#nsira — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #nsira, aggregated by home.social.
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NSIRA's report: Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s Use of the Polygraph for Security Screening
https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/en/reviews/ongoing-and-completed-reviews/completed-reviews/review-of-the-communications-security-establishments-use-of-the-polygraph-for-security-screening/ -
NSIRA's report: Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s Use of the Polygraph for Security Screening
https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/en/reviews/ongoing-and-completed-reviews/completed-reviews/review-of-the-communications-security-establishments-use-of-the-polygraph-for-security-screening/ -
NSIRA's report: Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s Use of the Polygraph for Security Screening
https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/en/reviews/ongoing-and-completed-reviews/completed-reviews/review-of-the-communications-security-establishments-use-of-the-polygraph-for-security-screening/ -
NSIRA's report: Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s Use of the Polygraph for Security Screening
https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/en/reviews/ongoing-and-completed-reviews/completed-reviews/review-of-the-communications-security-establishments-use-of-the-polygraph-for-security-screening/ -
CSE may have violated employees' charter rights with polygraph tests, watchdog says
https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/spy-agency-may-have-violated-charter-rights-with-polygraph -
CSE may have violated employees' charter rights with polygraph tests, watchdog says
https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/spy-agency-may-have-violated-charter-rights-with-polygraph -
CSE may have violated employees' charter rights with polygraph tests, watchdog says
https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/spy-agency-may-have-violated-charter-rights-with-polygraph -
CSE may have violated employees' charter rights with polygraph tests, watchdog says
https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/spy-agency-may-have-violated-charter-rights-with-polygraph -
CSE may have violated employees' charter rights with polygraph tests, watchdog says
https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/spy-agency-may-have-violated-charter-rights-with-polygraph -
A report released by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) in 2023 also raised concerns about the legal ramifications of a redacted collection activity planned by CSE. 5/x
https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/CSE-MAMO_EN.pdf -
A report released by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) in 2023 also raised concerns about the legal ramifications of a redacted collection activity planned by CSE. 5/x
https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/CSE-MAMO_EN.pdf -
A report released by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) in 2023 also raised concerns about the legal ramifications of a redacted collection activity planned by CSE. 5/x
https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/CSE-MAMO_EN.pdf -
I read it in NSIRA's 2021 annual report, which was made public in October 2022. https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/AR-2021_EN.pdf 3/3 #CSE #NSIRA #CyberOperations
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I read it in NSIRA's 2021 annual report, which was made public in October 2022. https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/AR-2021_EN.pdf 3/3 #CSE #NSIRA #CyberOperations
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I read it in NSIRA's 2021 annual report, which was made public in October 2022. https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/AR-2021_EN.pdf 3/3 #CSE #NSIRA #CyberOperations
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Here is the passage with the redacted information restored. So, how did I manage to uncover this information that CSE's redactors inexplicably consider too sensitive for public eyes? 2/3 #CSE #NSIRA #CyberOperations
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Here is the passage with the redacted information restored. So, how did I manage to uncover this information that CSE's redactors inexplicably consider too sensitive for public eyes? 2/3 #CSE #NSIRA #CyberOperations
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Here is the passage with the redacted information restored. So, how did I manage to uncover this information that CSE's redactors inexplicably consider too sensitive for public eyes? 2/3 #CSE #NSIRA #CyberOperations
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Today I reveal one of my methods for deredacting documents, using as an example this redacted passage from NSIRA's recently released review of CSE's cyber operations. https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/en/reviews/ongoing-and-completed-reviews/completed-reviews/cses-governance-of-active-and-defensive-cyber-operations/ 1/3 #CSE #NSIRA #CyberOperations
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Today I reveal one of my methods for deredacting documents, using as an example this redacted passage from NSIRA's recently released review of CSE's cyber operations. https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/en/reviews/ongoing-and-completed-reviews/completed-reviews/cses-governance-of-active-and-defensive-cyber-operations/ 1/3 #CSE #NSIRA #CyberOperations
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Today I reveal one of my methods for deredacting documents, using as an example this redacted passage from NSIRA's recently released review of CSE's cyber operations. https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/en/reviews/ongoing-and-completed-reviews/completed-reviews/cses-governance-of-active-and-defensive-cyber-operations/ 1/3 #CSE #NSIRA #CyberOperations
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19 December 2021: NSIRA Chair Marie Deschamps meets with the Minister of National Defence to discuss NSIRA’s relationship with CSE: "Difficulties in obtaining timely access to information, the inability to independently verify the veracity and completeness of the information provided, and a larger culture of resisting and impeding the efficient progress of review activities directly impact NSIRA’s ability to fulfill the government’s mandate in regards to CSE."
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19 December 2021: NSIRA Chair Marie Deschamps meets with the Minister of National Defence to discuss NSIRA’s relationship with CSE: "Difficulties in obtaining timely access to information, the inability to independently verify the veracity and completeness of the information provided, and a larger culture of resisting and impeding the efficient progress of review activities directly impact NSIRA’s ability to fulfill the government’s mandate in regards to CSE."
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19 December 2021: NSIRA Chair Marie Deschamps meets with the Minister of National Defence to discuss NSIRA’s relationship with CSE: "Difficulties in obtaining timely access to information, the inability to independently verify the veracity and completeness of the information provided, and a larger culture of resisting and impeding the efficient progress of review activities directly impact NSIRA’s ability to fulfill the government’s mandate in regards to CSE."
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19 December 2021: NSIRA Chair Marie Deschamps meets with the Minister of National Defence to discuss NSIRA’s relationship with CSE: "Difficulties in obtaining timely access to information, the inability to independently verify the veracity and completeness of the information provided, and a larger culture of resisting and impeding the efficient progress of review activities directly impact NSIRA’s ability to fulfill the government’s mandate in regards to CSE."
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19 December 2021: NSIRA Chair Marie Deschamps meets with the Minister of National Defence to discuss NSIRA’s relationship with CSE: "Difficulties in obtaining timely access to information, the inability to independently verify the veracity and completeness of the information provided, and a larger culture of resisting and impeding the efficient progress of review activities directly impact NSIRA’s ability to fulfill the government’s mandate in regards to CSE."
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See also this earlier post from May about NSIRA - CSE tensions. https://mstdn.ca/@billrobinson/110361755458804376
#CSE #NSIRA -
See also this earlier post from May about NSIRA - CSE tensions. https://mstdn.ca/@billrobinson/110361755458804376
#CSE #NSIRA -
See also this earlier post from May about NSIRA - CSE tensions. https://mstdn.ca/@billrobinson/110361755458804376
#CSE #NSIRA -
More information about tensions between watchdog NSIRA and agencies in the Canadian security and intelligence community. https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/watchdog-s-relations-with-spy-community-particularly-strained-over-last-year-1.6427254
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More information about tensions between watchdog NSIRA and agencies in the Canadian security and intelligence community. https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/watchdog-s-relations-with-spy-community-particularly-strained-over-last-year-1.6427254
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More information about tensions between watchdog NSIRA and agencies in the Canadian security and intelligence community. https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/watchdog-s-relations-with-spy-community-particularly-strained-over-last-year-1.6427254
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"A culture within Canada’s cyberspy service of “resisting and impeding” independent review has frustrated efforts to ensure it is obeying the law, say newly released documents from the federal intelligence watchdog." #CSE #NSIRA
https://lethbridgenewsnow.com/2023/05/13/systemic-difficulties-hampered-review-of-canadas-cyberspy-service-watchdog/ -
"A culture within Canada’s cyberspy service of “resisting and impeding” independent review has frustrated efforts to ensure it is obeying the law, say newly released documents from the federal intelligence watchdog." #CSE #NSIRA
https://lethbridgenewsnow.com/2023/05/13/systemic-difficulties-hampered-review-of-canadas-cyberspy-service-watchdog/ -
"A culture within Canada’s cyberspy service of “resisting and impeding” independent review has frustrated efforts to ensure it is obeying the law, say newly released documents from the federal intelligence watchdog." #CSE #NSIRA
https://lethbridgenewsnow.com/2023/05/13/systemic-difficulties-hampered-review-of-canadas-cyberspy-service-watchdog/ -
"A culture within Canada’s cyberspy service of “resisting and impeding” independent review has frustrated efforts to ensure it is obeying the law, say newly released documents from the federal intelligence watchdog." #CSE #NSIRA
https://lethbridgenewsnow.com/2023/05/13/systemic-difficulties-hampered-review-of-canadas-cyberspy-service-watchdog/ -
Both versions redact the year "2019" from Finding 3. We know the year because NSIRA's 2020 Annual Report, which was made public in December 2021, included that information in its summary of the review's findings (see p. 65): https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/tabling-of-the-national-security-and-intelligence-review-agencys-annual-report
The Annual Report also reported CSE's responses to NSIRA's recommendations. CSE did not accept recommendation 3, which called for a formal legal assessment of the international law regime applicable to active cyber ops (see p. 66).
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Both versions redact the year "2019" from Finding 3. We know the year because NSIRA's 2020 Annual Report, which was made public in December 2021, included that information in its summary of the review's findings (see p. 65): https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/tabling-of-the-national-security-and-intelligence-review-agencys-annual-report
The Annual Report also reported CSE's responses to NSIRA's recommendations. CSE did not accept recommendation 3, which called for a formal legal assessment of the international law regime applicable to active cyber ops (see p. 66).
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Both versions redact the year "2019" from Finding 3. We know the year because NSIRA's 2020 Annual Report, which was made public in December 2021, included that information in its summary of the review's findings (see p. 65): https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/tabling-of-the-national-security-and-intelligence-review-agencys-annual-report
The Annual Report also reported CSE's responses to NSIRA's recommendations. CSE did not accept recommendation 3, which called for a formal legal assessment of the international law regime applicable to active cyber ops (see p. 66).
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Both versions redact the year "2019" from Finding 3. We know the year because NSIRA's 2020 Annual Report, which was made public in December 2021, included that information in its summary of the review's findings (see p. 65): https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/tabling-of-the-national-security-and-intelligence-review-agencys-annual-report
The Annual Report also reported CSE's responses to NSIRA's recommendations. CSE did not accept recommendation 3, which called for a formal legal assessment of the international law regime applicable to active cyber ops (see p. 66).
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Both versions redact the year "2019" from Finding 3. We know the year because NSIRA's 2020 Annual Report, which was made public in December 2021, included that information in its summary of the review's findings (see p. 65): https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/tabling-of-the-national-security-and-intelligence-review-agencys-annual-report
The Annual Report also reported CSE's responses to NSIRA's recommendations. CSE did not accept recommendation 3, which called for a formal legal assessment of the international law regime applicable to active cyber ops (see p. 66).
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The full text of Finding 5 (revealed in the ATI version) shows that the 2019 Ministerial Order on Canadian Identifying Info (CII) "only included one class of persons phrased in broad language instead of a detailed list of persons and classes of persons designated to receive CII."
This was later fixed by CSE.
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The full text of Finding 5 (revealed in the ATI version) shows that the 2019 Ministerial Order on Canadian Identifying Info (CII) "only included one class of persons phrased in broad language instead of a detailed list of persons and classes of persons designated to receive CII."
This was later fixed by CSE.
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The full text of Finding 5 (revealed in the ATI version) shows that the 2019 Ministerial Order on Canadian Identifying Info (CII) "only included one class of persons phrased in broad language instead of a detailed list of persons and classes of persons designated to receive CII."
This was later fixed by CSE.
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The full text of Finding 5 (revealed in the ATI version) shows that the 2019 Ministerial Order on Canadian Identifying Info (CII) "only included one class of persons phrased in broad language instead of a detailed list of persons and classes of persons designated to receive CII."
This was later fixed by CSE.
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The full text of Finding 5 (revealed in the ATI version) shows that the 2019 Ministerial Order on Canadian Identifying Info (CII) "only included one class of persons phrased in broad language instead of a detailed list of persons and classes of persons designated to receive CII."
This was later fixed by CSE.
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Unlike the recently posted version, the ATI version does not pointlessly redact the SI (Special Intelligence) control markings on the document. Nor does it inexplicably redact the C (Confidential) portion marking on para. 44.
The ATI version also contains a less-redacted version of para. 26 and provides the full, unredacted text of Finding 5. For its part, the version posted by NSIRA does give us the unredacted, if unremarkable, text of footnote 40.
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Unlike the recently posted version, the ATI version does not pointlessly redact the SI (Special Intelligence) control markings on the document. Nor does it inexplicably redact the C (Confidential) portion marking on para. 44.
The ATI version also contains a less-redacted version of para. 26 and provides the full, unredacted text of Finding 5. For its part, the version posted by NSIRA does give us the unredacted, if unremarkable, text of footnote 40.
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Unlike the recently posted version, the ATI version does not pointlessly redact the SI (Special Intelligence) control markings on the document. Nor does it inexplicably redact the C (Confidential) portion marking on para. 44.
The ATI version also contains a less-redacted version of para. 26 and provides the full, unredacted text of Finding 5. For its part, the version posted by NSIRA does give us the unredacted, if unremarkable, text of footnote 40.
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Unlike the recently posted version, the ATI version does not pointlessly redact the SI (Special Intelligence) control markings on the document. Nor does it inexplicably redact the C (Confidential) portion marking on para. 44.
The ATI version also contains a less-redacted version of para. 26 and provides the full, unredacted text of Finding 5. For its part, the version posted by NSIRA does give us the unredacted, if unremarkable, text of footnote 40.