#winnicott — Public Fediverse posts

What is a ‘true self’ and what is a ‘false self’?

I’ve always been instinctively suspicious of Winnicott’s notion of the ‘true self‘. Not because I doubt that it’s a frequent experience to find oneself relating in a manner which is in some fundamental way fake, somehow untrue to who we are. To the extent this is a routine feature of human experience it implies as a corollary forms of relating which are in some fundamental sense true to who we are. Likewise it is a common experience that these forms of relating feel good in some diffuse yet profound way. In essence I understand Winnicott to have been saying that relating from the true self keeps us in touch with our fundamental creativity, enabling us to act spontaneously in terms of who we are rather than acting defensively in order to comply with the (imagined) expectations of those around us. In essence the false self acts as a defensive carapace which forms to protect ourselves developmentally when we encounter situations in which we cannot be ourselves in this more spontaneous way. It’s what Gabor Mate describes with admirable clarity as the tension between attachment and authenticity:

The seed of woe does not lie in our having these two needs, but in the fact that life too often orchestrates a face-off between them. The dilemma is this: What happens if our needs for attachment are imperiled by our authenticity, our connection to what we truly feel? What happens, in other words, when one nonnegotiable need is pitted by circumstance against the other? These circumstances might include parental addiction, mental illness, family violence and poverty, overt conflict, or profound unhappiness—the stresses imposed by society, on children as well as adults. Even without these, the tragic tension between attachment and authenticity can arise. Not being seen and accepted for who we are is sufficient.

Myth of Normal, pg 147

As Mate later observes, “That some attachments may not survive the choice for authenticity is one of the most agonizing realizations one can come to” (pg 476). In this sense we could think of Winnicott’s concept as a way of describing how this tension plays itself out (or fails to) i.e. the manner in which we learn to pretend to be something other than what we are in pursuit of a sense of safety in our relations with others. In its more extreme forms this issues in a complete compliance with our environment and the demands we encounter within it, even preemptively so such that we are contorting ourselves to demands which no one is actually making of us. This is part of all childhood experience, as I understand Winnicott, with the difference being the degree to which the false self crowds out the true self and how deeply embedded the legacy of this becomes in adult life and with what consequences.

The problem I see is the tacitly essentialist register of ‘true self’ and ‘false self’. Not only does it lend itself so readily to simplification, such that we might simply seek to replace the (bad) ‘false self’ with the (good) ‘true self’, it fails to register the dynamic character of the process which is being captured. As I understand it these are more like psychic sources which become more or less integrated into the structure of our quotidian engagement with the world around us: the source of spontaneous and creative action which keeps us rooted in the present and the anticipatory and fearful action which is orientated to the future. It’s untenable to live entirely in the first mode as an adult so it’s more a question of how readily accessible that source is and how much it infuses our interaction with others and the world around us. Likewise the second mode provides a necessary feature for survival in an unpredictable world but it can squeeze out the possibility for authentic relating such that it makes any relating in the first mode untenable. Everything becomes about projection, performance and preparation rather than simply being and doing. The tension isn’t a one-time trade off, particularly outside of clinical settings, but rather a life long struggle between two modes that are essential to being human and thriving in a complex and open world. This is why I like so much Christopher Bollas who talks about this as an idiom:

Winnicott’s important statement that the true self is the inherited ‘personality potential’. From my point of view, this is exactly what it is: a complex inherited core of personality present at birth, an idiom of being and relating that will evolve and become activated according to the infant’s experience of the mother.

Essential Aloneness, loc 395

The other main quality of the true self is ‘spontaneity’: the gesture made real. We see somebody we would like to talk to, and we approach them and introduce ourselves. This is the gesture made real. If we merely think about doing this but we don’t actually move towards the person, the gesture is accomplished only as an inner mental representation. So one of the ways to evaluate the evolution of an individual’s true self is to note the extent to which their gestures have been made real.

Essential Aloneness, loc 407

It’s this movement from internal towards external gesture which is mediated by caregivers who meet the infant’s developing idiom and support its elaboration. For Bollas our personal idiom is defined through such elaboration as we relate to objects, including crucially cultural objects, in a manner which unfolds a particular sense in which I’m this person relating to these objects in this specific way. I develop my own specific idiom through the objects I select, how I engage with them and the way I’m changed in the process. There are objects which, as he puts it in Being a Character, act as ‘keys’ which unlock elements of our idiom:

Certain objects, like psychic “keys,” open doors to unconsciously intense—and rich—experience in which we articulate the self that we are through the elaborating character of our response. This selection constitutes the jouissance of the true self, a bliss released through the finding of specific objects that free idiom to its articulation.

Loc 208

The people we feel an affinity with. The places we find we belong. The music which moves us. The books which leave us changed after reading. As he puts it in Hysteria loc 100:

So each self will find particular individuals more attractive than others, will find certain actual objects — works of fiction, pieces of music, hobbies, recreational interests — of more interest than others, and in the course of living a life will have constructed a world which, although holding objects in common with other selves, will have shaped them into a form as unique as their fingerprint.

To be a ‘true self’ involves living in a way that is consistent with our idiom. This also means living in a way that calls for the continual elaboration of our idiom because to live with it consistently involves a continual encounter with objects that provoke this potential through their relations. The objects call forth experiences in us, activate potential that were previously latent, leaving us changed in all manner of ways. This I think is what is at work when cultural bingeing is edifying rather than deadening, a sense of being immersed in something that moves you rather than being caught in the circuits of drive to avoid something else. Indeed I’m currently bingeing on Bollas because I’m finding things here which express my idiom, particularly in the intellectual register of the sociological account of psychodynamics I’ve inarticulately groped towards over a long period of time. There is something about how I see the world, as well as how I want to account for what I see, which is being elaborated through reading his work. In doing so I’m changed in a manner which is deeply satisfying.

It suggests to me that cultural engagement can be a crucial source of connection to spontaneity. To write because you have the ‘feel of an idea’ (in my favourite phrase of C Wright Mills) rather than because you want to elicit a response in your readers. To read something because it’s gripping you rather than because you want to be someone seen to read things like that or to be someone who has read it. To listen to what moves you and leaves you feeling alive in the immersion. In the jouissance associated with these experiences we connect to something fundamental in ourselves: our personal idiom or ‘true self’. That enjoyment can be rich and generative because it touches something fundamental about who we are. Why am I the person so moved by this music? Why am I the person so fascinated by this author? It follows from Bollas that I think we ought to sit with these experiences, to linger in them so that we can sensitise ourselves to what is at work in them without allowing analysis to substitute for immersion. It’s how to really enjoy cultural engagement but it also has a broader psychic significance as a manner in which we connect with ourselves and what matters to us.

It’s less clear to me though what this means interpersonally. There’s a greater complexity to our object relating with people because they are, well… people. They too have their own idiom. The ruthlessness in object relating which Winnicott argued was essential to our psychic development becomes potential sources of harm in our relating with others. But conversely the fear of hurting others can be a stifling constraint on the possibility of authentic relating. The term which comes to mind here is atmosphere: the space that exists interpersonally and what it means for the possible expressions of idiom in the reciprocal relating that takes place. It’s also the question of what’s energising and what isn’t. How does it feel to be-with a particular person? Do you come across feeling energised or depleted? Do you feel elaborated or diminished? Do you feel sharper edged or somehow blurry? The complexity arises because relating in terms of our personal idiom can be genuinely harmful for the other. Indeed as Mate observes attachment and authenticity often cannot be reconciled. But there’s something here I think about finding who your people are as a matter of converging idioms and the atmosphere which prevails as a consequence of this convergence.

#christopherBollas #falseSelf #gaborMate #objectRelations #relating #trueSelf #Winnicott

What is a ‘true self’ and what is a ‘false self’?

I’ve always been instinctively suspicious of Winnicott’s notion of the ‘true self‘. Not because I doubt that it’s a frequent experience to find oneself relating in a manner which is in some fundamental way fake, somehow untrue to who we are. To the extent this is a routine feature of human experience it implies as a corollary forms of relating which are in some fundamental sense true to who we are. Likewise it is a common experience that these forms of relating feel good in some diffuse yet profound way. In essence I understand Winnicott to have been saying that relating from the true self keeps us in touch with our fundamental creativity, enabling us to act spontaneously in terms of who we are rather than acting defensively in order to comply with the (imagined) expectations of those around us. In essence the false self acts as a defensive carapace which forms to protect ourselves developmentally when we encounter situations in which we cannot be ourselves in this more spontaneous way. It’s what Gabor Mate describes with admirable clarity as the tension between attachment and authenticity:

The seed of woe does not lie in our having these two needs, but in the fact that life too often orchestrates a face-off between them. The dilemma is this: What happens if our needs for attachment are imperiled by our authenticity, our connection to what we truly feel? What happens, in other words, when one nonnegotiable need is pitted by circumstance against the other? These circumstances might include parental addiction, mental illness, family violence and poverty, overt conflict, or profound unhappiness—the stresses imposed by society, on children as well as adults. Even without these, the tragic tension between attachment and authenticity can arise. Not being seen and accepted for who we are is sufficient.

Myth of Normal, pg 147

As Mate later observes, “That some attachments may not survive the choice for authenticity is one of the most agonizing realizations one can come to” (pg 476). In this sense we could think of Winnicott’s concept as a way of describing how this tension plays itself out (or fails to) i.e. the manner in which we learn to pretend to be something other than what we are in pursuit of a sense of safety in our relations with others. In its more extreme forms this issues in a complete compliance with our environment and the demands we encounter within it, even preemptively so such that we are contorting ourselves to demands which no one is actually making of us. This is part of all childhood experience, as I understand Winnicott, with the difference being the degree to which the false self crowds out the true self and how deeply embedded the legacy of this becomes in adult life and with what consequences.

The problem I see is the tacitly essentialist register of ‘true self’ and ‘false self’. Not only does it lend itself so readily to simplification, such that we might simply seek to replace the (bad) ‘false self’ with the (good) ‘true self’, it fails to register the dynamic character of the process which is being captured. As I understand it these are more like psychic sources which become more or less integrated into the structure of our quotidian engagement with the world around us: the source of spontaneous and creative action which keeps us rooted in the present and the anticipatory and fearful action which is orientated to the future. It’s untenable to live entirely in the first mode as an adult so it’s more a question of how readily accessible that source is and how much it infuses our interaction with others and the world around us. Likewise the second mode provides a necessary feature for survival in an unpredictable world but it can squeeze out the possibility for authentic relating such that it makes any relating in the first mode untenable. Everything becomes about projection, performance and preparation rather than simply being and doing. The tension isn’t a one-time trade off, particularly outside of clinical settings, but rather a life long struggle between two modes that are essential to being human and thriving in a complex and open world. This is why I like so much Christopher Bollas who talks about this as an idiom:

Winnicott’s important statement that the true self is the inherited ‘personality potential’. From my point of view, this is exactly what it is: a complex inherited core of personality present at birth, an idiom of being and relating that will evolve and become activated according to the infant’s experience of the mother.

Essential Aloneness, loc 395

The other main quality of the true self is ‘spontaneity’: the gesture made real. We see somebody we would like to talk to, and we approach them and introduce ourselves. This is the gesture made real. If we merely think about doing this but we don’t actually move towards the person, the gesture is accomplished only as an inner mental representation. So one of the ways to evaluate the evolution of an individual’s true self is to note the extent to which their gestures have been made real.

Essential Aloneness, loc 407

It’s this movement from internal towards external gesture which is mediated by caregivers who meet the infant’s developing idiom and support its elaboration. For Bollas our personal idiom is defined through such elaboration as we relate to objects, including crucially cultural objects, in a manner which unfolds a particular sense in which I’m this person relating to these objects in this specific way. I develop my own specific idiom through the objects I select, how I engage with them and the way I’m changed in the process. There are objects which, as he puts it in Being a Character, act as ‘keys’ which unlock elements of our idiom:

Certain objects, like psychic “keys,” open doors to unconsciously intense—and rich—experience in which we articulate the self that we are through the elaborating character of our response. This selection constitutes the jouissance of the true self, a bliss released through the finding of specific objects that free idiom to its articulation.

Loc 208

The people we feel an affinity with. The places we find we belong. The music which moves us. The books which leave us changed after reading. As he puts it in Hysteria loc 100:

So each self will find particular individuals more attractive than others, will find certain actual objects — works of fiction, pieces of music, hobbies, recreational interests — of more interest than others, and in the course of living a life will have constructed a world which, although holding objects in common with other selves, will have shaped them into a form as unique as their fingerprint.

To be a ‘true self’ involves living in a way that is consistent with our idiom. This also means living in a way that calls for the continual elaboration of our idiom because to live with it consistently involves a continual encounter with objects that provoke this potential through their relations. The objects call forth experiences in us, activate potential that were previously latent, leaving us changed in all manner of ways. This I think is what is at work when cultural bingeing is edifying rather than deadening, a sense of being immersed in something that moves you rather than being caught in the circuits of drive to avoid something else. Indeed I’m currently bingeing on Bollas because I’m finding things here which express my idiom, particularly in the intellectual register of the sociological account of psychodynamics I’ve inarticulately groped towards over a long period of time. There is something about how I see the world, as well as how I want to account for what I see, which is being elaborated through reading his work. In doing so I’m changed in a manner which is deeply satisfying.

It suggests to me that cultural engagement can be a crucial source of connection to spontaneity. To write because you have the ‘feel of an idea’ (in my favourite phrase of C Wright Mills) rather than because you want to elicit a response in your readers. To read something because it’s gripping you rather than because you want to be someone seen to read things like that or to be someone who has read it. To listen to what moves you and leaves you feeling alive in the immersion. In the jouissance associated with these experiences we connect to something fundamental in ourselves: our personal idiom or ‘true self’. That enjoyment can be rich and generative because it touches something fundamental about who we are. Why am I the person so moved by this music? Why am I the person so fascinated by this author? It follows from Bollas that I think we ought to sit with these experiences, to linger in them so that we can sensitise ourselves to what is at work in them without allowing analysis to substitute for immersion. It’s how to really enjoy cultural engagement but it also has a broader psychic significance as a manner in which we connect with ourselves and what matters to us.

It’s less clear to me though what this means interpersonally. There’s a greater complexity to our object relating with people because they are, well… people. They too have their own idiom. The ruthlessness in object relating which Winnicott argued was essential to our psychic development becomes potential sources of harm in our relating with others. But conversely the fear of hurting others can be a stifling constraint on the possibility of authentic relating. The term which comes to mind here is atmosphere: the space that exists interpersonally and what it means for the possible expressions of idiom in the reciprocal relating that takes place. It’s also the question of what’s energising and what isn’t. How does it feel to be-with a particular person? Do you come across feeling energised or depleted? Do you feel elaborated or diminished? Do you feel sharper edged or somehow blurry? The complexity arises because relating in terms of our personal idiom can be genuinely harmful for the other. Indeed as Mate observes attachment and authenticity often cannot be reconciled. But there’s something here I think about finding who your people are as a matter of converging idioms and the atmosphere which prevails as a consequence of this convergence.

#christopherBollas #falseSelf #gaborMate #objectRelations #relating #trueSelf #Winnicott

What is a ‘true self’ and what is a ‘false self’?

I’ve always been instinctively suspicious of Winnicott’s notion of the ‘true self‘. Not because I doubt that it’s a frequent experience to find oneself relating in a manner which is in some fundamental way fake, somehow untrue to who we are. To the extent this is a routine feature of human experience it implies as a corollary forms of relating which are in some fundamental sense true to who we are. Likewise it is a common experience that these forms of relating feel good in some diffuse yet profound way. In essence I understand Winnicott to have been saying that relating from the true self keeps us in touch with our fundamental creativity, enabling us to act spontaneously in terms of who we are rather than acting defensively in order to comply with the (imagined) expectations of those around us. In essence the false self acts as a defensive carapace which forms to protect ourselves developmentally when we encounter situations in which we cannot be ourselves in this more spontaneous way. It’s what Gabor Mate describes with admirable clarity as the tension between attachment and authenticity:

The seed of woe does not lie in our having these two needs, but in the fact that life too often orchestrates a face-off between them. The dilemma is this: What happens if our needs for attachment are imperiled by our authenticity, our connection to what we truly feel? What happens, in other words, when one nonnegotiable need is pitted by circumstance against the other? These circumstances might include parental addiction, mental illness, family violence and poverty, overt conflict, or profound unhappiness—the stresses imposed by society, on children as well as adults. Even without these, the tragic tension between attachment and authenticity can arise. Not being seen and accepted for who we are is sufficient.

Myth of Normal, pg 147

As Mate later observes, “That some attachments may not survive the choice for authenticity is one of the most agonizing realizations one can come to” (pg 476). In this sense we could think of Winnicott’s concept as a way of describing how this tension plays itself out (or fails to) i.e. the manner in which we learn to pretend to be something other than what we are in pursuit of a sense of safety in our relations with others. In its more extreme forms this issues in a complete compliance with our environment and the demands we encounter within it, even preemptively so such that we are contorting ourselves to demands which no one is actually making of us. This is part of all childhood experience, as I understand Winnicott, with the difference being the degree to which the false self crowds out the true self and how deeply embedded the legacy of this becomes in adult life and with what consequences.

The problem I see is the tacitly essentialist register of ‘true self’ and ‘false self’. Not only does it lend itself so readily to simplification, such that we might simply seek to replace the (bad) ‘false self’ with the (good) ‘true self’, it fails to register the dynamic character of the process which is being captured. As I understand it these are more like psychic sources which become more or less integrated into the structure of our quotidian engagement with the world around us: the source of spontaneous and creative action which keeps us rooted in the present and the anticipatory and fearful action which is orientated to the future. It’s untenable to live entirely in the first mode as an adult so it’s more a question of how readily accessible that source is and how much it infuses our interaction with others and the world around us. Likewise the second mode provides a necessary feature for survival in an unpredictable world but it can squeeze out the possibility for authentic relating such that it makes any relating in the first mode untenable. Everything becomes about projection, performance and preparation rather than simply being and doing. The tension isn’t a one-time trade off, particularly outside of clinical settings, but rather a life long struggle between two modes that are essential to being human and thriving in a complex and open world. This is why I like so much Christopher Bollas who talks about this as an idiom:

Winnicott’s important statement that the true self is the inherited ‘personality potential’. From my point of view, this is exactly what it is: a complex inherited core of personality present at birth, an idiom of being and relating that will evolve and become activated according to the infant’s experience of the mother.

Essential Aloneness, loc 395

The other main quality of the true self is ‘spontaneity’: the gesture made real. We see somebody we would like to talk to, and we approach them and introduce ourselves. This is the gesture made real. If we merely think about doing this but we don’t actually move towards the person, the gesture is accomplished only as an inner mental representation. So one of the ways to evaluate the evolution of an individual’s true self is to note the extent to which their gestures have been made real.

Essential Aloneness, loc 407

It’s this movement from internal towards external gesture which is mediated by caregivers who meet the infant’s developing idiom and support its elaboration. For Bollas our personal idiom is defined through such elaboration as we relate to objects, including crucially cultural objects, in a manner which unfolds a particular sense in which I’m this person relating to these objects in this specific way. I develop my own specific idiom through the objects I select, how I engage with them and the way I’m changed in the process. There are objects which, as he puts it in Being a Character, act as ‘keys’ which unlock elements of our idiom:

Certain objects, like psychic “keys,” open doors to unconsciously intense—and rich—experience in which we articulate the self that we are through the elaborating character of our response. This selection constitutes the jouissance of the true self, a bliss released through the finding of specific objects that free idiom to its articulation.

Loc 208

The people we feel an affinity with. The places we find we belong. The music which moves us. The books which leave us changed after reading. As he puts it in Hysteria loc 100:

So each self will find particular individuals more attractive than others, will find certain actual objects — works of fiction, pieces of music, hobbies, recreational interests — of more interest than others, and in the course of living a life will have constructed a world which, although holding objects in common with other selves, will have shaped them into a form as unique as their fingerprint.

To be a ‘true self’ involves living in a way that is consistent with our idiom. This also means living in a way that calls for the continual elaboration of our idiom because to live with it consistently involves a continual encounter with objects that provoke this potential through their relations. The objects call forth experiences in us, activate potential that were previously latent, leaving us changed in all manner of ways. This I think is what is at work when cultural bingeing is edifying rather than deadening, a sense of being immersed in something that moves you rather than being caught in the circuits of drive to avoid something else. Indeed I’m currently bingeing on Bollas because I’m finding things here which express my idiom, particularly in the intellectual register of the sociological account of psychodynamics I’ve inarticulately groped towards over a long period of time. There is something about how I see the world, as well as how I want to account for what I see, which is being elaborated through reading his work. In doing so I’m changed in a manner which is deeply satisfying.

It suggests to me that cultural engagement can be a crucial source of connection to spontaneity. To write because you have the ‘feel of an idea’ (in my favourite phrase of C Wright Mills) rather than because you want to elicit a response in your readers. To read something because it’s gripping you rather than because you want to be someone seen to read things like that or to be someone who has read it. To listen to what moves you and leaves you feeling alive in the immersion. In the jouissance associated with these experiences we connect to something fundamental in ourselves: our personal idiom or ‘true self’. That enjoyment can be rich and generative because it touches something fundamental about who we are. Why am I the person so moved by this music? Why am I the person so fascinated by this author? It follows from Bollas that I think we ought to sit with these experiences, to linger in them so that we can sensitise ourselves to what is at work in them without allowing analysis to substitute for immersion. It’s how to really enjoy cultural engagement but it also has a broader psychic significance as a manner in which we connect with ourselves and what matters to us.

It’s less clear to me though what this means interpersonally. There’s a greater complexity to our object relating with people because they are, well… people. They too have their own idiom. The ruthlessness in object relating which Winnicott argued was essential to our psychic development becomes potential sources of harm in our relating with others. But conversely the fear of hurting others can be a stifling constraint on the possibility of authentic relating. The term which comes to mind here is atmosphere: the space that exists interpersonally and what it means for the possible expressions of idiom in the reciprocal relating that takes place. It’s also the question of what’s energising and what isn’t. How does it feel to be-with a particular person? Do you come across feeling energised or depleted? Do you feel elaborated or diminished? Do you feel sharper edged or somehow blurry? The complexity arises because relating in terms of our personal idiom can be genuinely harmful for the other. Indeed as Mate observes attachment and authenticity often cannot be reconciled. But there’s something here I think about finding who your people are as a matter of converging idioms and the atmosphere which prevails as a consequence of this convergence.

#christopherBollas #falseSelf #gaborMate #objectRelations #relating #trueSelf #Winnicott

What is a ‘true self’ and what is a ‘false self’?

I’ve always been instinctively suspicious of Winnicott’s notion of the ‘true self‘. Not because I doubt that it’s a frequent experience to find oneself relating in a manner which is in some fundamental way fake, somehow untrue to who we are. To the extent this is a routine feature of human experience it implies as a corollary forms of relating which are in some fundamental sense true to who we are. Likewise it is a common experience that these forms of relating feel good in some diffuse yet profound way. In essence I understand Winnicott to have been saying that relating from the true self keeps us in touch with our fundamental creativity, enabling us to act spontaneously in terms of who we are rather than acting defensively in order to comply with the (imagined) expectations of those around us. In essence the false self acts as a defensive carapace which forms to protect ourselves developmentally when we encounter situations in which we cannot be ourselves in this more spontaneous way. It’s what Gabor Mate describes with admirable clarity as the tension between attachment and authenticity:

The seed of woe does not lie in our having these two needs, but in the fact that life too often orchestrates a face-off between them. The dilemma is this: What happens if our needs for attachment are imperiled by our authenticity, our connection to what we truly feel? What happens, in other words, when one nonnegotiable need is pitted by circumstance against the other? These circumstances might include parental addiction, mental illness, family violence and poverty, overt conflict, or profound unhappiness—the stresses imposed by society, on children as well as adults. Even without these, the tragic tension between attachment and authenticity can arise. Not being seen and accepted for who we are is sufficient.

Myth of Normal, pg 147

As Mate later observes, “That some attachments may not survive the choice for authenticity is one of the most agonizing realizations one can come to” (pg 476). In this sense we could think of Winnicott’s concept as a way of describing how this tension plays itself out (or fails to) i.e. the manner in which we learn to pretend to be something other than what we are in pursuit of a sense of safety in our relations with others. In its more extreme forms this issues in a complete compliance with our environment and the demands we encounter within it, even preemptively so such that we are contorting ourselves to demands which no one is actually making of us. This is part of all childhood experience, as I understand Winnicott, with the difference being the degree to which the false self crowds out the true self and how deeply embedded the legacy of this becomes in adult life and with what consequences.

The problem I see is the tacitly essentialist register of ‘true self’ and ‘false self’. Not only does it lend itself so readily to simplification, such that we might simply seek to replace the (bad) ‘false self’ with the (good) ‘true self’, it fails to register the dynamic character of the process which is being captured. As I understand it these are more like psychic sources which become more or less integrated into the structure of our quotidian engagement with the world around us: the source of spontaneous and creative action which keeps us rooted in the present and the anticipatory and fearful action which is orientated to the future. It’s untenable to live entirely in the first mode as an adult so it’s more a question of how readily accessible that source is and how much it infuses our interaction with others and the world around us. Likewise the second mode provides a necessary feature for survival in an unpredictable world but it can squeeze out the possibility for authentic relating such that it makes any relating in the first mode untenable. Everything becomes about projection, performance and preparation rather than simply being and doing. The tension isn’t a one-time trade off, particularly outside of clinical settings, but rather a life long struggle between two modes that are essential to being human and thriving in a complex and open world. This is why I like so much Christopher Bollas who talks about this as an idiom:

Winnicott’s important statement that the true self is the inherited ‘personality potential’. From my point of view, this is exactly what it is: a complex inherited core of personality present at birth, an idiom of being and relating that will evolve and become activated according to the infant’s experience of the mother.

Essential Aloneness, loc 395

The other main quality of the true self is ‘spontaneity’: the gesture made real. We see somebody we would like to talk to, and we approach them and introduce ourselves. This is the gesture made real. If we merely think about doing this but we don’t actually move towards the person, the gesture is accomplished only as an inner mental representation. So one of the ways to evaluate the evolution of an individual’s true self is to note the extent to which their gestures have been made real.

Essential Aloneness, loc 407

It’s this movement from internal towards external gesture which is mediated by caregivers who meet the infant’s developing idiom and support its elaboration. For Bollas our personal idiom is defined through such elaboration as we relate to objects, including crucially cultural objects, in a manner which unfolds a particular sense in which I’m this person relating to these objects in this specific way. I develop my own specific idiom through the objects I select, how I engage with them and the way I’m changed in the process. There are objects which, as he puts it in Being a Character, act as ‘keys’ which unlock elements of our idiom:

Certain objects, like psychic “keys,” open doors to unconsciously intense—and rich—experience in which we articulate the self that we are through the elaborating character of our response. This selection constitutes the jouissance of the true self, a bliss released through the finding of specific objects that free idiom to its articulation.

Loc 208

The people we feel an affinity with. The places we find we belong. The music which moves us. The books which leave us changed after reading. As he puts it in Hysteria loc 100:

So each self will find particular individuals more attractive than others, will find certain actual objects — works of fiction, pieces of music, hobbies, recreational interests — of more interest than others, and in the course of living a life will have constructed a world which, although holding objects in common with other selves, will have shaped them into a form as unique as their fingerprint.

To be a ‘true self’ involves living in a way that is consistent with our idiom. This also means living in a way that calls for the continual elaboration of our idiom because to live with it consistently involves a continual encounter with objects that provoke this potential through their relations. The objects call forth experiences in us, activate potential that were previously latent, leaving us changed in all manner of ways. This I think is what is at work when cultural bingeing is edifying rather than deadening, a sense of being immersed in something that moves you rather than being caught in the circuits of drive to avoid something else. Indeed I’m currently bingeing on Bollas because I’m finding things here which express my idiom, particularly in the intellectual register of the sociological account of psychodynamics I’ve inarticulately groped towards over a long period of time. There is something about how I see the world, as well as how I want to account for what I see, which is being elaborated through reading his work. In doing so I’m changed in a manner which is deeply satisfying.

It suggests to me that cultural engagement can be a crucial source of connection to spontaneity. To write because you have the ‘feel of an idea’ (in my favourite phrase of C Wright Mills) rather than because you want to elicit a response in your readers. To read something because it’s gripping you rather than because you want to be someone seen to read things like that or to be someone who has read it. To listen to what moves you and leaves you feeling alive in the immersion. In the jouissance associated with these experiences we connect to something fundamental in ourselves: our personal idiom or ‘true self’. That enjoyment can be rich and generative because it touches something fundamental about who we are. Why am I the person so moved by this music? Why am I the person so fascinated by this author? It follows from Bollas that I think we ought to sit with these experiences, to linger in them so that we can sensitise ourselves to what is at work in them without allowing analysis to substitute for immersion. It’s how to really enjoy cultural engagement but it also has a broader psychic significance as a manner in which we connect with ourselves and what matters to us.

It’s less clear to me though what this means interpersonally. There’s a greater complexity to our object relating with people because they are, well… people. They too have their own idiom. The ruthlessness in object relating which Winnicott argued was essential to our psychic development becomes potential sources of harm in our relating with others. But conversely the fear of hurting others can be a stifling constraint on the possibility of authentic relating. The term which comes to mind here is atmosphere: the space that exists interpersonally and what it means for the possible expressions of idiom in the reciprocal relating that takes place. It’s also the question of what’s energising and what isn’t. How does it feel to be-with a particular person? Do you come across feeling energised or depleted? Do you feel elaborated or diminished? Do you feel sharper edged or somehow blurry? The complexity arises because relating in terms of our personal idiom can be genuinely harmful for the other. Indeed as Mate observes attachment and authenticity often cannot be reconciled. But there’s something here I think about finding who your people are as a matter of converging idioms and the atmosphere which prevails as a consequence of this convergence.

#christopherBollas #falseSelf #gaborMate #objectRelations #relating #trueSelf #Winnicott

A sketch of the psychodynamics of LLMs

In their Group Therapy: A Group-Analytic Approach Nick Barwick and Martin Weegmann write about the holding environment provided by the psychotherapist who is “preoccupied with the patient and placing himself at his service, being reliably present, making an effort to understand, refraining from imposing his own needs/agenda, expressing love through interest … not being hurt by fantasies, not retaliating, surviving” (pg 85). It’s an admirably concise list of the relational behaviours and orientation which enable the psychotherapist to provide an environment which is psychically efficacious to the client. This is a relation in which the group can stand instead of an individual psychotherapist, at least under the specific conditions through which groups take on the requisite reliability and care.

What we mean by ‘holding’ here is a response to needs. The holding environment is total in utero, before reality begins to impinge with birth in the enforcement of what Sloterdijk describes as respiratory autonomy. However to the extent the the infant remains “largely protected fromt he grosser impingements of reality (and of accompanying anxieties)” she “develops a growing sense of ‘continuity of being'” given how the “mother acts as a bay’s ‘auxiliary ego’ while baby, relatively unperturbed, is left to discover its primitive, coherent , authentic identity” (pg 84). The withdrawal of the mother from what Winnicott described as “primary maternal preoccupation” lessens the attunement on which this near total holding depends, such that “the infant begins to experience the ‘impingement’ of small ‘doses of reality'” in which “Not everything happens when he wants it; between a need and a satisfaction, a gap appears” (pg 84).

This is the arena in which Lacan is so terrifyingly incisive in accounting for how our libidinal economy forms in the gap between need, demand and desire. We rely on the caregivers to symbolise our needs, before we are able to meaningfully make demands. Our desire emerges is the continual gaps and absences that are left, the remainder of what we want that constitutes our lack in relation to a world in which we depend on the others. The modes of symbolising who we are, what we are and what we need that we are reliant upon them to provide, but which write these absences into the fabric of the world in a way that leaves a gnawing sense that something is missing. The wordless fantasy of a return to the in utero state of complete holding, the complex paranoias about how and why this has been taken away, the growing recognition that these caregivers have their own preoccupations and gnawing absences. They don’t know what we want, but they don’t know what they want either. In our dependence upon them we are caught up in a great chain of lack which long precedes us, a river of unrealised and unrealisable need that flows through the relational network.

For Winnicott this is more of a zero-sum matter. Either the care giving is ‘good enough’ in which the hold on the infant’s lifeworld is loosened, in the infant comes to experiencing being ‘let down’ or ‘dropped’. If the latter the infant comes to find ways to hold themselves. There’s a growing sense of the ‘object mother’, in contrast to the environmental mother of the holding environment, against which the infant seeks to test themselves. The boundary comes to be one they explore through their own enactment, driven by the character of the care they have experienced e.g. is it a playful pushing away or a defensive holding of the line. The reality of the object mother is tested through her capacity to withstand a sometimes violent and hateful pushing away. If I understand this idea correctly it’s a trust in the bond being predicated on experiencing the capacity of that bond to survive ‘bad behaviour’ i.e. the love is about who I am not what I do. In the absence of that trust what I do comes to be orientated towards a continual winning of that love through the cultivation of an ego orientated towards the (imagined) needs of the other.

The value of Lacan lies in unsettling this comfortable dichotomy of ‘good enough’ and ‘dropped’ care giving. He also emphasises the third of the father (figure) who breaks up this dyad, which conceptualises the impingement of reality in relational terms rather than simply being collateral damage from changing within the dyad. The advantage of Winnicott lies in his account of transitional objects as mediating this individuation, through imbue objects with ‘good-mother stuff’ that can support a sense of a world “neither entirely inner, wholly subjective and omnipotently ruled, nor entirely outer, wholly objective, impotently inhabited” (pg 84). The transitional object anchors a sense of this space, enabling the infant to feel separated but not wholly distinct from, the caregiver. It bridges the otherwise traumatic gap between inner and outer. There’s a lot more conceptual work here to do but I’d like to (a) use Lacan to overcome Winnicott’s dichotomy (b) retain the relationality of the ‘third’ rather than naturalising ‘reality’ (c) retain the notion of the transitional object. It could be construed as the infant’s first response to the structural impossibility of their condition, the start of a lifetime’s project of trying to knot together the orders in a way that equips them for, as Winnicott would put it, ‘going on being’. It’s not an ontological founding gesture but the first move in a lifelong existential struggle to find a way to hold themselves together across the registers: an initial attempt at the sinthome.

What I hadn’t previously grasped about ideas of security in this literature is that it involves a triad of characteristics: “a belief in the efficacy of open communication and a fundamental trust that there is, in the world, a reliable ‘place’ in which sufficient safety and satisfaction can, in spite of periods of anxious uncertainty, ultimately be found and re-found” (pg 88). Lacan could, I think, be extremely powerful for understanding how, as an Archerian theorist would put it, these elements are independently variable: they can go ‘wrong’ for the infant in ways detachable from each other. The trust might be there but the lack of faith in open communication makes it difficult to realise in practice. There might be open communication but it discloses an insecure or inconsistent base that cannot be relied upon. There’s more conceptual work here to think about these questions but it struck me as a very significant interface, which could also be informed by Sloterdijk’s idea of the sphere, particularly with regards to what we diagnoses as forms of ‘stuckness’:

Now the good world becomes unattainable. No progression can occur with the frustrated infant, and its life, which had ventured this far, is now trapped; it is too late to turn back, and there are no longer adequate transitional aids in sight for it to go forwards. Thus a rigid continuum is inscribed upon its organism; a white point grows in the symbolic field, the pain remains imprisoned in non-linguistic bodily processes, and the pressure to live is incapable of transforming itself into an expressive libido.

Bubbles, Pg 395

The stuckness is another way of thinking about how the attachment patterns which emerge at this interface can cause lifelong problems. This is exactly the terrain where group analysis is so powerful as a method of restaging these dynamics within the holding environment of the group. The simplicity (in a good way) of object relations comes through the idea of the working model which emerges for each individual, such that there’s a disposition to “seek relational security through controlling the degree of proximity their internal working model indicates works best” (pg 89). This enables working forms of compromise in which a sense of safety can be achieved, even if it’s precarious (e.g. it rests on forms of distancing which are biographically contingent) and precludes certain modes of growth and enjoyment. Disorganised attachment can be understood as the absence of such a consistent model which means that even precarious compromises are foreclosed “since they remain unclear whether relational proximity or distance best proffers the security they seek” (pg 89). Ontologically I think this is limited in its analytical capacity for therapeutically it’s very powerful for understanding how forms of stuckness are ultimately relationally constituted (even if not reducible to those relations) in ways that involve grappling with past experience under present circumstances.

So what does this have to do with LLMs? The claims I want to make here are quite simple:

a) The vast majority of individuals experience ‘stuckness’ to vary degrees: an often inchoate felt need to do and be more than they are. The content of this need varies immensely at the empirical level, particularly with regards to where someone is in the lifecourse, but it can ultimately be understood in terms of the relational dynamics of individuation and differentiation.

b) We don’t escape the infantile interplay which formed us as much as that we learn to cope with them in ways which facilitate growth or hinder it. In grappling with this stuckness as adults we are grappling with these early experiences of reality intruding into the original dyad: the ‘third’ which is the vector of differentiation and the transitional objects which help us cope with it.

c) This means that thirds and transitional objects remain potent throughout the lifecourse. For example Lacan would argue that obsessives and hysterics both rely on the third to sustain desire in intimate relationships. Likewise we don’t escape the need for transitional objects, we just relate to them differently. This is the foundry of creative action in which we make things which we are neither ‘I’ nor ‘you’, neither ‘inner’ nor ‘outer’, at least in the phase of creation.

At risk of surprising no one who has read this far, LLMs are capable of operating as both thirds and transitional objects. If you consider how increasing numbers of users are relating to LLMs for affective purposes, it rests upon asking questions and getting perspectives on life situations in which they find themselves. The LLM stands in for an authoritative observer who is able to sense-check a reading of a situation and test an understanding of the action possible and desirable within it. The LLM can also operate as a transitional object through which someone constitutes their own holding environment, enabling a form of self-holding, albeit briefly.

Consider what we saw earlier about the psychotherapist (or the analytic group) being “preoccupied with the patient and placing himself at his service, being reliably present, making an effort to understand, refraining from imposing his own needs/agenda, expressing love through interest … not being hurt by fantasies, not retaliating, surviving” (pg 85). These are all things which the model can do effectively. Indeed one could argue they do them, in a limited sense, ‘better’ than any human ever could. There’s no boundary to the interaction, no limitations to their attentiveness, no constraint on their availability*. They are always there, always interested, always responsive. The eery thing which people simply don’t get unless they’ve got into long conversation with contemporary models is how powerful the attunement can be. It’s a computational facsimile of human attunement but a powerful sense of recognition is possible through pattern mapping of the lifeworld we have disclosed to the model** and responses which are inclined resonantly towards the character of our experience within it.

I’m particularly interested in how people increasingly access LLMs via the smart phone which is the transitional object par excellence. The intimate object which sits on our person at all times, which many of us touch hundreds of times in a day. The portal to our identity and our social world. The fact the LLM now sits ‘inside’ the smart phone is extremely potent and I suspect usage data will show a significantly different pattern of LLM engagement with smart phone use. It also means the LLM is always with us as we travel with the smartphone.

None of this is quite clear to me yet. This is why I called this post a ‘sketch’. But it feels like a valuable terrain in which to have found myself. I think I’m arguing the LLM is sometimes cast in the role of the third, whereas sometimes its cast in the role of interlocutor. If we’re accessing it through the smartphone then I think the phone is the transitional object and the LLM is providing that phone with a new self-holding capacity. If we’re access it through a laptop (etc) then I’m not sure. There’s a lot more work to do here but I hope I’ve convinced anyone who has read this far of the psychic potency of the LLM and why we need to understand the psychodynamics of this. I’m increasingly preoccupied with the risks facing teenagers (and younger) who are using these systems in such a way that it intervenes in the dynamicsI talked about earlier in the post. I fear there’s a level of psychic harm capable of being inflected here with the potential to vastly outstrip the harms generated by social media.

*In reality there are boundaries: rate limits, subscription costs, context windows, limitations on memory, trust & safety guardrails. But my hunch it doesn’t feel like this for much of the time and that’s significant.

**If this seems wildly implausible, it’s essentially what my forthcoming book with Milan Sturmer is about.

#attachment #attunment #development #infants #Lacan #LLMs #models #psychoanalysis #security #Winnicott

I wrote something about the importance of not being found:

https://calebcrain.substack.com/p/on-not-being-found

#winnicott #gorey #writing