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1000 results for “ezcrypt”
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Check out my previous release, dis'joint, this #BandcampFriday, during which time, as you probably know, funds go directly to artists.
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Check out my previous release, dis'joint, this #BandcampFriday, during which time, as you probably know, funds go directly to artists.
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Check out my previous release, dis'joint, this #BandcampFriday, during which time, as you probably know, funds go directly to artists.
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Check out my previous release, dis'joint, this #BandcampFriday, during which time, as you probably know, funds go directly to artists.
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LinkedIn scans for 6,278 extensions and encrypts the results into every request
#HackerNews #LinkedIn #BrowserExtensions #DataPrivacy #Cybersecurity #TechNews #Encryption
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Encrypted messaging straight from the terminal! 💯
🔐 **XMTP** — TUI chat client for E2E messaging
🗨 MLS-based encryption, DMs/groups, streaming + profile-based CLI
🦀 Written in Rust & built with @ratatui_rs
⭐ GitHub: https://github.com/qntx/xmtp
#rustlang #ratatui #tui #crypto #messaging #e2e #streaming #terminal
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#encryptionist refers to technologists and developers who prioritise cryptographic security and technical control as an end in itself - replacing human trust and open social relationships with code-enforced systems, embodying the #geekproblem tendency to solve political and social problems with technical fixes rather than addressing any underlying social dynamics.
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Encryption ≠ permanent protection.
“Encryption is treated as final when it’s temporary.” - Garfield Jones
• Capture now, decrypt later risk
• Legacy crypto still active
• Visibility gaps persisthttps://www.technadu.com/why-encrypted-data-today-may-not-stay-secure-in-a-quantum-future/626654/
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Encryption ≠ permanent protection.
“Encryption is treated as final when it’s temporary.” - Garfield Jones
• Capture now, decrypt later risk
• Legacy crypto still active
• Visibility gaps persisthttps://www.technadu.com/why-encrypted-data-today-may-not-stay-secure-in-a-quantum-future/626654/
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Encryption ≠ permanent protection.
“Encryption is treated as final when it’s temporary.” - Garfield Jones
• Capture now, decrypt later risk
• Legacy crypto still active
• Visibility gaps persisthttps://www.technadu.com/why-encrypted-data-today-may-not-stay-secure-in-a-quantum-future/626654/
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Encryption ≠ permanent protection.
“Encryption is treated as final when it’s temporary.” - Garfield Jones
• Capture now, decrypt later risk
• Legacy crypto still active
• Visibility gaps persisthttps://www.technadu.com/why-encrypted-data-today-may-not-stay-secure-in-a-quantum-future/626654/
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Setting up email #encryption is a great first #UserFreedom step for everyone: u.fsf.org/1bq
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Contrary to popular superstition, AES 128 is just fine in a post-quantum world
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Contrary to popular superstition, AES 128 is just fine in a post-quantum world
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Contrary to popular superstition, AES 128 is just fine in a post-quantum world
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Contrary to popular superstition, AES 128 is just fine in a post-quantum world
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Wusste gar nicht mehr, dass es den noch gibt: Die #Verschlüsselung vom #Messenger #TeleGuard ist wohl Müll: https://www.heise.de/news/TeleGuard-Sicherheitsexperten-entschluesseln-Messenger-Nachrichten-11261132.html
Irgendwie überrascht mich das nicht. 🤷
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Mein Artikel zum Mini-Verschlüsselungstool Picocrypt NG (Linux/Win/MacOS) ist nun online bei @gnulinux
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Mein Artikel zum Mini-Verschlüsselungstool Picocrypt NG (Linux/Win/MacOS) ist nun online bei @gnulinux
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Mein Artikel zum Mini-Verschlüsselungstool Picocrypt NG (Linux/Win/MacOS) ist nun online bei @gnulinux
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Mein Artikel zum Mini-Verschlüsselungstool Picocrypt NG (Linux/Win/MacOS) ist nun online bei @gnulinux
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It has been in the news lately that quantum computers might break asymmetric encryption much sooner an easier than previously thought.
Passkeys has been recommended for a while now instead of passwords, but does this not change that?
If I'm using a randomly generated password with 256+ bits of entropy, would that not be more sure than a passkey?
(I'm not taking into account that passkeys has other advantages like that they can't be grabbed in a phishing attack).
#Infosec #Security #Passkeys #Passwords #QuantumComputers #Encryption -
It has been in the news lately that quantum computers might break asymmetric encryption much sooner an easier than previously thought.
Passkeys has been recommended for a while now instead of passwords, but does this not change that?
If I'm using a randomly generated password with 256+ bits of entropy, would that not be more sure than a passkey?
(I'm not taking into account that passkeys has other advantages like that they can't be grabbed in a phishing attack).
#Infosec #Security #Passkeys #Passwords #QuantumComputers #Encryption -
WTF?
What kind of notification is this, and what am I suuposed to do with it?
I guess all one has to do is to skip #encryption. -
@scottymace Signal’s database #encryption wasn’t the problem in this instance, it was the amount of detail in the content of push notifications (and it’s persistence) in the iOS ̶A̶P̶N̶ ̶ notifications database
choosing to use a #Signal fork like #Molly instead of the official client brings its own set of risks and trade-offs to be weighed in the context of your specific threat model
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@scottymace Signal’s database #encryption wasn’t the problem in this instance, it was the amount of detail in the content of push notifications (and it’s persistence) in the iOS ̶A̶P̶N̶ ̶ notifications database
choosing to use a #Signal fork like #Molly instead of the official client brings its own set of risks and trade-offs to be weighed in the context of your specific threat model
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@scottymace Signal’s database #encryption wasn’t the problem in this instance, it was the amount of detail in the content of push notifications (and it’s persistence) in the iOS ̶A̶P̶N̶ ̶ notifications database
choosing to use a #Signal fork like #Molly instead of the official client brings its own set of risks and trade-offs to be weighed in the context of your specific threat model
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@scottymace Signal’s database #encryption wasn’t the problem in this instance, it was the amount of detail in the content of push notifications (and it’s persistence) in the iOS ̶A̶P̶N̶ ̶ notifications database
choosing to use a #Signal fork like #Molly instead of the official client brings its own set of risks and trade-offs to be weighed in the context of your specific threat model
