#facebok — Public Fediverse posts

広島・呉で正月用の葉付きミカン出荷　鏡餅やしめ縄に
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ACnpqJ6mlO0
#youtube_videomainichi #6386635638112 #facebok #youtube #ニュース

Heute ist #metadeleteday ai opt out dann account löschen #facebok #instagram und #whatsapp letzte Chance der ai werbematrix zu entkommen.

Heute ist #metadeleteday ai opt out dann account löschen #facebok #instagram und #whatsapp letzte Chance der ai werbematrix zu entkommen.

Heute ist #metadeleteday ai opt out dann account löschen #facebok #instagram und #whatsapp letzte Chance der ai werbematrix zu entkommen.

Heute ist #metadeleteday ai opt out dann account löschen #facebok #instagram und #whatsapp letzte Chance der ai werbematrix zu entkommen.

Heute ist #metadeleteday ai opt out dann account löschen #facebok #instagram und #whatsapp letzte Chance der ai werbematrix zu entkommen.

Infos und Anleitung zum Widerspruch gegen das Verglibbern des eigenen #Facebok- und/oder #Instagram-Accounts in der #Meta-KI, falls wer brauchen kann.
https://datenschutz-hamburg.de/news/meta-ki-training-mit-persoenlichen-daten

Infos und Anleitung zum Widerspruch gegen das Verglibbern des eigenen #Facebok- und/oder #Instagram-Accounts in der #Meta-KI, falls wer brauchen kann.
https://datenschutz-hamburg.de/news/meta-ki-training-mit-persoenlichen-daten

Infos und Anleitung zum Widerspruch gegen das Verglibbern des eigenen #Facebok- und/oder #Instagram-Accounts in der #Meta-KI, falls wer brauchen kann.
https://datenschutz-hamburg.de/news/meta-ki-training-mit-persoenlichen-daten

Infos und Anleitung zum Widerspruch gegen das Verglibbern des eigenen #Facebok- und/oder #Instagram-Accounts in der #Meta-KI, falls wer brauchen kann.
https://datenschutz-hamburg.de/news/meta-ki-training-mit-persoenlichen-daten

Infos und Anleitung zum Widerspruch gegen das Verglibbern des eigenen #Facebok- und/oder #Instagram-Accounts in der #Meta-KI, falls wer brauchen kann.
https://datenschutz-hamburg.de/news/meta-ki-training-mit-persoenlichen-daten

quindi ricapitolando, parlando con una persona su #facebok che vota di deficienti al governo sono venuto a scoprire che:
1) il PD e l' islam hanno degli accordi Segreti
2) appena una persona si laurea in legge diventa automaticamente di sinistra
3 ) i migranti hanno un piano segreto per invadere l'Italia e imporre alle donne il burka

e niente alla fine io povero scemo mi aspettavo una realtà un tantino più complessa e invece questa " illuminante" conversazione mi ha aperto la mente e il cuore

quindi ricapitolando, parlando con una persona su #facebok che vota di deficienti al governo sono venuto a scoprire che:
1) il PD e l' islam hanno degli accordi Segreti
2) appena una persona si laurea in legge diventa automaticamente di sinistra
3 ) i migranti hanno un piano segreto per invadere l'Italia e imporre alle donne il burka

e niente alla fine io povero scemo mi aspettavo una realtà un tantino più complessa e invece questa " illuminante" conversazione mi ha aperto la mente e il cuore

quindi ricapitolando, parlando con una persona su #facebok che vota di deficienti al governo sono venuto a scoprire che:
1) il PD e l' islam hanno degli accordi Segreti
2) appena una persona si laurea in legge diventa automaticamente di sinistra
3 ) i migranti hanno un piano segreto per invadere l'Italia e imporre alle donne il burka

e niente alla fine io povero scemo mi aspettavo una realtà un tantino più complessa e invece questa " illuminante" conversazione mi ha aperto la mente e il cuore

quindi ricapitolando, parlando con una persona su #facebok che vota di deficienti al governo sono venuto a scoprire che:
1) il PD e l' islam hanno degli accordi Segreti
2) appena una persona si laurea in legge diventa automaticamente di sinistra
3 ) i migranti hanno un piano segreto per invadere l'Italia e imporre alle donne il burka

e niente alla fine io povero scemo mi aspettavo una realtà un tantino più complessa e invece questa " illuminante" conversazione mi ha aperto la mente e il cuore

For an unknown period until the end of January 2024, Facebook appears to have suffered a data leak that has exposed users’ email addresses, phone numbers and other identifying information.

The only action required was to send an HTTP request to https://x.facebook.com/ with a valid Facebook tracking cookie (datr) set. The link to which the HTTP 302 redirected then revealed third-party user data.

📝 For privacy reasons some data is redacted with either ‘▒▒▒’ (base64url or hex strings) or ‘●●●●’ (human readable).

For example, a simple

curl --silent \
     --header "Cookie: datr=__▒▒▒;" \
     --dump-header - \
     https://x.facebook.com/ \
     | grep -i "^location:"

resulted in the following server response: location: https://m.facebook.com/recover/code/?ars=m_try_another_way_clicked_from_code_entry&ph%5B0%5D=%2B9899●●●●●●●●&rm=send_sms&fl=default_recover&c=%2Flogin%2F&hash=AU▒▒▒&refsrc=deprecated&_rdr

📝 Note: In the following, only the field-value pairs of https://m.facebook.com/recover/code/? are listed in favour of better readability.

ars=m_try_another_way_clicked_from_code_entry
ph[0]=+9899●●●●●●●●
rm=send_sms
fl=default_recover
c=/login/
hash=AU▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
_rdr

The value +9899●●●●●●●● apparently is a Pakistani phone number.

Numbers from WhatsApp accounts were also revealed by Facebook’s ‘chatty’ redirects:

ars=m_lara_first_password_failure
ph[0]=+919165●●●●●●●
rm=send_whatsapp_skip_bc
hash=AU▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
_rdr

E-mail addresses (em[0]) were disclosed in plain text as well.

em[0]=●●●●●●.●●●●●●●@gmail.com
rm=send_email
c=/login/?next=https://www.facebook.com/public/●●●●-●●●●●●●/
hash=AU▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
_rdr

In some cases, multiple telephone numbers or e-mail addresses were given for accounts (em[1], ph[1], ...).

Alternatively, a cuid was returned instead, which can also be correlated with an email address or telephone number:

rm=send_email
spc=0
cuid=AY▒▒▒
fl=default_recover
try=6
locale2=es_ES
refsrc=deprecated
wtsid=rdr_▒▒▒
hash=AU▒▒▒
_rdr

Some information has also been leaked about OAuth logins via third-party providers.

em[0]=a***@*******
rm=send_email
c=/login/?skip_api_login=1
api_key=●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
kid_directed_site=0
app_id=●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
signed_next=1
next=https://m.facebook.com/dialog/oauth?

client_id=●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
redirect_uri=https://login.●●●●●●●●●●●.co.uk/●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●.onmicrosoft.com/oauth2/authresp
response_type=code
scope=email+public_profile
state=StateProperties=ey▒▒▒
ret=login
fbapp_pres=0
logger_id=▒▒-▒-▒-▒-▒▒▒
tp=unspecified

cancel_url=https://login.●●●●●●●●●●●.co.uk.onmicrosoft.com/●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●.onmicrosoft.com/oauth2?

error=access_denied
error_code=200
error_description=Permissions+error
error_reason=user_denied
state=StateProperties=ey▒▒▒
#_=_

display=touch
locale=en_GB
pl_dbl=0
refsrc=deprecated
is_from_native_app=true
locale2=en_GB
hash=▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
_rdr

Although, in this example, the email address (em[0]) has been anonymized by Facebook itself, it is possible to draw conclusions about users on the basis of api_key (identical to app_id and client_id) and redirect_uri (containing ●●●●●●.co.uk)

Query strings with the field n are particularly concerning. n seems to be a one-time password, as known from password reset emails. This is even more worrying when combined with the cuid, which can easily be derived from the email address.

n=24807091
s=23
exp_locale=pl_PL
cuid=AY▒▒▒
redirect_from=button
wtsid=rdr_▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
hash=AU▒▒▒
_rdr.

During my investigations I noticed that the same URLs were returned for requests in quick succession. However, the returned query string changed at irregular intervals, roughly once per minute, depending on the time of day.

The issue was reported to Facebook via its bug bounty programme. While the demonstrated method stopped working two weeks after submission, the issue was triaged for an extensive period of time. In accordance with the principle of responsible disclosure, this is published only now.

#Facebok #Meta #WhatsApp #Infosec #DataBreach #DataLeak

For an unknown period until the end of January 2024, Facebook appears to have suffered a data leak that has exposed users’ email addresses, phone numbers and other identifying information.

The only action required was to send an HTTP request to https://x.facebook.com/ with a valid Facebook tracking cookie (datr) set. The link to which the HTTP 302 redirected then revealed third-party user data.

📝 For privacy reasons some data is redacted with either ‘▒▒▒’ (base64url or hex strings) or ‘●●●●’ (human readable).

For example, a simple

curl --silent \
     --header "Cookie: datr=__▒▒▒;" \
     --dump-header - \
     https://x.facebook.com/ \
     | grep -i "^location:"

resulted in the following server response: location: https://m.facebook.com/recover/code/?ars=m_try_another_way_clicked_from_code_entry&ph%5B0%5D=%2B9899●●●●●●●●&rm=send_sms&fl=default_recover&c=%2Flogin%2F&hash=AU▒▒▒&refsrc=deprecated&_rdr

📝 Note: In the following, only the field-value pairs of https://m.facebook.com/recover/code/? are listed in favour of better readability.

ars=m_try_another_way_clicked_from_code_entry
ph[0]=+9899●●●●●●●●
rm=send_sms
fl=default_recover
c=/login/
hash=AU▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
_rdr

The value +9899●●●●●●●● apparently is a Pakistani phone number.

Numbers from WhatsApp accounts were also revealed by Facebook’s ‘chatty’ redirects:

ars=m_lara_first_password_failure
ph[0]=+919165●●●●●●●
rm=send_whatsapp_skip_bc
hash=AU▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
_rdr

E-mail addresses (em[0]) were disclosed in plain text as well.

em[0]=●●●●●●.●●●●●●●@gmail.com
rm=send_email
c=/login/?next=https://www.facebook.com/public/●●●●-●●●●●●●/
hash=AU▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
_rdr

In some cases, multiple telephone numbers or e-mail addresses were given for accounts (em[1], ph[1], ...).

Alternatively, a cuid was returned instead, which can also be correlated with an email address or telephone number:

rm=send_email
spc=0
cuid=AY▒▒▒
fl=default_recover
try=6
locale2=es_ES
refsrc=deprecated
wtsid=rdr_▒▒▒
hash=AU▒▒▒
_rdr

Some information has also been leaked about OAuth logins via third-party providers.

em[0]=a***@*******
rm=send_email
c=/login/?skip_api_login=1
api_key=●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
kid_directed_site=0
app_id=●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
signed_next=1
next=https://m.facebook.com/dialog/oauth?

client_id=●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
redirect_uri=https://login.●●●●●●●●●●●.co.uk/●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●.onmicrosoft.com/oauth2/authresp
response_type=code
scope=email+public_profile
state=StateProperties=ey▒▒▒
ret=login
fbapp_pres=0
logger_id=▒▒-▒-▒-▒-▒▒▒
tp=unspecified

cancel_url=https://login.●●●●●●●●●●●.co.uk.onmicrosoft.com/●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●.onmicrosoft.com/oauth2?

error=access_denied
error_code=200
error_description=Permissions+error
error_reason=user_denied
state=StateProperties=ey▒▒▒
#_=_

display=touch
locale=en_GB
pl_dbl=0
refsrc=deprecated
is_from_native_app=true
locale2=en_GB
hash=▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
_rdr

Although, in this example, the email address (em[0]) has been anonymized by Facebook itself, it is possible to draw conclusions about users on the basis of api_key (identical to app_id and client_id) and redirect_uri (containing ●●●●●●.co.uk)

Query strings with the field n are particularly concerning. n seems to be a one-time password, as known from password reset emails. This is even more worrying when combined with the cuid, which can easily be derived from the email address.

n=24807091
s=23
exp_locale=pl_PL
cuid=AY▒▒▒
redirect_from=button
wtsid=rdr_▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
hash=AU▒▒▒
_rdr.

During my investigations I noticed that the same URLs were returned for requests in quick succession. However, the returned query string changed at irregular intervals, roughly once per minute, depending on the time of day.

The issue was reported to Facebook via its bug bounty programme. While the demonstrated method stopped working two weeks after submission, the issue was triaged for an extensive period of time. In accordance with the principle of responsible disclosure, this is published only now.

#Facebok #Meta #WhatsApp #Infosec #DataBreach #DataLeak

For an unknown period until the end of January 2024, Facebook appears to have suffered a data leak that has exposed users’ email addresses, phone numbers and other identifying information.

The only action required was to send an HTTP request to https://x.facebook.com/ with a valid Facebook tracking cookie (datr) set. The link to which the HTTP 302 redirected then revealed third-party user data.

📝 For privacy reasons some data is redacted with either ‘▒▒▒’ (base64url or hex strings) or ‘●●●●’ (human readable).

For example, a simple

curl --silent \
     --header "Cookie: datr=__▒▒▒;" \
     --dump-header - \
     https://x.facebook.com/ \
     | grep -i "^location:"

resulted in the following server response: location: https://m.facebook.com/recover/code/?ars=m_try_another_way_clicked_from_code_entry&ph%5B0%5D=%2B9899●●●●●●●●&rm=send_sms&fl=default_recover&c=%2Flogin%2F&hash=AU▒▒▒&refsrc=deprecated&_rdr

📝 Note: In the following, only the field-value pairs of https://m.facebook.com/recover/code/? are listed in favour of better readability.

ars=m_try_another_way_clicked_from_code_entry
ph[0]=+9899●●●●●●●●
rm=send_sms
fl=default_recover
c=/login/
hash=AU▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
_rdr

The value +9899●●●●●●●● apparently is a Pakistani phone number.

Numbers from WhatsApp accounts were also revealed by Facebook’s ‘chatty’ redirects:

ars=m_lara_first_password_failure
ph[0]=+919165●●●●●●●
rm=send_whatsapp_skip_bc
hash=AU▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
_rdr

E-mail addresses (em[0]) were disclosed in plain text as well.

em[0]=●●●●●●.●●●●●●●@gmail.com
rm=send_email
c=/login/?next=https://www.facebook.com/public/●●●●-●●●●●●●/
hash=AU▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
_rdr

In some cases, multiple telephone numbers or e-mail addresses were given for accounts (em[1], ph[1], ...).

Alternatively, a cuid was returned instead, which can also be correlated with an email address or telephone number:

rm=send_email
spc=0
cuid=AY▒▒▒
fl=default_recover
try=6
locale2=es_ES
refsrc=deprecated
wtsid=rdr_▒▒▒
hash=AU▒▒▒
_rdr

Some information has also been leaked about OAuth logins via third-party providers.

em[0]=a***@*******
rm=send_email
c=/login/?skip_api_login=1
api_key=●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
kid_directed_site=0
app_id=●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
signed_next=1
next=https://m.facebook.com/dialog/oauth?

client_id=●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
redirect_uri=https://login.●●●●●●●●●●●.co.uk/●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●.onmicrosoft.com/oauth2/authresp
response_type=code
scope=email+public_profile
state=StateProperties=ey▒▒▒
ret=login
fbapp_pres=0
logger_id=▒▒-▒-▒-▒-▒▒▒
tp=unspecified

cancel_url=https://login.●●●●●●●●●●●.co.uk.onmicrosoft.com/●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●.onmicrosoft.com/oauth2?

error=access_denied
error_code=200
error_description=Permissions+error
error_reason=user_denied
state=StateProperties=ey▒▒▒
#_=_

display=touch
locale=en_GB
pl_dbl=0
refsrc=deprecated
is_from_native_app=true
locale2=en_GB
hash=▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
_rdr

Although, in this example, the email address (em[0]) has been anonymized by Facebook itself, it is possible to draw conclusions about users on the basis of api_key (identical to app_id and client_id) and redirect_uri (containing ●●●●●●.co.uk)

Query strings with the field n are particularly concerning. n seems to be a one-time password, as known from password reset emails. This is even more worrying when combined with the cuid, which can easily be derived from the email address.

n=24807091
s=23
exp_locale=pl_PL
cuid=AY▒▒▒
redirect_from=button
wtsid=rdr_▒▒▒
refsrc=deprecated
hash=AU▒▒▒
_rdr.

During my investigations I noticed that the same URLs were returned for requests in quick succession. However, the returned query string changed at irregular intervals, roughly once per minute, depending on the time of day.

The issue was reported to Facebook via its bug bounty programme. While the demonstrated method stopped working two weeks after submission, the issue was triaged for an extensive period of time. In accordance with the principle of responsible disclosure, this is published only now.

#Facebok #Meta #WhatsApp #Infosec #DataBreach #DataLeak

The thing is, not every last one has to leave #X, #Facebok, #Threads or any #SocialNetwork criticized right now, for them to lose the value they still have: If only the tiny number of people who post most of the content there leave for #Mastodon (or #Bluesky), they are not worth a visit for anyone.

The thing is, not every last one has to leave #X, #Facebok, #Threads or any #SocialNetwork criticized right now, for them to lose the value they still have: If only the tiny number of people who post most of the content there leave for #Mastodon (or #Bluesky), they are not worth a visit for anyone.

The thing is, not every last one has to leave #X, #Facebok, #Threads or any #SocialNetwork criticized right now, for them to lose the value they still have: If only the tiny number of people who post most of the content there leave for #Mastodon (or #Bluesky), they are not worth a visit for anyone.

The thing is, not every last one has to leave #X, #Facebok, #Threads or any #SocialNetwork criticized right now, for them to lose the value they still have: If only the tiny number of people who post most of the content there leave for #Mastodon (or #Bluesky), they are not worth a visit for anyone.

The thing is, not every last one has to leave #X, #Facebok, #Threads or any #SocialNetwork criticized right now, for them to lose the value they still have: If only the tiny number of people who post most of the content there leave for #Mastodon (or #Bluesky), they are not worth a visit for anyone.

@Sascha_Raubal der Recep hat bei Facebook, Instagram, X, YouTube das Sagen, ansonsten erpresst er diese Institutionen mit Sperre ! Dadurch beugen sie sich dieser Erpressung und verbieten alle Symbole und Wörter über die #PKK.
Die Namen der PKK und vom Vorsitzenden der PKK #AbdullahÖcalan dürfen nicht ausgeschrieben werden. Extreme Zensur gegen die Kurden nur weil der Recep das so will.

#instagam #Facebok #X #Youtube #Zensur

@Sascha_Raubal der Recep hat bei Facebook, Instagram, X, YouTube das Sagen, ansonsten erpresst er diese Institutionen mit Sperre ! Dadurch beugen sie sich dieser Erpressung und verbieten alle Symbole und Wörter über die #PKK.
Die Namen der PKK und vom Vorsitzenden der PKK #AbdullahÖcalan dürfen nicht ausgeschrieben werden. Extreme Zensur gegen die Kurden nur weil der Recep das so will.

#instagam #Facebok #X #Youtube #Zensur

@Sascha_Raubal der Recep hat bei Facebook, Instagram, X, YouTube das Sagen, ansonsten erpresst er diese Institutionen mit Sperre ! Dadurch beugen sie sich dieser Erpressung und verbieten alle Symbole und Wörter über die #PKK.
Die Namen der PKK und vom Vorsitzenden der PKK #AbdullahÖcalan dürfen nicht ausgeschrieben werden. Extreme Zensur gegen die Kurden nur weil der Recep das so will.

#instagam #Facebok #X #Youtube #Zensur

@Sascha_Raubal der Recep hat bei Facebook, Instagram, X, YouTube das Sagen, ansonsten erpresst er diese Institutionen mit Sperre ! Dadurch beugen sie sich dieser Erpressung und verbieten alle Symbole und Wörter über die #PKK.
Die Namen der PKK und vom Vorsitzenden der PKK #AbdullahÖcalan dürfen nicht ausgeschrieben werden. Extreme Zensur gegen die Kurden nur weil der Recep das so will.

#instagam #Facebok #X #Youtube #Zensur

Nur für #Sachsen: #Facebok präsentiert neue Reaktion #Hitlergruss
https://www.der-postillon.com/2016/02/nur-fur-sachsen-facebook-prasentiert.html?m=1

Nur für #Sachsen: #Facebok präsentiert neue Reaktion #Hitlergruss
https://www.der-postillon.com/2016/02/nur-fur-sachsen-facebook-prasentiert.html?m=1

Nur für #Sachsen: #Facebok präsentiert neue Reaktion #Hitlergruss
https://www.der-postillon.com/2016/02/nur-fur-sachsen-facebook-prasentiert.html?m=1

Fra Kode24. En kar der som betalte for Facebook, og hva du da får se.

Jeg betalte 149 kroner for Facebook, så du slipper - Kode24

https://www.kode24.no/artikkel/jeg-betalte-149-kroner-for-facebook-sa-du-slipper/80486967

#norsktut #facebok

Fra Kode24. En kar der som betalte for Facebook, og hva du da får se.

Jeg betalte 149 kroner for Facebook, så du slipper - Kode24

https://www.kode24.no/artikkel/jeg-betalte-149-kroner-for-facebook-sa-du-slipper/80486967

#norsktut #facebok

Fra Kode24. En kar der som betalte for Facebook, og hva du da får se.

Jeg betalte 149 kroner for Facebook, så du slipper - Kode24

https://www.kode24.no/artikkel/jeg-betalte-149-kroner-for-facebook-sa-du-slipper/80486967

#norsktut #facebok

Fra Kode24. En kar der som betalte for Facebook, og hva du da får se.

Jeg betalte 149 kroner for Facebook, så du slipper - Kode24

https://www.kode24.no/artikkel/jeg-betalte-149-kroner-for-facebook-sa-du-slipper/80486967

#norsktut #facebok

Fra Kode24. En kar der som betalte for Facebook, og hva du da får se.

Jeg betalte 149 kroner for Facebook, så du slipper - Kode24

https://www.kode24.no/artikkel/jeg-betalte-149-kroner-for-facebook-sa-du-slipper/80486967

#norsktut #facebok

Media Publishers File Flawed Competition Act Application Over Meta Blocking News Links Due to Bill C-18 - Michael Geist https://bit.ly/3s7NtBv #Meta #Facebok #CompetitionBureau #OnlineNewsAct #BillC18 #cdnpoli @canadiangreens @cdnpoli

Media Publishers File Flawed Competition Act Application Over Meta Blocking News Links Due to Bill C-18 - Michael Geist https://bit.ly/3s7NtBv #Meta #Facebok #CompetitionBureau #OnlineNewsAct #BillC18 #cdnpoli @canadiangreens @cdnpoli

Media Publishers File Flawed Competition Act Application Over Meta Blocking News Links Due to Bill C-18 - Michael Geist https://bit.ly/3s7NtBv #Meta #Facebok #CompetitionBureau #OnlineNewsAct #BillC18 #cdnpoli @canadiangreens @cdnpoli

Media Publishers File Flawed Competition Act Application Over Meta Blocking News Links Due to Bill C-18 - Michael Geist https://bit.ly/3s7NtBv #Meta #Facebok #CompetitionBureau #OnlineNewsAct #BillC18 #cdnpoli @canadiangreens @cdnpoli

Media Publishers File Flawed Competition Act Application Over Meta Blocking News Links Due to Bill C-18 - Michael Geist https://bit.ly/3s7NtBv #Meta #Facebok #CompetitionBureau #OnlineNewsAct #BillC18 #cdnpoli @canadiangreens @cdnpoli

Man stelle sich vor, jede Instagram, WhatsApp und Facebook APP würde beim nächsten öffnen die Frage einblenden:
"Wollen Sie ihren Account föderieren?"

Nehmt mal an nur 5% würden innerhalb von 24h den Haken bei "JA" setzen!
💣
#meta #Gedankenspiel #instagram #Facebok #whatsapp #Fediverse #Pixelfed #Mastodon

Man stelle sich vor, jede Instagram, WhatsApp und Facebook APP würde beim nächsten öffnen die Frage einblenden:
"Wollen Sie ihren Account föderieren?"

Nehmt mal an nur 5% würden innerhalb von 24h den Haken bei "JA" setzen!
💣
#meta #Gedankenspiel #instagram #Facebok #whatsapp #Fediverse #Pixelfed #Mastodon

Man stelle sich vor, jede Instagram, WhatsApp und Facebook APP würde beim nächsten öffnen die Frage einblenden:
"Wollen Sie ihren Account föderieren?"

Nehmt mal an nur 5% würden innerhalb von 24h den Haken bei "JA" setzen!
💣
#meta #Gedankenspiel #instagram #Facebok #whatsapp #Fediverse #Pixelfed #Mastodon

Man stelle sich vor, jede Instagram, WhatsApp und Facebook APP würde beim nächsten öffnen die Frage einblenden:
"Wollen Sie ihren Account föderieren?"

Nehmt mal an nur 5% würden innerhalb von 24h den Haken bei "JA" setzen!
💣
#meta #Gedankenspiel #instagram #Facebok #whatsapp #Fediverse #Pixelfed #Mastodon

Man stelle sich vor, jede Instagram, WhatsApp und Facebook APP würde beim nächsten öffnen die Frage einblenden:
"Wollen Sie ihren Account föderieren?"

Nehmt mal an nur 5% würden innerhalb von 24h den Haken bei "JA" setzen!
💣
#meta #Gedankenspiel #instagram #Facebok #whatsapp #Fediverse #Pixelfed #Mastodon

L'algoritmo cieco di #Facebok mi ha bloccato per un commento ironico/sarcastico in cui citavo una frase altrui. Da ieri, non posso commentare o pubblicare in gruppi, nemmeno quelli in cui sono admin, né giustificare quanto scritto perché nessuno potrebbe capire. Poi magari arriva SexyTizy con le labbra vaginali all'aria aperta o il bullo di turno che ti insulta e segnalare non serve perché "rispetta gli standard di comunità". I limiti degli algoritmi sono ancora infiniti.

It has been said before but I think that you have to assume that any site that has any links to Facebook or Google on it is sharing your information without your permission

#Facebok #Google #HomeDepot #CBC

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/home-depot-privacy-commissioner-meta-1.6726668

It has been said before but I think that you have to assume that any site that has any links to Facebook or Google on it is sharing your information without your permission

#Facebok #Google #HomeDepot #CBC

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/home-depot-privacy-commissioner-meta-1.6726668

It has been said before but I think that you have to assume that any site that has any links to Facebook or Google on it is sharing your information without your permission

#Facebok #Google #HomeDepot #CBC

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/home-depot-privacy-commissioner-meta-1.6726668

Fazit des Tages : Was mich interessiert gibt's auch in #Mastodon, dazu brauch ich kein #twitter ; #Retweeter braucht kein Mensch und #Facebok verbreitet Lügen. Gute Nacht mein #fedivere