#thebaltics — Public Fediverse posts

Friday, June 5, 2026

https://activitypub.writeworks.uk/2026/06/friday-june-5-2026/

Friday, June 5, 2026

https://activitypub.writeworks.uk/2026/06/friday-june-5-2026/

The Baltic States Are More Important For Ukraine Than Most Might Realize

The Baltic States Are More Important For Ukraine Than Most Might Realize

By Andrew Korybko

The Baltic States and Ukraine’s borders with Russia and Belarus are the most likely tripwires for a hot NATO-Russian war, which they have an interest in provoking due to the false expectation of coercing Russia into concessions, due to their artificially engineered symbiotic security relationship from 2024.

Lithuania recently committed to producing weapons for Ukraine, and while the scope and financing of their deal remain unclear, this nonetheless drew attention to the Baltic States’ importance for Ukraine. Few are aware of it, but Ukraine clinched security agreements with all three of them – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – across 2024, the gist of which mirrors those that it clinched with major NATO states in the sense of obligating them to resume their present level of military support if there’s another conflict.

The Baltic States’ armed forces are miniscule by comparison to most NATO members’, but they’re arguably more strategic than most too due to their location along the borders with “mainland Russia”, Belarus, and Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad. This means that any border incident, including that which they or the NATO allies whose troops are present on their territory might provoke with Russia/Belarus, could spiral into a full-blown crisis due to Article 5, after which NATO as a whole could get involved.

This scenario is especially credible in light of the Baltic States’ commitment in late January to form their own “military Schengen” for facilitating the flow of troops and equipment between them. This zone could merge with the “Via Baltica” highway and its delayed “Rail Baltica” counterpart to connect them to the original “military Schengen” between Poland, Germany (which now has troops in Lithuania), and the Netherlands. If Belgium and France join as reported, then this would stretch to the Pyrenees.

Poland envisages restoring its long-lost Great Power status with US support, and seeing as how the Commonwealth once extended as far north as southern Estonia, it’s safe to say that Poland correspondingly envisages restoring its “sphere of influence” over the Baltic States as well. Poland also fields the EU’s largest army right now, which the third-largest in all of NATO with plans to reach 500,000 by 2039 (200,00 of whom would be reservists), and is at the centre of the “military Schengen”.

Accordingly, the earlier mentioned chain reaction of a border incident between the Baltic States and Russia escalating into a full-blown crisis would likely occur if Poland dispatches troops there in “defence” of its envisaged “sphere of influence”, thus drawing in the rest of NATO shortly after. The aforesaid sequence highlights the grossly outsized strategic threat that the Baltic States pose to Russia due to them serving as tripwires for a hot NATO-Russian war in the worst-case scenario.

This makes the Baltic States more important for Ukraine than most might realize given all four countries’ interest in provoking the above scenario with the (arguably false) expectation that Russia would then ultimately be coerced into concessions to avoid World War III. Either could initiate their own border incidents with Russia in order to prompt the other into following suit in the spirit of their security pacts and therefore activating both Article 5 and major NATO states’ separate security pacts with Ukraine.

With this artificially engineered symbiotic security relationship in mind, it thus becomes the case that the Baltic States and Ukraine’s borders with Russia/Belarus are the most likely tripwires for a hot NATO-Russian war, but with the caveat that this all depends on Poland. If it reacts to their border provocations against Russia, then a hot war might be inevitable, but this could be averted if it exercises restraint just like during September’s drone incident when the “deep state” tried hard to manipulate it into war.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

The Brits Want The Poles To Contain Russia In The Baltic

The Brits Want The Poles To Contain Russia In The Baltic

By Andrew Korybko

Some of the €44 billion in loans that Poland just received from the EU’s “SAFE” program will go towards its new “SAFE Baltic” program, and if the precedent of the newly clinched Polish-Swedish submarine deal is anything to go by, then UK companies will profit from forthcoming Polish deals too.

The Polish Defence Minister announced in late November that his country will buy three A26 Blekinge-class diesel-electric submarines from Sweden as part of a deal estimated to be worth a little less than €2.5 billion. This comes just several months after their first joint exercise, which presaged closer cooperation against Russia in the Baltic, and also follows reported British lobbying for Sweden over other competing bidders since one of its defence companies is expected to profit from this deal.

Although the US is Poland’s closest partner, with which it’s working hand-in-hand to geostrategically re-engineer Europe by facilitating the revival of Poland’s long-lost Great Power status simultaneously with counteracting Germany’s plans to federalize the EU, the Brits are arguably its second-closest one. This was confirmed by the creation of their de facto trilateral alliance with Ukraine exactly one week before the special operation started. They then conspired to sabotage that spring’s peace talks with Russia.

Last summer, it was assessed that “The UK Aims To Entrench Its Influence In Estonia In Order To Lead The Arctic-Baltic Front”, which preceded “SVR Once Again Warning About A British-Ukrainian False Flag Provocation At Sea” a month later. Then at the start of fall, Scandinavia experienced a Russian drone scare that was likely a series of false flags for justifying a potential crackdown on Russia’s shadow fleet in the Baltic, which is already under pressure. Such a move could serve to greatly escalate tensions.

That hasn’t yet happened due to Trump once again escalating against Russia in mid-October and then just as unexpectedly pushing for peace a month later. This made such a provocation redundant and then reduced the likeliness that Trump would fall for it after he soured on the Europeans yet again throughout the ongoing peace process that he abruptly revived. Instead of staging a false flag provocation at sea, the Brits were likely the ones who leaked the Witkoff-Ushakov call, which intended to discredit this process.

Regardless of whether or not Albion employs any more of its infamous perfidy, it’s nevertheless doing what’s needed to ensure its regional influence in the Arctic, Baltic, and Central Europe after the Ukrainian Conflict ends. Its interests in the Arctic are advanced through its base in Estonia, which also enables it to exert influence over the northern Baltic Sea, while its interests in the rest of that sea and Central Europe are advanced through its de facto alliance with Poland.

This takes the form of bilateral cooperation on Ukraine as well as the latest opportunity of indirectly cooperating through Poland’s new submarine deal with Sweden as was earlier explained. From the UK’s strategic perspective, facilitating closer cooperation between Poland and Sweden in the Baltic helps to contain Russia there, the shared goal of which is furthered by Poland’s new “SAFE Baltic” program that expands the scope of its naval activity and aims to streamline decisions on the use of force at sea.

Crucially, some of the €44 billion in loans that Poland just received from the EU’s €150 billion “Security Action For Europe” program (SAFE, which is part of the “ReArm Europe Plan”), will go towards the “SAFE Baltic” program. The precedent established by Poland’s submarine deal with Sweden could see the UK lobbying for more such deals from which its own companies will profit. Therefore, Poland’s rise as a Baltic naval power will be backed by the UK, which hopes that this will tighten Russia’s containment.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

#Britain #CentralEurope #Estonia #EU #Europe #Geopolitics #Germany #NATO #Poland #Russia #Sweden #TheBaltics #UK

Poland Is Expanding Its Influence Over The Baltics Through The “Via Baltica” Highway

Poland Is Expanding Its Influence Over The Baltics Through The “Via Baltica” Highway

By Andrew Korybko

The “EU Defence Line” that’s being built, which refers to the combination of the “Baltic Defence Line” and Poland’s “East Shield” along NATO’s eastern border, might then be bolstered by Polish-led troop deployments seeing as how Poland would be integral to those three’s survival in any war with Russia.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki inaugurated the latest section of the “Via Baltica” highway between Poland and the Baltic States in late October in an event with his Lithuanian counterpart, with both highlighting the dual military purpose of this megaproject in an allusion to the “military Schengen”. “Via Baltica” is one of the “Three Seas Initiative’s” (3SI) flagships, many of which complement the newer “military Schengen” initiative of facilitating the flow of troops and equipment eastward towards Russia.

Poland envisages the 3SI accelerating the revival of its long-lost Great Power status that’ll then result in it leading Russia’s containment all across Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) once the Ukrainian Conflict ends. It’s the most populous formerly communist member of NATO with the bloc’s third-largest military, just became a $1 trillion economy with its sights now set on a G20 seat, and has a history of regional leadership during the Commonwealth/“Rzeczpospolita” era, so these ambitions aren’t delusional.

Building upon the last point, most casual observers don’t know that the Commonwealth stretched as far north as parts of Latvia, which remained under its control till the Third Partition in 1795. Prior to that, it even controlled around half of Estonia from 1561-1629, after which it was ceded to Sweden. Suffice to say, what’s nowadays the nation-state of Lithuania was also part of the “Republic of the Two Nations” as the Commonwealth was officially known, thus giving Poland a substantial footprint in Baltic history.

The insight shared in the preceding two paragraphs enables the reader to better understand what Nawrocki told Lithuanian media during his maiden trip as president to that country last September about how “We as Poles, and I as the President of Poland, are aware that we are responsible for entire regions of Central Europe, including the Baltic States and Lithuania. Thanks to this visit and our cooperation, we feel that we are also building our military potential in solidarity, supported across the ocean.”

“Via Baltica” and the complementary “Rail Baltica”, both of which are behind schedule (especially the latter), will serve as the means for Poland to fulfil this dimension of its Great Power vision as elucidated by Nawrocki. The US’ post-Ukraine “Pivot (back) to (East) Asia” for more muscularly containing China could result in it redeploying some troops from CEE to there, but Poland would then likely replace the US’ reduced role through its ongoing militarization and 3SI-driven military logistical access to the Baltics.

The “EU Defence Line” that’s being built, which refers to the combination of the “Baltic Defence Line” and Poland’s “East Shield” along NATO’s eastern border, might then be bolstered by Polish-led troop deployments seeing as how Poland would be integral to those three’s survival in any war with Russia. In that scenario, from Estonia down to the Polish-Belarusian-Ukrainian tripoint, Russia’s number one adversary wouldn’t necessarily be NATO as a whole but Poland. That would have important implications.

In brief, while Poland is closely allied with the Anglo-American Axis for reasons of shared anti-Russian goals, it’s not their puppet and might become even more strategically autonomous under Nawrocki. After all, he surprised many by recently saying that he’s ready to talk to Putin if Poland’s security depends on it, thus opening the door for a Polish-Russian modus vivendi in the future. Such an understanding might be the key to keeping the peace in CEE after the Ukrainian Conflict ends.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

#CEE #CentralAndEasternEurope #Estonia #EU #Europe #Lithuania #NATO #Poland #Russia #TheBaltics #Ukraine

Poland Envisages Indirectly Expanding The EU’s “Drone Wall” Into Ukraine

Poland Envisages Indirectly Expanding The EU’s “Drone Wall” Into Ukraine

By Andrew Korybko

This would result in the de facto new Iron Curtain and associated NATO influence stretching up to whatever the new Russian-Ukrainian border might be by the time the conflict ends.

Poland and Ukraine signed a drone warfare cooperation agreement that’ll see Ukraine share its relevant experiences with Poland, both of them jointly developing new defensive methods, and their armed forces further strengthening their interoperability in accordance with summer 2024’s security pact. The Polish Defence Minister also declared that “we know very well that the security line of our country runs along the front line of Ukraine and Russia”, which amounts to Polish strategic depth inside Ukraine.

NATO’s unprecedented downing of Russian drones over Poland, which likely veered off course due to the bloc’s jamming and were then exploited by deep state forces in an attempt to manipulate the president into war with Russia as respectively explained here and here, served as the impetus for this deal. NATO then launched “Operation Eastern Sentry” in Poland and Romania to bolster the bloc’s anti-air defences. This aligns with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s proposed “drone wall” concept.

The idea, which was proposed by the Baltic States, is to create an impenetrable electronic and physical warfare barrier along the EU’s eastern border. This pairs with the “EU Defence Line” that the bloc is building, which refers to the combination of the “Baltic Defence Line” and Poland’s “East Shield” that’ll stretch from the Estonian-Russian border down to the Polish-Belarusian one and might foreseeably be expanded northward to include the Finnish-Russian border. This de facto amounts to new Iron Curtain.

Given the rapidly evolving military-strategic context as described above, it therefore appears that Poland envisages indirectly expanding the “drone wall” component of the “EU Defence Line” into Ukraine through their newly signed drone warfare cooperation agreement. Poland’s ruling duopoly, which refers to it conservative-nationalist president and liberal-globalist prime minister, expect to benefit by solidifying their country’s strategic depth inside Ukraine as declared by their country’s Defence Minister.

As for Ukraine, Poland’s explicit plans to profit from Ukraine could hypothetically be moderated through these means, such as if Ukraine proposes being remunerated for sharing its drone warfare experience with Poland through more military donations instead of buying them on credit like is now planned. Zelensky might also calculate that having his country function as Poland’s “drone wall”, which exploits its paranoia about Russia, could help drag it into the conflict like he’s sought to do since November 2022.

Poland and Ukraine also have shared interests. Both want to show the US, EU, and NATO that they can contain Russia’s aerial capabilities (at least in part as they’d present this as having achieved) in the region, thus currying more favour with them. Another point is that Poland will receive €43.7 billion in cheap loans from the EU’s €150 billion defence investment program as part of the €800 billion “ReArm Europe Plan”. Some of this could go towards subsidizing anti-air and -drone equipment for Ukraine.

“Poland’s Military-Industrial Complex Is Embarrassingly Underdeveloped” so it might use these loans to invest in modernizing it, after which the aforesaid equipment could be sold to Ukraine on credit for a steep discount or perhaps simply donated. Through these means, the EU’s “drone wall” can indirectly expand into Ukraine, thus resulting in the de facto new Iron Curtain and associated NATO influence stretching up to whatever the new Russian-Ukrainian border might be by the time the conflict ends.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#drones #EU #Europe #Geopolitics #NATO #Poland #Russia #TheBaltics #Ukraine

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