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388 results for “dHeinemann”

  1. Jon Awbrey @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
    • web.archive.org/web/2013121115
    • web.archive.org/web/2013121103

    I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    ❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference —

    Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource —

    Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
    • academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One

    #Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
    #Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

    #morphism #likeness #likelystory #likelihood #analogy #inquiry
  2. Jon Awbrey @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
    • web.archive.org/web/2013121115
    • web.archive.org/web/2013121103

    I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    ❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference —

    Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource —

    Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
    • academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One

    #Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
    #Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

    #morphism #likeness #likelystory #likelihood #analogy #inquiry
  3. Jon Awbrey @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
    • web.archive.org/web/2013121115
    • web.archive.org/web/2013121103

    I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    ❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference —

    Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource —

    Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
    • academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One

    #Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
    #Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

    #morphism #likeness #likelystory #likelihood #analogy #inquiry
  4. Jon Awbrey @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
    • web.archive.org/web/2013121115
    • web.archive.org/web/2013121103

    I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    ❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference —

    Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource —

    Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
    • academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One

    #Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
    #Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

    #aristotle #peirce #iconindexsymbol #semiotics #signrelations #logic
  5. Jon Awbrey @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
    • web.archive.org/web/2013121115
    • web.archive.org/web/2013121103

    I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    ❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference —

    Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource —

    Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
    • academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One

    #Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
    #Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

    #morphism #likeness #likelystory #likelihood #analogy #inquiry
  6. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
    cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #analogy #aristotle #cspeirce #iconindexsymbol #induction #inquiry
  7. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
    cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #analogy #aristotle #cspeirce #iconindexsymbol #induction #inquiry
  8. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
    cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #analogy #aristotle #cspeirce #iconindexsymbol #induction #inquiry
  9. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
    cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #signrelations #semiotics #probablereasoning #probability #mathematics #logic
  10. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
    cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #analogy #aristotle #cspeirce #iconindexsymbol #induction #inquiry
  11. Jon Awbrey @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05

    Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    ❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

    ❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

    ❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference —

    Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource —

    Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
    • academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One

    #Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
    #Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

    #morphism #likeness #likelystory #likelihood #analogy #inquiry
  12. Jon Awbrey @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05

    Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    ❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

    ❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

    ❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference —

    Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource —

    Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
    • academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One

    #Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
    #Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

    #morphism #likeness #likelystory #likelihood #analogy #inquiry
  13. Jon Awbrey @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05

    Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    ❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

    ❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

    ❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference —

    Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource —

    Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
    • academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One

    #Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
    #Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

    #morphism #likeness #likelystory #likelihood #analogy #inquiry
  14. Jon Awbrey @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05

    Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    ❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

    ❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

    ❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference —

    Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource —

    Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
    • academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One

    #Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
    #Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

    #aristotle #peirce #iconindexsymbol #semiotics #signrelations #logic
  15. Jon Awbrey @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05

    Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    ❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

    ❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

    ❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference —

    Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource —

    Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
    • academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One

    #Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
    #Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

    #morphism #likeness #likelystory #likelihood #analogy #inquiry
  16. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

    Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    Related Discussion

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #analogy #aristotle #cspeirce #iconindexsymbol #induction #inquiry
  17. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

    Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    Related Discussion

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #analogy #aristotle #cspeirce #iconindexsymbol #induction #inquiry
  18. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

    Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    Related Discussion

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #analogy #aristotle #cspeirce #iconindexsymbol #induction #inquiry
  19. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

    Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    Related Discussion

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #signrelations #semiotics #probablereasoning #probability #mathematics #logic
  20. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

    Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    Related Discussion

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #analogy #aristotle #cspeirce #iconindexsymbol #induction #inquiry
  21. Helmut Lorscheid @[email protected] ·

    Schreck in der Morgenstunde

    oder: Wie sich die Grünen verändert haben

    Als Die Grünen 1983 erstmals im Bundestag waren, hatten sie zunächst kaum Räume und keinerlei Infrastruktur – also auch nicht ausreichend Büro und zunächst auch noch keine Büroausstattung. Damals waren das noch Schreibmaschinen und nur vereinzelt Computer. Auch Petra Kelly hatte zwar ein Mandat, aber kein Büro. So schrieb ich zu Hause auf meiner Schreibmasschine die ersten beiden Bundestagsanfragen der Grünen. Meiner Erinnung nach, hinterfragte eine der Fragen, die Panzerexporte in das damals von einer blutigen Militärdiktatur regierte Argentinien und die zweite befasst sich mit der deutsch-französischen Zuzsammenarbeit. Es ging um den deutschen Anteil an dem nach der Statistik “französischen” Rüstungsexport – der damals wie heute – noch kaltblütiger und moralfreier war als der aus Deutschland.

    Dazu passte, dass sich ein Großteil der neuen grünen Bundestagsabgeordneten morgens, um 7.00 h, also noch Stunden vor dem bekannten Einzug in den Plenarsaal – vor dem Bundeswirtschaftsministerium an einer Demonstration gegen Rüstungsexporte nach Argentinien beteiligte, zu der die Kampagne “Stoppt den Rüstungsexport!” aufgerufen hatte. Die Demo wurde organsiert von der europäischen Jugendorganisation “Junge Europäische Förderalisten (JEF)”.

    Dabei waren neben den ehemaligen JEF-Vorständen Petra K. Kelly, Roland Vogt auch Walter Schwenninger, Willi Hoss, Milan Horacek. In den folgenden acht Jahren schrieb ich etwa 98 Prozent der Bundestagsanfragen der Grünen zum Rüstungsxport, organisierte dazu Fragestunden und Aktuelle Stunden, alles im Rahmen der Anti-Rüstungsexport-Kampagne und der Anti-Apartheid-Bewegung.

    Damals herrschte in Südafrika noch die rassistische Apartheid-Gesetzgebung – von der Israel einiges, gegen die Palästinenser gerichtet, übernommen hat. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland gehörte zu jenen Ländern, die unter Bruch des völkerrechtlich bindenden UNO-Rüstungsembargo den Apartheid-Staat nuklear aufrüstete.

    Auch die Wahlkampfmaterialien der Grünen für den Bundestagswahlkampf 1987 zu den Themen Rüstungsexport und Apartheid bekämpfen, stammten inhaltlich von mir. Der irgendwann inhaltlich von der CDU übernommene Antrag für einen jährlichen Rüstungsexportbericht geht auf die Kampagne “Stoppt den Rüstungsexport!” und mich zurück. Warum die CDU/CSU ihn inhaltlich übernommen hatte, haben mir Abgeordnete der Union erklärt.- Diese ständigen Anfragen zum Rüstungsexport würden im Wirtschaftsministerium zeitweise zehn Personen beschäftigen. Der Aufwand für einen jährlichen Bericht sei wesentlich geringer.

    Sie sollten Recht bekommen, auch das zunächst recht große Interesse an einzelnen Exporten ließ mit dem Bericht deutlich nach. Soviel zur Geschichte.

    Gesterm früh hörte ich früh morgens ein Interview des Deutschlandfunks mit einer Frau Brantner über deutsch-französische Beziehungen. Der Moderator Christoph Heinemann, fragte sie zum Schluß, welche Projekte sie in der deutschen-französischen Zusammenarbeit gerne durchsetzen würde. Und was kommt? Dieser Politikerin fallen est mal nur Waffen ein:

    “Eine wichtige Entscheidung die immer noch aussteht ist die über ein deutsch-französische Kampfflugzeug. Ein großes gemeinsames Projekt. Man müsse die Industriellen zusammenbringen, und sagen, jetzt wollen wir, dass wir gemeinsam nach vorne gehen. Das sei nicht einfach, aber ein Scheitern fände ich ein politisch fatales Zeichen.”

    So Brantner heute früh. Ich dachte, ich hätte irgendeine CDU-Europa-Abgeordnete gehört und habe mich fast am Kaffee verschluckt, als die “Auflösung” kam. Es war ein Gespräch mit der Grünen-Vorsitzenden Brantner. Ok – ich finde deutlicher als diese – für mich furchtbare Politikerin kann man es kaum zusammenfassen, warum für mich diese heutigen Grünen zu meinen politischen Gegnern gehören. Was nützt es Grüne zu wählen, wenn glasklare CSU- und FDP-Politik dabei rauskommt.

    Über Helmut Lorscheid:

    https://marjorie-wiki.de/wiki/Helmut_Lorscheid

    #apartheid #b90diegrunen #franziskabrantner #jef #karllamers #milanhoracek
  22. Helmut Lorscheid @[email protected] ·

    Schreck in der Morgenstunde

    oder: Wie sich die Grünen verändert haben

    Als Die Grünen 1983 erstmals im Bundestag waren, hatten sie zunächst kaum Räume und keinerlei Infrastruktur – also auch nicht ausreichend Büro und zunächst auch noch keine Büroausstattung. Damals waren das noch Schreibmaschinen und nur vereinzelt Computer. Auch Petra Kelly hatte zwar ein Mandat, aber kein Büro. So schrieb ich zu Hause auf meiner Schreibmasschine die ersten beiden Bundestagsanfragen der Grünen. Meiner Erinnung nach, hinterfragte eine der Fragen, die Panzerexporte in das damals von einer blutigen Militärdiktatur regierte Argentinien und die zweite befasst sich mit der deutsch-französischen Zuzsammenarbeit. Es ging um den deutschen Anteil an dem nach der Statistik “französischen” Rüstungsexport – der damals wie heute – noch kaltblütiger und moralfreier war als der aus Deutschland.

    Dazu passte, dass sich ein Großteil der neuen grünen Bundestagsabgeordneten morgens, um 7.00 h, also noch Stunden vor dem bekannten Einzug in den Plenarsaal – vor dem Bundeswirtschaftsministerium an einer Demonstration gegen Rüstungsexporte nach Argentinien beteiligte, zu der die Kampagne “Stoppt den Rüstungsexport!” aufgerufen hatte. Die Demo wurde organsiert von der europäischen Jugendorganisation “Junge Europäische Förderalisten (JEF)”.

    Dabei waren neben den ehemaligen JEF-Vorständen Petra K. Kelly, Roland Vogt auch Walter Schwenninger, Willi Hoss, Milan Horacek. In den folgenden acht Jahren schrieb ich etwa 98 Prozent der Bundestagsanfragen der Grünen zum Rüstungsxport, organisierte dazu Fragestunden und Aktuelle Stunden, alles im Rahmen der Anti-Rüstungsexport-Kampagne und der Anti-Apartheid-Bewegung.

    Damals herrschte in Südafrika noch die rassistische Apartheid-Gesetzgebung – von der Israel einiges, gegen die Palästinenser gerichtet, übernommen hat. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland gehörte zu jenen Ländern, die unter Bruch des völkerrechtlich bindenden UNO-Rüstungsembargo den Apartheid-Staat nuklear aufrüstete.

    Auch die Wahlkampfmaterialien der Grünen für den Bundestagswahlkampf 1987 zu den Themen Rüstungsexport und Apartheid bekämpfen, stammten inhaltlich von mir. Der irgendwann inhaltlich von der CDU übernommene Antrag für einen jährlichen Rüstungsexportbericht geht auf die Kampagne “Stoppt den Rüstungsexport!” und mich zurück. Warum die CDU/CSU ihn inhaltlich übernommen hatte, haben mir Abgeordnete der Union erklärt.- Diese ständigen Anfragen zum Rüstungsexport würden im Wirtschaftsministerium zeitweise zehn Personen beschäftigen. Der Aufwand für einen jährlichen Bericht sei wesentlich geringer.

    Sie sollten Recht bekommen, auch das zunächst recht große Interesse an einzelnen Exporten ließ mit dem Bericht deutlich nach. Soviel zur Geschichte.

    Gesterm früh hörte ich früh morgens ein Interview des Deutschlandfunks mit einer Frau Brantner über deutsch-französische Beziehungen. Der Moderator Christoph Heinemann, fragte sie zum Schluß, welche Projekte sie in der deutschen-französischen Zusammenarbeit gerne durchsetzen würde. Und was kommt? Dieser Politikerin fallen est mal nur Waffen ein:

    “Eine wichtige Entscheidung die immer noch aussteht ist die über ein deutsch-französische Kampfflugzeug. Ein großes gemeinsames Projekt. Man müsse die Industriellen zusammenbringen, und sagen, jetzt wollen wir, dass wir gemeinsam nach vorne gehen. Das sei nicht einfach, aber ein Scheitern fände ich ein politisch fatales Zeichen.”

    So Brantner heute früh. Ich dachte, ich hätte irgendeine CDU-Europa-Abgeordnete gehört und habe mich fast am Kaffee verschluckt, als die “Auflösung” kam. Es war ein Gespräch mit der Grünen-Vorsitzenden Brantner. Ok – ich finde deutlicher als diese – für mich furchtbare Politikerin kann man es kaum zusammenfassen, warum für mich diese heutigen Grünen zu meinen politischen Gegnern gehören. Was nützt es Grüne zu wählen, wenn glasklare CSU- und FDP-Politik dabei rauskommt.

    Über Helmut Lorscheid:

    https://marjorie-wiki.de/wiki/Helmut_Lorscheid

    #apartheid #b90diegrunen #franziskabrantner #jef #karllamers #milanhoracek
  23. Helmut Lorscheid @[email protected] ·

    Schreck in der Morgenstunde

    oder: Wie sich die Grünen verändert haben

    Als Die Grünen 1983 erstmals im Bundestag waren, hatten sie zunächst kaum Räume und keinerlei Infrastruktur – also auch nicht ausreichend Büro und zunächst auch noch keine Büroausstattung. Damals waren das noch Schreibmaschinen und nur vereinzelt Computer. Auch Petra Kelly hatte zwar ein Mandat, aber kein Büro. So schrieb ich zu Hause auf meiner Schreibmasschine die ersten beiden Bundestagsanfragen der Grünen. Meiner Erinnung nach, hinterfragte eine der Fragen, die Panzerexporte in das damals von einer blutigen Militärdiktatur regierte Argentinien und die zweite befasst sich mit der deutsch-französischen Zuzsammenarbeit. Es ging um den deutschen Anteil an dem nach der Statistik “französischen” Rüstungsexport – der damals wie heute – noch kaltblütiger und moralfreier war als der aus Deutschland.

    Dazu passte, dass sich ein Großteil der neuen grünen Bundestagsabgeordneten morgens, um 7.00 h, also noch Stunden vor dem bekannten Einzug in den Plenarsaal – vor dem Bundeswirtschaftsministerium an einer Demonstration gegen Rüstungsexporte nach Argentinien beteiligte, zu der die Kampagne “Stoppt den Rüstungsexport!” aufgerufen hatte. Die Demo wurde organsiert von der europäischen Jugendorganisation “Junge Europäische Förderalisten (JEF)”.

    Dabei waren neben den ehemaligen JEF-Vorständen Petra K. Kelly, Roland Vogt auch Walter Schwenninger, Willi Hoss, Milan Horacek. In den folgenden acht Jahren schrieb ich etwa 98 Prozent der Bundestagsanfragen der Grünen zum Rüstungsxport, organisierte dazu Fragestunden und Aktuelle Stunden, alles im Rahmen der Anti-Rüstungsexport-Kampagne und der Anti-Apartheid-Bewegung.

    Damals herrschte in Südafrika noch die rassistische Apartheid-Gesetzgebung – von der Israel einiges, gegen die Palästinenser gerichtet, übernommen hat. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland gehörte zu jenen Ländern, die unter Bruch des völkerrechtlich bindenden UNO-Rüstungsembargo den Apartheid-Staat nuklear aufrüstete.

    Auch die Wahlkampfmaterialien der Grünen für den Bundestagswahlkampf 1987 zu den Themen Rüstungsexport und Apartheid bekämpfen, stammten inhaltlich von mir. Der irgendwann inhaltlich von der CDU übernommene Antrag für einen jährlichen Rüstungsexportbericht geht auf die Kampagne “Stoppt den Rüstungsexport!” und mich zurück. Warum die CDU/CSU ihn inhaltlich übernommen hatte, haben mir Abgeordnete der Union erklärt.- Diese ständigen Anfragen zum Rüstungsexport würden im Wirtschaftsministerium zeitweise zehn Personen beschäftigen. Der Aufwand für einen jährlichen Bericht sei wesentlich geringer.

    Sie sollten Recht bekommen, auch das zunächst recht große Interesse an einzelnen Exporten ließ mit dem Bericht deutlich nach. Soviel zur Geschichte.

    Gesterm früh hörte ich früh morgens ein Interview des Deutschlandfunks mit einer Frau Brantner über deutsch-französische Beziehungen. Der Moderator Christoph Heinemann, fragte sie zum Schluß, welche Projekte sie in der deutschen-französischen Zusammenarbeit gerne durchsetzen würde. Und was kommt? Dieser Politikerin fallen est mal nur Waffen ein:

    “Eine wichtige Entscheidung die immer noch aussteht ist die über ein deutsch-französische Kampfflugzeug. Ein großes gemeinsames Projekt. Man müsse die Industriellen zusammenbringen, und sagen, jetzt wollen wir, dass wir gemeinsam nach vorne gehen. Das sei nicht einfach, aber ein Scheitern fände ich ein politisch fatales Zeichen.”

    So Brantner heute früh. Ich dachte, ich hätte irgendeine CDU-Europa-Abgeordnete gehört und habe mich fast am Kaffee verschluckt, als die “Auflösung” kam. Es war ein Gespräch mit der Grünen-Vorsitzenden Brantner. Ok – ich finde deutlicher als diese – für mich furchtbare Politikerin kann man es kaum zusammenfassen, warum für mich diese heutigen Grünen zu meinen politischen Gegnern gehören. Was nützt es Grüne zu wählen, wenn glasklare CSU- und FDP-Politik dabei rauskommt.

    Über Helmut Lorscheid:

    https://marjorie-wiki.de/wiki/Helmut_Lorscheid

    #willihoss #walterschwenninger #sudafrika #rustungsexport #rolandvogt #petrakkelly
  24. Helmut Lorscheid @[email protected] ·

    Schreck in der Morgenstunde

    oder: Wie sich die Grünen verändert haben

    Als Die Grünen 1983 erstmals im Bundestag waren, hatten sie zunächst kaum Räume und keinerlei Infrastruktur – also auch nicht ausreichend Büro und zunächst auch noch keine Büroausstattung. Damals waren das noch Schreibmaschinen und nur vereinzelt Computer. Auch Petra Kelly hatte zwar ein Mandat, aber kein Büro. So schrieb ich zu Hause auf meiner Schreibmasschine die ersten beiden Bundestagsanfragen der Grünen. Meiner Erinnung nach, hinterfragte eine der Fragen, die Panzerexporte in das damals von einer blutigen Militärdiktatur regierte Argentinien und die zweite befasst sich mit der deutsch-französischen Zuzsammenarbeit. Es ging um den deutschen Anteil an dem nach der Statistik “französischen” Rüstungsexport – der damals wie heute – noch kaltblütiger und moralfreier war als der aus Deutschland.

    Dazu passte, dass sich ein Großteil der neuen grünen Bundestagsabgeordneten morgens, um 7.00 h, also noch Stunden vor dem bekannten Einzug in den Plenarsaal – vor dem Bundeswirtschaftsministerium an einer Demonstration gegen Rüstungsexporte nach Argentinien beteiligte, zu der die Kampagne “Stoppt den Rüstungsexport!” aufgerufen hatte. Die Demo wurde organsiert von der europäischen Jugendorganisation “Junge Europäische Förderalisten (JEF)”.

    Dabei waren neben den ehemaligen JEF-Vorständen Petra K. Kelly, Roland Vogt auch Walter Schwenninger, Willi Hoss, Milan Horacek. In den folgenden acht Jahren schrieb ich etwa 98 Prozent der Bundestagsanfragen der Grünen zum Rüstungsxport, organisierte dazu Fragestunden und Aktuelle Stunden, alles im Rahmen der Anti-Rüstungsexport-Kampagne und der Anti-Apartheid-Bewegung.

    Damals herrschte in Südafrika noch die rassistische Apartheid-Gesetzgebung – von der Israel einiges, gegen die Palästinenser gerichtet, übernommen hat. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland gehörte zu jenen Ländern, die unter Bruch des völkerrechtlich bindenden UNO-Rüstungsembargo den Apartheid-Staat nuklear aufrüstete.

    Auch die Wahlkampfmaterialien der Grünen für den Bundestagswahlkampf 1987 zu den Themen Rüstungsexport und Apartheid bekämpfen, stammten inhaltlich von mir. Der irgendwann inhaltlich von der CDU übernommene Antrag für einen jährlichen Rüstungsexportbericht geht auf die Kampagne “Stoppt den Rüstungsexport!” und mich zurück. Warum die CDU/CSU ihn inhaltlich übernommen hatte, haben mir Abgeordnete der Union erklärt.- Diese ständigen Anfragen zum Rüstungsexport würden im Wirtschaftsministerium zeitweise zehn Personen beschäftigen. Der Aufwand für einen jährlichen Bericht sei wesentlich geringer.

    Sie sollten Recht bekommen, auch das zunächst recht große Interesse an einzelnen Exporten ließ mit dem Bericht deutlich nach. Soviel zur Geschichte.

    Gesterm früh hörte ich früh morgens ein Interview des Deutschlandfunks mit einer Frau Brantner über deutsch-französische Beziehungen. Der Moderator Christoph Heinemann, fragte sie zum Schluß, welche Projekte sie in der deutschen-französischen Zusammenarbeit gerne durchsetzen würde. Und was kommt? Dieser Politikerin fallen est mal nur Waffen ein:

    “Eine wichtige Entscheidung die immer noch aussteht ist die über ein deutsch-französische Kampfflugzeug. Ein großes gemeinsames Projekt. Man müsse die Industriellen zusammenbringen, und sagen, jetzt wollen wir, dass wir gemeinsam nach vorne gehen. Das sei nicht einfach, aber ein Scheitern fände ich ein politisch fatales Zeichen.”

    So Brantner heute früh. Ich dachte, ich hätte irgendeine CDU-Europa-Abgeordnete gehört und habe mich fast am Kaffee verschluckt, als die “Auflösung” kam. Es war ein Gespräch mit der Grünen-Vorsitzenden Brantner. Ok – ich finde deutlicher als diese – für mich furchtbare Politikerin kann man es kaum zusammenfassen, warum für mich diese heutigen Grünen zu meinen politischen Gegnern gehören. Was nützt es Grüne zu wählen, wenn glasklare CSU- und FDP-Politik dabei rauskommt.

    Über Helmut Lorscheid:

    https://marjorie-wiki.de/wiki/Helmut_Lorscheid

    #apartheid #b90diegrunen #franziskabrantner #jef #karllamers #milanhoracek
  25. Jon Awbrey @[email protected] ·

    Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 1
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/01

    Questions about the relationship between “interpreters” and “interpretants” in Peircean semiotics have broken out again. To put the matter as pointedly as possible — because I know someone or other is bound to — “In a theory of three‑place relations among objects, signs, and interpretant signs, where indeed is there any place for the interpretive agent?”

    By way of getting my feet on the ground with the issue I'll do what always helped me before and review a small set of basic texts. Here is the first.

    Figure 1. The Sign Relation in Aristotle
    • inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordp

    ❝Words spoken are symbols or signs (symbola) of affections or impressions (pathemata) of the soul (psyche); written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs (semeia), are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects (pragmata) of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies (homoiomata).❞ (Aristotle, De Interp. i. 16a4).

    References —

    Aristotle, “On Interpretation” (De Interp.), Harold P. Cooke (trans.), pp. 111–179 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
    • web.archive.org/web/2000121016
    • pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/i
    • academia.edu/1266493/Interpret
    • academia.edu/57812482/Interpre

    #Peirce #Logic #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations
    #Aristotle #Hermeneutics #Interpretation #Interpretant

    #triadicrelations #signrelations #semiotics #logic #interpretation #hermeneutics
  26. Jon Awbrey @[email protected] ·

    Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 1
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01

    Questions about the relation between “interpreters” and “interpretants” in Peircean semiotics have broken out again. To put the matter as pointedly as possible, because I know someone or other is bound to — In a theory of three‑place relations among objects, signs, and interpretant signs, where indeed is there any place for the interpretive agent?

    By way of getting my feet on the ground with the issue I'll do what always helped me before and review a small set of basic texts. Here is the first.

    Figure 1. The Sign Relation in Aristotle
    • inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordp

    ❝Words spoken are symbols or signs (symbola) of affections or impressions (pathemata) of the soul (psyche); written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs (semeia), are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects (pragmata) of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies (homoiomata).❞ (Aristotle, De Interp. i. 16a4).

    References —

    Aristotle, “On Interpretation” (De Interp.), Harold P. Cooke (trans.), pp. 111–179 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
    • web.archive.org/web/2000121016
    • pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/i
    • academia.edu/1266493/Interpret
    • academia.edu/57812482/Interpre

    #Peirce #Logic #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations
    #Aristotle #Interpretation #Hermeneutics #InterpretantSign

    #interpretantsign #hermeneutics #interpretation #aristotle #triadicrelations #signrelations
  27. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

    An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

    • E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
    • The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
    • The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

    If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

    In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

    Translator’s Notes

    1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
    2. Strictly an enthymeme.
    3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
    4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
    5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
    6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
    cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #analogy #aristotle #cspeirce #iconindexsymbol #induction #inquiry
  28. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

    An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

    • E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
    • The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
    • The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

    If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

    In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

    Translator’s Notes

    1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
    2. Strictly an enthymeme.
    3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
    4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
    5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
    6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
    cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #analogy #aristotle #cspeirce #iconindexsymbol #induction #inquiry
  29. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

    An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

    • E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
    • The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
    • The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

    If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

    In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

    Translator’s Notes

    1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
    2. Strictly an enthymeme.
    3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
    4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
    5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
    6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
    cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #analogy #aristotle #cspeirce #iconindexsymbol #induction #inquiry
  30. Inquiry Into Inquiry @[email protected] ·

    Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

    An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

    • E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
    • The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
    • The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

    If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

    In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

    Translator’s Notes

    1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
    2. Strictly an enthymeme.
    3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
    4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
    5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
    6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
    cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #signrelations #semiotics #probablereasoning #probability #mathematics #logic
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