#cloaker — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #cloaker, aggregated by home.social.
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We planned one report on Keitaro abuse, but we ran out of pages before we ran out of cases.
So here’s Part 2 of 3, a medley of threats that go well beyond AI‑investment scams.Threat actors abuse Keitaro’s traffic distribution, cloaking, and rule engine to hide malicious landing pages behind geo and device-based filters. They stack bulletproof hosting and reverse proxies to add layers of indirection, making takedown and analysis harder. In this post, we share how we overcame this using multi‑protocol, multi‑vantage telemetry. We leveraged JA4+ web server fingerprints, DNS analytics, and Confiant’s visibility into advertising supply chain data to uncover Keitaro abuse and the delivery of malware downloaders, infostealers, weaponized RMMs, wallet drainer campaigns, scams, and email spam and advertising attack vectors.
If you hunt threats distributed via adtech, these indicators can be useful pivots. https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/no-reach-no-risk-the-keitaro-abuse-in-modern-cybercrime-distribution/
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #ai #keitaro #adtech #tds #trafficdistributionsystem #cloaker #cloaking #landscape #malvertising #infostealer #rmm #remotemonitoringmanagement #downloader #malware #spam #airdrop #cryptocurrency #ja4 #ja4_fingerprinting
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We planned one report on Keitaro abuse, but we ran out of pages before we ran out of cases.
So here’s Part 2 of 3, a medley of threats that go well beyond AI‑investment scams.Threat actors abuse Keitaro’s traffic distribution, cloaking, and rule engine to hide malicious landing pages behind geo and device-based filters. They stack bulletproof hosting and reverse proxies to add layers of indirection, making takedown and analysis harder. In this post, we share how we overcame this using multi‑protocol, multi‑vantage telemetry. We leveraged JA4+ web server fingerprints, DNS analytics, and Confiant’s visibility into advertising supply chain data to uncover Keitaro abuse and the delivery of malware downloaders, infostealers, weaponized RMMs, wallet drainer campaigns, scams, and email spam and advertising attack vectors.
If you hunt threats distributed via adtech, these indicators can be useful pivots. https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/no-reach-no-risk-the-keitaro-abuse-in-modern-cybercrime-distribution/
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #ai #keitaro #adtech #tds #trafficdistributionsystem #cloaker #cloaking #landscape #malvertising #infostealer #rmm #remotemonitoringmanagement #downloader #malware #spam #airdrop #cryptocurrency #ja4 #ja4_fingerprinting
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We planned one report on Keitaro abuse, but we ran out of pages before we ran out of cases.
So here’s Part 2 of 3, a medley of threats that go well beyond AI‑investment scams.Threat actors abuse Keitaro’s traffic distribution, cloaking, and rule engine to hide malicious landing pages behind geo and device-based filters. They stack bulletproof hosting and reverse proxies to add layers of indirection, making takedown and analysis harder. In this post, we share how we overcame this using multi‑protocol, multi‑vantage telemetry. We leveraged JA4+ web server fingerprints, DNS analytics, and Confiant’s visibility into advertising supply chain data to uncover Keitaro abuse and the delivery of malware downloaders, infostealers, weaponized RMMs, wallet drainer campaigns, scams, and email spam and advertising attack vectors.
If you hunt threats distributed via adtech, these indicators can be useful pivots. https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/no-reach-no-risk-the-keitaro-abuse-in-modern-cybercrime-distribution/
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #ai #keitaro #adtech #tds #trafficdistributionsystem #cloaker #cloaking #landscape #malvertising #infostealer #rmm #remotemonitoringmanagement #downloader #malware #spam #airdrop #cryptocurrency #ja4 #ja4_fingerprinting
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We planned one report on Keitaro abuse, but we ran out of pages before we ran out of cases.
So here’s Part 2 of 3, a medley of threats that go well beyond AI‑investment scams.Threat actors abuse Keitaro’s traffic distribution, cloaking, and rule engine to hide malicious landing pages behind geo and device-based filters. They stack bulletproof hosting and reverse proxies to add layers of indirection, making takedown and analysis harder. In this post, we share how we overcame this using multi‑protocol, multi‑vantage telemetry. We leveraged JA4+ web server fingerprints, DNS analytics, and Confiant’s visibility into advertising supply chain data to uncover Keitaro abuse and the delivery of malware downloaders, infostealers, weaponized RMMs, wallet drainer campaigns, scams, and email spam and advertising attack vectors.
If you hunt threats distributed via adtech, these indicators can be useful pivots. https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/no-reach-no-risk-the-keitaro-abuse-in-modern-cybercrime-distribution/
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #ai #keitaro #adtech #tds #trafficdistributionsystem #cloaker #cloaking #landscape #malvertising #infostealer #rmm #remotemonitoringmanagement #downloader #malware #spam #airdrop #cryptocurrency #ja4 #ja4_fingerprinting
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We planned one report on Keitaro abuse, but we ran out of pages before we ran out of cases.
So here’s Part 2 of 3, a medley of threats that go well beyond AI‑investment scams.Threat actors abuse Keitaro’s traffic distribution, cloaking, and rule engine to hide malicious landing pages behind geo and device-based filters. They stack bulletproof hosting and reverse proxies to add layers of indirection, making takedown and analysis harder. In this post, we share how we overcame this using multi‑protocol, multi‑vantage telemetry. We leveraged JA4+ web server fingerprints, DNS analytics, and Confiant’s visibility into advertising supply chain data to uncover Keitaro abuse and the delivery of malware downloaders, infostealers, weaponized RMMs, wallet drainer campaigns, scams, and email spam and advertising attack vectors.
If you hunt threats distributed via adtech, these indicators can be useful pivots. https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/no-reach-no-risk-the-keitaro-abuse-in-modern-cybercrime-distribution/
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #ai #keitaro #adtech #tds #trafficdistributionsystem #cloaker #cloaking #landscape #malvertising #infostealer #rmm #remotemonitoringmanagement #downloader #malware #spam #airdrop #cryptocurrency #ja4 #ja4_fingerprinting
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🔴 A threat isn't much of a threat if it can't reach the right victims. 📦 That's why many modern threat actors rely on cloakers and traffic distribution systems (TDS) to target, route, and hide at scale. In a six‑month joint effort analyzing four months of data with Confiant, we identified 15,500 domains configured to Keitaro instances and actively used in cyber campaigns. Keitaro is a legitimate ad tracker, but it is frequently misused by cybercriminals as an all‑in‑one tracker + TDS + cloaker in scam and malware campaigns. We encounter Keitaro in our investigations nearly every day, and we set out to quantify that abuse in the broader landscape. We're publishing a three‑part series to share what we learned. Part 1 focuses on a subset of actors who leverage AI in their operations, most of whom are tied to investment scams. At the end of the report, you'll find a link to our github repository that contains thousands of related Keitaro iocs.
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #ai #keitaro #adtech #tds #trafficdistributionsystem #cloaker #cloaking #landscape #malvertising
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🔴 A threat isn't much of a threat if it can't reach the right victims. 📦 That's why many modern threat actors rely on cloakers and traffic distribution systems (TDS) to target, route, and hide at scale. In a six‑month joint effort analyzing four months of data with Confiant, we identified 15,500 domains configured to Keitaro instances and actively used in cyber campaigns. Keitaro is a legitimate ad tracker, but it is frequently misused by cybercriminals as an all‑in‑one tracker + TDS + cloaker in scam and malware campaigns. We encounter Keitaro in our investigations nearly every day, and we set out to quantify that abuse in the broader landscape. We're publishing a three‑part series to share what we learned. Part 1 focuses on a subset of actors who leverage AI in their operations, most of whom are tied to investment scams. At the end of the report, you'll find a link to our github repository that contains thousands of related Keitaro iocs.
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #ai #keitaro #adtech #tds #trafficdistributionsystem #cloaker #cloaking #landscape #malvertising
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🔴 A threat isn't much of a threat if it can't reach the right victims. 📦 That's why many modern threat actors rely on cloakers and traffic distribution systems (TDS) to target, route, and hide at scale. In a six‑month joint effort analyzing four months of data with Confiant, we identified 15,500 domains configured to Keitaro instances and actively used in cyber campaigns. Keitaro is a legitimate ad tracker, but it is frequently misused by cybercriminals as an all‑in‑one tracker + TDS + cloaker in scam and malware campaigns. We encounter Keitaro in our investigations nearly every day, and we set out to quantify that abuse in the broader landscape. We're publishing a three‑part series to share what we learned. Part 1 focuses on a subset of actors who leverage AI in their operations, most of whom are tied to investment scams. At the end of the report, you'll find a link to our github repository that contains thousands of related Keitaro iocs.
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #ai #keitaro #adtech #tds #trafficdistributionsystem #cloaker #cloaking #landscape #malvertising
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🔴 A threat isn't much of a threat if it can't reach the right victims. 📦 That's why many modern threat actors rely on cloakers and traffic distribution systems (TDS) to target, route, and hide at scale. In a six‑month joint effort analyzing four months of data with Confiant, we identified 15,500 domains configured to Keitaro instances and actively used in cyber campaigns. Keitaro is a legitimate ad tracker, but it is frequently misused by cybercriminals as an all‑in‑one tracker + TDS + cloaker in scam and malware campaigns. We encounter Keitaro in our investigations nearly every day, and we set out to quantify that abuse in the broader landscape. We're publishing a three‑part series to share what we learned. Part 1 focuses on a subset of actors who leverage AI in their operations, most of whom are tied to investment scams. At the end of the report, you'll find a link to our github repository that contains thousands of related Keitaro iocs.
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #ai #keitaro #adtech #tds #trafficdistributionsystem #cloaker #cloaking #landscape #malvertising
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🔴 A threat isn't much of a threat if it can't reach the right victims. 📦 That's why many modern threat actors rely on cloakers and traffic distribution systems (TDS) to target, route, and hide at scale. In a six‑month joint effort analyzing four months of data with Confiant, we identified 15,500 domains configured to Keitaro instances and actively used in cyber campaigns. Keitaro is a legitimate ad tracker, but it is frequently misused by cybercriminals as an all‑in‑one tracker + TDS + cloaker in scam and malware campaigns. We encounter Keitaro in our investigations nearly every day, and we set out to quantify that abuse in the broader landscape. We're publishing a three‑part series to share what we learned. Part 1 focuses on a subset of actors who leverage AI in their operations, most of whom are tied to investment scams. At the end of the report, you'll find a link to our github repository that contains thousands of related Keitaro iocs.
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #ai #keitaro #adtech #tds #trafficdistributionsystem #cloaker #cloaking #landscape #malvertising
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Last week, Microsoft reported that their Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) and international partners disrupted Lumma Stealer by taking down 2,300 domains critical to the malware's operation. Shortly after, Palo Alto's Unit 42 reported about cyber campaigns that previously dropped Lumma Stealer are now distributing StealC infostealer payloads. We analyzed the DNS infrastructure related to the attacks and discovered a large number of malicious registered domain generation algorithm (RDGA) domains. Based on passive DNS, the threat actor that controls the infrastructure configured the domains to a staging environment via a dedicated Panama IP address (self-signed SSL) before deploying them. We identified 144 unique domains in this IP space, and all of them were detected as "suspicious" by our algorithms 1-2 months before they were activated for malicious activity.
Disrupting criminal operations is difficult and they will find ways to resurface. However, this example proves that blocking connections at the DNS level can often protect users against the new versions before they emerge. The infostealer actors made a quick turn, but we were already blocking their path. Our specialty is in DNS analytics, so we use DNS signatures, as opposed to malware signatures, for preemptive security. We love this stuff.
Here are some examples of the RDGA domains:
2323dot2[.]cfd, 2323dot2[.]cyou, 2323dot2[.]my, 232pip1[.]my, 232pip1[.]sbs, 832pip[.]cfd, 832pip[.]cyou, 832pip[.]my, 832pip[.]sbs, b3cloud[.]cfd, b3cloud[.]cyou, b3cloud[.]my, b3cloud[.]sbs, bin48[.]cfd, bin48[.]cyou, bin48[.]my, bin898293[.]cfd, bin898293[.]cyou, bin898293[.]my, bin898293[.]sbs, bit7dl[.]cfd, bit7dl[.]cyou, bit7dl[.]my, bit7dl[.]sbs, bot113cloud[.]cfd, bot113cloud[.]cyou, bot113cloud[.]my
These campaigns share similar TTPs with those that we reported several months ago. The threat actor that we discussed in this post (https://infosec.exchange/@InfobloxThreatIntel/114027715851469775) also distributed Lumma Stealer and used RDGA domains, but incorporated additional components, such as traffic distribution systems (TDS), web trackers, and cloakers.
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #infostealer #lummastealer #stealc #tds #tracker #cloaker #rdga -
Last week, Microsoft reported that their Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) and international partners disrupted Lumma Stealer by taking down 2,300 domains critical to the malware's operation. Shortly after, Palo Alto's Unit 42 reported about cyber campaigns that previously dropped Lumma Stealer are now distributing StealC infostealer payloads. We analyzed the DNS infrastructure related to the attacks and discovered a large number of malicious registered domain generation algorithm (RDGA) domains. Based on passive DNS, the threat actor that controls the infrastructure configured the domains to a staging environment via a dedicated Panama IP address (self-signed SSL) before deploying them. We identified 144 unique domains in this IP space, and all of them were detected as "suspicious" by our algorithms 1-2 months before they were activated for malicious activity.
Disrupting criminal operations is difficult and they will find ways to resurface. However, this example proves that blocking connections at the DNS level can often protect users against the new versions before they emerge. The infostealer actors made a quick turn, but we were already blocking their path. Our specialty is in DNS analytics, so we use DNS signatures, as opposed to malware signatures, for preemptive security. We love this stuff.
Here are some examples of the RDGA domains:
2323dot2[.]cfd, 2323dot2[.]cyou, 2323dot2[.]my, 232pip1[.]my, 232pip1[.]sbs, 832pip[.]cfd, 832pip[.]cyou, 832pip[.]my, 832pip[.]sbs, b3cloud[.]cfd, b3cloud[.]cyou, b3cloud[.]my, b3cloud[.]sbs, bin48[.]cfd, bin48[.]cyou, bin48[.]my, bin898293[.]cfd, bin898293[.]cyou, bin898293[.]my, bin898293[.]sbs, bit7dl[.]cfd, bit7dl[.]cyou, bit7dl[.]my, bit7dl[.]sbs, bot113cloud[.]cfd, bot113cloud[.]cyou, bot113cloud[.]my
These campaigns share similar TTPs with those that we reported several months ago. The threat actor that we discussed in this post (https://infosec.exchange/@InfobloxThreatIntel/114027715851469775) also distributed Lumma Stealer and used RDGA domains, but incorporated additional components, such as traffic distribution systems (TDS), web trackers, and cloakers.
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #infostealer #lummastealer #stealc #tds #tracker #cloaker #rdga -
Last week, Microsoft reported that their Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) and international partners disrupted Lumma Stealer by taking down 2,300 domains critical to the malware's operation. Shortly after, Palo Alto's Unit 42 reported about cyber campaigns that previously dropped Lumma Stealer are now distributing StealC infostealer payloads. We analyzed the DNS infrastructure related to the attacks and discovered a large number of malicious registered domain generation algorithm (RDGA) domains. Based on passive DNS, the threat actor that controls the infrastructure configured the domains to a staging environment via a dedicated Panama IP address (self-signed SSL) before deploying them. We identified 144 unique domains in this IP space, and all of them were detected as "suspicious" by our algorithms 1-2 months before they were activated for malicious activity.
Disrupting criminal operations is difficult and they will find ways to resurface. However, this example proves that blocking connections at the DNS level can often protect users against the new versions before they emerge. The infostealer actors made a quick turn, but we were already blocking their path. Our specialty is in DNS analytics, so we use DNS signatures, as opposed to malware signatures, for preemptive security. We love this stuff.
Here are some examples of the RDGA domains:
2323dot2[.]cfd, 2323dot2[.]cyou, 2323dot2[.]my, 232pip1[.]my, 232pip1[.]sbs, 832pip[.]cfd, 832pip[.]cyou, 832pip[.]my, 832pip[.]sbs, b3cloud[.]cfd, b3cloud[.]cyou, b3cloud[.]my, b3cloud[.]sbs, bin48[.]cfd, bin48[.]cyou, bin48[.]my, bin898293[.]cfd, bin898293[.]cyou, bin898293[.]my, bin898293[.]sbs, bit7dl[.]cfd, bit7dl[.]cyou, bit7dl[.]my, bit7dl[.]sbs, bot113cloud[.]cfd, bot113cloud[.]cyou, bot113cloud[.]my
These campaigns share similar TTPs with those that we reported several months ago. The threat actor that we discussed in this post (https://infosec.exchange/@InfobloxThreatIntel/114027715851469775) also distributed Lumma Stealer and used RDGA domains, but incorporated additional components, such as traffic distribution systems (TDS), web trackers, and cloakers.
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #infostealer #lummastealer #stealc #tds #tracker #cloaker #rdga -
Last week, Microsoft reported that their Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) and international partners disrupted Lumma Stealer by taking down 2,300 domains critical to the malware's operation. Shortly after, Palo Alto's Unit 42 reported about cyber campaigns that previously dropped Lumma Stealer are now distributing StealC infostealer payloads. We analyzed the DNS infrastructure related to the attacks and discovered a large number of malicious registered domain generation algorithm (RDGA) domains. Based on passive DNS, the threat actor that controls the infrastructure configured the domains to a staging environment via a dedicated Panama IP address (self-signed SSL) before deploying them. We identified 144 unique domains in this IP space, and all of them were detected as "suspicious" by our algorithms 1-2 months before they were activated for malicious activity.
Disrupting criminal operations is difficult and they will find ways to resurface. However, this example proves that blocking connections at the DNS level can often protect users against the new versions before they emerge. The infostealer actors made a quick turn, but we were already blocking their path. Our specialty is in DNS analytics, so we use DNS signatures, as opposed to malware signatures, for preemptive security. We love this stuff.
Here are some examples of the RDGA domains:
2323dot2[.]cfd, 2323dot2[.]cyou, 2323dot2[.]my, 232pip1[.]my, 232pip1[.]sbs, 832pip[.]cfd, 832pip[.]cyou, 832pip[.]my, 832pip[.]sbs, b3cloud[.]cfd, b3cloud[.]cyou, b3cloud[.]my, b3cloud[.]sbs, bin48[.]cfd, bin48[.]cyou, bin48[.]my, bin898293[.]cfd, bin898293[.]cyou, bin898293[.]my, bin898293[.]sbs, bit7dl[.]cfd, bit7dl[.]cyou, bit7dl[.]my, bit7dl[.]sbs, bot113cloud[.]cfd, bot113cloud[.]cyou, bot113cloud[.]my
These campaigns share similar TTPs with those that we reported several months ago. The threat actor that we discussed in this post (https://infosec.exchange/@InfobloxThreatIntel/114027715851469775) also distributed Lumma Stealer and used RDGA domains, but incorporated additional components, such as traffic distribution systems (TDS), web trackers, and cloakers.
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #infostealer #lummastealer #stealc #tds #tracker #cloaker #rdga -
Last week, Microsoft reported that their Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) and international partners disrupted Lumma Stealer by taking down 2,300 domains critical to the malware's operation. Shortly after, Palo Alto's Unit 42 reported about cyber campaigns that previously dropped Lumma Stealer are now distributing StealC infostealer payloads. We analyzed the DNS infrastructure related to the attacks and discovered a large number of malicious registered domain generation algorithm (RDGA) domains. Based on passive DNS, the threat actor that controls the infrastructure configured the domains to a staging environment via a dedicated Panama IP address (self-signed SSL) before deploying them. We identified 144 unique domains in this IP space, and all of them were detected as "suspicious" by our algorithms 1-2 months before they were activated for malicious activity.
Disrupting criminal operations is difficult and they will find ways to resurface. However, this example proves that blocking connections at the DNS level can often protect users against the new versions before they emerge. The infostealer actors made a quick turn, but we were already blocking their path. Our specialty is in DNS analytics, so we use DNS signatures, as opposed to malware signatures, for preemptive security. We love this stuff.
Here are some examples of the RDGA domains:
2323dot2[.]cfd, 2323dot2[.]cyou, 2323dot2[.]my, 232pip1[.]my, 232pip1[.]sbs, 832pip[.]cfd, 832pip[.]cyou, 832pip[.]my, 832pip[.]sbs, b3cloud[.]cfd, b3cloud[.]cyou, b3cloud[.]my, b3cloud[.]sbs, bin48[.]cfd, bin48[.]cyou, bin48[.]my, bin898293[.]cfd, bin898293[.]cyou, bin898293[.]my, bin898293[.]sbs, bit7dl[.]cfd, bit7dl[.]cyou, bit7dl[.]my, bit7dl[.]sbs, bot113cloud[.]cfd, bot113cloud[.]cyou, bot113cloud[.]my
These campaigns share similar TTPs with those that we reported several months ago. The threat actor that we discussed in this post (https://infosec.exchange/@InfobloxThreatIntel/114027715851469775) also distributed Lumma Stealer and used RDGA domains, but incorporated additional components, such as traffic distribution systems (TDS), web trackers, and cloakers.
#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #infostealer #lummastealer #stealc #tds #tracker #cloaker #rdga