Cartoon by Daniel Boris; horses, asses and traitors.
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Macht der hessische #CDU-Ministerpräsident Boris Rhein jetzt den Trump?
Was Trump mit Columbia und Harvard vormachte, macht Hessen nun im Kleinformat: Erpressung per Rotstift! Die Frankfurter Goethe-Uni nun als Testfeld für lächerlichen, "antiwoken" Kulturkampf von rechts?
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Wer hätte das auch ahnen können?🤦♂️
Kaum hat der hessische #CDU - Ministerpräsident Boris Rhein den Blinker nach rechts gesetzt, und schon reagieren AfD-Rechtsextremisten mit Erpressungsversuchen.
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https://www.europesays.com/sk/212495/ Vlhová už lyžuje dravšie, vraví brat Boris. Magoni by ju úplne zodral #SK #Slovak #Slovakia #Slovenčina #Slovensko #Šport #Sports
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A big chunk of how the Polylane team builds software now happens in Slack, with agents fixing, reviewing, and arguing over PRs. Boris Tane on why the next step is closing the loop on what happens after code hits production.
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THE KREMLIN'S FAKE FACTORY
THE INSIDER
Organizations and agencies involved in creating and spreading fakes in Europe, the US and Ukraine
Presidential Directorate for Monitoring and Analysis of Social Processes
Expert Institute for Social Research (EISI)
Sergey Kiriyenko
Evgeny Kazakov
Boris Rapoport
Alexander Kharichev
Oleg Gaba
Alexander Asafov
Sergey Chernakov
Presidential Directorate for ICT and Communication Infrastructure
Ekaterina Sorokova
Margarita Klimanova
Sofia Zakharova
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Security Council
Alexey Goltyaev
Social Design Agency, Struktura
Ilya Gambashidze
Nikolai Tupikin
Center for Global IT Cooperation
Vadim Glushchenko
Roman Shamraev
Yun Lindre
ANO Dialog, Internet Development Institute (IRI)
Readovka
Vladimir Tabak
Alexey Goreslavsky
Alexey Kostylev
Kirill Solok
Elena Rodnova
Stanislav Starostin
Timofey V
Alexander Samokhvalov
Sources: correspondence, reports and internal documents of the Social Design Agency (SDA), 2026
(with the heads of the named individuals) -
Hours debugging a failing CI run, only to find out GitHub is down again. Boris Tane on teaching Polylane to tell the difference between your app breaking and the platform underneath it.
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https://www.europesays.com/si/270470/ Slavko Moharič, ki bi moral naslediti Borisa Mijiča: Funkcije ne bom sprejel. Žal. #video #BorisMijić #DržavniZbor #IzkoriščanjeDelavcev #NadomestniPoslanci #RepublicOfSlovenia #RepublikaSlovenija #ResniCa #SI #SlavkoMoharič #Slovene #Slovenia #Slovenija #Slovenščina #ZoranStevanović
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Spacecraft spotlight (92/610)
Name: Soyuz 21
Status: Single Use
Agency: Russian Federal Space Agency (ROSCOSMOS)
Description: Soyuz 21 was a Soyuz spacecraft which launched on 6 July 1976 12:08 UTC. It transported two cosmonauts on the first flight to Salyut. The crew was Boris Volynov and Vitaly Zholobov.
In use: No -
China and Russia: The Protests Their Governments Would Rather You Didn’t See
WPS News | International Affairs / Civil Liberties
October 20, 2026 | 2026-10-21 09:00 Philippine Standard Time (PHST)
Thousands of protests in China. Demonstrators detained in Moscow. Workers demanding unpaid wages, citizens challenging political repression, and governments determined to control what the public can see. Behind the official appearances of stability, China and Russia face forms of dissent that rarely receive sustained international attention.
The Silence Is Misleading
When hundreds of thousands of people demonstrate in France, the world sees the pictures.
When stores are looted in Italy, international news organizations report the destruction, police response, and political consequences.
But what happens when people protest in countries where independent journalism is restricted, political opposition can result in imprisonment, and the authorities control much of the information reaching the public?
China and Russia present precisely that problem.
Both governments project images of national unity, political stability, and strong leadership. Both also maintain extensive systems for controlling political opposition and public information.
Yet citizens continue to challenge authorities.
In China, the resistance often concerns unpaid wages, unfinished housing developments, confiscated land, and abuses by local officials.
In Russia, opposition includes antiwar dissent, demands for political prisoners to be released, and criticism of political restrictions.
The absence of constant international television coverage should not be confused with the absence of public dissatisfaction.
The evidence tells a different story.
China: Thousands of Protests Behind the Great Firewall
One of the clearest indications of China’s internal tensions comes from the China Dissent Monitor, a research project operated by Freedom House.
The organization documented 5,343 dissent events during 2025, an increase of approximately 44 percent over 2024.
During the first quarter of 2026, researchers documented at least 1,241 protests.
Another 846 dissent events were recorded during the second quarter.
That amounts to at least 2,087 documented incidents during the first six months of 2026.
These figures are not estimates of the number of individual protesters. They represent separately recorded incidents, ranging from relatively small gatherings to larger collective demonstrations.
They also do not capture every protest occurring throughout China.
The research depends partly on information that survives government censorship long enough to be identified and documented.
That creates a fundamental problem: the Chinese government can influence not only what its citizens know about demonstrations, but also what outside observers can measure.
Workers Who Want Their Money
Much of China’s unrest is rooted in economic grievances rather than organized demands to overthrow the Communist Party.
Workers protest because employers have failed to pay wages.
Construction employees demand compensation for completed projects.
Families who purchased apartments complain about developments that remain unfinished.
Rural residents challenge land seizures and compensation decisions.
These are practical disputes involving livelihoods, homes, and economic security.
But in a political system where independent unions and opposition organizations face severe restrictions, even ordinary economic grievances can become confrontations with government authority.
The China Dissent Monitor reported that workers accounted for a substantial share of demonstrations during 2025.
Its research also documented a sharp increase in protests over unpaid wages before the 2026 Lunar New Year.
These demonstrations challenge the assumption that China’s economic achievements have eliminated serious social tensions.
The country remains an enormous manufacturing and technological power.
But national economic strength does not guarantee that individual workers receive their wages or that families receive the homes they purchased.
For those citizens, political stability means little if the system cannot enforce basic economic obligations.
The Housing Problem Becomes a Political Problem
China’s troubled property sector has produced another major source of public anger.
For years, housing construction helped drive economic expansion.
Developers borrowed heavily, local governments benefited from land transactions, and families invested substantial portions of their savings in apartments.
When developers encountered financial difficulties, some projects stalled.
Buyers were left waiting for homes that had already been paid for, sometimes while continuing to make mortgage payments.
The resulting protests are especially significant because homeownership represents financial security for many Chinese families.
During the second quarter of 2026, homeowners accounted for approximately 36 percent of the dissent events documented by Freedom House.
Workers accounted for 24 percent, and rural residents for another 18 percent.
Together, those groups represented more than three-quarters of the recorded incidents.
The pattern suggests that much of China’s documented unrest arises from disputes over property, employment, and local governance.
It does not establish that a nationwide revolutionary movement is developing.
But it does demonstrate that ordinary economic problems can generate repeated public resistance.
Censorship: Making the Evidence Disappear
The Chinese government’s response to dissent includes extensive control over public information.
China’s internet censorship system, commonly called the Great Firewall, restricts access to foreign websites and information services.
Domestic platforms are subject to government rules concerning politically sensitive content.
Freedom House examined 2,970 social-media posts about protests published on Douyin between June and December 2025.
Approximately two-thirds were subsequently deleted.
In February 2026, Chinese authorities announced another campaign targeting online material considered likely to encourage negative public sentiment.
Freedom House subsequently warned that increased censorship may have contributed to an apparent decline in documented protests during the second quarter.
This is an important distinction.
A decline in visible protests does not necessarily mean fewer protests occurred.
It may mean that evidence became harder to find.
China’s information restrictions therefore create a serious obstacle to evaluating public dissatisfaction.
Independent researchers can identify patterns, document incidents, and investigate individual cases.
They cannot guarantee that every demonstration has been discovered.
Russia: Dissent in the Shadow of War
Russia presents a different picture.
Its political repression is closely connected to President Vladimir Putin’s long rule, restrictions on opposition activity, and the war against Ukraine.
Public criticism of the war can expose individuals to prosecution.
Independent media organizations have faced closure, exile, restrictions, or criminal investigations.
Political activists and journalists operate under significant pressure.
Yet public dissent has not disappeared.
In early October 2026, approximately 60 people were detained following a rally in Moscow organized by Russia’s Communist Party.
The gathering commemorated the violent 1993 confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and parliament.
Participants reportedly shouted demands for fair elections, freedom for political prisoners, and an end to authoritarian rule.
One slogan was particularly revealing:
“Down with the Tsar.”
The Communist Party itself is generally regarded as part of Russia’s tolerated parliamentary opposition and has supported the war in Ukraine.
That makes the detentions noteworthy.
Even a gathering associated with an established political party was not necessarily protected from police intervention when participants expressed politically sensitive demands.
The arrests do not establish that Russia is approaching a nationwide uprising.
They do demonstrate that public political dissatisfaction persists despite the risks.
The War and the Cost of Opposition
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered its domestic political environment.
The government has imposed severe restrictions on statements about the armed forces and the conduct of the war.
People accused of spreading prohibited information or discrediting the military have faced prosecution.
The resulting atmosphere makes organized antiwar protest particularly difficult.
Some Russians support the war.
Others oppose it.
Still others may be primarily concerned with personal safety, military service, economic security, or the consequences of publicly expressing an opinion.
It would be inaccurate to treat the Russian population as politically uniform.
It would also be inaccurate to assume that limited visible protest demonstrates widespread approval of government policy.
Public opinion measured under conditions of political repression must be interpreted carefully.
People may hesitate to express views that could expose them or their families to consequences.
At the same time, repression alone does not prove that a hidden majority opposes the government.
The responsible conclusion is narrower: Russia’s restrictions make the true extent and intensity of political opposition difficult to establish.
Journalists Become Targets of State Security
Russia’s treatment of journalists provides another indication of the country’s political environment.
On October 15, the Associated Press reported that Japan had protested the arrest of Japanese journalist Yuki Imai by Russia’s Federal Security Service.
Russian authorities accused him of espionage.
Japan demanded an explanation, consular access, and humane treatment.
The Committee to Protect Journalists called for his release.
An espionage accusation is not proof that a journalist committed espionage.
Nor does the existence of a diplomatic dispute automatically establish every allegation about the arrest.
But detaining foreign reporters under national-security accusations has obvious consequences for independent reporting.
Journalists investigating politically sensitive subjects must consider the possibility of arrest, prosecution, or expulsion.
That further restricts the information available about conditions inside Russia.
Two Governments, Different Forms of Control
China and Russia are not identical political systems.
China is governed by the Chinese Communist Party, which maintains institutional control over the state, military, and major political organizations.
Russia operates through a formally multiparty electoral system, but political competition is heavily restricted and presidential authority is highly concentrated.
Both systems restrict independent opposition.
Both employ extensive surveillance and information controls.
Both have used criminal law and state-security institutions against critics.
Yet the patterns of documented dissent differ.
In China, many recorded protests concern immediate economic or local administrative grievances.
In Russia, political repression, wartime restrictions, and the consequences of military conflict are central to understanding opposition.
These differences matter.
A worker demanding unpaid wages in Guangdong is not necessarily seeking the overthrow of Xi Jinping.
A Russian citizen demanding the release of political prisoners is not necessarily participating in an organized revolutionary movement.
Treating every act of dissent as evidence of imminent regime collapse would be sensationalism rather than journalism.
Ignoring those acts because they occur under authoritarian governments would be equally irresponsible.
What We Know — and What We Do Not
As of October 20, 2026, the available evidence establishes that dissent continues in both countries.
China’s documented protests number in the thousands annually, with substantial activity involving workers, homeowners, and rural residents.
Russia continues to detain people participating in politically sensitive demonstrations, while restrictions on journalism and antiwar expression remain significant.
What the evidence does not establish is that either country is experiencing a nationwide uprising comparable to the major street demonstrations recently reported in France.
Nor does it establish that Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin faces an immediate threat of removal from power.
Those conclusions would require evidence of broader political mobilization, significant institutional defections, or other developments not demonstrated by the reporting examined here.
There is also an important difference between an absence of evidence and evidence of absence.
When governments restrict journalism, censor social media, and punish political dissent, outside observers cannot assume they are seeing the complete picture.
That uncertainty must be acknowledged rather than filled with speculation.
The Larger Question
France and Italy have recently demonstrated how economic dissatisfaction can produce major public confrontations.
China and Russia show something different: how political restrictions can make public dissatisfaction less visible without necessarily resolving its causes.
An authoritarian government may prevent a protest from becoming a national spectacle.
It may remove videos, detain organizers, and prevent independent reporters from investigating.
But none of those measures pays an unpaid worker, completes an abandoned apartment building, or answers a citizen demanding political accountability.
Neither China nor Russia should be described as collapsing on the basis of the evidence currently available.
Both remain powerful states with substantial coercive and administrative capacity.
But their governments’ claims of stability deserve examination against the experiences of ordinary citizens.
The most revealing question may not be how many people are marching through Beijing or Moscow today.
It may be how many people have grievances that cannot be openly discussed, independently investigated, or peacefully resolved.
A government can suppress the evidence of dissatisfaction. That is not the same thing as eliminating dissatisfaction itself.
APA-Style Source List
Associated Press. (2026, October). Dozens detained at a rally in Moscow held by Kremlin-friendly Communist Party, party says. https://apnews.com/article/a31ea561ce61b22603e35305266bb4a4
Associated Press. (2026, October 15). Tokyo protests Russia’s arrest of Japanese journalist on suspicion of spying. https://apnews.com/article/5b4ae97e83d638c191d8b32c3e119713
Freedom House. (2026, February 18). China Dissent Monitor: Issue 11, October–December 2025. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/CDM_Issue11_2.18.26_0.pdf
Freedom House. (2026, July 16). China Dissent Monitor: Issue 12, April–June 2026. https://freedomhouse.org/report/china-dissent-monitor/2026/issue-12-april-june-2026
Human Rights Watch. (2026). World report 2026: China. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/china
U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China. (2026). China monitor #5. https://www.cecc.gov/publications/china-monitor/china-monitor-5
#china #CivilUnrest #freedomOfSpeech #humanRights #internationalAffairs #politicalRepression #russia