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333 results for “jni”
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Two days of national mourning have been declared in Mali after the country's defence minister was killed in an attack by Al-Qaeda linked group JNIM, who have allied with Tuareg rebels. Despite their disagreements, the two sides joined forces to fight against the Malian army, which is supported by Russian mercenaries.
#Mali #rebels #jihadists #JNIM #ALF #Tuareg #Sahel -
Two days of national mourning have been declared in Mali after the country's defence minister was killed in an attack by Al-Qaeda linked group JNIM, who have allied with Tuareg rebels. Despite their disagreements, the two sides joined forces to fight against the Malian army, which is supported by Russian mercenaries.
#Mali #rebels #jihadists #JNIM #ALF #Tuareg #Sahel -
Two days of national mourning have been declared in Mali after the country's defence minister was killed in an attack by Al-Qaeda linked group JNIM, who have allied with Tuareg rebels. Despite their disagreements, the two sides joined forces to fight against the Malian army, which is supported by Russian mercenaries.
#Mali #rebels #jihadists #JNIM #ALF #Tuareg #Sahel -
Two days of national mourning have been declared in Mali after the country's defence minister was killed in an attack by Al-Qaeda linked group JNIM, who have allied with Tuareg rebels. Despite their disagreements, the two sides joined forces to fight against the Malian army, which is supported by Russian mercenaries.
#Mali #rebels #jihadists #JNIM #ALF #Tuareg #Sahel -
Africa Corps, a paramilitary group controlled by Russia's Defence Ministry, confirmed on Monday that its forces had withdrawn from the northern town of Kidal in Mali after fierce fighting there. Africa Corps has been supporting the Malian junta since deploying to Mali in 2025. But Russia's presence in the country stretches back to 2021.
#Mali #rebels #jihadists #Russia #JNIM #Tuareg #ALF #Azawad -
Africa Corps, a paramilitary group controlled by Russia's Defence Ministry, confirmed on Monday that its forces had withdrawn from the northern town of Kidal in Mali after fierce fighting there. Africa Corps has been supporting the Malian junta since deploying to Mali in 2025. But Russia's presence in the country stretches back to 2021.
#Mali #rebels #jihadists #Russia #JNIM #Tuareg #ALF #Azawad -
Africa Corps, a paramilitary group controlled by Russia's Defence Ministry, confirmed on Monday that its forces had withdrawn from the northern town of Kidal in Mali after fierce fighting there. Africa Corps has been supporting the Malian junta since deploying to Mali in 2025. But Russia's presence in the country stretches back to 2021.
#Mali #rebels #jihadists #Russia #JNIM #Tuareg #ALF #Azawad -
Africa Corps, a paramilitary group controlled by Russia's Defence Ministry, confirmed on Monday that its forces had withdrawn from the northern town of Kidal in Mali after fierce fighting there. Africa Corps has been supporting the Malian junta since deploying to Mali in 2025. But Russia's presence in the country stretches back to 2021.
#Mali #rebels #jihadists #Russia #JNIM #Tuareg #ALF #Azawad -
Africa Corps, a paramilitary group controlled by Russia's Defence Ministry, confirmed on Monday that its forces had withdrawn from the northern town of Kidal in Mali after fierce fighting there. Africa Corps has been supporting the Malian junta since deploying to Mali in 2025. But Russia's presence in the country stretches back to 2021.
#Mali #rebels #jihadists #Russia #JNIM #Tuareg #ALF #Azawad -
https://www.europesays.com/videos/16574/ Who are the Russian mercenaries operating in Mali? • FRANCE 24 English #AfricaCorps #AlQaeda #attacks #DefenceMinister #FRANCE24 #FRANCE24English #FRANCE24 #FRANCE24English #Jama'atNusratAlIslam #jihadists #JNIM #Mali #mercenaries #rebels #Russia #SadioCamara #Wagner
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https://www.europesays.com/sk/54952/ V Afrike padol vojenský generál, analytici vinia Rusko zo slabej podpory #Afrika #Bamako #FLA #generál #JNIM #Kidal #mali #MinisterObrany #News #RadikálneSkupiny #SadiaCamara #SK #Slovak #Slovenčina #Správy #srť #Svet #útok #World #WorldNews
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https://www.europesays.com/videos/16512/ Mali’s junta in crisis as defence minister killed, key city ‘caputred’ • FRANCE 24 English #AlQaeda #attacks #DefenceMinister #FRANCE24 #FRANCE24English #FRANCE24 #FRANCE24English #Jama'atNusratAlIslam #jihadists #JNIM #Mali #rebels #Russia #SadioCamara
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https://www.europesays.com/videos/16372/ Mali defence minister killed as jihadis and rebels launch major assault • FRANCE 24 English #AlQaeda #attacks #DefenceMinister #FRANCE24 #FRANCE24English #FRANCE24 #FRANCE24English #Jama'atNusratAlIslam #jihadists #JNIM #Mali #rebels #Russia #SadioCamara
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https://www.europesays.com/fr/893829/ Mali : ce que l’on sait des combats qui ont eu lieu samedi entre l’armée et des djihadistes du JNIM, affilié à Al-Qaïda #Actualités #EU #europe #EuropeanUnion #FR #France #junte #Mali #News #RépubliqueFrançaise #UE #UnionEuropéenne
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https://www.europesays.com/videos/15876/ MALI: Gewalt eskaliert erneut! Terrorattacken treffen Bamako – Militärregierung unter massivem Druck #2026 #afrika #aktuell #AlQaida #angriffe #Bamako #fernsehen #Gewalt #JNIM #Mali #militärregierung #n24 #nachrichten #NachrichtenAktuell #news #Sahel #Sicherheitslage #TERROR #terroranschläge #tv #video #welt #WELTNews #westafrika
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C-Libraries in Java nutzen 1: Grundlagen der Foreign Function & Memory API
Die Foreign Function & Memory API bietet in Java einen deutlich einfacheren Zugang zu Funktionen in C-Libraries als das veraltete JNI.
#Developer #IT #Java #Schnittstellen #Softwareentwicklung #news
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Using C Libraries in Java 1: Fundamentals of the Foreign Function & Memory API
The Foreign Function & Memory API in Java provides significantly easier access to functions in C libraries than the outdated JNI.
#Developer #IT #Java #Schnittstellen #Softwareentwicklung #news
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https://www.europesays.com/africa/183939/ Benin election favours continuity amid al-Qaeda attacks, poverty #Africa #AfricanUnion #AlQaeda #Benin #BurkinaFaso #Cotonou #ECOWAS #EuropeanUnion #GroupForTheSupportOfIslamAndMuslims #JNIM #NanaAkufoAddo #niger #PatriceTalon #PaulHounkpe #RomualdWadagni #TheDemocrats
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Создаем Java обертку для C++ класса в Android приложении, а также реализуем обратные вызовы из нэйтива
Кратко расскажу о себе и о том, зачем возникла необходимость в подобном. Я более десяти лет пишу приложения под Android, около 5 лет под IOS, и сейчас переношу свои наработки под десктопы. Приложения мои предназначены для сисадминов, это SSH клиент, сетевые сканеры и тд. В общем, самое сложное - не сам интерфейс, а то, что под капотом. Когда я лишь начинал, я думал, что остановлюсь на платформе Android и стал пилить все на Java. Но затем осознал свою ошибку и исправил ее. На данный момент все мои приложения состоят из двух частей: общего для всех систем ядра на С++ и платформозависимого интерфейса, написанного на Java/Swift/C++ в зависимости от системы. Оговорюсь сразу, эта статья будет лишь своего рода вступлением. Я покажу, как работать с объектно-ориентированным кодом на C++ в Java оболочке (в JNI нам доступен экспорт С функций). Инициализировать объект, делать из него вызовы, удалять, при этом имея аналогичный класс в оболочке, будто бы наш код был написан на Java. Задача эта не слишком сложная, но прежде чем опытные прогеры закрыли эту статью, я оговорюсь, что в следующей части мы уже будем работать с каллбэками - вызовами Java листенеров из нашего С++ кода, а вот это уже задача совсем нетривиальная, требующая понимания работы JNI и Dalvik. Но обо всем по порядку. Итак, у нас есть некий CPP класс и Java оболочка. Через JNI мы можем вызывать только С-функции, то есть не объектный код. Так как же нам работать с ООП? Главная проблема - не столько вызовы, сколько хранение адреса объекта нативного класса. Лично для себя я нашел решение - хранить его в Java классе, как long. То есть, у нас получается приблизительно такой код:
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https://www.europesays.com/africa/163809/ Russia’s Africa Corps PMC ‘Hands-Off’ Approach in Mali Proves Costly #Africa #JNIM #Mali #mercenary #Russia #SAHEL #Terrorism
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Signal vs Wire — binary analysis of both APKs (apktool, strings, ELF inspection).
The gap is larger than most people think:
Signal: Rust core (libsignal_jni.so), Kyber-1024 post-quantum hybrid ratchet, SQLCipher for at-rest encryption, SVR with Intel SGX attestation, IME_FLAG_NO_PERSONALIZED_LEARNING (keyboard can't index your messages), zero third-party trackers.
Wire: Kotlin/Ktor, no hardened native core (more accessible to Frida), no SQLCipher (messages extractable in plaintext on rooted devices), no post-quantum, Segment SDK for behavioural telemetry.
But the finding that surprised me most:
Wire APKs from unofficial stores (Uptodown et al.) contain additional tracking workers and ACCESS_SUPERUSER permission requests not present in the official build. Supply chain integrity is not a footnote — it's the threat model.
Conclusion: Signal is the only one of the two suitable for threat models involving physical or administrative device compromise.
soon the full paper
#infosec #AndroidSecurity #Signal #Wire #ReverseEngineering #mobileforensics #supplychain #MASA
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Signal vs Wire — binary analysis of both APKs (apktool, strings, ELF inspection).
The gap is larger than most people think:
Signal: Rust core (libsignal_jni.so), Kyber-1024 post-quantum hybrid ratchet, SQLCipher for at-rest encryption, SVR with Intel SGX attestation, IME_FLAG_NO_PERSONALIZED_LEARNING (keyboard can't index your messages), zero third-party trackers.
Wire: Kotlin/Ktor, no hardened native core (more accessible to Frida), no SQLCipher (messages extractable in plaintext on rooted devices), no post-quantum, Segment SDK for behavioural telemetry.
But the finding that surprised me most:
Wire APKs from unofficial stores (Uptodown et al.) contain additional tracking workers and ACCESS_SUPERUSER permission requests not present in the official build. Supply chain integrity is not a footnote — it's the threat model.
Conclusion: Signal is the only one of the two suitable for threat models involving physical or administrative device compromise.
soon the full paper
#infosec #AndroidSecurity #Signal #Wire #ReverseEngineering #mobileforensics #supplychain #MASA
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Signal vs Wire — binary analysis of both APKs (apktool, strings, ELF inspection).
The gap is larger than most people think:
Signal: Rust core (libsignal_jni.so), Kyber-1024 post-quantum hybrid ratchet, SQLCipher for at-rest encryption, SVR with Intel SGX attestation, IME_FLAG_NO_PERSONALIZED_LEARNING (keyboard can't index your messages), zero third-party trackers.
Wire: Kotlin/Ktor, no hardened native core (more accessible to Frida), no SQLCipher (messages extractable in plaintext on rooted devices), no post-quantum, Segment SDK for behavioural telemetry.
But the finding that surprised me most:
Wire APKs from unofficial stores (Uptodown et al.) contain additional tracking workers and ACCESS_SUPERUSER permission requests not present in the official build. Supply chain integrity is not a footnote — it's the threat model.
Conclusion: Signal is the only one of the two suitable for threat models involving physical or administrative device compromise.
soon the full paper
#infosec #AndroidSecurity #Signal #Wire #ReverseEngineering #mobileforensics #supplychain #MASA
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Signal vs Wire — binary analysis of both APKs (apktool, strings, ELF inspection).
The gap is larger than most people think:
Signal: Rust core (libsignal_jni.so), Kyber-1024 post-quantum hybrid ratchet, SQLCipher for at-rest encryption, SVR with Intel SGX attestation, IME_FLAG_NO_PERSONALIZED_LEARNING (keyboard can't index your messages), zero third-party trackers.
Wire: Kotlin/Ktor, no hardened native core (more accessible to Frida), no SQLCipher (messages extractable in plaintext on rooted devices), no post-quantum, Segment SDK for behavioural telemetry.
But the finding that surprised me most:
Wire APKs from unofficial stores (Uptodown et al.) contain additional tracking workers and ACCESS_SUPERUSER permission requests not present in the official build. Supply chain integrity is not a footnote — it's the threat model.
Conclusion: Signal is the only one of the two suitable for threat models involving physical or administrative device compromise.
soon the full paper
#infosec #AndroidSecurity #Signal #Wire #ReverseEngineering #mobileforensics #supplychain #MASA
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Static + dynamic analysis of Signal's APK. The good news first: Signal is genuinely exceptional.
Rust core (libsignal_jni.so), post-quantum hybrid Double Ratchet (Kyber-1024 + X25519), Direct ByteBuffers with immediate zeroing after PIN/username hashing, Intel SGX attestation for SVR — MREnclave verification means even a compromised Signal server can't extract your PIN hash.
But two things stood out:
1. Firebase is always there. Google receives IP + notification timestamps regardless of message content. If you need metadata privacy, Signal still leaks presence data to Google's infrastructure.
2. Certificate revocation endpoints hit http://g.symcd.com in plaintext. An ISP or state-level observer can fingerprint Signal usage from DNS queries and HTTP traffic to those CAs — without touching message content.
Conclusion: strongest crypto engineering in consumer messaging. The attack surface isn't the cryptography. It's the operational dependencies.
Soon the full analysis
#infosec #AndroidSecurity #Signal #privacy #ReverseEngineering #postquantum #mobileforensics
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Static + dynamic analysis of Signal's APK. The good news first: Signal is genuinely exceptional.
Rust core (libsignal_jni.so), post-quantum hybrid Double Ratchet (Kyber-1024 + X25519), Direct ByteBuffers with immediate zeroing after PIN/username hashing, Intel SGX attestation for SVR — MREnclave verification means even a compromised Signal server can't extract your PIN hash.
But two things stood out:
1. Firebase is always there. Google receives IP + notification timestamps regardless of message content. If you need metadata privacy, Signal still leaks presence data to Google's infrastructure.
2. Certificate revocation endpoints hit http://g.symcd.com in plaintext. An ISP or state-level observer can fingerprint Signal usage from DNS queries and HTTP traffic to those CAs — without touching message content.
Conclusion: strongest crypto engineering in consumer messaging. The attack surface isn't the cryptography. It's the operational dependencies.
Soon the full analysis
#infosec #AndroidSecurity #Signal #privacy #ReverseEngineering #postquantum #mobileforensics
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Static + dynamic analysis of Signal's APK. The good news first: Signal is genuinely exceptional.
Rust core (libsignal_jni.so), post-quantum hybrid Double Ratchet (Kyber-1024 + X25519), Direct ByteBuffers with immediate zeroing after PIN/username hashing, Intel SGX attestation for SVR — MREnclave verification means even a compromised Signal server can't extract your PIN hash.
But two things stood out:
1. Firebase is always there. Google receives IP + notification timestamps regardless of message content. If you need metadata privacy, Signal still leaks presence data to Google's infrastructure.
2. Certificate revocation endpoints hit http://g.symcd.com in plaintext. An ISP or state-level observer can fingerprint Signal usage from DNS queries and HTTP traffic to those CAs — without touching message content.
Conclusion: strongest crypto engineering in consumer messaging. The attack surface isn't the cryptography. It's the operational dependencies.
Soon the full analysis
#infosec #AndroidSecurity #Signal #privacy #ReverseEngineering #postquantum #mobileforensics
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Static + dynamic analysis of Signal's APK. The good news first: Signal is genuinely exceptional.
Rust core (libsignal_jni.so), post-quantum hybrid Double Ratchet (Kyber-1024 + X25519), Direct ByteBuffers with immediate zeroing after PIN/username hashing, Intel SGX attestation for SVR — MREnclave verification means even a compromised Signal server can't extract your PIN hash.
But two things stood out:
1. Firebase is always there. Google receives IP + notification timestamps regardless of message content. If you need metadata privacy, Signal still leaks presence data to Google's infrastructure.
2. Certificate revocation endpoints hit http://g.symcd.com in plaintext. An ISP or state-level observer can fingerprint Signal usage from DNS queries and HTTP traffic to those CAs — without touching message content.
Conclusion: strongest crypto engineering in consumer messaging. The attack surface isn't the cryptography. It's the operational dependencies.
Soon the full analysis
#infosec #AndroidSecurity #Signal #privacy #ReverseEngineering #postquantum #mobileforensics
