#carteradministration — Public Fediverse posts

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> Carter, who has won global praise for his humanitarian actions since leaving the presidency, has never spoken publicly about his actions in Gwangju (through an intermediary, he declined to comment for this article). His most extensive remarks came in an interview on CNN on June 1, 1980, when he was asked by the journalist Daniel Schorr if US policy in Korea reflected a conflict between human rights and national security.
#JimmyCarter #CarterOnKorea #Gwangju #CarterAdministration
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> No representative of the ruling class, like an ex-president, has ever shown such an epiphany and transformed himself into a model of progressive ideas like Carter has. And he deserves praise for it.
> Carter’s legacy, however, is not so clean-cut. His admirable post-presidency in many ways was a clean-up operation for the ways he transformed American politics and the damage he did as president.
https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/03/02/jimmy-carter-is-a-liberal-saint-now-was-a-war-criminal-then/
#LiberalSaint #JimmyCarter #CartersLegacy #CarterAdministration

> the role played in it by the Trilateral Commission. The mass media had little to say about this matter during the Presidential campaign
#CarterAdministration
#TrilateralCommission: The Heritage Foundation of the USA "liberals" for freedom, the freedom of business to control and externalize.
#TumpAdministration
#HeritageFoundation: The Trilateral Commission-like planners of the USA not labeled as liberals: conservatives to conserve and extend business privileges.
#RadicalPriorities
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Corporations peddling cars & trucks can kindly stop with the self-aggrandizing propaganda. You sick fucks are making electric vehicles because you were forced to do so or would be facing mobs ripping you apart in the near future. Every e-ad with "It's A Wonderful World" behind it is fascist propaganda from sick fucks who only give a shit about the money in their coffers or they'd have done this IN 1980 WHEN THEY KNEW WHAT WAS COMING!

#ClimateChange #FossilFuels #CarterAdministration #sociopaths

... While the arrogance of his statement was stunning (how can mass murder be dismissed as not measuring up to "our standards"?) so was Carter's reasoning: the uprising and anguish in Kwangju had been reduced to another global Communist plot, one more nagging dilemma for American diplomats fighting in the trenches of the Cold War. The national security mentality was personified by Holbrooke, who had worked his way up the State Department ladder by dutifully serving United States interests in Vietnam and the Philippines before being named Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific by Carter. As Bruce Cumings reminds us in his penetrating introduction to this book, Holbrooke suggested to Congress during the crisis that Americans were paying far too much "attention to Kwangjoo" without proper consideration of the "broad questions" of Korean and U.S. security inter- ests. General John Wickham, the U.S. military commander in Korea who signaled U.S. support for Chun in an infamous interview with the Associated Press in August 1980, later suggested that Koreans were "lemmings" who would follow anybody with a military uniform. And who can forget that, eight months later, Chun Doo Hwan, the man responsible for the carnage in Kwangju, was walking the corridors of the White House as an honored guest of President Reagan?

... While the arrogance of his statement was stunning (how can mass murder be dismissed as not measuring up to "our standards"?) so was Carter's reasoning: the uprising and anguish in Kwangju had been reduced to another global Communist plot, one more nagging dilemma for American diplomats fighting in the trenches of the Cold War. The national security mentality was personified by Holbrooke, who had worked his way up the State Department ladder by dutifully serving United States interests in Vietnam and the Philippines before being named Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific by Carter. As Bruce Cumings reminds us in his penetrating introduction to this book, Holbrooke suggested to Congress during the crisis that Americans were paying far too much "attention to Kwangjoo" without proper consideration of the "broad questions" of Korean and U.S. security inter- ests. General John Wickham, the U.S. military commander in Korea who signaled U.S. support for Chun in an infamous interview with the Associated Press in August 1980, later suggested that Koreans were "lemmings" who would follow anybody with a military uniform. And who can forget that, eight months later, Chun Doo Hwan, the man responsible for the carnage in Kwangju, was walking the corridors of the White House as an honored guest of President Reagan?

... While the arrogance of his statement was stunning (how can mass murder be dismissed as not measuring up to "our standards"?) so was Carter's reasoning: the uprising and anguish in Kwangju had been reduced to another global Communist plot, one more nagging dilemma for American diplomats fighting in the trenches of the Cold War. The national security mentality was personified by Holbrooke, who had worked his way up the State Department ladder by dutifully serving United States interests in Vietnam and the Philippines before being named Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific by Carter. As Bruce Cumings reminds us in his penetrating introduction to this book, Holbrooke suggested to Congress during the crisis that Americans were paying far too much "attention to Kwangjoo" without proper consideration of the "broad questions" of Korean and U.S. security inter- ests. General John Wickham, the U.S. military commander in Korea who signaled U.S. support for Chun in an infamous interview with the Associated Press in August 1980, later suggested that Koreans were "lemmings" who would follow anybody with a military uniform. And who can forget that, eight months later, Chun Doo Hwan, the man responsible for the carnage in Kwangju, was walking the corridors of the White House as an honored guest of President Reagan?

... While the arrogance of his statement was stunning (how can mass murder be dismissed as not measuring up to "our standards"?) so was Carter's reasoning: the uprising and anguish in Kwangju had been reduced to another global Communist plot, one more nagging dilemma for American diplomats fighting in the trenches of the Cold War. The national security mentality was personified by Holbrooke, who had worked his way up the State Department ladder by dutifully serving United States interests in Vietnam and the Philippines before being named Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific by Carter. As Bruce Cumings reminds us in his penetrating introduction to this book, Holbrooke suggested to Congress during the crisis that Americans were paying far too much "attention to Kwangjoo" without proper consideration of the "broad questions" of Korean and U.S. security inter- ests. General John Wickham, the U.S. military commander in Korea who signaled U.S. support for Chun in an infamous interview with the Associated Press in August 1980, later suggested that Koreans were "lemmings" who would follow anybody with a military uniform. And who can forget that, eight months later, Chun Doo Hwan, the man responsible for the carnage in Kwangju, was walking the corridors of the White House as an honored guest of President Reagan?

... While the arrogance of his statement was stunning (how can mass murder be dismissed as not measuring up to "our standards"?) so was Carter's reasoning: the uprising and anguish in Kwangju had been reduced to another global Communist plot, one more nagging dilemma for American diplomats fighting in the trenches of the Cold War. The national security mentality was personified by Holbrooke, who had worked his way up the State Department ladder by dutifully serving United States interests in Vietnam and the Philippines before being named Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific by Carter. As Bruce Cumings reminds us in his penetrating introduction to this book, Holbrooke suggested to Congress during the crisis that Americans were paying far too much "attention to Kwangjoo" without proper consideration of the "broad questions" of Korean and U.S. security inter- ests. General John Wickham, the U.S. military commander in Korea who signaled U.S. support for Chun in an infamous interview with the Associated Press in August 1980, later suggested that Koreans were "lemmings" who would follow anybody with a military uniform. And who can forget that, eight months later, Chun Doo Hwan, the man responsible for the carnage in Kwangju, was walking the corridors of the White House as an honored guest of President Reagan?

> .. the #CarterAdministration had essentially given the green light to South Korea’s generals to use military force against the huge student and worker demonstrations that rocked the country in the spring of 1980(.. several hundred CIA documents, showing how badly the agency had underestimated Korean opposition to the dictatorship). The cables are now famously known in #SouthKorea as the “#CherokeeDocuments” after the secret code name..
#JimmyCarter #PresidentCarter

"If the Nuremberg Laws were Applied…"
> [President] Ford.. supported the Indonesian invasion of #EastTimor, which was near genocidal.. supported decisively by the United States, both the diplomatic and the necessary military support came primarily from the United States. This was picked up under #Carter.

https://chomsky.info/1990____-2/
#JimmyCarter #PresidentCarter #CarterAdministration #USA helps massacre East Timor

“The fed funds rate began the decade at a target level of 14 percent in January 1980. By the time officials concluded a conference call on Dec. 5, 1980, they hiked the target range by 2 percentage points to 19-20 percent, its highest ever.”

https://www.bankrate.com/banking/federal-reserve/history-of-federal-funds-rate/

#CarterAdministration #interestrates #fedfunds #inflation #unemployment #economy #bankrate

“The fed funds rate began the decade at a target level of 14 percent in January 1980. By the time officials concluded a conference call on Dec. 5, 1980, they hiked the target range by 2 percentage points to 19-20 percent, its highest ever.”

https://www.bankrate.com/banking/federal-reserve/history-of-federal-funds-rate/

#CarterAdministration #interestrates #fedfunds #inflation #unemployment #economy #bankrate

“The fed funds rate began the decade at a target level of 14 percent in January 1980. By the time officials concluded a conference call on Dec. 5, 1980, they hiked the target range by 2 percentage points to 19-20 percent, its highest ever.”

https://www.bankrate.com/banking/federal-reserve/history-of-federal-funds-rate/

#CarterAdministration #interestrates #fedfunds #inflation #unemployment #economy #bankrate

“The fed funds rate began the decade at a target level of 14 percent in January 1980. By the time officials concluded a conference call on Dec. 5, 1980, they hiked the target range by 2 percentage points to 19-20 percent, its highest ever.”

https://www.bankrate.com/banking/federal-reserve/history-of-federal-funds-rate/

#CarterAdministration #interestrates #fedfunds #inflation #unemployment #economy #bankrate

“The fed funds rate began the decade at a target level of 14 percent in January 1980. By the time officials concluded a conference call on Dec. 5, 1980, they hiked the target range by 2 percentage points to 19-20 percent, its highest ever.”

https://www.bankrate.com/banking/federal-reserve/history-of-federal-funds-rate/

#CarterAdministration #interestrates #fedfunds #inflation #unemployment #economy #bankrate

Jimmy Carter Illusions

To examine some main-stream media myths:

During his presidency, Carter proclaimed human rights to be “the soul of our foreign policy.” Although many journalists promoted that image, the reality was quite different.

Inaugurated 13 months after Indonesia’s December 1975 invasion of East Timor, Carter stepped up U.S. military aid to the Jakarta regime as it continued to murder Timorese civilians. By the time Carter left office, about 200,000 people had been slaughtered.

Elsewhere, despotic allies — from Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines to the Shah of Iran — received support from President Carter.

In El Salvador, the Carter administration provided key military aid to a brutal regime. In Nicaragua, contrary to myth, Carter backed dictator Anastasio Somoza almost until the end of his reign. In Guatemala — again contrary to enduring myth — major U.S. military shipments to bloody tyrants never ended.

> .. after the overthrow of #Somoza, the #CarterAdministration had initiated the CIA destabilization campaign.. expanded by the #Reaganites. The #Carter doves did not give direct support to the #NationalGuard forces that they helped reconstitute. Rather, training and direction were in the hands of #NeoNazi #Argentine generals serving "as a proxy for the United States" (#RandCorporation terrorism expert Brian Jenkins).
https://znetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/zbooks/htdocs/chomsky/dd/dd-c10-s05.html
#JImmyCarter #PresidentCarter #DeathIsNotPerfume