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  1. @Francois

    Brilliant essay! I fully agree.

    Glad to see a reference to #DemocraticResilience . Doing serious academic studies of a dynamical system as complex as national systems of government is difficult, but some people are doing that [1]. There's no need to accept #DemocraticBacksliding as inevitable. Evidence exists on what tends to provide resilience.

    [1] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democrat

  2. Empower, not impose.

    The public isn't a risk to be contained; it's the largest resilience asset we have — if we treat it that way. Bring people in. Don't lecture them out.

    That's the whole-of-society design SAUFEX keeps arguing for.

    More: saufex.eu/insights/

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #EU

  3. 20 September 2024: SAUFEX argues the first rule of involving citizens is to never label them "them" — it's "us" we defend (blog post #17).

    12 June 2025: the EU's disinformation fight is missing its most vital ally — the public — because the response is built by and for expert insiders.

    Resilience is first-person plural.

    Read more: saufex.eu/insights/17-Not-them

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #EU

  4. DATE: September 27, 2026 at 10:00AM
    SOURCE: PSYPOST.ORG

    ** Research quality varies widely from fantastic to small exploratory studies. Please check research methods when conclusions are very important to you. **
    -------------------------------------------------

    TITLE: Study reveals which values actually stop voters from supporting antidemocratic politicians

    URL: psypost.org/study-reveals-whic

    New research suggests that an individual’s personal commitment to the institutions of liberal democracy can act as a buffer against voting for politicians who threaten democratic rules. The findings indicate that while political party loyalty heavily influences voter choices, a deep-seated support for democratic principles helps people resist candidates who might otherwise erode democratic norms. The study was published in Public Opinion Quarterly.

    Democratic backsliding is an ongoing concern in many modern nations. This process occurs when elected officials gradually dismantle democratic institutions, such as free elections, independent courts, and a free press. A major factor driving this decline is the willingness of ordinary citizens to vote for candidates who violate democratic rules.

    Past studies show that voters generally dislike antidemocratic behavior in theory. Yet they often end up supporting politicians who break democratic rules if those politicians belong to their preferred political party or share their policy views. This creates a tension between a voter’s abstract democratic values and their practical political loyalties.

    The research was led by Christopher Claassen, a professor of political behavior at the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Glasgow. The study aimed to understand whether specific aspects of a country’s political culture might help prevent this trend.

    “A growing body of research shows that voters frequently support politicians who threaten democratic institutions, particularly when those politicians belong to their preferred party or agree with them on important issues,” Claassen told PsyPost. “But we know much less about whether people’s underlying attitudes toward democracy help them resist those pressures.”

    “I wanted to connect that recent work on democratic backsliding with the much older political-culture literature, which argues that citizens’ orientations toward democracy can help sustain democratic government,” he explained.

    To test this, the researcher analyzed data from 5,951 participants across three democracies currently facing backsliding pressures. The sample included 1,983 people in the United States, 1,967 in Poland, and 2,001 in South Korea. The participants took part in a candidate-choice experiment, which is a type of survey design that simulates an election. Participants were shown pairs of hypothetical political candidates and asked to choose who they would vote for, completing twelve different matchups in total.

    The candidates varied randomly in age, gender, occupational background, political party, and policy positions on taxes and gender equality. The central feature of the experiment was that each matchup pitted one prodemocratic candidate against one antidemocratic candidate. The antidemocratic candidates proposed actions like cutting polling stations in opposition areas, ignoring court rulings, or prosecuting journalists. The prodemocratic candidates took the opposite stances, promising to respect these institutions.

    Before the simulated elections, the survey measured six dimensions of political culture for each participant. These included preferences for democracy over autocracy, support for liberal democratic institutions, and trust in political institutions. The survey also measured political tolerance, which is the willingness to allow political opponents to have civil rights. Finally, the survey assessed emancipative values, which prioritize individual autonomy and equality, alongside authoritarian values, which prioritize obedience and conformity.

    Across the three countries, support for liberal democracy was the most consistent predictor of a willingness to vote for the prodemocratic candidate. This specific measure captures a person’s backing of core institutions like free speech, equal voting rights, and the rule of law. People who scored high on this measure were consistently less likely to reward candidates who threatened these democratic pillars.

    “One broader implication is that democratic culture is not a single thing its multidimensional,” Claassen noted. “I examined several kinds of orientations that political scientists have linked to democracy, and they behaved quite differently.”

    “Support for liberal-democratic institutions was the most consistent predictor of pro-democratic choice, which suggests that the particular democratic commitments citizens hold may matter more than simply possessing a generally ‘democratic’ political culture,” he added.

    The author looked closely at difficult scenarios known as cross-pressured choices. These are situations where a voter must choose between a prodemocratic candidate from an opposing party and an antidemocratic candidate from their own party. Even in these demanding situations, support for liberal democracy made a noticeable difference. It helped voters resist the temptation to blindly support their own political side.

    Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in a person’s support for liberal democracy was associated with a 2 to 12 percentage point increase in the probability of choosing the prodemocratic candidate across party lines. This shift depended on the specific country and the statistical model used. While this increase might seem modest, it represents a meaningful shift in competitive elections.

    “The effects are meaningful but not enormous,” the researcher said. “That can matter in a close election, but the results also show how powerful partisan loyalties remain.”

    Other aspects of political culture showed mixed or weak associations. For instance, having a general preference for democracy over autocracy and holding emancipative values sometimes predicted prodemocratic choices. However, these factors did not predict voting choices consistently across all countries and policy scenarios. Interestingly, trust in political institutions showed almost no relationship with resisting antidemocratic candidates.

    “Two findings surprised me,” Claassen explained. “First, political trust had virtually no consistent relationship with choosing the pro-democratic candidate, despite a long tradition of treating trust in institutions as important for democracy. Trust may matter for democracy in other ways, but our results suggest that it does not necessarily make people more willing to defend democratic institutions at the ballot box.”

    Claassen was also struck by the weak results for authoritarian values. “There is an obvious theoretical connection between authoritarian values and authoritarian political systems they even share the same name but those values were not strong predictors of candidate choice in my study,” he noted. “It may be that these underlying social values are simply too distant from concrete decisions about electoral choices.”

    The statistical models controlled for various factors to isolate the role of political culture. These controls included age, gender, education, income, and geographic region. The models also accounted for political interest, preferred party, and the participants’ actual positions on redistribution and gender equality.

    As with all research, there are a few things to keep in mind regarding this study. The voting choices were made in a simulated survey environment rather than a real election. In actual elections, voters face intense campaign messaging and social pressures that might alter how they weigh democratic violations against party loyalty. The hypothetical nature of the survey means we cannot be certain these exact percentage shifts would appear at a real ballot box.

    The findings are also observational regarding political culture. Because a person’s values and beliefs cannot be randomly assigned in an experiment, the results show an association rather than a direct cause-and-effect relationship. We can see that strong democratic beliefs predict certain voting patterns, but we cannot isolate those beliefs from other lifelong personal traits that might influence a voter’s decisions.

    “The candidate attributes were experimentally randomized, but respondents’ democratic orientations were measured rather than manipulated,” Claassen noted, reinforcing that the relationship should be understood as an association rather than a causal effect.

    Finally, the pull of partisanship remains incredibly strong. In the Polish and South Korean samples, the predicted support for prodemocratic candidates from an opposing party often remained below 50 percent, even among citizens with high democratic commitments. This suggests that while strong democratic values help people resist backsliding, they do not always create a majority willing to cross party lines to punish bad actors.

    “I would avoid interpreting the findings as showing that strong democratic attitudes will necessarily defeat anti-democratic politicians,” Claassen cautioned.

    “The main takeaway is that what ordinary citizens think about democracy does matter,” the researcher summarized. “People who more strongly support liberal-democratic institutions were more likely to choose the pro-democratic candidate, including in situations where their partisan identity or ideological position pulled them in the opposite direction.”

    “So democratic resilience is not something entirely outside citizens’ hands,” he added. “At the same time, public support is only one part of the story: what political leaders, parties, and institutions do matters enormously for whether democracy survives.”

    Looking ahead, the researcher plans to refine how these attitudes are studied. “One next step is to develop more fine-grained measures of democratic orientations,” Claassen noted. “Most research focuses either on support for democratic institutions or democracy itself, and I think there is room to measure underlying democratic values more carefully and systematically.”

    “I’m also interested in why people sometimes bring their democratic attitudes to bear on a voting decision and sometimes do not,” he said. “In particular, I’m looking at factors such as attitude importance and accessibility: whether democracy is something people care deeply about and whether those considerations are readily available in their minds when they actually make a political choice.”

    The study, “Voting for Democracy? Testing Political-Cultural Constraints on Democratic Backsliding,” was authored by Christopher Claassen.

    URL: psypost.org/study-reveals-whic

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    Unofficial Psychology Today Xitter to toot feed at Psych Today Unofficial Bot @PTUnofficialBot

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    #psychology #counseling #socialwork #psychotherapy @psychotherapist @psychotherapists @psychology @socialpsych @socialwork @psychiatry #mentalhealth #psychiatry #healthcare #depression #psychotherapist #DemocraticBacksliding #LiberalDemocracy #DemocracySupport #VotingBehavior #DemocraticInstitutions #PoliticalCulture #PublicOpinion #DemocraticResilience #ElectionReality #ProDemocracy

  5. From the epilogue of Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies.

    That's where fourteen weeks of SAUFEX posts land. Manipulation sells certainty — fast, cheap, tribal. Resilience is slower: a practice of coordinating, participating, teaching, questioning. It doesn't trend. But it's the only thing that lasts.

    Thank you for reading along. The research is free. The framework is yours.

    Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies, saufex.eu/disinfonomics.pdf

    #FIMI #disinformation #DemocraticResilience #EU

  6. The receipts, in one place.

    2024–2025: SAUFEX proposed European Resilience Councils and named the European Democracy Shield framework — blog posts #2, #26 and #33.

    2025–2026: Brussels announced, then launched, a European Centre for Democratic Resilience on the same all-of-society model.

    We don't claim Brussels copied us. We just put the dates side by side.

    The full timeline: saufex.eu/lineage

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #DSA #EU

  7. "The ledger, rewritten."

    Chapter 16 of Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies.

    Ten weeks ago we started with a single idea: disinformation is a market. Everything since — AI, detection, councils, citizens, training — has been about one question. Can we rewrite the ledger so disinformation costs more and resilience pays? Time to tie it together.

    Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies, saufex.eu/disinfonomics.pdf

    #FIMI #disinformation #DemocraticResilience #EU

  8. Democracy in action!
    Today EU Citizens gather in brussels to discuss democratic resilience, and you can join - online!
    You can follow their plenary in the live stream at 14:30 today (and again on Sat and Sun). And you can leave your own thoughts and opinions in the online debate: citizens.ec.europa.eu/index_en

    #EU #Democracy #CitizenEngagementPlatform #EuropeanUnion #DemocraticResilience

  9. The receipts, continued.

    On 30 July 2024, SAUFEX blog post #2 proposed a central institution to coordinate national resilience councils.

    Later that year, the Commission President used the State of the Union address to announce a European Centre for Democratic Resilience.

    We put the dates side by side.

    The original concept: saufex.eu/insights/2-Resilienc

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #DSA #EU

  10. "The disinformation economy is powerful. But it is not the only economy you live in."

    From the epilogue of Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies.

    The Polish pilot is a reminder that people aren't just targets in an information war. They're neighbours, teachers, citizens — with lives, institutions and trust that manipulation has to compete with. Build those up, and the ledger tilts.

    Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies, saufex.eu/disinfonomics.pdf

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience

  11. Principle 01 of the SAUFEX manifesto: If it doesn't work in the field, it's not a solution.

    It's easy to design a resilience council on a slide. The test is whether it survives contact with real institutions, real teachers, real citizens — with all their constraints and politics.

    Poland is where we find out. That's not a risk to the idea. It's the only way to prove it.

    Our six principles: saufex.eu

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #EU #HorizonEurope

  12. "The best defence is a life that doesn't need the outrage."

    From the epilogue of Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies.

    Resilience isn't only institutions and tools. It's communities strong enough that manipulation finds nothing to grab. This week: what that looks like when a Resilience Council stops being a proposal and becomes a pilot.

    Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies, saufex.eu/disinfonomics.pdf

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #EU

  13. "Belonging beats facts. But you can build belonging that doesn't poison."

    Chapter 13 of Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies.

    The demand for manipulation is, underneath, a demand for belonging. You can't argue people out of that — but you can offer a better version of it: a role, a community, a way to act. That's what a citizen-centred resilience model is really for.

    Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies, saufex.eu/disinfonomics.pdf

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #DSA

  14. In October 2025, at Disinfo 2025 in Ljubljana, SAUFEX presented the case for a plug-and-play tool letting citizens flag suspected FIMI — and transmitted the brief to the EEAS the same day.

    On 24 February 2026, a citizen-centred European Centre for Democratic Resilience began work.

    We put the dates side by side.

    Our research: saufex.eu/research/

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #DSA #EU

  15. Drawn from SAUFEX work on decentralising the DSA (Onno Hansen-Staszyński) and democratising information governance, this carousel makes the case: citizens are treated as people to be protected, not actors who can help.

    GetResilience flips that — putting FIMI analysis and response into councils' and citizens' hands. Whole-of-society isn't a slogan. It's a design.

    Swipe through.

    The research: saufex.eu/research/

    #FIMI #DSA #DemocraticResilience #EU

  16. "You can't fact-check your way out of a belonging crisis."

    Chapter 13 of Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies.

    People don't share manipulation because they lack a correction. They share it because it makes them feel part of something. Which means resilience can't only be top-down and technical. It has to give people a role.

    Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies, saufex.eu/disinfonomics.pdf

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #DSA #EU

  17. In November 2025, SAUFEX took societal-resilience thinking to the EU–Western Balkans Media Literacy Conference in Skopje — resilience shared across the Union and its neighbours.

    On 27 March 2026, the European Centre for Democratic Resilience convened on "holistic approaches to democratic resilience."

    We put the dates side by side.

    Our research: saufex.eu/research/

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #DSA #EU

  18. In June 2025, at the Polish Presidency's Helsinki conference, SAUFEX/DROG contributed "Enhancing societal resilience through listening and being heard."

    On 12 November 2025, the Joint Communication on the European Democracy Shield set out a whole-of-society European resilience hub — built on the same instinct.

    We put the dates side by side.

    Our position: saufex.eu/research/

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #DSA #EU

  19. Understanding how FIMI works isn't the same as understanding how it lands, and the people best placed to see that are the ones living where the narratives hit.

    SAUFEX builds with them, not for them. Resilience designed in a Brussels meeting room and shipped outward tends to miss. Resilience built at the frontline travels.

    Our six principles: saufex.eu

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #EU #HorizonEurope

  20. @mrubin1971 argues that #Armenia should #Recognize #Somaliland, citing shared histories of interrupted #Independence, #DemocraticResilience & pressure from #Turkey. He says it could create new #diplomatic, #commercial & security opportunities for both countries.

    saxafimedia.com/armenia-recogn

  21. The receipts, continued.

    On 11 February 2025, after presenting in Brussels, SAUFEX blog post #33 refined our Resilience Council proposal: an all-of-society body that complements existing EU institutions rather than duplicating them.

    On 27 March 2026, the European Centre for Democratic Resilience hosted a workshop titled "Holistic approaches to democratic resilience" — the same whole-of-society framing.

    The full SAUFEX position: saufex.eu/insights/33-Proposal

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #DSA #EU

  22. Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference is real. But if we let it define the whole problem, we end up defending against yesterday's attack instead of building tomorrow's resilience.

    SAUFEX treats FIMI as the reason we're funded, not the limit of what we build. The goal isn't a counter-FIMI tool. It's a society that doesn't need one.

    Our six principles: saufex.eu

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #EU #HorizonEurope

  23. More receipts.

    On 6 January 2025, SAUFEX blog post #26 set out a "Policy proposal for the creation of a European Resilience Council", explicitly under the European Democracy Shield framework. On 12 November 2025, the European Commission's Joint Communication formally proposed the Shield.

    The dates speak for themselves. We're proud SAUFEX was early to this.

    The full proposal: saufex.eu/insights/26-Policy-p

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #DSA #EU

  24. @Walrus @henryk

    Per #MadeleineRogers [1], the abuse of procedures like fast-tracking is a component of #DemocraticBacksliding that is "buried in confusing complexities that are difficult for non-experts to disentangle,... outside of the attention of the general public". Rogers gives an analysis + specific suggestions [1] of how to improve #DemocraticResilience [2] before it's too late. Not easy because of the complexity, but doable.

    [1] idea.int/sites/default/files/2

    [2] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democrat

  25. From research to the classroom.

    SAUFEX has signed a contract with PCEN to bring the Interdemocracy method into Pilot 3: 10 schools, 14 teachers, around 200 students.

    This is what resilience looks like in practice, a Horizon Europe project's methods landing in real classrooms, taught by real teachers, to the generation that will need them most.

    Resilience, taught at the source.

    #FIMI #MediaLiteracy #DemocraticResilience #EU #HorizonEurope

  26. On 30 July 2024, our blog post #2 proposed "a central European institution… to coordinate, harmonise and standardise" national resilience councils. On 24 February 2026, the European Centre for Democratic Resilience began work as exactly that kind of coordinating hub under the European Democracy Shield.

    The original SAUFEX concept: saufex.eu/insights/2-Resilienc

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #DSA #EU

  27. That's the line that opens chapter 13 of Disinfonomics. It points at something most counter disinformation strategies still miss.

    People don't share lies because they're stupid. They share them because the lie buys them belonging, to a tribe, a worldview, a community of meaning.

    Until our interventions offer better belonging, not just better information, we're bringing facts to a fight about identity.

    Disinfonomics:saufex.eu/disinfonomics.pdf

    #FIMI #disinformation #DemocraticResilience

  28. On 27 March 2026, the European Centre for Democratic Resilience hosted a workshop in Brussels titled "Holistic approaches to democratic resilience."

    It's a direction SAUFEX has been advocating for since the project began. In February 2025, our blog post #33 set out the principles in detail: an all-of-society approach, complementing existing EU institutions, avoiding duplication.

    The full SAUFEX position: lnkd.in/eNKYNtAR

    #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #DSA #EU

  29. Disinformation isn't a truth problem. It's a transaction.

    Every viral lie spreads because someone profits, in clicks, donations, ad impressions, identity reinforcement. If the trade didn't clear, the lie wouldn't move.

    That's the opening of Disinfonomics: The Market of Lies, a new SAUFEX report on the economics behind information manipulation.

    Read the full book (free): lnkd.in/eRjdgKbQ

    #FIMI #disinformation hashtag#DSA #EU #DemocraticResilience

  30. www.tumblr.com/climatejusti... #EvidenceBasedGovernance #GovernmentTransparency #IndependentInstitutions #CivicEmpowerment #DemocraticResilience #InstitutionalIntegrity

    Post by @climatejustice1 · 5 l...

  31. The start of the #ArabSpring was spectacular, but the hard slog of political negotiation and compromise and institution building is off the media radar. The elections will be important in terms of the power structure, but the process of getting there is likely just as important for #DemocraticResilience [5].

    [5] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/democrat

    #PeaceProcess #LibyanPeaceProcess #Negotiations #DemocraticForwardsliding

  32. @catileptic You probably know this anyway, but there's empirical research about the factors that seem to be most significant for #DemocraticResilience against democratic backsliding [1]. Activists can check this evidence as background when choosing which particular political goals to prioritise.

    [1] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democrat

  33. Authoritarianism doesn’t begin only with bad leaders, dangerous ideologies, or manipulated information.

    It also grows in emptiness: in closed youth centres, underfunded libraries, commercialised public squares, and feeds that replace conversation with performance.

    associationredefine.substack.c

    #CivicIntelligence #Democracy #PublicSpace #Belonging #DigitalDemocracy #AIAndSociety #SocialInfrastructure #DemocraticResilience

  34. New Book Chapter: »Open Digital Infrastructures for Democratic Resilience and Economic Sovereignty«

    Together with Maximilian Heimstädt, I had the honor to contribute the closing chapter of the volume “The Politics of Open Infrastructures: Power, Governance, and Justice in Digital Knowledge Practices”, edited by Katja Mayer, Astrid Mager and Renée Ridgway (editor)

    Our concluding chapter is somewhere between manifesto and essay, entitled “Open Digital Infrastructures for Democratic Resilience and Economic Sovereignty”. Check out the abstract below:

    This chapter advances six theses on why digital resilience and economic sovereignty in platformised societies depend on the systematic strengthening of open digital infrastructures. It argues that proprietary, centralised platforms generate structural dependencies, democratic vulnerabilities and economic lock-in effects, while open standards, open protocols and free software enable decentralisation, interoperability and collective self-empowerment. Conceptualising open digital infrastructures as digital commons shifts attention from problems of overuse to challenges of provision, maintenance and sustainable financing. Treating open infrastructures as essential public services, comparable to transport or energy networks emphasises responsibilities of the state in funding and regulating such infrastructures. Yet, to avoid undermining their decentralised character, pluralistic governance arrangements and new legal forms of public social ownership such as public infrastructure funds, mandatory commons contributions and multi-stakeholder oversight are needed.

    The whole book has been published by Open Book Publishers and is thus available open access in various formats.

    #DemocraticResilience #DigitalSovereignty #OpenBookPublishers #OpenDigitalInfrastructures
  35. 1/2 Analysis of "the playbook that defeated #Orbán". #DanielHunter counts 8 key techniques [1]. #DHub [2] plans to do its own analysis of how #Hungary overthrew its dictator: what are the factors of #DemocraticResilience ?

    1. You have to meet people where they actually live.

    2. Anti is not enough — you need a [proposal].

    3. Build for the long game, but deploy at election time.

    4. Investigative journalism is infrastructure.

  36. Join the #TUMSpeakersSeries event on February 13 featuring Vitaliy and Wladimir Klitschko on leadership under pressure, #democraticresilience, and civil society’s role in defending freedom and sovereignty. Register now: t1p.de/TUMSpeakersSeriesEvent

    #MSC2026

    📷TUM Speakers Series

  37. Over the next two days, the political communication division of the german communication association holds a conference on the theme #democraticResilience.

    Kicking things off is Josephine Lukito, taking about “digital surrogates” in the context of right wing extremism movements.

    #polkomm26

  38. @kurdystan.info

    There's a very interesting analysis that goes beyond the question of the #jihadist takeover of military territorial control in #Aleppo: "Dossier: The Resilience of #SheikhMaqsoud and #Ashrafieh in the Face of Geopolitical Ambitions and Demographic Change Plans
    updated on January 27, 2026" [1]

    Crushing democracy may not be as easy as #AlSharaa thinks.

    #Rojava #Kurdistan #governance #DemocraticResilience

    [1] womendefendrojava.net/en/2026/

  39. The quiet danger facing democracies today: not collapse by force, but decay by fatigue.

    In this piece, we explore how Star Wars, the EU, and a classroom full of students reveal the same truth: complexity isn’t a flaw of democracy, it’s its shield.
    associationredefine.substack.c

    #Democracy #StarWars #DemocraticResilience #PowerAndPolitics #CivicEducation #PoliticalLiteracy
    #TeachingDemocracy #StoriesThatTeach #PopCultureAndPolitics

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