissidents in authoritarian states can also create serious challenges for law enforcement in democratic states.

The Democratization of Anonymous Infrastructure

Historically, operating Onion Services required substantial expertise.

Administrators needed to understand:

• Linux
• networking
• reverse proxies
• DNS
• Tor
• certificates
• firewalls
• application integration

Automation changes everything.

Eventually, the entire deployment process could become:

1. Install Droidian on an old smartphone.
2. Install Infinito.Nexus.
3. Select the desired applications.
4. Enable Tor support.
5. Click Deploy.

Minutes later, an entire private infrastructure could be online.

No cloud provider.

No VPS.

No static IP.

No public DNS.

Infrastructure that previously required experienced system administrators becomes accessible to ordinary users.

That democratization is both empowering and dangerous.

Open Source Has Always Faced This Dilemma

This is not a new ethical problem.

Encryption protects:

• journalists
• dissidents
• criminals

VPNs protect:

• activists
• ransomware operators

Git is used to build:

• medical software
• malware

Linux powers:

• hospitals
• botnets

Artificial Intelligence can:

• accelerate scientific discovery
• generate phishing campaigns

Technology itself has no morality.

People do.

Infinito.Nexus Is Infrastructure

Infinito.Nexus is not being developed to create hidden criminal networks.

Its purpose is to simplify the deployment of sovereign, self-hosted infrastructure.

Native Tor support simply extends that philosophy.

The software itself does not decide who uses it.

The responsibility remains with those who deploy it.

The Ethical Challenge

Should powerful privacy technologies be withheld because they could be abused?

Or should society accept that technologies capable of protecting freedom will inevitably also be exploited by malicious actors?

There is no perfect answer.

Throughout history, almost every revolutionary communication technology — from the printing press to encrypted messaging — has been used for both constructive and destructive purposes.

Tor is no different.

Neither is Infinito.Nexus.

Technical Design

Native Tor support is currently being designed as a core networking feature of Infinito.Nexus.

Instead of treating Tor as an optional add-on, every deployed application can automatically receive its own Onion Service while remaining fully integrated into the deployment framework.

The current design proposal is publicly available:

Native Tor Support Requirements
https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/infinito-nexus-core/blob/feature/svc-net-tor/docs/requirements/031-svc-net-tor-onion.md

Related projects:

Infinito.Nexus Core
https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/infinito-nexus-core

Hetzner Arch LUKS
https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/hetzner-arch-luks

Linux Image Manager
https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/linux-image-manager

These projects together lay the groundwork for a future where deploying fully encrypted, self-hosted, Tor-native infrastructure becomes almost as simple as installing a mobile app.

Conclusion

Native Tor support has the potential to fundamentally reshape how self-hosted infrastructure is deployed.

For the first time, individuals, NGOs, journalists, companies, and political opposition movements could build private digital ecosystems with remarkably little technical expertise.

At the same time, the same technology could lower the barrier for anonymous criminal infrastructure.

A discarded smartphone running Linux could become a resilient, battery-backed server hidden almost anywhere.

That reality is both inspiring and unsettling.

Like encryption, Linux, Git, VPNs, and the Internet itself, Infinito.Nexus is infrastructure.

Infrastructure does not decide how it is used.

People do.

The challenge for society is therefore not whether such technology should exist, but how we choose to live in a world where powerful privacy tools become accessible to everyone.

Unlocking Fully Encrypted Servers over Tor

Remote servers should not have to choose between security and availability.

For years, the common compromise has been to expose SSH to the public Internet or to rely on VPNs and provider-specific KVM consoles whenever a LUKS-encrypted server reboots.

I believe there is a better approach.

By combining LUKS, Tor Onion Services, and a lightweight SSH server running directly inside the initramfs, it is possible to build servers that remain fully encrypted at rest, yet can always be unlocked remotely without exposing any public management interface.

This article describes the concept and how it could evolve into a reusable feature for Infinito.Nexus.

The Problem

Full disk encryption protects data when a server is powered off.

However, after every reboot someone must enter the LUKS passphrase.

For remote dedicated servers this usually means one of the following:

• opening SSH to the Internet
• connecting through a VPN
• using a provider’s KVM/IPMI console
• booting into a rescue system

While remote unlocking via Dropbear inside the initramfs is already a well-known solution, it still typically relies on a publicly reachable IP address.

The Idea

Instead of exposing SSH publicly, start Tor directly inside the initramfs.

The boot sequence would look like this:

Server boots
        │
        ▼
Kernel + initramfs
        │
        ▼
Network initialization
        │
        ▼
Tor starts
        │
        ▼
Temporary Onion Service appears

unlock-xxxxxxxx.onion
        │
        ▼
SSH via Tor
        │
        ▼
cryptsetup luksOpen
        │
        ▼
Root filesystem unlocked
        │
        ▼
Operating system boots
        │
        ▼
Temporary Onion Service disappears

The administrator simply connects through Tor:

torsocks ssh [email protected]

After entering the LUKS passphrase, the operating system continues booting normally.

Separate Identities for Boot and Runtime

One of the strongest aspects of this design is that boot-time and runtime use different Onion identities.

Boot environment

• dedicated Ed25519 key
• dedicated Onion address
• only SSH
• exists only during boot

Example:

unlock-xxxxxxxx.onion

Runtime environment

Once the operating system has booted:

• the initramfs exits
• Tor inside initramfs stops
• a new Tor instance starts
• completely different Onion addresses become available

For example:

ssh-xxxxxxxx.onion
cloud-xxxxxxxx.onion
matrix-xxxxxxxx.onion
mail-xxxxxxxx.onion

The unlock address simply disappears.

This cleanly separates the trust boundaries between the bootloader environment and the running operating system.

Why Tor?

Using Tor instead of exposing SSH directly provides several advantages:

• no public IP address required
• no exposed SSH port
• no VPN infrastructure
• works behind NAT or Carrier-Grade NAT
• management interface is only reachable through the Tor network
• additional network privacy
• ideal for self-hosted infrastructure

This is particularly attractive for servers hosted in data centers where administrators rarely have physical access.

What Happens After a Crash?

Whenever the server reboots:

1. the initramfs starts
2. networking is initialized
3. Tor publishes the temporary Onion Service
4. you connect via SSH
5. you unlock LUKS
6. the server continues booting

No KVM console.

No VPN.

No public SSH endpoint.

Only Tor.

Of course, catastrophic failures such as a broken initramfs or missing network drivers still require traditional recovery methods such as a rescue system or KVM.

Existing Building Blocks

Most of the required components already exist today.

My repository hetzner-arch-luks demonstrates how to deploy Arch Linux with full disk encryption on Hetzner servers and configure remote unlocking via SSH during the initramfs stage.

Repository:

https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/hetzner-arch-luks

Another project, linux-image-manager, automates the creation and customization of Linux images and could serve as the foundation for embedding Tor, Dropbear/TinySSH, and the required initramfs configuration into reusable images.

Repository:

https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/linux-image-manager

Together, these repositories provide much of the groundwork required for a fully automated implementation.

Future Integration into Infinito.Nexus

I envision this becoming a native feature of Infinito.Nexus.

Provisioning a server could automatically:

• install Arch Linux
• configure LUKS full disk encryption
• generate an initramfs containing:
  • Tor
  • Dropbear or TinySSH
  • cryptsetup
• create a dedicated boot-time Onion Service
• automatically switch to permanent runtime Onion Services after successful boot

From the administrator’s perspective, recovering a rebooted server would be as simple as:

torsocks ssh root@unlock-<hostname>.onion

Enter the passphrase.

The server continues booting.

Nothing is ever exposed to the public Internet.

Looking Ahead

This concept combines three mature technologies:

• LUKS
• Tor Onion Services
• Remote initramfs unlocking

While each technology already exists independently, integrating them into a seamless provisioning workflow could significantly improve the security and usability of encrypted self-hosted infrastructure.

For projects focused on digital sovereignty and privacy, removing the need for publicly exposed management interfaces is a natural next step.

@ubuntu
Is there a specific reason you do not make #fulldiskencryption the default option on your installer of the desktop 26.x version?

I could not believe it at first. Eventually had to waste some hours reinstalling. Otherwise huge #itsecurity hazard. Anyone who takes it can just read/manipulate all my files and potentially some chrome passwords etc.

#linux #ubuntu #askubuntu ;)

YellowKey: BitLocker Bypass or Backdoor

YellowKey, tracked as CVE-2026-45585, is a public BitLocker bypass that abuses WinRE/recovery-path behavior to expose a protected volume without the Windows password, recovery key, or AES cracking.

At the time of this post, the author’s GitHub and original YellowKey repo appear to be down.

Read more: https://forum.hashpwn.net/post/13339

#BitLocker #YellowKey #CVE202645585 #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #WindowsSecurity #TPM #FullDiskEncryption #hack #exploit #news #hashpwn

When two Hetzner servers died at the same time

On May 12, 2026, two of my Arch Linux + LUKS servers at Hetzner became unreachable at the same moment. Both had been running for 4+ months without issue. Both had received the same pacman -Syyu the day before, but had stayed on the old kernel until the morning the websites stopped responding. I rebooted — SSH never came back. nmap -Pn -p 22 showed filtered from anywhere. No ping. No banner. The Hetzner Robot panel insisted the hardware was fine.

Several hours went into hypotheses that turned out to be wrong:

• The encryptssh initcpio hook referencing a /usr/lib/initcpio/udev/11-dm-initramfs.rules file that no longer exists. Real bug, no boot impact — the initramfs rebuilds anyway.
• PermitRootLogin no in sshd_config. Real misconfiguration, fixed it, didn’t help. A refusing sshd shows closed, not filtered.
• Predictable interface-naming drift after the systemd 260 upgrade. Patched the .network config to match by MAC. Useful hardening; not the cause.
• Stale GRUB stage1 + core.img in the MBR. Arch never re-runs grub-install after a grub package upgrade. Refreshed it. Still filtered.
• Kernel 7.0.5 regression. Downgraded to 6.18.3, the kernel that had run for 4 months. Still filtered. So the kernel itself wasn’t it either.

The clue was in the persistent journal: a single recorded boot from December 31 to May 12 10:13 UTC, and absolutely nothing after. Every reboot since the upgrade was failing before systemd-journald could flush to disk — so the failure had to be in the initramfs, before the root filesystem was even mounted.

What it almost certainly was

Hetzner Dedicated servers configure the initramfs network with ip=dhcp on the kernel command line. That depends on Hetzner’s DHCP server replying to whatever request format the current kernel sends. Somewhere between kernel 6.18 / iproute2 6.18 and kernel 7.0 / iproute2 7.0, the request format changed enough that Hetzner’s DHCP stopped responding. Effects:

• Old kernel at runtime kept the interface already configured (Phase A — 32 hours of healthy operation after the package upgrade).
• New kernel cold-boots, hits DHCP, never gets an IP, dropbear cannot listen, port 22 stays filtered.

Hetzner’s own documentation has been quietly moving away from ip=dhcp toward static IPv4 in the kernel command line. The fix is exactly that:

GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="cryptdevice=/dev/md1:cryptroot ip=A.B.C.D::GATEWAY:255.255.255.255:hostname:eth0:none"

One line in /etc/default/grub, grub-mkconfig, reboot. No more dependency on Hetzner’s DHCP responding to whatever your current kernel sends.

Why it matters for anyone running this stack

If you run Arch on Hetzner Dedicated with full-disk encryption and remote unlock via dropbear, the ip=dhcp shipped by installimage is a latent bug. It can keep working for years and then break overnight, on every machine you have, after a routine pacman -Syyu. The static-IP version is what Hetzner now recommends and removes the entire dependency.

Tooling

While debugging, I turned the whole rescue / chroot / diagnose / fix workflow into a Python CLI (hal) — including hal fix static-ip, which derives the static cmdline directly from your existing systemd-networkd .network file:

→ github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/hetzner-arch-luks

Single command, idempotent, reversible (the original /etc/default/grub is backed up to .hal-backup). If you’re on this stack, switch to static IP before the next kernel upgrade catches you.

When two Hetzner servers died at the same time

On May 12, 2026, two of my Arch Linux + LUKS servers at Hetzner became unreachable at the same moment. Both had been running for 4+ months without issue. Both had received the same pacman -Syyu the day before, but had stayed on the old kernel until the morning the websites stopped responding. I rebooted — SSH never came back. nmap -Pn -p 22 showed filtered from anywhere. No ping. No banner. The Hetzner Robot panel insisted the hardware was fine.

Several hours went into hypotheses that turned out to be wrong:

• The encryptssh initcpio hook referencing a /usr/lib/initcpio/udev/11-dm-initramfs.rules file that no longer exists. Real bug, no boot impact — the initramfs rebuilds anyway.
• PermitRootLogin no in sshd_config. Real misconfiguration, fixed it, didn’t help. A refusing sshd shows closed, not filtered.
• Predictable interface-naming drift after the systemd 260 upgrade. Patched the .network config to match by MAC. Useful hardening; not the cause.
• Stale GRUB stage1 + core.img in the MBR. Arch never re-runs grub-install after a grub package upgrade. Refreshed it. Still filtered.
• Kernel 7.0.5 regression. Downgraded to 6.18.3, the kernel that had run for 4 months. Still filtered. So the kernel itself wasn’t it either.

The clue was in the persistent journal: a single recorded boot from December 31 to May 12 10:13 UTC, and absolutely nothing after. Every reboot since the upgrade was failing before systemd-journald could flush to disk — so the failure had to be in the initramfs, before the root filesystem was even mounted.

What it almost certainly was

Hetzner Dedicated servers configure the initramfs network with ip=dhcp on the kernel command line. That depends on Hetzner’s DHCP server replying to whatever request format the current kernel sends. Somewhere between kernel 6.18 / iproute2 6.18 and kernel 7.0 / iproute2 7.0, the request format changed enough that Hetzner’s DHCP stopped responding. Effects:

• Old kernel at runtime kept the interface already configured (Phase A — 32 hours of healthy operation after the package upgrade).
• New kernel cold-boots, hits DHCP, never gets an IP, dropbear cannot listen, port 22 stays filtered.

Hetzner’s own documentation has been quietly moving away from ip=dhcp toward static IPv4 in the kernel command line. The fix is exactly that:

GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="cryptdevice=/dev/md1:cryptroot ip=A.B.C.D::GATEWAY:255.255.255.255:hostname:eth0:none"

One line in /etc/default/grub, grub-mkconfig, reboot. No more dependency on Hetzner’s DHCP responding to whatever your current kernel sends.

Why it matters for anyone running this stack

If you run Arch on Hetzner Dedicated with full-disk encryption and remote unlock via dropbear, the ip=dhcp shipped by installimage is a latent bug. It can keep working for years and then break overnight, on every machine you have, after a routine pacman -Syyu. The static-IP version is what Hetzner now recommends and removes the entire dependency.

Tooling

While debugging, I turned the whole rescue / chroot / diagnose / fix workflow into a Python CLI (hal) — including hal fix static-ip, which derives the static cmdline directly from your existing systemd-networkd .network file:

→ github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/hetzner-arch-luks

Single command, idempotent, reversible (the original /etc/default/grub is backed up to .hal-backup). If you’re on this stack, switch to static IP before the next kernel upgrade catches you.

@kkarhan I was just pointed at this:

https://search.nixos.org/packages?channel=unstable&query=Shufflecake

https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3576915.3623126

#FDE #FullDiskEncryption #Deniability #PlausibleDeniability #Shufflecake

@kkarhan I was just pointed at this:

https://search.nixos.org/packages?channel=unstable&query=Shufflecake

https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3576915.3623126

#FDE #FullDiskEncryption #Deniability #PlausibleDeniability #Shufflecake

I got a "hankerin'" (as we say here) to try daily-driving #FreeBSD again, but I kind of want to wait until the desktop installer is ready.

@evgandr, how fast did you say you got FreeBSD to resume from S3, again?

I wouldn't mind trying #NetBSD again, but the instructions for #FDE (#FullDiskEncryption) looked quite daunting.

I got a "hankerin'" (as we say here) to try daily-driving #FreeBSD again, but I kind of want to wait until the desktop installer is ready.

@evgandr, how fast did you say you got FreeBSD to resume from S3, again?

I wouldn't mind trying #NetBSD again, but the instructions for #FDE (#FullDiskEncryption) looked quite daunting.

#POLL: Do you use Full-Disk Encryption, such as LUKS on #Linux or GELI on #FreeBSD?

#FullDiskEncryption #FDE #LUKS #GELI

#POLL: Do you use Full-Disk Encryption, such as LUKS on #Linux or GELI on #FreeBSD?

#FullDiskEncryption #FDE #LUKS #GELI

How to install @linuxmint with #btrfs, #raid and #luks #fulldiskencryption. Spent over a week trying to figure this out...

https://gist.github.com/Leniwcowaty/4b2c239ca74629cad60d4718f79ff600

#linux #tips #tutorial #informative #content #technology #mint #debian #installation #distrohopping #security

Ubuntu 25.10 To Feature Experimental TPM-Backed Full Disk Encryption (FDE) #ubuntu25_10 #TPM #FDE #QuestingQuokka #Security #FullDiskEncryption #TrustedPlatformModule #Linux #Opensource
https://ostechnix.com/ubuntu-25-10-tpm-backed-full-disk-encryption-fde/

Ubuntu 25.10 To Feature Experimental TPM-Backed Full Disk Encryption (FDE) #ubuntu25_10 #TPM #FDE #QuestingQuokka #Security #FullDiskEncryption #TrustedPlatformModule #Linux #Opensource
https://ostechnix.com/ubuntu-25-10-tpm-backed-full-disk-encryption-fde/

CyMaIS: 100 % DSGVO-konform

Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DSGVO) schreibt strenge Vorgaben vor, wenn es um den Umgang mit personenbezogenen Daten geht. Wer seine Unternehmensdaten und die persönlichen Informationen von Mitarbeitenden oder Kund:innen schützen möchte, braucht mehr als nur eine Standard-Cloud. CyMaIS erfüllt nicht nur sämtliche DSGVO-Anforderungen, sondern geht mit ausgefeilten Sicherheitskonzepten und flexibler Infrastruktur noch einen Schritt weiter.

[…]

https://blog.cymais.cloud/blog/2025/06/19/cymais-100-dsgvo-konform/

Installing #VoidLinux is one thing, but documenting it is key. I'm working on #dracut hooks to automatically create and sign the #unifiedkernelimage. I've already done #FullDiskEncryption (including /boot)

The best thing is that i can lookup most of the stuff on the #ArchLinux #wiki (except #systemd stuff). I like #runit, though i'm not used to it yet.

I can also fix or reinstall the OS how much i want because of my separate /home partition. This level of customization and control is so cool.

I'm already excited to #automate the base system installation using #Ansible.

#linux #unix #void #customization #secureboot #automation

Installing #VoidLinux is one thing, but documenting it is key. I'm working on #dracut hooks to automatically create and sign the #unifiedkernelimage. I've already done #FullDiskEncryption (including /boot)

The best thing is that i can lookup most of the stuff on the #ArchLinux #wiki (except #systemd stuff). I like #runit, though i'm not used to it yet.

I can also fix or reinstall the OS how much i want because of my separate /home partition. This level of customization and control is so cool.

I'm already excited to #automate the base system installation using #Ansible.

#linux #unix #void #customization #secureboot #automation

Thinking of trying #postmarketOS on my #PinebookPro.

I didn't even know you could run it as a desktop OS.

Supposedly the installer supports #FullDiskEncryption, which is... "poggers," I think the kids say.

#pmOS #FDE

Thinking of trying #postmarketOS on my #PinebookPro.

I didn't even know you could run it as a desktop OS.

Supposedly the installer supports #FullDiskEncryption, which is... "poggers," I think the kids say.

#pmOS #FDE

@Codeschubse @linuxmint

A user named linux22 on the mint forums did a writeup on how to do #FullDiskEncryption on #LinuxMint 22, perhaps you can find some helpful pointers there. Good luck!

https://forums.linuxmint.com/viewtopic.php?t=198077

@Codeschubse @linuxmint

A user named linux22 on the mint forums did a writeup on how to do #FullDiskEncryption on #LinuxMint 22, perhaps you can find some helpful pointers there. Good luck!

https://forums.linuxmint.com/viewtopic.php?t=198077

Dilemme #FullDiskEncryption sous #Linux :

mon installation Debian pour le vieux portable à processeur i3 et 4Go de RAM, je regrette de l'avoir faite avec chiffrement du disque parce que l'engin galère pas mal niveau performance, et c'est pour faire un serveur, donc c'est pas pertinent.

Je crois qu'on va recommencer ce soir.

Dilemme #FullDiskEncryption sous #Linux :

mon installation Debian pour le vieux portable à processeur i3 et 4Go de RAM, je regrette de l'avoir faite avec chiffrement du disque parce que l'engin galère pas mal niveau performance, et c'est pour faire un serveur, donc c'est pas pertinent.

Je crois qu'on va recommencer ce soir.

'"the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) […] allows an unattended auto-unlock, providing a pass is no longer required. That completely fits to secure disks that have been put in a machine in a safe location. With FDE [Full Disk Encryption] and TPM, your data becomes protected and cannot be read outside of your machine."'

https://www.suse.com/c/full-disk-encryption-grub2-tpm/ #grub #tpm #FullDiskEncryption

'"the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) […] allows an unattended auto-unlock, providing a pass is no longer required. That completely fits to secure disks that have been put in a machine in a safe location. With FDE [Full Disk Encryption] and TPM, your data becomes protected and cannot be read outside of your machine."'

https://www.suse.com/c/full-disk-encryption-grub2-tpm/ #grub #tpm #FullDiskEncryption

#Cellebrite is just a hardware encryption key brute forcing device for hardware running #Android? Curious if it also has the same effect on #postmarketOS with #FullDiskEncryption. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6mlaPLPcXU

OpenSUSE Aeon Desktop Enhances Security with Full Disk Encryption #Aeondesktop #Opensuse #FDE #FullDiskEncryption #Linux #Security
https://ostechnix.com/full-disk-encryption-in-aeon-desktop/

OpenSUSE Aeon Desktop Enhances Security with Full Disk Encryption #Aeondesktop #Opensuse #FDE #FullDiskEncryption #Linux #Security
https://ostechnix.com/full-disk-encryption-in-aeon-desktop/

@stu

#NomadBSD is nice! Solid xfce desktop, persistent USB session (or desktop installer), and even GELI* #FullDiskEncryption, even on persistent USB.

*It stands for "Geom ELI."
As far as i can tell, only one person on the earth knows what ELI stands for. Yes, the author. Yes, I have emailed him., No, he's not telling. No, it doesn't stand for Encryption Layer Interface. Yes, I asked. 😆

#FreeBSD #GELI

@stu

#NomadBSD is nice! Solid xfce desktop, persistent USB session (or desktop installer), and even GELI* #FullDiskEncryption, even on persistent USB.

*It stands for "Geom ELI."
As far as i can tell, only one person on the earth knows what ELI stands for. Yes, the author. Yes, I have emailed him., No, he's not telling. No, it doesn't stand for Encryption Layer Interface. Yes, I asked. 😆

#FreeBSD #GELI

Kudos to @opensuse and their work on systemd-boot integration!! Just switched from Grub2 with #secureboot , #snapper #btrfs snapshots and #fulldiskencryption configured following docs (https://en.opensuse.org/Systemd-boot) and it is working great.

Any #nixos user who could answer me this question?

If i setup nixos on my laptop, with luks #fulldiskencryption and copy the config file to my workstation, is that gonna work? I'm asking because luks has a unique id and stuff like that. Thanks in advance.

Any #nixos user who could answer me this question?

If i setup nixos on my laptop, with luks #fulldiskencryption and copy the config file to my workstation, is that gonna work? I'm asking because luks has a unique id and stuff like that. Thanks in advance.

Also, #pikvm is something i really need. That way, i could use #fulldiskencryption on my server and still be able to reboot it or change #bios settings even when i'm not at home.

Also, #pikvm is something i really need. That way, i could use #fulldiskencryption on my server and still be able to reboot it or change #bios settings even when i'm not at home.

Got my #archlinux installation ready with #secureboot, #btrfs and #fulldiskencryption. Next step will be some #hardening with #lynis.

I'm thinking of moving back from #NixOS to #Arch or #Debian.

I'm finding #NixOS just too complicated to deal with specially when it comes to #drivers.

Also, #NixOS doesn't support #systemd on #initramfs which makes #FullDiskEncryption harder as it doesn't allow me to use systemd-enroll.

(tl;dr summary: trying to get data from encrypted FreeBSD disks on Linux)

Scenario: I had an old server running #FreeBSD, which I'm wanting to migrate to a new server running Linux. I put a couple of SSDs in the new machine to use as a mirror, and set up the basics.

I've now moved the disks to the new server, but actually using them directly is a bit of a faff since I encrypted my root pool's disks with geli. I found Portable Geli (https://github.com/bijanebrahimi/portable-geli) and hoped that would work for me, but after some experimentation I realised it doesn't support keyfiles, and my setup used one.

Now, I've created a VM on the new server and passed the disks through to it and reconfigured the boot config to let me effectively boot my old server, but it would be nice to not have to do this and just have the data be directly available on Linux.

Does anyone know if it would be incredibly frustrating for someone with very little in the way of C skills to lift the code to support keyfiles from geli and add it to portable geli, or alternatively how terrible an idea it might be to remove one drive from the (RAIDZ, 4x3TB) pool at a time, reinitialise it with LUKS, and add it back in and wait for it to resilver? The disks are pretty old, which I hope makes them more trustworthy than they would be if they were brand new...

#FreeBSD #ZFS #Linux #GELI #LUKS #FullDiskEncryption

Just in case anyone is looking for this info, you *CAN* use #Libreboot and #OpenBSD with #FullDiskEncryption (#FDE).

You just have to flash a libreboot ROM with a #SeaBIOS payload, and both the physical volume and the #encrypted disk (e.g., sd0 and sd2 from install environment, assuming that sd1 is the usb media) must be formatted as #MBR.

#GPT will *not* work.

Ok. For anyone that might help at any point in the future, have fun. ;)

Just found this #OpenBSD based project:

https://www.secbsd.org/

Still in alpha testing !

Contributors needed...

#BSD #infosec #floss #opensource #cybersécurité #testdintrusion #pentesting #privacy #hacking #FullDiskEncryption #BugHunters #cybersecurity #SecurityResearchers #OffensiveSecurity #DefensiveSecurity