#phylosophy — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #phylosophy, aggregated by home.social.
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Kas yra stebėtojas? Tai nėra gili filosofija, o tiesiog įprastas kasdienis gyvenimas. Kas yra stebėtojas? Kas yra tas „aš“, kuris sako „aš žiūriu“? „Aš“, kuris žiūri, yra sukauptos patirtys, pasmerkimai, stebėjimai, žinios ir pan. Tai yra centras, stebėtojas. Jis atsiskiria nuo stebimo dalyko, sakydamas: „Aš stebiu savo baimę, savo kaltę, savo neviltį.“ Bet stebėtojas yra stebimas. Jei jis nėra, jis pripažįsta savo neviltį. Aš žinau, kas yra neviltis, kas yra vienatvė, ir ta atmintis išlieka. Kitą kartą, kai ji atsiranda, aš sakau, kad matau kažką, kas skiriasi nuo manęs. Šis stebėtojo ir stebimojo atskyrimas sukuria konfliktą, ir tada aš nukrypstu nuo temos, bandydamas rasti būdą jį išspręsti. Bet faktas yra tas, kad stebėtojas yra stebimasis. Tai nėra intelektualus konceptas, bet faktas.
From Collected Works, Vol. 17
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Who is the observer? This is not deep philosophy, but just ordinary, daily life. Who is the observer? Who is the ‘I’ that says, ‘I look’? The ‘I’ that is looking is the accumulated experiences, condemnations, observations, knowledge and so on. It is the centre, the observer. He separates himself from the thing observed, saying, ‘I am observing my fear, my guilt, my despair.’ But the observer is the observed. If he is not, he recognises his despair. I know what despair is, what loneliness is, and that memory remains. The next time it arises, I say that I see something different from me. This division between the observer and the observed creates a conflict, and then I go off on a tangent, trying to find a way to resolve it. But the fact is that the observer is the observed. This is not an intellectual concept, but a fact.
From Collected Works, Vol. 17
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Who is the observer? This is not deep philosophy, but just ordinary, daily life. Who is the observer? Who is the ‘I’ that says, ‘I look’? The ‘I’ that is looking is the accumulated experiences, condemnations, observations, knowledge and so on. It is the centre, the observer. He separates himself from the thing observed, saying, ‘I am observing my fear, my guilt, my despair.’ But the observer is the observed. If he is not, he recognises his despair. I know what despair is, what loneliness is, and that memory remains. The next time it arises, I say that I see something different from me. This division between the observer and the observed creates a conflict, and then I go off on a tangent, trying to find a way to resolve it. But the fact is that the observer is the observed. This is not an intellectual concept, but a fact.
From Collected Works, Vol. 17