#ukrainecyber — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #ukrainecyber, aggregated by home.social.
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May 2026 Wave-2 Pterodo wrap:
- 14+ Pterodo HTML droppers on 212.193.20.110 over 2.5 months of observation
- 1 DDNS reactivation (babynet.serveirc.com, 2026-04-30)
- 0 takedown responses from @no-ip on my abuse@ submissions
- 0 new CERT-UA advisories (gap holds at 2023-07-13 → present, ~3 years)
- Microsoft Defender remains the single mainstream AV reliably catching the HTML stageActive campaign. Quiet public reporting. The asymmetry is the story.
Full notes: github.com/palianytsia-200/U-OB-KY
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May 2026 Wave-2 Pterodo wrap:
- 14+ Pterodo HTML droppers on 212.193.20.110 over 2.5 months of observation
- 1 DDNS reactivation (babynet.serveirc.com, 2026-04-30)
- 0 takedown responses from @no-ip on my abuse@ submissions
- 0 new CERT-UA advisories (gap holds at 2023-07-13 → present, ~3 years)
- Microsoft Defender remains the single mainstream AV reliably catching the HTML stageActive campaign. Quiet public reporting. The asymmetry is the story.
Full notes: github.com/palianytsia-200/U-OB-KY
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Looking for early reviewers on chapters 2 + 3 of my BSc thesis (Pterodo network architecture + WinRAR exploit chain).
Project notes live at github.com/palianytsia-200/U-OB-KY. Draft PDFs available — DM here on Mastodon or email [email protected]. Happy to trade reviews (your DFIR / detection-engineering writeup for mine).
Especially looking for anyone with hands-on Gamaredon incident-response experience. The thesis is methodology-heavy but I want feedback from people who've actually had to triage this stuff in a real SOC.
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Looking for early reviewers on chapters 2 + 3 of my BSc thesis (Pterodo network architecture + WinRAR exploit chain).
Project notes live at github.com/palianytsia-200/U-OB-KY. Draft PDFs available — DM here on Mastodon or email [email protected]. Happy to trade reviews (your DFIR / detection-engineering writeup for mine).
Especially looking for anyone with hands-on Gamaredon incident-response experience. The thesis is methodology-heavy but I want feedback from people who've actually had to triage this stuff in a real SOC.
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Looking for early reviewers on chapters 2 + 3 of my BSc thesis (Pterodo network architecture + WinRAR exploit chain).
Project notes live at github.com/palianytsia-200/U-OB-KY. Draft PDFs available — DM here on Mastodon or email [email protected]. Happy to trade reviews (your DFIR / detection-engineering writeup for mine).
Especially looking for anyone with hands-on Gamaredon incident-response experience. The thesis is methodology-heavy but I want feedback from people who've actually had to triage this stuff in a real SOC.
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Looking for early reviewers on chapters 2 + 3 of my BSc thesis (Pterodo network architecture + WinRAR exploit chain).
Project notes live at github.com/palianytsia-200/U-OB-KY. Draft PDFs available — DM here on Mastodon or email [email protected]. Happy to trade reviews (your DFIR / detection-engineering writeup for mine).
Especially looking for anyone with hands-on Gamaredon incident-response experience. The thesis is methodology-heavy but I want feedback from people who've actually had to triage this stuff in a real SOC.
-
Looking for early reviewers on chapters 2 + 3 of my BSc thesis (Pterodo network architecture + WinRAR exploit chain).
Project notes live at github.com/palianytsia-200/U-OB-KY. Draft PDFs available — DM here on Mastodon or email [email protected]. Happy to trade reviews (your DFIR / detection-engineering writeup for mine).
Especially looking for anyone with hands-on Gamaredon incident-response experience. The thesis is methodology-heavy but I want feedback from people who've actually had to triage this stuff in a real SOC.
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Friendly reminder: CERT-UA's last public UAC-0010 (Gamaredon) advisory was 2023-07-13. That's almost three years of public silence on the most prolific Russian APT targeting Ukraine.
UAC-0010 samples on VT have not slowed down. Public reporting has. The defender community has lost its single best public feed for in-the-clear Gamaredon IOCs.
I started U-OB-KY in late 2024 partly to fill that gap for myself. If anyone else has the bandwidth to do similar — please do. The more distributed the public picture, the harder it is to silence.
github.com/palianytsia-200/U-OB-KY
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Friendly reminder: CERT-UA's last public UAC-0010 (Gamaredon) advisory was 2023-07-13. That's almost three years of public silence on the most prolific Russian APT targeting Ukraine.
UAC-0010 samples on VT have not slowed down. Public reporting has. The defender community has lost its single best public feed for in-the-clear Gamaredon IOCs.
I started U-OB-KY in late 2024 partly to fill that gap for myself. If anyone else has the bandwidth to do similar — please do. The more distributed the public picture, the harder it is to silence.
github.com/palianytsia-200/U-OB-KY
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Whichever automation team at UAC-0010 designed the `Scan_<X>_<Y>_<Z>_<NNNN>_<DD.MM.YYYY>.htm` filename schema — congrats, you automated your own signature.
14 samples across 2 months, zero variation. The `Scan_` prefix was added 2026-04-29 — social-engineering touch ("scanned document, today's date" clicks better). The `_DD.MM.YYYY.htm` suffix anchors a near-perfect mail-gateway regex until they decide to drop it.
Detection at the mail gateway is the cheapest defense. Drafts in github.com/palianytsia-200/U-OB-KY/blob/main/rules/pterodo-filename.rules
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Whichever automation team at UAC-0010 designed the `Scan_<X>_<Y>_<Z>_<NNNN>_<DD.MM.YYYY>.htm` filename schema — congrats, you automated your own signature.
14 samples across 2 months, zero variation. The `Scan_` prefix was added 2026-04-29 — social-engineering touch ("scanned document, today's date" clicks better). The `_DD.MM.YYYY.htm` suffix anchors a near-perfect mail-gateway regex until they decide to drop it.
Detection at the mail gateway is the cheapest defense. Drafts in github.com/palianytsia-200/U-OB-KY/blob/main/rules/pterodo-filename.rules
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The CANFAIL campaign demonstrates structured, LLM-assisted phishing operations attributed to a suspected Russian-linked actor.
Per Google Threat Intelligence Group:
• Sectoral targeting: defense, military, energy, aerospace
• Regionally tailored email list generation
• Google Drive-hosted RAR payload delivery
• Double-extension obfuscation (*.pdf.js)
• JavaScript loader → PowerShell execution
• Memory-only dropper
• Fake error decoy
• Links to PhantomCaptcha activity (via SentinelOne)LLMs were used for reconnaissance, lure generation, and post-compromise operational guidance.
This signals operational AI integration into state-aligned cyber campaigns.
Are detection models prepared for LLM-generated phishing artifacts?
Engage below.
Follow TechNadu for deep technical analysis.#ThreatIntel #CANFAIL #APTActivity #PhishingDetection #LLMThreats #PowerShellAbuse #UkraineCyber #C2Infrastructure #SOC #BlueTeam #CyberOperations #MalwareAnalysis #Infosec
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The CANFAIL campaign demonstrates structured, LLM-assisted phishing operations attributed to a suspected Russian-linked actor.
Per Google Threat Intelligence Group:
• Sectoral targeting: defense, military, energy, aerospace
• Regionally tailored email list generation
• Google Drive-hosted RAR payload delivery
• Double-extension obfuscation (*.pdf.js)
• JavaScript loader → PowerShell execution
• Memory-only dropper
• Fake error decoy
• Links to PhantomCaptcha activity (via SentinelOne)LLMs were used for reconnaissance, lure generation, and post-compromise operational guidance.
This signals operational AI integration into state-aligned cyber campaigns.
Are detection models prepared for LLM-generated phishing artifacts?
Engage below.
Follow TechNadu for deep technical analysis.#ThreatIntel #CANFAIL #APTActivity #PhishingDetection #LLMThreats #PowerShellAbuse #UkraineCyber #C2Infrastructure #SOC #BlueTeam #CyberOperations #MalwareAnalysis #Infosec
-
The CANFAIL campaign demonstrates structured, LLM-assisted phishing operations attributed to a suspected Russian-linked actor.
Per Google Threat Intelligence Group:
• Sectoral targeting: defense, military, energy, aerospace
• Regionally tailored email list generation
• Google Drive-hosted RAR payload delivery
• Double-extension obfuscation (*.pdf.js)
• JavaScript loader → PowerShell execution
• Memory-only dropper
• Fake error decoy
• Links to PhantomCaptcha activity (via SentinelOne)LLMs were used for reconnaissance, lure generation, and post-compromise operational guidance.
This signals operational AI integration into state-aligned cyber campaigns.
Are detection models prepared for LLM-generated phishing artifacts?
Engage below.
Follow TechNadu for deep technical analysis.#ThreatIntel #CANFAIL #APTActivity #PhishingDetection #LLMThreats #PowerShellAbuse #UkraineCyber #C2Infrastructure #SOC #BlueTeam #CyberOperations #MalwareAnalysis #Infosec
-
The CANFAIL campaign demonstrates structured, LLM-assisted phishing operations attributed to a suspected Russian-linked actor.
Per Google Threat Intelligence Group:
• Sectoral targeting: defense, military, energy, aerospace
• Regionally tailored email list generation
• Google Drive-hosted RAR payload delivery
• Double-extension obfuscation (*.pdf.js)
• JavaScript loader → PowerShell execution
• Memory-only dropper
• Fake error decoy
• Links to PhantomCaptcha activity (via SentinelOne)LLMs were used for reconnaissance, lure generation, and post-compromise operational guidance.
This signals operational AI integration into state-aligned cyber campaigns.
Are detection models prepared for LLM-generated phishing artifacts?
Engage below.
Follow TechNadu for deep technical analysis.#ThreatIntel #CANFAIL #APTActivity #PhishingDetection #LLMThreats #PowerShellAbuse #UkraineCyber #C2Infrastructure #SOC #BlueTeam #CyberOperations #MalwareAnalysis #Infosec
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📬 Ukraine warnt vor Cyber-Angriffen auf den Telegram-Messenger
#Hacking #Armageddon #Gamaredon #Phishing #Telegram #Ukraine #UkraineCyberPolice https://tarnkappe.info/artikel/hacking/ukraine-warnt-vor-cyber-angriffen-auf-den-telegram-messenger-219440.html -
📬 Ukraine warnt vor Cyber-Angriffen auf den Telegram-Messenger
#Hacking #Armageddon #Gamaredon #Phishing #Telegram #Ukraine #UkraineCyberPolice https://tarnkappe.info/artikel/hacking/ukraine-warnt-vor-cyber-angriffen-auf-den-telegram-messenger-219440.html -
📬Bulletproof Exchangers: Ukrainische Cyberpolice verhaftet Cyber-Gang📬 https://tarnkappe.info/bulletproof-exchangers-ukrainische-cyberpolice-verhaftet-cyber-gang/ #BulletproofExchangers #UkraineCyberPolice #Krypto-Geldwäsche #DarkCommerce #Binance #Bitcoin #Poltawa #TRMLabs #Krypto
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📬Bulletproof Exchangers: Ukrainische Cyberpolice verhaftet Cyber-Gang📬 https://tarnkappe.info/bulletproof-exchangers-ukrainische-cyberpolice-verhaftet-cyber-gang/ #BulletproofExchangers #UkraineCyberPolice #Krypto-Geldwäsche #DarkCommerce #Binance #Bitcoin #Poltawa #TRMLabs #Krypto