#bushellscase1670 — Public Fediverse posts

UK Lawfare, Jury Equity & Silencing the Defence: The High-Stakes Legal Battle in Re Rajiv Menon KC! Pt 2

On 22 June 2026, Mr Justice Johnson delivered a judgment that fundamentally redefines the boundaries of legal advocacy in the UK. [1], [2] The case against Rajiv Menon KC, a veteran human rights advocate, stems from his closing speech in the “Filton Six” trial, where activists were charged with damaging an Elbit Systems facility to prevent what they termed “genocide in Gaza.” [3] This ruling is not just a procedural update; it is a blueprint for how the State intends to manage “protest” cases by restricting what can be said within the four walls of a courtroom. [4], [5]

——————————————————————————–

Critically Evaluating the Judgment

This judgment addresses whether an advocate can be held in criminal contempt for a speech that allegedly invited “jury equity” in defiance of judicial gags. We have identified three core pillars of this ruling that every student of law and civil liberty should understand:

1. The Jurisdictional Journey

A significant procedural lacuna addressed in this case is the authority of the court to initiate contempt proceedings months after a trial concludes. [6] After Menon KC’s speech in January 2026, the trial judge initially referred the matter to the Administrative Court, which attempted to launch proceedings of its own motion. [7], [8] However, the Court of Appeal intervened, ruling that the Administrative Court lacked jurisdiction over Crown Court contempt matters. [9] Consequently, the case returned to Mr Justice Johnson, who ruled that “summary jurisdiction”—the power of a judge to act as both prosecutor and judge—remains valid post-trial if acting earlier would have “derailed” the original criminal proceedings. [10], [6], [11]

2. The Legal Standard for Contempt (Mens Rea)

The defense argued that contempt requires a “specific intent” to impede justice. [12] However, the court rejected this, applying the standard from Solicitor General v Cox: it is sufficient if the acts were deliberate and in breach of an order the advocate was aware of. [13], [14] For an experienced King’s Counsel, the court held it is a “natural inference” that they intended the words spoken and knew they contravened the court’s rulings. [15] This effectively lowers the bar for prosecuting advocates, as “good intentions” or “zealous advocacy” are no longer a valid shield against contempt charges if a judicial order is breached. [16], [17]

3. The Conflict Over Jury Equity

The heart of the alleged contempt lies in Menon KC’s reference to the Old Bailey plaque and the 1670 Bushell’s Case, which established the independence of the jury. [18], [19] The court drew a sharp distinction: while juries have the historical power to acquit according to their conscience, advocates are strictly forbidden from inviting them to do so or even informing them of this power if the judge has ruled otherwise. [20], [21] The judgment characterizes such references not as historical education, but as a “wilful defiance” of the court’s authority. [22], [23]

——————————————————————————–

Summary for Activists

For the “truthaholic” community and direct-action movements, this judgment establishes a “New Normal” for courtroom activism:

• The “Genocide” Gag is Absolute: 
  The court reaffirmed that damaging property to prevent alleged genocide in Gaza is not a valid defence in English law. [3] Judges have the power to issue orders preventing any mention of the Middle East or the personal motivations of defendants. [4], [24]
  .
• Jury Equity is Off-Limits: 
  You and your lawyers are legally barred from telling the jury they have a right to acquit based on their conscience. [20], [25] Quoting the Old Bailey’s own history to a jury can now be treated as a criminal act. [18], [21]
  .
• The “Corporate Protection” Trap: 
  Suggesting the court is “protecting” corporations like Elbit Systems—or noting that corporate executives are “wined and dined” while activists are locked up—is considered an attack on judicial impartiality and can trigger contempt proceedings. [26], [27], [28]
  .
• Judicial Directions vs. Jury Independence: 
  While a judge cannot technically order a jury to convict, they can withdraw every possible defense, effectively leaving a “Route to Verdict” with only one exit. [29], [30], [31]
  .
• Delayed Jeopardy: 
  Do not assume an advocate is safe if the judge doesn’t act immediately. The court can wait until sentencing is complete to launch contempt proceedings to ensure the trial is not “derailed.” [32], [11]
  .
• Standing of the Crown: 
  The court ruled that the prosecution (the Crown) has the legal standing to demand contempt proceedings against defence lawyers, even though they are a party to the original case. [33], [34]
  .
• Future Trials: 
  The court explicitly stated that these proceedings are necessary to prevent similar “protest” tactics in upcoming trials scheduled through 2027. [35], [36]
  

——————————————————————————–

Numbered Footnotes:
directly referencing Judgment paragraphs

[1] Approved Judgment, Re Rajiv Menon KC (22 June 2026), Header. 
[2] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [1]. 
[3] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [2]. 
[4] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [3(2)-(4)]. 
[29] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [3(7)]. 
[20] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [3(8)-(10)]. 
[22] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(1)-(2)]. 
[18] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(1)]. 
[25] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(3)]. 
[21] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(1), 10]. 
[37] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(6)]. 
[38] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(6)]. 
[26] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(7)]. 
[7] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [29]. 
[8] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [29]. 
[9] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [29]. 
[27] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [27]. 
[39] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [22]. 
[33] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [18]. 
[34] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [25]. 
[10] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [40]. 
[16] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [41]. 
[23] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [7]. 
[12] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [39]. 
[13] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [42]. 
[14] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [42]. 
[17] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [42]. 
[15] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [33]. 
[43] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [44]. 
[6] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [45]. 
[32] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [45]. 
[35] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [46]. 
[5] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [46]. 
[36] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [47]. 
[11] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [48]. 
[30] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at Appendix 1, lines 180-185. 
[31] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at Appendix 1, lines 212-221. 
[49] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at Appendix 1, lines 246-250. 
[19] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at Appendix 1, lines 271-280. 
[28] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at Appendix 2, Part 7.

ALSO SEE:
relevant background

https://youtu.be/YoW7JAXDRWk

UK Lawfare, Jury Equity & Silencing the Defence: The High-Stakes Legal Battle in Re Rajiv Menon KC! Pt 2

On 22 June 2026, Mr Justice Johnson delivered a judgment that fundamentally redefines the boundaries of legal advocacy in the UK. [1], [2] The case against Rajiv Menon KC, a veteran human rights advocate, stems from his closing speech in the “Filton Six” trial, where activists were charged with damaging an Elbit Systems facility to prevent what they termed “genocide in Gaza.” [3] This ruling is not just a procedural update; it is a blueprint for how the State intends to manage “protest” cases by restricting what can be said within the four walls of a courtroom. [4], [5]

——————————————————————————–

Critically Evaluating the Judgment

This judgment addresses whether an advocate can be held in criminal contempt for a speech that allegedly invited “jury equity” in defiance of judicial gags. We have identified three core pillars of this ruling that every student of law and civil liberty should understand:

1. The Jurisdictional Journey

A significant procedural lacuna addressed in this case is the authority of the court to initiate contempt proceedings months after a trial concludes. [6] After Menon KC’s speech in January 2026, the trial judge initially referred the matter to the Administrative Court, which attempted to launch proceedings of its own motion. [7], [8] However, the Court of Appeal intervened, ruling that the Administrative Court lacked jurisdiction over Crown Court contempt matters. [9] Consequently, the case returned to Mr Justice Johnson, who ruled that “summary jurisdiction”—the power of a judge to act as both prosecutor and judge—remains valid post-trial if acting earlier would have “derailed” the original criminal proceedings. [10], [6], [11]

2. The Legal Standard for Contempt (Mens Rea)

The defense argued that contempt requires a “specific intent” to impede justice. [12] However, the court rejected this, applying the standard from Solicitor General v Cox: it is sufficient if the acts were deliberate and in breach of an order the advocate was aware of. [13], [14] For an experienced King’s Counsel, the court held it is a “natural inference” that they intended the words spoken and knew they contravened the court’s rulings. [15] This effectively lowers the bar for prosecuting advocates, as “good intentions” or “zealous advocacy” are no longer a valid shield against contempt charges if a judicial order is breached. [16], [17]

3. The Conflict Over Jury Equity

The heart of the alleged contempt lies in Menon KC’s reference to the Old Bailey plaque and the 1670 Bushell’s Case, which established the independence of the jury. [18], [19] The court drew a sharp distinction: while juries have the historical power to acquit according to their conscience, advocates are strictly forbidden from inviting them to do so or even informing them of this power if the judge has ruled otherwise. [20], [21] The judgment characterizes such references not as historical education, but as a “wilful defiance” of the court’s authority. [22], [23]

——————————————————————————–

Summary for Activists

For the “truthaholic” community and direct-action movements, this judgment establishes a “New Normal” for courtroom activism:

• The “Genocide” Gag is Absolute: 
  The court reaffirmed that damaging property to prevent alleged genocide in Gaza is not a valid defence in English law. [3] Judges have the power to issue orders preventing any mention of the Middle East or the personal motivations of defendants. [4], [24]
  .
• Jury Equity is Off-Limits: 
  You and your lawyers are legally barred from telling the jury they have a right to acquit based on their conscience. [20], [25] Quoting the Old Bailey’s own history to a jury can now be treated as a criminal act. [18], [21]
  .
• The “Corporate Protection” Trap: 
  Suggesting the court is “protecting” corporations like Elbit Systems—or noting that corporate executives are “wined and dined” while activists are locked up—is considered an attack on judicial impartiality and can trigger contempt proceedings. [26], [27], [28]
  .
• Judicial Directions vs. Jury Independence: 
  While a judge cannot technically order a jury to convict, they can withdraw every possible defense, effectively leaving a “Route to Verdict” with only one exit. [29], [30], [31]
  .
• Delayed Jeopardy: 
  Do not assume an advocate is safe if the judge doesn’t act immediately. The court can wait until sentencing is complete to launch contempt proceedings to ensure the trial is not “derailed.” [32], [11]
  .
• Standing of the Crown: 
  The court ruled that the prosecution (the Crown) has the legal standing to demand contempt proceedings against defence lawyers, even though they are a party to the original case. [33], [34]
  .
• Future Trials: 
  The court explicitly stated that these proceedings are necessary to prevent similar “protest” tactics in upcoming trials scheduled through 2027. [35], [36]
  

——————————————————————————–

Numbered Footnotes:
directly referencing Judgment paragraphs

[1] Approved Judgment, Re Rajiv Menon KC (22 June 2026), Header. 
[2] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [1]. 
[3] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [2]. 
[4] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [3(2)-(4)]. 
[29] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [3(7)]. 
[20] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [3(8)-(10)]. 
[22] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(1)-(2)]. 
[18] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(1)]. 
[25] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(3)]. 
[21] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(1), 10]. 
[37] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(6)]. 
[38] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(6)]. 
[26] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [4(7)]. 
[7] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [29]. 
[8] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [29]. 
[9] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [29]. 
[27] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [27]. 
[39] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [22]. 
[33] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [18]. 
[34] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [25]. 
[10] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [40]. 
[16] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [41]. 
[23] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [7]. 
[12] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [39]. 
[13] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [42]. 
[14] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [42]. 
[17] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [42]. 
[15] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [33]. 
[43] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [44]. 
[6] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [45]. 
[32] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [45]. 
[35] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [46]. 
[5] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [46]. 
[36] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [47]. 
[11] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at [48]. 
[30] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at Appendix 1, lines 180-185. 
[31] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at Appendix 1, lines 212-221. 
[49] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at Appendix 1, lines 246-250. 
[19] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at Appendix 1, lines 271-280. 
[28] Re Rajiv Menon KC (2026) at Appendix 2, Part 7.

ALSO SEE:
relevant background

https://youtu.be/YoW7JAXDRWk