#vendorrisk — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #vendorrisk, aggregated by home.social.
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New by me: The N-central Exploits Are an MSP Vendor-Risk Test
https://www.kylereddoch.me/blog/the-n-central-exploits-are-an-msp-vendor-risk-test/
#Cybersecurity #InfoSec #MSP #Nable #Ncentral #RMM #VendorRisk #IncidentResponse
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New by me: The N-central Exploits Are an MSP Vendor-Risk Test
https://www.kylereddoch.me/blog/the-n-central-exploits-are-an-msp-vendor-risk-test/
#Cybersecurity #InfoSec #MSP #Nable #Ncentral #RMM #VendorRisk #IncidentResponse
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New by me: The N-central Exploits Are an MSP Vendor-Risk Test
https://www.kylereddoch.me/blog/the-n-central-exploits-are-an-msp-vendor-risk-test/
#Cybersecurity #InfoSec #MSP #Nable #Ncentral #RMM #VendorRisk #IncidentResponse
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New by me: The N-central Exploits Are an MSP Vendor-Risk Test
https://www.kylereddoch.me/blog/the-n-central-exploits-are-an-msp-vendor-risk-test/
#Cybersecurity #InfoSec #MSP #Nable #Ncentral #RMM #VendorRisk #IncidentResponse
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New by me: The N-central Exploits Are an MSP Vendor-Risk Test
https://www.kylereddoch.me/blog/the-n-central-exploits-are-an-msp-vendor-risk-test/
#Cybersecurity #InfoSec #MSP #Nable #Ncentral #RMM #VendorRisk #IncidentResponse
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Reward: You've unlocked the Phantom Backup Relic — a data artifact no one remembers creating, cursed to appear only during breach disclosures.
#DataBreach #CyberSecurity #ThomsonReuters #CloudSecurity #VendorRisk #AchievementUnlocked (3/3)
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Reward: You've unlocked the Phantom Backup Relic — a data artifact no one remembers creating, cursed to appear only during breach disclosures.
#DataBreach #CyberSecurity #ThomsonReuters #CloudSecurity #VendorRisk #AchievementUnlocked (3/3)
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Reward: You've unlocked the Phantom Backup Relic — a data artifact no one remembers creating, cursed to appear only during breach disclosures.
#DataBreach #CyberSecurity #ThomsonReuters #CloudSecurity #VendorRisk #AchievementUnlocked (3/3)
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With the new hack-back memo, the US has shot itself in the foot again. And most of the initial online discussions miss how far the damage reaches. For the US.
Quick summary. On August 12 the President signed a memorandum letting vetted American companies break into foreign systems used by criminal groups and disrupt or destroy them. It is not vigilantism: the companies act under federal direction, and two officials approve every operation in writing.
Americans lost more than $20 billion to this fraud last year, so the motivation is real. I am not against acting. I am against this approach, and I know the arguments because I spent years making them to governments that wanted the same thing.
The debate so far has been about whether private firms should do this, and whether innocent foreigners get hurt. However I analyze it, the first casualty is American:
- Why would anyone share threat intel with Americans, when it could now be used to attack infrastructure in their own country?
- Why would a non-US CISO keep American EDR and XDR agents deep in their stack, when nobody can tell them whether that vendor also runs surveillance and offensive operations for the state?
- Why would anyone outside the US let an American vendor build the map of their weakest cryptography, in the PQC discovery and inventory work their own regulator is forcing them to do?
- Why would a European buyer accept "we cannot comment" as a tender answer?
- Why would an American firm disclose the flaw it just found, when its other contract values that flaw unpatched?
- Why would a sovereign wealth fund hold a listed US security vendor it has no way to assess?
- Why would an allied service share access with a partner whose contractors may be on the same box?
- How does a US prosecutor explain the next indictment of a Chinese contractor hacker?
- What does Washington say when Beijing runs the same program and calls it law enforcement?
Procedures are due October 11 and need not be published. Which means these questions may never get a public answer, and every one of them will get answered by assumption instead. None of those assumptions will favor the American cybersecurity industry.
https://postquantum.com/cyber-kinetic-security/cyber-privateers-what-breaks/
#Cybersecurity #CISO #CyberPolicy #ThreatIntel #NationalSecurity #InfoSec #VendorRisk #PQC
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With the new hack-back memo, the US has shot itself in the foot again. And most of the initial online discussions miss how far the damage reaches. For the US.
Quick summary. On August 12 the President signed a memorandum letting vetted American companies break into foreign systems used by criminal groups and disrupt or destroy them. It is not vigilantism: the companies act under federal direction, and two officials approve every operation in writing.
Americans lost more than $20 billion to this fraud last year, so the motivation is real. I am not against acting. I am against this approach, and I know the arguments because I spent years making them to governments that wanted the same thing.
The debate so far has been about whether private firms should do this, and whether innocent foreigners get hurt. However I analyze it, the first casualty is American:
- Why would anyone share threat intel with Americans, when it could now be used to attack infrastructure in their own country?
- Why would a non-US CISO keep American EDR and XDR agents deep in their stack, when nobody can tell them whether that vendor also runs surveillance and offensive operations for the state?
- Why would anyone outside the US let an American vendor build the map of their weakest cryptography, in the PQC discovery and inventory work their own regulator is forcing them to do?
- Why would a European buyer accept "we cannot comment" as a tender answer?
- Why would an American firm disclose the flaw it just found, when its other contract values that flaw unpatched?
- Why would a sovereign wealth fund hold a listed US security vendor it has no way to assess?
- Why would an allied service share access with a partner whose contractors may be on the same box?
- How does a US prosecutor explain the next indictment of a Chinese contractor hacker?
- What does Washington say when Beijing runs the same program and calls it law enforcement?
Procedures are due October 11 and need not be published. Which means these questions may never get a public answer, and every one of them will get answered by assumption instead. None of those assumptions will favor the American cybersecurity industry.
https://postquantum.com/cyber-kinetic-security/cyber-privateers-what-breaks/
#Cybersecurity #CISO #CyberPolicy #ThreatIntel #NationalSecurity #InfoSec #VendorRisk #PQC
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With the new hack-back memo, the US has shot itself in the foot again. And most of the initial online discussions miss how far the damage reaches. For the US.
Quick summary. On August 12 the President signed a memorandum letting vetted American companies break into foreign systems used by criminal groups and disrupt or destroy them. It is not vigilantism: the companies act under federal direction, and two officials approve every operation in writing.
Americans lost more than $20 billion to this fraud last year, so the motivation is real. I am not against acting. I am against this approach, and I know the arguments because I spent years making them to governments that wanted the same thing.
The debate so far has been about whether private firms should do this, and whether innocent foreigners get hurt. However I analyze it, the first casualty is American:
- Why would anyone share threat intel with Americans, when it could now be used to attack infrastructure in their own country?
- Why would a non-US CISO keep American EDR and XDR agents deep in their stack, when nobody can tell them whether that vendor also runs surveillance and offensive operations for the state?
- Why would anyone outside the US let an American vendor build the map of their weakest cryptography, in the PQC discovery and inventory work their own regulator is forcing them to do?
- Why would a European buyer accept "we cannot comment" as a tender answer?
- Why would an American firm disclose the flaw it just found, when its other contract values that flaw unpatched?
- Why would a sovereign wealth fund hold a listed US security vendor it has no way to assess?
- Why would an allied service share access with a partner whose contractors may be on the same box?
- How does a US prosecutor explain the next indictment of a Chinese contractor hacker?
- What does Washington say when Beijing runs the same program and calls it law enforcement?
Procedures are due October 11 and need not be published. Which means these questions may never get a public answer, and every one of them will get answered by assumption instead. None of those assumptions will favor the American cybersecurity industry.
https://postquantum.com/cyber-kinetic-security/cyber-privateers-what-breaks/
#Cybersecurity #CISO #CyberPolicy #ThreatIntel #NationalSecurity #InfoSec #VendorRisk #PQC
-
With the new hack-back memo, the US has shot itself in the foot again. And most of the initial online discussions miss how far the damage reaches. For the US.
Quick summary. On August 12 the President signed a memorandum letting vetted American companies break into foreign systems used by criminal groups and disrupt or destroy them. It is not vigilantism: the companies act under federal direction, and two officials approve every operation in writing.
Americans lost more than $20 billion to this fraud last year, so the motivation is real. I am not against acting. I am against this approach, and I know the arguments because I spent years making them to governments that wanted the same thing.
The debate so far has been about whether private firms should do this, and whether innocent foreigners get hurt. However I analyze it, the first casualty is American:
- Why would anyone share threat intel with Americans, when it could now be used to attack infrastructure in their own country?
- Why would a non-US CISO keep American EDR and XDR agents deep in their stack, when nobody can tell them whether that vendor also runs surveillance and offensive operations for the state?
- Why would anyone outside the US let an American vendor build the map of their weakest cryptography, in the PQC discovery and inventory work their own regulator is forcing them to do?
- Why would a European buyer accept "we cannot comment" as a tender answer?
- Why would an American firm disclose the flaw it just found, when its other contract values that flaw unpatched?
- Why would a sovereign wealth fund hold a listed US security vendor it has no way to assess?
- Why would an allied service share access with a partner whose contractors may be on the same box?
- How does a US prosecutor explain the next indictment of a Chinese contractor hacker?
- What does Washington say when Beijing runs the same program and calls it law enforcement?
Procedures are due October 11 and need not be published. Which means these questions may never get a public answer, and every one of them will get answered by assumption instead. None of those assumptions will favor the American cybersecurity industry.
https://postquantum.com/cyber-kinetic-security/cyber-privateers-what-breaks/
#Cybersecurity #CISO #CyberPolicy #ThreatIntel #NationalSecurity #InfoSec #VendorRisk #PQC
-
With the new hack-back memo, the US has shot itself in the foot again. And most of the initial online discussions miss how far the damage reaches. For the US.
Quick summary. On August 12 the President signed a memorandum letting vetted American companies break into foreign systems used by criminal groups and disrupt or destroy them. It is not vigilantism: the companies act under federal direction, and two officials approve every operation in writing.
Americans lost more than $20 billion to this fraud last year, so the motivation is real. I am not against acting. I am against this approach, and I know the arguments because I spent years making them to governments that wanted the same thing.
The debate so far has been about whether private firms should do this, and whether innocent foreigners get hurt. However I analyze it, the first casualty is American:
- Why would anyone share threat intel with Americans, when it could now be used to attack infrastructure in their own country?
- Why would a non-US CISO keep American EDR and XDR agents deep in their stack, when nobody can tell them whether that vendor also runs surveillance and offensive operations for the state?
- Why would anyone outside the US let an American vendor build the map of their weakest cryptography, in the PQC discovery and inventory work their own regulator is forcing them to do?
- Why would a European buyer accept "we cannot comment" as a tender answer?
- Why would an American firm disclose the flaw it just found, when its other contract values that flaw unpatched?
- Why would a sovereign wealth fund hold a listed US security vendor it has no way to assess?
- Why would an allied service share access with a partner whose contractors may be on the same box?
- How does a US prosecutor explain the next indictment of a Chinese contractor hacker?
- What does Washington say when Beijing runs the same program and calls it law enforcement?
Procedures are due October 11 and need not be published. Which means these questions may never get a public answer, and every one of them will get answered by assumption instead. None of those assumptions will favor the American cybersecurity industry.
https://postquantum.com/cyber-kinetic-security/cyber-privateers-what-breaks/
#Cybersecurity #CISO #CyberPolicy #ThreatIntel #NationalSecurity #InfoSec #VendorRisk #PQC
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Three LexisNexis services remain offline during vendor-server probe #LexisNexis #IncidentResponse #VendorRisk #NewYork #Cybersecurity #NexisNewsdesk https://dysruptionhub.com/lexisnexis-three-services-offline/
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Three LexisNexis services remain offline during vendor-server probe #LexisNexis #IncidentResponse #VendorRisk #NewYork #Cybersecurity #NexisNewsdesk https://dysruptionhub.com/lexisnexis-three-services-offline/
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Anthropic spent months carefully gatekeeping access to Mythos, their most capable AI model, while limiting access only to a small group of vetted companies for defensive cybersecurity testing. Then a private online forum got in anyway, through a third-party vendor, on the same day the controlled program was announced.
That's the part worth sitting with. Not the model. The vendor. Third-party vendors... It's always the the 3td party vendor. 🤦🏻♂️ You can build the most carefully controlled AI release program in the industry, and one weak link in your supply chain burns it down. We keep having this conversation about AI safety and regulation, and we keep forgetting that the threat surface isn't just the model. It's every partner, every integration, every environment touching it. 🔗 Everything's connected. Everything.
🤔 Ask yourself: how many third parties have access to your most sensitive systems right now? Do you actually know?
⚠️ Vendor risk management isn't a compliance checkbox. It's where your security posture actually lives or dies.https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/anthropics-mythos-model-accessed-unauthorized-214920132.html
#Cybersecurity #AI #VendorRisk #InfoSec #RiskManagement #security #privacy #cloud #infosec -
Anthropic spent months carefully gatekeeping access to Mythos, their most capable AI model, while limiting access only to a small group of vetted companies for defensive cybersecurity testing. Then a private online forum got in anyway, through a third-party vendor, on the same day the controlled program was announced.
That's the part worth sitting with. Not the model. The vendor. Third-party vendors... It's always the the 3td party vendor. 🤦🏻♂️ You can build the most carefully controlled AI release program in the industry, and one weak link in your supply chain burns it down. We keep having this conversation about AI safety and regulation, and we keep forgetting that the threat surface isn't just the model. It's every partner, every integration, every environment touching it. 🔗 Everything's connected. Everything.
🤔 Ask yourself: how many third parties have access to your most sensitive systems right now? Do you actually know?
⚠️ Vendor risk management isn't a compliance checkbox. It's where your security posture actually lives or dies.https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/anthropics-mythos-model-accessed-unauthorized-214920132.html
#Cybersecurity #AI #VendorRisk #InfoSec #RiskManagement #security #privacy #cloud #infosec -
Anthropic spent months carefully gatekeeping access to Mythos, their most capable AI model, while limiting access only to a small group of vetted companies for defensive cybersecurity testing. Then a private online forum got in anyway, through a third-party vendor, on the same day the controlled program was announced.
That's the part worth sitting with. Not the model. The vendor. Third-party vendors... It's always the the 3td party vendor. 🤦🏻♂️ You can build the most carefully controlled AI release program in the industry, and one weak link in your supply chain burns it down. We keep having this conversation about AI safety and regulation, and we keep forgetting that the threat surface isn't just the model. It's every partner, every integration, every environment touching it. 🔗 Everything's connected. Everything.
🤔 Ask yourself: how many third parties have access to your most sensitive systems right now? Do you actually know?
⚠️ Vendor risk management isn't a compliance checkbox. It's where your security posture actually lives or dies.https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/anthropics-mythos-model-accessed-unauthorized-214920132.html
#Cybersecurity #AI #VendorRisk #InfoSec #RiskManagement #security #privacy #cloud #infosec -
Anthropic spent months carefully gatekeeping access to Mythos, their most capable AI model, while limiting access only to a small group of vetted companies for defensive cybersecurity testing. Then a private online forum got in anyway, through a third-party vendor, on the same day the controlled program was announced.
That's the part worth sitting with. Not the model. The vendor. Third-party vendors... It's always the the 3td party vendor. 🤦🏻♂️ You can build the most carefully controlled AI release program in the industry, and one weak link in your supply chain burns it down. We keep having this conversation about AI safety and regulation, and we keep forgetting that the threat surface isn't just the model. It's every partner, every integration, every environment touching it. 🔗 Everything's connected. Everything.
🤔 Ask yourself: how many third parties have access to your most sensitive systems right now? Do you actually know?
⚠️ Vendor risk management isn't a compliance checkbox. It's where your security posture actually lives or dies.https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/anthropics-mythos-model-accessed-unauthorized-214920132.html
#Cybersecurity #AI #VendorRisk #InfoSec #RiskManagement #security #privacy #cloud #infosec -
Anthropic spent months carefully gatekeeping access to Mythos, their most capable AI model, while limiting access only to a small group of vetted companies for defensive cybersecurity testing. Then a private online forum got in anyway, through a third-party vendor, on the same day the controlled program was announced.
That's the part worth sitting with. Not the model. The vendor. Third-party vendors... It's always the the 3td party vendor. 🤦🏻♂️ You can build the most carefully controlled AI release program in the industry, and one weak link in your supply chain burns it down. We keep having this conversation about AI safety and regulation, and we keep forgetting that the threat surface isn't just the model. It's every partner, every integration, every environment touching it. 🔗 Everything's connected. Everything.
🤔 Ask yourself: how many third parties have access to your most sensitive systems right now? Do you actually know?
⚠️ Vendor risk management isn't a compliance checkbox. It's where your security posture actually lives or dies.https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/anthropics-mythos-model-accessed-unauthorized-214920132.html
#Cybersecurity #AI #VendorRisk #InfoSec #RiskManagement #security #privacy #cloud #infosec -
Anthropic launches Code Review at $15-25 per pull request, completing a vertical integration play across code generation, review, and security. Their own engineers tripled output using Claude, creating demand for AI-powered oversight. Meanwhile, Pentagon supply chain designation creates new vendor risk considerations for enterprise buyers weighing the full-stack approach. #AICodeReview #EnterpriseAI #VendorRisk
https://www.implicator.ai/anthropic-built-the-highway-now-its-selling-the-guardrails/
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Anthropic launches Code Review at $15-25 per pull request, completing a vertical integration play across code generation, review, and security. Their own engineers tripled output using Claude, creating demand for AI-powered oversight. Meanwhile, Pentagon supply chain designation creates new vendor risk considerations for enterprise buyers weighing the full-stack approach. #AICodeReview #EnterpriseAI #VendorRisk
https://www.implicator.ai/anthropic-built-the-highway-now-its-selling-the-guardrails/
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A security incident involving restaurant technology provider HungerRush highlights the growing risk of compromised communication infrastructure.
A threat actor sent extortion emails to restaurant patrons, claiming access to millions of data records associated with the HungerRush platform.
Technical observations include:
• Emails delivered through Twilio SendGrid infrastructure
• Messages passed SPF, DKIM, and DMARC authentication checks
• Access was reportedly gained via compromised third-party vendor credentials
HungerRush states the incident was limited to an email marketing service account, and that no passwords, payment card information, or sensitive personal data were exposed.The event demonstrates how attackers can leverage trusted messaging infrastructure to launch extortion or phishing campaigns at scale.
How should organizations better secure email platforms and vendor integrations within SaaS environments?
Share your insights in the comments and follow TechNadu for more cybersecurity threat intelligence and breach coverage.
#InfoSec #CyberSecurity #EmailSecurity #VendorRisk #ThreatIntelligence #DataSecurity #SecurityOperations #CyberThreats #SupplyChainSecurity
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A security incident involving restaurant technology provider HungerRush highlights the growing risk of compromised communication infrastructure.
A threat actor sent extortion emails to restaurant patrons, claiming access to millions of data records associated with the HungerRush platform.
Technical observations include:
• Emails delivered through Twilio SendGrid infrastructure
• Messages passed SPF, DKIM, and DMARC authentication checks
• Access was reportedly gained via compromised third-party vendor credentials
HungerRush states the incident was limited to an email marketing service account, and that no passwords, payment card information, or sensitive personal data were exposed.The event demonstrates how attackers can leverage trusted messaging infrastructure to launch extortion or phishing campaigns at scale.
How should organizations better secure email platforms and vendor integrations within SaaS environments?
Share your insights in the comments and follow TechNadu for more cybersecurity threat intelligence and breach coverage.
#InfoSec #CyberSecurity #EmailSecurity #VendorRisk #ThreatIntelligence #DataSecurity #SecurityOperations #CyberThreats #SupplyChainSecurity
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A security incident involving restaurant technology provider HungerRush highlights the growing risk of compromised communication infrastructure.
A threat actor sent extortion emails to restaurant patrons, claiming access to millions of data records associated with the HungerRush platform.
Technical observations include:
• Emails delivered through Twilio SendGrid infrastructure
• Messages passed SPF, DKIM, and DMARC authentication checks
• Access was reportedly gained via compromised third-party vendor credentials
HungerRush states the incident was limited to an email marketing service account, and that no passwords, payment card information, or sensitive personal data were exposed.The event demonstrates how attackers can leverage trusted messaging infrastructure to launch extortion or phishing campaigns at scale.
How should organizations better secure email platforms and vendor integrations within SaaS environments?
Share your insights in the comments and follow TechNadu for more cybersecurity threat intelligence and breach coverage.
#InfoSec #CyberSecurity #EmailSecurity #VendorRisk #ThreatIntelligence #DataSecurity #SecurityOperations #CyberThreats #SupplyChainSecurity
-
A security incident involving restaurant technology provider HungerRush highlights the growing risk of compromised communication infrastructure.
A threat actor sent extortion emails to restaurant patrons, claiming access to millions of data records associated with the HungerRush platform.
Technical observations include:
• Emails delivered through Twilio SendGrid infrastructure
• Messages passed SPF, DKIM, and DMARC authentication checks
• Access was reportedly gained via compromised third-party vendor credentials
HungerRush states the incident was limited to an email marketing service account, and that no passwords, payment card information, or sensitive personal data were exposed.The event demonstrates how attackers can leverage trusted messaging infrastructure to launch extortion or phishing campaigns at scale.
How should organizations better secure email platforms and vendor integrations within SaaS environments?
Share your insights in the comments and follow TechNadu for more cybersecurity threat intelligence and breach coverage.
#InfoSec #CyberSecurity #EmailSecurity #VendorRisk #ThreatIntelligence #DataSecurity #SecurityOperations #CyberThreats #SupplyChainSecurity
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ShinyHunters has listed a 1.67 GB JSON dataset allegedly containing 600K+ customer records tied to Canada Goose.
Reported by BleepingComputer.Dataset reportedly includes:
• checkout_id, cart_token schema indicators
• Shipping lines & order values
• IP telemetry
• Device/browser metadata
• Partial PAN (BIN + last four)
• Authorization metadata
No full card numbers observed in samples.Canada Goose states no evidence of breach of its own systems; attackers claim third-party processor origin.
Security implications:
• BIN + last four enable targeted card fraud attempts
• Order value profiling identifies high-value targets
• IP/device metadata aids social engineering
• Historical datasets still carry active fraud potential
Is vendor risk management keeping pace with SaaS-based commerce stacks?Engage below.
Follow @technadu for advanced threat analysis.#ThreatIntel #DataLeak #VendorRisk #RetailSecurity #FraudPrevention #Infosec #CloudSecurity #DataExposure #ShinyHunters #CyberDefense #PrivacyEngineering
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ShinyHunters has listed a 1.67 GB JSON dataset allegedly containing 600K+ customer records tied to Canada Goose.
Reported by BleepingComputer.Dataset reportedly includes:
• checkout_id, cart_token schema indicators
• Shipping lines & order values
• IP telemetry
• Device/browser metadata
• Partial PAN (BIN + last four)
• Authorization metadata
No full card numbers observed in samples.Canada Goose states no evidence of breach of its own systems; attackers claim third-party processor origin.
Security implications:
• BIN + last four enable targeted card fraud attempts
• Order value profiling identifies high-value targets
• IP/device metadata aids social engineering
• Historical datasets still carry active fraud potential
Is vendor risk management keeping pace with SaaS-based commerce stacks?Engage below.
Follow @technadu for advanced threat analysis.#ThreatIntel #DataLeak #VendorRisk #RetailSecurity #FraudPrevention #Infosec #CloudSecurity #DataExposure #ShinyHunters #CyberDefense #PrivacyEngineering
-
ShinyHunters has listed a 1.67 GB JSON dataset allegedly containing 600K+ customer records tied to Canada Goose.
Reported by BleepingComputer.Dataset reportedly includes:
• checkout_id, cart_token schema indicators
• Shipping lines & order values
• IP telemetry
• Device/browser metadata
• Partial PAN (BIN + last four)
• Authorization metadata
No full card numbers observed in samples.Canada Goose states no evidence of breach of its own systems; attackers claim third-party processor origin.
Security implications:
• BIN + last four enable targeted card fraud attempts
• Order value profiling identifies high-value targets
• IP/device metadata aids social engineering
• Historical datasets still carry active fraud potential
Is vendor risk management keeping pace with SaaS-based commerce stacks?Engage below.
Follow @technadu for advanced threat analysis.#ThreatIntel #DataLeak #VendorRisk #RetailSecurity #FraudPrevention #Infosec #CloudSecurity #DataExposure #ShinyHunters #CyberDefense #PrivacyEngineering
-
ShinyHunters has listed a 1.67 GB JSON dataset allegedly containing 600K+ customer records tied to Canada Goose.
Reported by BleepingComputer.Dataset reportedly includes:
• checkout_id, cart_token schema indicators
• Shipping lines & order values
• IP telemetry
• Device/browser metadata
• Partial PAN (BIN + last four)
• Authorization metadata
No full card numbers observed in samples.Canada Goose states no evidence of breach of its own systems; attackers claim third-party processor origin.
Security implications:
• BIN + last four enable targeted card fraud attempts
• Order value profiling identifies high-value targets
• IP/device metadata aids social engineering
• Historical datasets still carry active fraud potential
Is vendor risk management keeping pace with SaaS-based commerce stacks?Engage below.
Follow @technadu for advanced threat analysis.#ThreatIntel #DataLeak #VendorRisk #RetailSecurity #FraudPrevention #Infosec #CloudSecurity #DataExposure #ShinyHunters #CyberDefense #PrivacyEngineering
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At RELIANOID, we know your security is only as strong as your weakest vendor.
That’s why we: ✅ Continuously monitor third-party risks
✅ Run attack simulations
✅ Collaborate directly with vendorsIn our book, cybersecurity isn’t optional — it’s mandatory. 🛡️
#CyberSecurity #VendorRisk #RELIANOID
https://www.relianoid.com/blog/how-relianoid-takes-extreme-measures-to-manage-third-party-risks/ -
AI-driven fraud has moved from isolated scams to machine-scale impersonation — and many enterprise defenses haven’t caught up.
In an exclusive interview with MoveTheNeedle.news, Trustpair CEO Baptiste Collot explains why manual controls like callbacks and email confirmations are failing, where fraud exploits operational change, and why continuous validation is becoming a baseline requirement.
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AI-driven fraud has moved from isolated scams to machine-scale impersonation — and many enterprise defenses haven’t caught up.
In an exclusive interview with MoveTheNeedle.news, Trustpair CEO Baptiste Collot explains why manual controls like callbacks and email confirmations are failing, where fraud exploits operational change, and why continuous validation is becoming a baseline requirement.
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AI-driven fraud has moved from isolated scams to machine-scale impersonation — and many enterprise defenses haven’t caught up.
In an exclusive interview with MoveTheNeedle.news, Trustpair CEO Baptiste Collot explains why manual controls like callbacks and email confirmations are failing, where fraud exploits operational change, and why continuous validation is becoming a baseline requirement.
-
AI-driven fraud has moved from isolated scams to machine-scale impersonation — and many enterprise defenses haven’t caught up.
In an exclusive interview with MoveTheNeedle.news, Trustpair CEO Baptiste Collot explains why manual controls like callbacks and email confirmations are failing, where fraud exploits operational change, and why continuous validation is becoming a baseline requirement.
-
AI-driven fraud has moved from isolated scams to machine-scale impersonation — and many enterprise defenses haven’t caught up.
In an exclusive interview with MoveTheNeedle.news, Trustpair CEO Baptiste Collot explains why manual controls like callbacks and email confirmations are failing, where fraud exploits operational change, and why continuous validation is becoming a baseline requirement.
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Vendor risk, insider failures, AI abuse & record DDoS activity defined this week’s threat landscape.
Full breakdown:
https://www.technadu.com/vetting-the-gaps-vendor-risk-grows-vacancies-rise-and-security-talent-waits-outside/619436/ -
Vendor risk, insider failures, AI abuse & record DDoS activity defined this week’s threat landscape.
Full breakdown:
https://www.technadu.com/vetting-the-gaps-vendor-risk-grows-vacancies-rise-and-security-talent-waits-outside/619436/ -
Vendor risk, insider failures, AI abuse & record DDoS activity defined this week’s threat landscape.
Full breakdown:
https://www.technadu.com/vetting-the-gaps-vendor-risk-grows-vacancies-rise-and-security-talent-waits-outside/619436/ -
Vendor risk, insider failures, AI abuse & record DDoS activity defined this week’s threat landscape.
Full breakdown:
https://www.technadu.com/vetting-the-gaps-vendor-risk-grows-vacancies-rise-and-security-talent-waits-outside/619436/ -
Fake employees and compromised contractors are forcing organizations to rethink vendor vetting, hiring security, and identity controls.
Our team is seeing more incidents where attackers don’t exploit vulnerabilities—they exploit trust. In the latest Cyberside Chats episode, @sherridavidoff and @MDurrin unpack Amazon’s recent incident in which a North Korean IT worker was detected through behavioral anomalies and a Russian state-sponsored campaign abusing trusted infrastructure and edge devices.
Watch or listen to hear why hiring workflows, contractors, credentials, and edge devices are now part of your attack surface and what to do about it.
Watch the video: https://youtu.be/WE8p9I3uUuA
Listen to the podcast: https://www.chatcyberside.com/e/amazon-s-deepfake-hire-and-a-5-year-espionage-campaign-what-happened/
#LMGSecurity #CybersideChats #IdentitySecurity #VendorRisk #InitialAccess #ZeroTrust #SecurityLeadership
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Fake employees and compromised contractors are forcing organizations to rethink vendor vetting, hiring security, and identity controls.
Our team is seeing more incidents where attackers don’t exploit vulnerabilities—they exploit trust. In the latest Cyberside Chats episode, @sherridavidoff and @MDurrin unpack Amazon’s recent incident in which a North Korean IT worker was detected through behavioral anomalies and a Russian state-sponsored campaign abusing trusted infrastructure and edge devices.
Watch or listen to hear why hiring workflows, contractors, credentials, and edge devices are now part of your attack surface and what to do about it.
Watch the video: https://youtu.be/WE8p9I3uUuA
Listen to the podcast: https://www.chatcyberside.com/e/amazon-s-deepfake-hire-and-a-5-year-espionage-campaign-what-happened/
#LMGSecurity #CybersideChats #IdentitySecurity #VendorRisk #InitialAccess #ZeroTrust #SecurityLeadership
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Fake employees and compromised contractors are forcing organizations to rethink vendor vetting, hiring security, and identity controls.
Our team is seeing more incidents where attackers don’t exploit vulnerabilities—they exploit trust. In the latest Cyberside Chats episode, @sherridavidoff and @MDurrin unpack Amazon’s recent incident in which a North Korean IT worker was detected through behavioral anomalies and a Russian state-sponsored campaign abusing trusted infrastructure and edge devices.
Watch or listen to hear why hiring workflows, contractors, credentials, and edge devices are now part of your attack surface and what to do about it.
Watch the video: https://youtu.be/WE8p9I3uUuA
Listen to the podcast: https://www.chatcyberside.com/e/amazon-s-deepfake-hire-and-a-5-year-espionage-campaign-what-happened/
#LMGSecurity #CybersideChats #IdentitySecurity #VendorRisk #InitialAccess #ZeroTrust #SecurityLeadership
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Pornhub discloses Premium user data exposure linked to third-party Mixpanel analytics.
https://www.technadu.com/pornhub-premium-user-data-exposed-allegedly-due-to-third-party-mixpanel-breach-shinyhunters-extorts-the-company/615863/• Third-party vendor exposure
• Analytics data allegedly involved
• No passwords or payment data confirmed
• ShinyHunters extortion claims under investigation -
Pornhub discloses Premium user data exposure linked to third-party Mixpanel analytics.
https://www.technadu.com/pornhub-premium-user-data-exposed-allegedly-due-to-third-party-mixpanel-breach-shinyhunters-extorts-the-company/615863/• Third-party vendor exposure
• Analytics data allegedly involved
• No passwords or payment data confirmed
• ShinyHunters extortion claims under investigation -
Pornhub discloses Premium user data exposure linked to third-party Mixpanel analytics.
https://www.technadu.com/pornhub-premium-user-data-exposed-allegedly-due-to-third-party-mixpanel-breach-shinyhunters-extorts-the-company/615863/• Third-party vendor exposure
• Analytics data allegedly involved
• No passwords or payment data confirmed
• ShinyHunters extortion claims under investigation -
A new investigation highlights how contractor access allegedly played a central role in a major cyber disruption at Russia’s flagship airline.
The attackers reportedly leveraged access from a small software vendor, escalated privileges inside the environment, and deployed multiple malware tools - ultimately causing extensive operational impact.
The case underscores persistent challenges around vendor oversight and third-party access management.
How can organizations better balance operational convenience with stringent access controls?
Source: https://therecord.media/russia-flagship-airline-hacked-through-little-known-vendor
Follow @technadu for ongoing threat intelligence updates.
#CyberSecurity #ThreatIntel #IncidentResponse #SupplyChainSecurity #VendorRisk #AviationSecurity #InfoSec
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A new investigation highlights how contractor access allegedly played a central role in a major cyber disruption at Russia’s flagship airline.
The attackers reportedly leveraged access from a small software vendor, escalated privileges inside the environment, and deployed multiple malware tools - ultimately causing extensive operational impact.
The case underscores persistent challenges around vendor oversight and third-party access management.
How can organizations better balance operational convenience with stringent access controls?
Source: https://therecord.media/russia-flagship-airline-hacked-through-little-known-vendor
Follow @technadu for ongoing threat intelligence updates.
#CyberSecurity #ThreatIntel #IncidentResponse #SupplyChainSecurity #VendorRisk #AviationSecurity #InfoSec
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A new investigation highlights how contractor access allegedly played a central role in a major cyber disruption at Russia’s flagship airline.
The attackers reportedly leveraged access from a small software vendor, escalated privileges inside the environment, and deployed multiple malware tools - ultimately causing extensive operational impact.
The case underscores persistent challenges around vendor oversight and third-party access management.
How can organizations better balance operational convenience with stringent access controls?
Source: https://therecord.media/russia-flagship-airline-hacked-through-little-known-vendor
Follow @technadu for ongoing threat intelligence updates.
#CyberSecurity #ThreatIntel #IncidentResponse #SupplyChainSecurity #VendorRisk #AviationSecurity #InfoSec
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iQ Credit Union has disclosed that a ransomware incident at its vendor, Marquis Software Solutions, exposed personal information of over 111K Washington residents. The attacker accessed files containing names, SSNs, dates of birth, addresses, and partial financial data after exploiting a SonicWall firewall.
Identity protection services are being provided, and individuals are advised to monitor accounts and consider credit freezes.
How should financial institutions rethink vendor-risk strategies moving forward?
Source: https://www.claimdepot.com/data-breach/iq-credit-union-2025
Share your insights and follow us for ongoing threat-intelligence updates.
#infosec #databreach #FinancialSecurity #VendorRisk #SonicWall #ThreatIntel #IdentityProtection #Ransomware #SecurityAwareness