#dnsrootserver — Public Fediverse posts

I can totally imagine the current US administration, or a future US administration, weaponizing the DNS root servers. Are there some national or international initiatives to mitigate this risk ?

#uspol #usa #dns #DNSRootServer #intpol #internetgovernance

I can totally imagine the current US administration, or a future US administration, weaponizing the DNS root servers. Are there some national or international initiatives to mitigate this risk ?

#uspol #usa #dns #DNSRootServer #intpol #internetgovernance

I can totally imagine the current US administration, or a future US administration, weaponizing the DNS root servers. Are there some national or international initiatives to mitigate this risk ?

#uspol #usa #dns #DNSRootServer #intpol #internetgovernance

I can totally imagine the current US administration, or a future US administration, weaponizing the DNS root servers. Are there some national or international initiatives to mitigate this risk ?

#uspol #usa #dns #DNSRootServer #intpol #internetgovernance

I can totally imagine the current US administration, or a future US administration, weaponizing the DNS root servers. Are there some national or international initiatives to mitigate this risk ?

#uspol #usa #dns #DNSRootServer #intpol #internetgovernance

Ever wondered why 13 is such an oddly specific number for #DNS #rootservers? Turns out that you could at most cram 13 domain names and their corresponding #IPv4 addresses in a non-truncated #UDP response. As soon as DNS truncates, the resolver falls back to #TCP. To avoid this additional performance impact and stress to the servers, the number is limited to 13.

https://blog.apnic.net/2017/02/15/the-root-of-the-dns/

#Internet #criticalinfrastructure #dnsrootserver

Ever wondered why 13 is such an oddly specific number for #DNS #rootservers? Turns out that you could at most cram 13 domain names and their corresponding #IPv4 addresses in a non-truncated #UDP response. As soon as DNS truncates, the resolver falls back to #TCP. To avoid this additional performance impact and stress to the servers, the number is limited to 13.

https://blog.apnic.net/2017/02/15/the-root-of-the-dns/

#Internet #criticalinfrastructure #dnsrootserver

Ever wondered why 13 is such an oddly specific number for #DNS #rootservers? Turns out that you could at most cram 13 domain names and their corresponding #IPv4 addresses in a non-truncated #UDP response. As soon as DNS truncates, the resolver falls back to #TCP. To avoid this additional performance impact and stress to the servers, the number is limited to 13.

https://blog.apnic.net/2017/02/15/the-root-of-the-dns/

#Internet #criticalinfrastructure #dnsrootserver

Ever wondered why 13 is such an oddly specific number for #DNS #rootservers? Turns out that you could at most cram 13 domain names and their corresponding #IPv4 addresses in a non-truncated #UDP response. As soon as DNS truncates, the resolver falls back to #TCP. To avoid this additional performance impact and stress to the servers, the number is limited to 13.

https://blog.apnic.net/2017/02/15/the-root-of-the-dns/

#Internet #criticalinfrastructure #dnsrootserver

📬 Ukraine würde Russland am liebsten aus dem Internet verbannen #Internet #AndriiNabok #DNSRootServer #ICANN #MykhailoFedorov #RIPENCC #Russland https://tarnkappe.info/artikel/internet/ukraine-wuerde-russland-am-liebsten-aus-dem-internet-verbannen-216653.html

📬 Ukraine würde Russland am liebsten aus dem Internet verbannen #Internet #AndriiNabok #DNSRootServer #ICANN #MykhailoFedorov #RIPENCC #Russland https://tarnkappe.info/artikel/internet/ukraine-wuerde-russland-am-liebsten-aus-dem-internet-verbannen-216653.html