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#faultinjection — Public Fediverse posts

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  1. Silent Data Corruption: A Major Reliability Challenge in Large-Scale LLM Training (TU Berlin)

    A new technical paper, “Exploring Silent Data Corruption as a Reliability Challenge in LLM Training,” was published by…
    #Germany #DE #Europe #EU #Europa #Berlin #faultinjection #GPUs #hardwaresecurity #LLMtraining #LLMs #reliability #SDC #silentdatacorruption #TechnischeUniversitätBerlin
    europesays.com/germany/4039/

  2. TurkuSec September Meetup

    Date: 04.09.2025 (Thursday)
    Time: 17:40 – Onwards

    "Burp Like a Pro - Tips and tricks from the hood" by Anton Lindholm

    "Rust and Software Defenses Against Physical Fault Injection Attacks -- Study of FIH hardening implemented on Caliptra RoT" by Joona Kannisto

    MORE INFO AND REGISTRATION: turkusec.fi/turkusec-september

    #TurkuSec #Meetup #Turku #Finland #BurpSuite #Rust #RustLang #faultinjection

  3. TurkuSec September Meetup

    Date: 04.09.2025 (Thursday)
    Time: 17:40 – Onwards

    "Burp Like a Pro - Tips and tricks from the hood" by Anton Lindholm

    "Rust and Software Defenses Against Physical Fault Injection Attacks -- Study of FIH hardening implemented on Caliptra RoT" by Joona Kannisto

    MORE INFO AND REGISTRATION: turkusec.fi/turkusec-september

    #TurkuSec #Meetup #Turku #Finland #BurpSuite #Rust #RustLang #faultinjection

  4. TurkuSec September Meetup

    Date: 04.09.2025 (Thursday)
    Time: 17:40 – Onwards

    "Burp Like a Pro - Tips and tricks from the hood" by Anton Lindholm

    "Rust and Software Defenses Against Physical Fault Injection Attacks -- Study of FIH hardening implemented on Caliptra RoT" by Joona Kannisto

    MORE INFO AND REGISTRATION: turkusec.fi/turkusec-september

    #TurkuSec #Meetup #Turku #Finland #BurpSuite #Rust #RustLang #faultinjection

  5. TurkuSec September Meetup

    Date: 04.09.2025 (Thursday)
    Time: 17:40 – Onwards

    "Burp Like a Pro - Tips and tricks from the hood" by Anton Lindholm

    "Rust and Software Defenses Against Physical Fault Injection Attacks -- Study of FIH hardening implemented on Caliptra RoT" by Joona Kannisto

    MORE INFO AND REGISTRATION: turkusec.fi/turkusec-september

    #TurkuSec #Meetup #Turku #Finland #BurpSuite #Rust #RustLang #faultinjection

  6. TurkuSec September Meetup

    Date: 04.09.2025 (Thursday)
    Time: 17:40 – Onwards

    "Burp Like a Pro - Tips and tricks from the hood" by Anton Lindholm

    "Rust and Software Defenses Against Physical Fault Injection Attacks -- Study of FIH hardening implemented on Caliptra RoT" by Joona Kannisto

    MORE INFO AND REGISTRATION: turkusec.fi/turkusec-september

    #TurkuSec #Meetup #Turku #Finland #BurpSuite #Rust #RustLang #faultinjection

  7. Exploring fault injection on ESP32 V3!

    Inspired by Delvaux work, we tested voltage #glitching as an attack vector. With advanced triggers & GDB, we achieved a ~1.5% success rate. #Hardware #FaultInjection is becoming more practical!

    security.humanativaspa.it/faul

  8. Exploring fault injection on ESP32 V3!

    Inspired by Delvaux work, we tested voltage #glitching as an attack vector. With advanced triggers & GDB, we achieved a ~1.5% success rate. #Hardware #FaultInjection is becoming more practical!

    security.humanativaspa.it/faul

  9. Exploring fault injection on ESP32 V3!

    Inspired by Delvaux work, we tested voltage #glitching as an attack vector. With advanced triggers & GDB, we achieved a ~1.5% success rate. #Hardware #FaultInjection is becoming more practical!

    security.humanativaspa.it/faul

  10. Exploring fault injection on ESP32 V3!

    Inspired by Delvaux work, we tested voltage #glitching as an attack vector. With advanced triggers & GDB, we achieved a ~1.5% success rate. #Hardware #FaultInjection is becoming more practical!

    security.humanativaspa.it/faul

  11. Ich denke noch über den #BitLocker Talk nach und die Hacks mit #FaultInjection.

    Vielleicht ist die Variante mit #TPM + PIN auch keine Alternative. Bleiben noch USB-Stick oder ein Passwort zur #Verschlüsselung.

    #38C3
    tomshardware.com/news/amd-tpm-

  12. Ich denke noch über den #BitLocker Talk nach und die Hacks mit #FaultInjection.

    Vielleicht ist die Variante mit #TPM + PIN auch keine Alternative. Bleiben noch USB-Stick oder ein Passwort zur #Verschlüsselung.

    #38C3
    tomshardware.com/news/amd-tpm-

  13. Great talk by Aedan Cullen (@aedancullen) at #38c3 on breaking security on the #RP2350 by glitching the OTP VDD.

    streaming.media.ccc.de/38c3/re

    I expect the bus between the state machine and OTP is like Wishbone or M68K and has a request and an acknowledge, and the data is latched on the ACK. No ACK? Guard word stays in the latch.

    #ICRE #ICReverseEngineering #FaultInjection

  14. Great talk by Aedan Cullen (@aedancullen) at #38c3 on breaking security on the #RP2350 by glitching the OTP VDD.

    streaming.media.ccc.de/38c3/re

    I expect the bus between the state machine and OTP is like Wishbone or M68K and has a request and an acknowledge, and the data is latched on the ACK. No ACK? Guard word stays in the latch.

    #ICRE #ICReverseEngineering #FaultInjection

  15. Great talk by Aedan Cullen (@aedancullen) at #38c3 on breaking security on the #RP2350 by glitching the OTP VDD.

    streaming.media.ccc.de/38c3/re

    I expect the bus between the state machine and OTP is like Wishbone or M68K and has a request and an acknowledge, and the data is latched on the ACK. No ACK? Guard word stays in the latch.

    #ICRE #ICReverseEngineering #FaultInjection

  16. Great talk by Aedan Cullen (@aedancullen) at #38c3 on breaking security on the #RP2350 by glitching the OTP VDD.

    streaming.media.ccc.de/38c3/re

    I expect the bus between the state machine and OTP is like Wishbone or M68K and has a request and an acknowledge, and the data is latched on the ACK. No ACK? Guard word stays in the latch.

    #ICRE #ICReverseEngineering #FaultInjection

  17. Great talk by Aedan Cullen (@aedancullen) at #38c3 on breaking security on the #RP2350 by glitching the OTP VDD.

    streaming.media.ccc.de/38c3/re

    I expect the bus between the state machine and OTP is like Wishbone or M68K and has a request and an acknowledge, and the data is latched on the ACK. No ACK? Guard word stays in the latch.

    #ICRE #ICReverseEngineering #FaultInjection

  18. The fault injection library (PicoGlitcher, Chipwhisper etc) was just updated with the results of me playing around with my PicoGlitcher yesterday evening. This info comes from actual glitches against a so-far unnamed IoT device based on the STM32F412.

    github.com/MKesenheimer/fault-

    Summary:

    1) No, it's not realistic to glitch ReadMemory to read out the internal flash from these devices with the known methods.

    2) Still fun though and why not study the v3.1 bootloader intensely?

    #ReverseEngineering #FaultInjection

  19. The fault injection library (PicoGlitcher, Chipwhisper etc) was just updated with the results of me playing around with my PicoGlitcher yesterday evening. This info comes from actual glitches against a so-far unnamed IoT device based on the STM32F412.

    github.com/MKesenheimer/fault-

    Summary:

    1) No, it's not realistic to glitch ReadMemory to read out the internal flash from these devices with the known methods.

    2) Still fun though and why not study the v3.1 bootloader intensely?

    #ReverseEngineering #FaultInjection

  20. The fault injection library (PicoGlitcher, Chipwhisper etc) was just updated with the results of me playing around with my PicoGlitcher yesterday evening. This info comes from actual glitches against a so-far unnamed IoT device based on the STM32F412.

    github.com/MKesenheimer/fault-

    Summary:

    1) No, it's not realistic to glitch ReadMemory to read out the internal flash from these devices with the known methods.

    2) Still fun though and why not study the v3.1 bootloader intensely?

    #ReverseEngineering #FaultInjection

  21. The fault injection library (PicoGlitcher, Chipwhisper etc) was just updated with the results of me playing around with my PicoGlitcher yesterday evening. This info comes from actual glitches against a so-far unnamed IoT device based on the STM32F412.

    github.com/MKesenheimer/fault-

    Summary:

    1) No, it's not realistic to glitch ReadMemory to read out the internal flash from these devices with the known methods.

    2) Still fun though and why not study the v3.1 bootloader intensely?

    #ReverseEngineering #FaultInjection