home.social

#warprofiteers — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #warprofiteers, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Critique of U.S. Defense Spending and the Military-Industrial Complex

    📰 Original title: A Budget of the Pentagon, By the Congress and For the War Profiteers

    🤖 IA: It's clickbait ⚠️
    👥 Users: It's clickbait ⚠️

    View full AI summary en.killbait.com/critique-of-u-

    #politics #militaryindustrialcomplex #defensebudget #warprofiteers

  2. Critique of U.S. Defense Spending and the Military-Industrial Complex

    📰 Original title: A Budget of the Pentagon, By the Congress and For the War Profiteers

    🤖 IA: It's clickbait ⚠️
    👥 Users: It's clickbait ⚠️

    View full AI summary en.killbait.com/critique-of-u-

    #politics #militaryindustrialcomplex #defensebudget #warprofiteers

  3. Critique of U.S. Defense Spending and the Military-Industrial Complex

    📰 Original title: A Budget of the Pentagon, By the Congress and For the War Profiteers

    🤖 IA: It's clickbait ⚠️
    👥 Users: It's clickbait ⚠️

    View full AI summary en.killbait.com/critique-of-u-

    #politics #militaryindustrialcomplex #defensebudget #warprofiteers

  4. Critique of U.S. Defense Spending and the Military-Industrial Complex

    📰 Original title: A Budget of the Pentagon, By the Congress and For the War Profiteers

    🤖 IA: It's clickbait ⚠️
    👥 Users: It's clickbait ⚠️

    View full AI summary en.killbait.com/critique-of-u-

    #politics #militaryindustrialcomplex #defensebudget #warprofiteers

  5. Critique of U.S. Defense Spending and the Military-Industrial Complex

    📰 Original title: A Budget of the Pentagon, By the Congress and For the War Profiteers

    🤖 IA: It's clickbait ⚠️
    👥 Users: It's clickbait ⚠️

    View full AI summary en.killbait.com/critique-of-u-

    #politics #militaryindustrialcomplex #defensebudget #warprofiteers

  6. Critique of U.S. Defense Spending and the Military-Industrial Complex

    📰 Original title: A Budget of the Pentagon, By the Congress and For the War Profiteers

    🤖 IA: It's clickbait ⚠️
    👥 Users: It's clickbait ⚠️

    View full AI summary en.killbait.com/critique-of-u-

    #politics #militaryindustrialcomplex #defensebudget #warprofiteers

  7. Critique of U.S. Defense Spending and the Military-Industrial Complex

    📰 Original title: A Budget of the Pentagon, By the Congress and For the War Profiteers

    🤖 IA: It's clickbait ⚠️
    👥 Users: It's clickbait ⚠️

    View full AI summary en.killbait.com/critique-of-u-

    #politics #militaryindustrialcomplex #defensebudget #warprofiteers

  8. Drawing the Line: Why the Palestine Action Case Matters for the Future of British Dissent & Direct Action!

    Yesterday’s Court of Appeal ruling in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [^1] isn’t just another dry legal headline. It marks a seismic shift in how the UK draws the line between passionate political protest and state-defined terrorism.

    By reversing a February High Court decision [^2] that had quashed the government’s ban on the protest group Palestine Action, the Court of Appeal has sanctioned something unprecedented: using the state’s heavy-duty counter-terrorism apparatus to outlaw a domestic, corporate-targeted direct-action group. [^3]

    For the first time, a group that does not target humans with physical violence has been officially proscribed—meaning it is now a criminal offense simply to belong to it, wear its emblems, or voice support for it. [^4] As the legal battle heads to the UK Supreme Court (#UKSC), the core of the argument isn’t just about one group; it’s about whether the British state is fundamentally rewriting the rules of democratic dissent.

    1. The Legal Tug-of-War: How We Got Here

    To understand why this is a massive deal, we have to look at how the Court of Appeal dismantled the High Court’s original, rights-protective ruling. The legal battle hinges on two main arguments.

    The Policy Flip-Flop

    When the High Court originally threw out the ban, it pointed out that the Home Secretary had violated her own explicit guidelines. [^5] Those guidelines state that the government shouldn’t just ban a group because they technically can under the broad wording of the Terrorism Act 2000. [^6] Instead, proscription is supposed to be a tool of last resort when ordinary policing fails. The High Court warned that using the automatic criminalization that comes with a ban as a shortcut to make policing easier was a dangerous, circular use of power.

    The Court of Appeal completely rejected this. Lady Chief Justice Sue Carr ruled that the Home Secretary is entirely entitled to look at the big picture. If a ban gives the police “additional operational levers” to shut down a disruptive group, that is a perfectly legitimate reason to use it. [^7]

    The Deference Trap

    The High Court had carefully weighed the group’s rights to free speech (Article 10) and free assembly (Article 11) against the disruption they caused. [^8] But the Court of Appeal decided the lower court didn’t give the government enough credit. The appellate bench emphasized that because Palestine Action used a “covert structure of secret cells” to evade local police, the judges should defer to the executive’s judgment on national security. [^9]

    The Government’s Stance (Court of Appeal)The Activists’ Stance (High Court & UKSC Appeal)Broad Definitions:
    Property damage designed to influence policy fits the legal definition of terrorism.Dangerous Precedent:
    Equating property damage with mass-casualty violence is an extreme overreach.Operational Need:
    Decentralized cells make ordinary policing ineffective; a total ban is required.Proportionate Policing:
    Hundreds of activists have already been successfully prosecuted under normal criminal law.Executive Deference:
    Courts must defer to the Home Secretary on matters of national security.Judicial Check:
    The judiciary must protect human rights (Articles 10 & 11) from executive overreach.

    2. The Activists’ Case for the Supreme Court

    As the defense team prepares to take this case to the highest court in the land, their arguments are designed to highlight what they view as a dangerous constitutional overreach.

    Argument I: The Ghost of the Suffragettes

    Under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, “terrorism” includes causing “serious damage to property” to advance a political or ideological cause. [^10] Activists argue that this creates a dangerous definition trap.

    By this metric, historical vanguard movements like the Suffragettes—who intentionally smashed windows and targeted property to force political change—would be legally classified as terrorists today. [^11] The defense will argue that upgrading symbolic, corporate-targeted property destruction to “terrorism” erases a vital historical distinction between property damage and actual, physical violence against human beings.

    Argument II: The Blanket Hammer vs. The Chilling Effect

    The immediate fallout of the ban has been swift. Police have already made thousands of arrests, often targeting people simply holding placards that say “I oppose genocide, I support Palestine Action.” [^12] Under the law, expressing support for a banned group carries a penalty of up to 14 years in prison. [^13]

    The problem with a total ban is that it is a blunt, indiscriminate weapon. Previous Supreme Court rulings, like DPP v Ziegler, [^14] established that the state must look at the specific, individualized proportionality of an arrest. A total ban bypasses that nuance entirely, creating a massive “chilling effect” where everyday citizens become terrified to voice anti-war or pro-Palestinian views for fear of being swept up in a counter-terrorism dragnet. [^15]

    3. The Unresolved Blindspots: Where the Supreme Court Battle Will Be Won

    If the activists’ legal team wants to win at the Supreme Court, they have to fix a few strategic blindspots that the Court of Appeal exploited.

    Deconstruct the “Secret Cell” Narrative:
    The Court of Appeal was clearly spooked by the group’s decentralized, horizontal structure. The defense must show that operating in decentralized groups is standard practice for modern social movements (like Extinction Rebellion or Just Stop Oil) to prevent heavy-handed, preemptive policing—not a sign of a clandestine terrorist syndicate. They must hammer home the fact that the state can and has successfully prosecuted these activists using ordinary criminal law. [^16]

    Leverage International Law:
    The Court of Appeal largely ignored warnings from the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism about the dangerous trend of Western states weaponizing national security laws against political dissenters. [^17] The Supreme Court must be reminded of European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, which consistently rules that while states can punish property damage under domestic criminal law, upgrading non-violent protest to “terrorism” violates the democratic minimums of a free society. [^18]

    Target the Original Intent:
    Relying only on a human rights argument gives the Supreme Court an easy out to defer to the government on national security. Instead, the legal team needs to challenge the interpretation of the law itself. They must argue that when Parliament passed the Terrorism Act 2000, its intent for the phrase “serious damage to property” was aimed at high-consequence attacks on critical infrastructure (like blowing up the National Grid), not protestors throwing red paint on a corporate weapons facility.

    If the Supreme Court doesn’t step in to narrow this definition, the line between aggressive political protest and terrorism will be permanently blurred. And that should concern anyone who believes in the right to stand up and disrupt the status quo.

    Footnotes

    [^1]: Ammori v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ (15 June 2026); see Judiciary of England and Wales Official Judgment.

    [^2]: R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin); see analysis on Public Law for Everyone.

    [^3]: See Haroon Siddique, ‘Ban on Palestine Action was lawful, court of appeal rules’, The Guardian (15 June 2026) The Guardian.

    [^4]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 11, s 12. Available at legislation.gov.uk.

    [^5]: Home Office, Proscription Policy Paper (27 February 2025).

    [^6]: Ammori [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin) at [91]-[95]; see also Doughty Street Chambers Case Commentary.

    [^7]: Ammori [2026] EWCA Civ, per Carr LCJ at [8].

    [^8]: Human Rights Act 1998, Sch 1, Part I, Art 10, Art 11. See legislation.gov.uk.

    [^9]: Ammori [2026] EWCA Civ at [12].

    [^10]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(1)(b).

    [^11]: Appellants’ skeleton argument summary; see historical parallels discussed in The Guardian (n 3).

    [^12]: Metropolitan Police Service enforcement data cited in The Guardian (n 3).

    [^13]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 11.

    [^14]: DPP v Ziegler [2021] UKSC 23, [2022] AC 408.

    [^15]: Liberty Policy Analysis, ‘Breaking down the Court of Appeal judgment on Palestine Action’s proscription’ (15 June 2026) Liberty.

    [^16]: Ammori [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin) at [140].

    [^17]: Written submissions of the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, intervening; noted in Doughty Street Chambers summary (n 6).

    [^18]: See e.g., Kudrevičius v Lithuania (2016) 62 EHRR 34.

    https://twitter.com/The_Aftershock_/status/2066430617131377055

    #accountabiliy #armsManufacturers #chillingEffects #CivilLiberties #genocide #History #impunity #InternationalLaw #justice #Law #news #Palestine #politics #RuleOfLaw #warCrimes #warProfiteers
  9. Drawing the Line: Why the Palestine Action Case Matters for the Future of British Dissent & Direct Action!

    Yesterday’s Court of Appeal ruling in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [^1] isn’t just another dry legal headline. It marks a seismic shift in how the UK draws the line between passionate political protest and state-defined terrorism.

    By reversing a February High Court decision [^2] that had quashed the government’s ban on the protest group Palestine Action, the Court of Appeal has sanctioned something unprecedented: using the state’s heavy-duty counter-terrorism apparatus to outlaw a domestic, corporate-targeted direct-action group. [^3]

    For the first time, a group that does not target humans with physical violence has been officially proscribed—meaning it is now a criminal offense simply to belong to it, wear its emblems, or voice support for it. [^4] As the legal battle heads to the UK Supreme Court (#UKSC), the core of the argument isn’t just about one group; it’s about whether the British state is fundamentally rewriting the rules of democratic dissent.

    1. The Legal Tug-of-War: How We Got Here

    To understand why this is a massive deal, we have to look at how the Court of Appeal dismantled the High Court’s original, rights-protective ruling. The legal battle hinges on two main arguments.

    The Policy Flip-Flop

    When the High Court originally threw out the ban, it pointed out that the Home Secretary had violated her own explicit guidelines. [^5] Those guidelines state that the government shouldn’t just ban a group because they technically can under the broad wording of the Terrorism Act 2000. [^6] Instead, proscription is supposed to be a tool of last resort when ordinary policing fails. The High Court warned that using the automatic criminalization that comes with a ban as a shortcut to make policing easier was a dangerous, circular use of power.

    The Court of Appeal completely rejected this. Lady Chief Justice Sue Carr ruled that the Home Secretary is entirely entitled to look at the big picture. If a ban gives the police “additional operational levers” to shut down a disruptive group, that is a perfectly legitimate reason to use it. [^7]

    The Deference Trap

    The High Court had carefully weighed the group’s rights to free speech (Article 10) and free assembly (Article 11) against the disruption they caused. [^8] But the Court of Appeal decided the lower court didn’t give the government enough credit. The appellate bench emphasized that because Palestine Action used a “covert structure of secret cells” to evade local police, the judges should defer to the executive’s judgment on national security. [^9]

    The Government’s Stance (Court of Appeal)The Activists’ Stance (High Court & UKSC Appeal)Broad Definitions:
    Property damage designed to influence policy fits the legal definition of terrorism.Dangerous Precedent:
    Equating property damage with mass-casualty violence is an extreme overreach.Operational Need:
    Decentralized cells make ordinary policing ineffective; a total ban is required.Proportionate Policing:
    Hundreds of activists have already been successfully prosecuted under normal criminal law.Executive Deference:
    Courts must defer to the Home Secretary on matters of national security.Judicial Check:
    The judiciary must protect human rights (Articles 10 & 11) from executive overreach.

    2. The Activists’ Case for the Supreme Court

    As the defense team prepares to take this case to the highest court in the land, their arguments are designed to highlight what they view as a dangerous constitutional overreach.

    Argument I: The Ghost of the Suffragettes

    Under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, “terrorism” includes causing “serious damage to property” to advance a political or ideological cause. [^10] Activists argue that this creates a dangerous definition trap.

    By this metric, historical vanguard movements like the Suffragettes—who intentionally smashed windows and targeted property to force political change—would be legally classified as terrorists today. [^11] The defense will argue that upgrading symbolic, corporate-targeted property destruction to “terrorism” erases a vital historical distinction between property damage and actual, physical violence against human beings.

    Argument II: The Blanket Hammer vs. The Chilling Effect

    The immediate fallout of the ban has been swift. Police have already made thousands of arrests, often targeting people simply holding placards that say “I oppose genocide, I support Palestine Action.” [^12] Under the law, expressing support for a banned group carries a penalty of up to 14 years in prison. [^13]

    The problem with a total ban is that it is a blunt, indiscriminate weapon. Previous Supreme Court rulings, like DPP v Ziegler, [^14] established that the state must look at the specific, individualized proportionality of an arrest. A total ban bypasses that nuance entirely, creating a massive “chilling effect” where everyday citizens become terrified to voice anti-war or pro-Palestinian views for fear of being swept up in a counter-terrorism dragnet. [^15]

    3. The Unresolved Blindspots: Where the Supreme Court Battle Will Be Won

    If the activists’ legal team wants to win at the Supreme Court, they have to fix a few strategic blindspots that the Court of Appeal exploited.

    Deconstruct the “Secret Cell” Narrative:
    The Court of Appeal was clearly spooked by the group’s decentralized, horizontal structure. The defense must show that operating in decentralized groups is standard practice for modern social movements (like Extinction Rebellion or Just Stop Oil) to prevent heavy-handed, preemptive policing—not a sign of a clandestine terrorist syndicate. They must hammer home the fact that the state can and has successfully prosecuted these activists using ordinary criminal law. [^16]

    Leverage International Law:
    The Court of Appeal largely ignored warnings from the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism about the dangerous trend of Western states weaponizing national security laws against political dissenters. [^17] The Supreme Court must be reminded of European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, which consistently rules that while states can punish property damage under domestic criminal law, upgrading non-violent protest to “terrorism” violates the democratic minimums of a free society. [^18]

    Target the Original Intent:
    Relying only on a human rights argument gives the Supreme Court an easy out to defer to the government on national security. Instead, the legal team needs to challenge the interpretation of the law itself. They must argue that when Parliament passed the Terrorism Act 2000, its intent for the phrase “serious damage to property” was aimed at high-consequence attacks on critical infrastructure (like blowing up the National Grid), not protestors throwing red paint on a corporate weapons facility.

    If the Supreme Court doesn’t step in to narrow this definition, the line between aggressive political protest and terrorism will be permanently blurred. And that should concern anyone who believes in the right to stand up and disrupt the status quo.

    Footnotes

    [^1]: Ammori v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ (15 June 2026); see Judiciary of England and Wales Official Judgment.

    [^2]: R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin); see analysis on Public Law for Everyone.

    [^3]: See Haroon Siddique, ‘Ban on Palestine Action was lawful, court of appeal rules’, The Guardian (15 June 2026) The Guardian.

    [^4]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 11, s 12. Available at legislation.gov.uk.

    [^5]: Home Office, Proscription Policy Paper (27 February 2025).

    [^6]: Ammori [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin) at [91]-[95]; see also Doughty Street Chambers Case Commentary.

    [^7]: Ammori [2026] EWCA Civ, per Carr LCJ at [8].

    [^8]: Human Rights Act 1998, Sch 1, Part I, Art 10, Art 11. See legislation.gov.uk.

    [^9]: Ammori [2026] EWCA Civ at [12].

    [^10]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(1)(b).

    [^11]: Appellants’ skeleton argument summary; see historical parallels discussed in The Guardian (n 3).

    [^12]: Metropolitan Police Service enforcement data cited in The Guardian (n 3).

    [^13]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 11.

    [^14]: DPP v Ziegler [2021] UKSC 23, [2022] AC 408.

    [^15]: Liberty Policy Analysis, ‘Breaking down the Court of Appeal judgment on Palestine Action’s proscription’ (15 June 2026) Liberty.

    [^16]: Ammori [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin) at [140].

    [^17]: Written submissions of the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, intervening; noted in Doughty Street Chambers summary (n 6).

    [^18]: See e.g., Kudrevičius v Lithuania (2016) 62 EHRR 34.

    https://twitter.com/The_Aftershock_/status/2066430617131377055

    #accountabiliy #armsManufacturers #chillingEffects #CivilLiberties #genocide #History #impunity #InternationalLaw #justice #Law #news #Palestine #politics #RuleOfLaw #warCrimes #warProfiteers
  10. Drawing the Line: Why the Palestine Action Case Matters for the Future of British Dissent & Direct Action!

    Yesterday’s Court of Appeal ruling in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [^1] isn’t just another dry legal headline. It marks a seismic shift in how the UK draws the line between passionate political protest and state-defined terrorism.

    By reversing a February High Court decision [^2] that had quashed the government’s ban on the protest group Palestine Action, the Court of Appeal has sanctioned something unprecedented: using the state’s heavy-duty counter-terrorism apparatus to outlaw a domestic, corporate-targeted direct-action group. [^3]

    For the first time, a group that does not target humans with physical violence has been officially proscribed—meaning it is now a criminal offense simply to belong to it, wear its emblems, or voice support for it. [^4] As the legal battle heads to the UK Supreme Court (#UKSC), the core of the argument isn’t just about one group; it’s about whether the British state is fundamentally rewriting the rules of democratic dissent.

    1. The Legal Tug-of-War: How We Got Here

    To understand why this is a massive deal, we have to look at how the Court of Appeal dismantled the High Court’s original, rights-protective ruling. The legal battle hinges on two main arguments.

    The Policy Flip-Flop

    When the High Court originally threw out the ban, it pointed out that the Home Secretary had violated her own explicit guidelines. [^5] Those guidelines state that the government shouldn’t just ban a group because they technically can under the broad wording of the Terrorism Act 2000. [^6] Instead, proscription is supposed to be a tool of last resort when ordinary policing fails. The High Court warned that using the automatic criminalization that comes with a ban as a shortcut to make policing easier was a dangerous, circular use of power.

    The Court of Appeal completely rejected this. Lady Chief Justice Sue Carr ruled that the Home Secretary is entirely entitled to look at the big picture. If a ban gives the police “additional operational levers” to shut down a disruptive group, that is a perfectly legitimate reason to use it. [^7]

    The Deference Trap

    The High Court had carefully weighed the group’s rights to free speech (Article 10) and free assembly (Article 11) against the disruption they caused. [^8] But the Court of Appeal decided the lower court didn’t give the government enough credit. The appellate bench emphasized that because Palestine Action used a “covert structure of secret cells” to evade local police, the judges should defer to the executive’s judgment on national security. [^9]

    The Government’s Stance (Court of Appeal)The Activists’ Stance (High Court & UKSC Appeal)Broad Definitions:
    Property damage designed to influence policy fits the legal definition of terrorism.Dangerous Precedent:
    Equating property damage with mass-casualty violence is an extreme overreach.Operational Need:
    Decentralized cells make ordinary policing ineffective; a total ban is required.Proportionate Policing:
    Hundreds of activists have already been successfully prosecuted under normal criminal law.Executive Deference:
    Courts must defer to the Home Secretary on matters of national security.Judicial Check:
    The judiciary must protect human rights (Articles 10 & 11) from executive overreach.

    2. The Activists’ Case for the Supreme Court

    As the defense team prepares to take this case to the highest court in the land, their arguments are designed to highlight what they view as a dangerous constitutional overreach.

    Argument I: The Ghost of the Suffragettes

    Under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, “terrorism” includes causing “serious damage to property” to advance a political or ideological cause. [^10] Activists argue that this creates a dangerous definition trap.

    By this metric, historical vanguard movements like the Suffragettes—who intentionally smashed windows and targeted property to force political change—would be legally classified as terrorists today. [^11] The defense will argue that upgrading symbolic, corporate-targeted property destruction to “terrorism” erases a vital historical distinction between property damage and actual, physical violence against human beings.

    Argument II: The Blanket Hammer vs. The Chilling Effect

    The immediate fallout of the ban has been swift. Police have already made thousands of arrests, often targeting people simply holding placards that say “I oppose genocide, I support Palestine Action.” [^12] Under the law, expressing support for a banned group carries a penalty of up to 14 years in prison. [^13]

    The problem with a total ban is that it is a blunt, indiscriminate weapon. Previous Supreme Court rulings, like DPP v Ziegler, [^14] established that the state must look at the specific, individualized proportionality of an arrest. A total ban bypasses that nuance entirely, creating a massive “chilling effect” where everyday citizens become terrified to voice anti-war or pro-Palestinian views for fear of being swept up in a counter-terrorism dragnet. [^15]

    3. The Unresolved Blindspots: Where the Supreme Court Battle Will Be Won

    If the activists’ legal team wants to win at the Supreme Court, they have to fix a few strategic blindspots that the Court of Appeal exploited.

    Deconstruct the “Secret Cell” Narrative:
    The Court of Appeal was clearly spooked by the group’s decentralized, horizontal structure. The defense must show that operating in decentralized groups is standard practice for modern social movements (like Extinction Rebellion or Just Stop Oil) to prevent heavy-handed, preemptive policing—not a sign of a clandestine terrorist syndicate. They must hammer home the fact that the state can and has successfully prosecuted these activists using ordinary criminal law. [^16]

    Leverage International Law:
    The Court of Appeal largely ignored warnings from the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism about the dangerous trend of Western states weaponizing national security laws against political dissenters. [^17] The Supreme Court must be reminded of European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, which consistently rules that while states can punish property damage under domestic criminal law, upgrading non-violent protest to “terrorism” violates the democratic minimums of a free society. [^18]

    Target the Original Intent:
    Relying only on a human rights argument gives the Supreme Court an easy out to defer to the government on national security. Instead, the legal team needs to challenge the interpretation of the law itself. They must argue that when Parliament passed the Terrorism Act 2000, its intent for the phrase “serious damage to property” was aimed at high-consequence attacks on critical infrastructure (like blowing up the National Grid), not protestors throwing red paint on a corporate weapons facility.

    If the Supreme Court doesn’t step in to narrow this definition, the line between aggressive political protest and terrorism will be permanently blurred. And that should concern anyone who believes in the right to stand up and disrupt the status quo.

    Footnotes

    [^1]: Ammori v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ (15 June 2026); see Judiciary of England and Wales Official Judgment.

    [^2]: R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin); see analysis on Public Law for Everyone.

    [^3]: See Haroon Siddique, ‘Ban on Palestine Action was lawful, court of appeal rules’, The Guardian (15 June 2026) The Guardian.

    [^4]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 11, s 12. Available at legislation.gov.uk.

    [^5]: Home Office, Proscription Policy Paper (27 February 2025).

    [^6]: Ammori [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin) at [91]-[95]; see also Doughty Street Chambers Case Commentary.

    [^7]: Ammori [2026] EWCA Civ, per Carr LCJ at [8].

    [^8]: Human Rights Act 1998, Sch 1, Part I, Art 10, Art 11. See legislation.gov.uk.

    [^9]: Ammori [2026] EWCA Civ at [12].

    [^10]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(1)(b).

    [^11]: Appellants’ skeleton argument summary; see historical parallels discussed in The Guardian (n 3).

    [^12]: Metropolitan Police Service enforcement data cited in The Guardian (n 3).

    [^13]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 11.

    [^14]: DPP v Ziegler [2021] UKSC 23, [2022] AC 408.

    [^15]: Liberty Policy Analysis, ‘Breaking down the Court of Appeal judgment on Palestine Action’s proscription’ (15 June 2026) Liberty.

    [^16]: Ammori [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin) at [140].

    [^17]: Written submissions of the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, intervening; noted in Doughty Street Chambers summary (n 6).

    [^18]: See e.g., Kudrevičius v Lithuania (2016) 62 EHRR 34.

    https://twitter.com/The_Aftershock_/status/2066430617131377055

    #accountabiliy #armsManufacturers #chillingEffects #CivilLiberties #genocide #History #impunity #InternationalLaw #justice #Law #news #Palestine #politics #RuleOfLaw #warCrimes #warProfiteers
  11. Drawing the Line: Why the Palestine Action Case Matters for the Future of British Dissent & Direct Action!

    Yesterday’s Court of Appeal ruling in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [^1] isn’t just another dry legal headline. It marks a seismic shift in how the UK draws the line between passionate political protest and state-defined terrorism.

    By reversing a February High Court decision [^2] that had quashed the government’s ban on the protest group Palestine Action, the Court of Appeal has sanctioned something unprecedented: using the state’s heavy-duty counter-terrorism apparatus to outlaw a domestic, corporate-targeted direct-action group. [^3]

    For the first time, a group that does not target humans with physical violence has been officially proscribed—meaning it is now a criminal offense simply to belong to it, wear its emblems, or voice support for it. [^4] As the legal battle heads to the UK Supreme Court (#UKSC), the core of the argument isn’t just about one group; it’s about whether the British state is fundamentally rewriting the rules of democratic dissent.

    1. The Legal Tug-of-War: How We Got Here

    To understand why this is a massive deal, we have to look at how the Court of Appeal dismantled the High Court’s original, rights-protective ruling. The legal battle hinges on two main arguments.

    The Policy Flip-Flop

    When the High Court originally threw out the ban, it pointed out that the Home Secretary had violated her own explicit guidelines. [^5] Those guidelines state that the government shouldn’t just ban a group because they technically can under the broad wording of the Terrorism Act 2000. [^6] Instead, proscription is supposed to be a tool of last resort when ordinary policing fails. The High Court warned that using the automatic criminalization that comes with a ban as a shortcut to make policing easier was a dangerous, circular use of power.

    The Court of Appeal completely rejected this. Lady Chief Justice Sue Carr ruled that the Home Secretary is entirely entitled to look at the big picture. If a ban gives the police “additional operational levers” to shut down a disruptive group, that is a perfectly legitimate reason to use it. [^7]

    The Deference Trap

    The High Court had carefully weighed the group’s rights to free speech (Article 10) and free assembly (Article 11) against the disruption they caused. [^8] But the Court of Appeal decided the lower court didn’t give the government enough credit. The appellate bench emphasized that because Palestine Action used a “covert structure of secret cells” to evade local police, the judges should defer to the executive’s judgment on national security. [^9]

    The Government’s Stance (Court of Appeal)The Activists’ Stance (High Court & UKSC Appeal)Broad Definitions:
    Property damage designed to influence policy fits the legal definition of terrorism.Dangerous Precedent:
    Equating property damage with mass-casualty violence is an extreme overreach.Operational Need:
    Decentralized cells make ordinary policing ineffective; a total ban is required.Proportionate Policing:
    Hundreds of activists have already been successfully prosecuted under normal criminal law.Executive Deference:
    Courts must defer to the Home Secretary on matters of national security.Judicial Check:
    The judiciary must protect human rights (Articles 10 & 11) from executive overreach.

    2. The Activists’ Case for the Supreme Court

    As the defense team prepares to take this case to the highest court in the land, their arguments are designed to highlight what they view as a dangerous constitutional overreach.

    Argument I: The Ghost of the Suffragettes

    Under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, “terrorism” includes causing “serious damage to property” to advance a political or ideological cause. [^10] Activists argue that this creates a dangerous definition trap.

    By this metric, historical vanguard movements like the Suffragettes—who intentionally smashed windows and targeted property to force political change—would be legally classified as terrorists today. [^11] The defense will argue that upgrading symbolic, corporate-targeted property destruction to “terrorism” erases a vital historical distinction between property damage and actual, physical violence against human beings.

    Argument II: The Blanket Hammer vs. The Chilling Effect

    The immediate fallout of the ban has been swift. Police have already made thousands of arrests, often targeting people simply holding placards that say “I oppose genocide, I support Palestine Action.” [^12] Under the law, expressing support for a banned group carries a penalty of up to 14 years in prison. [^13]

    The problem with a total ban is that it is a blunt, indiscriminate weapon. Previous Supreme Court rulings, like DPP v Ziegler, [^14] established that the state must look at the specific, individualized proportionality of an arrest. A total ban bypasses that nuance entirely, creating a massive “chilling effect” where everyday citizens become terrified to voice anti-war or pro-Palestinian views for fear of being swept up in a counter-terrorism dragnet. [^15]

    3. The Unresolved Blindspots: Where the Supreme Court Battle Will Be Won

    If the activists’ legal team wants to win at the Supreme Court, they have to fix a few strategic blindspots that the Court of Appeal exploited.

    Deconstruct the “Secret Cell” Narrative:
    The Court of Appeal was clearly spooked by the group’s decentralized, horizontal structure. The defense must show that operating in decentralized groups is standard practice for modern social movements (like Extinction Rebellion or Just Stop Oil) to prevent heavy-handed, preemptive policing—not a sign of a clandestine terrorist syndicate. They must hammer home the fact that the state can and has successfully prosecuted these activists using ordinary criminal law. [^16]

    Leverage International Law:
    The Court of Appeal largely ignored warnings from the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism about the dangerous trend of Western states weaponizing national security laws against political dissenters. [^17] The Supreme Court must be reminded of European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, which consistently rules that while states can punish property damage under domestic criminal law, upgrading non-violent protest to “terrorism” violates the democratic minimums of a free society. [^18]

    Target the Original Intent:
    Relying only on a human rights argument gives the Supreme Court an easy out to defer to the government on national security. Instead, the legal team needs to challenge the interpretation of the law itself. They must argue that when Parliament passed the Terrorism Act 2000, its intent for the phrase “serious damage to property” was aimed at high-consequence attacks on critical infrastructure (like blowing up the National Grid), not protestors throwing red paint on a corporate weapons facility.

    If the Supreme Court doesn’t step in to narrow this definition, the line between aggressive political protest and terrorism will be permanently blurred. And that should concern anyone who believes in the right to stand up and disrupt the status quo.

    Footnotes

    [^1]: Ammori v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ (15 June 2026); see Judiciary of England and Wales Official Judgment.

    [^2]: R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin); see analysis on Public Law for Everyone.

    [^3]: See Haroon Siddique, ‘Ban on Palestine Action was lawful, court of appeal rules’, The Guardian (15 June 2026) The Guardian.

    [^4]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 11, s 12. Available at legislation.gov.uk.

    [^5]: Home Office, Proscription Policy Paper (27 February 2025).

    [^6]: Ammori [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin) at [91]-[95]; see also Doughty Street Chambers Case Commentary.

    [^7]: Ammori [2026] EWCA Civ, per Carr LCJ at [8].

    [^8]: Human Rights Act 1998, Sch 1, Part I, Art 10, Art 11. See legislation.gov.uk.

    [^9]: Ammori [2026] EWCA Civ at [12].

    [^10]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(1)(b).

    [^11]: Appellants’ skeleton argument summary; see historical parallels discussed in The Guardian (n 3).

    [^12]: Metropolitan Police Service enforcement data cited in The Guardian (n 3).

    [^13]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 11.

    [^14]: DPP v Ziegler [2021] UKSC 23, [2022] AC 408.

    [^15]: Liberty Policy Analysis, ‘Breaking down the Court of Appeal judgment on Palestine Action’s proscription’ (15 June 2026) Liberty.

    [^16]: Ammori [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin) at [140].

    [^17]: Written submissions of the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, intervening; noted in Doughty Street Chambers summary (n 6).

    [^18]: See e.g., Kudrevičius v Lithuania (2016) 62 EHRR 34.

    https://twitter.com/The_Aftershock_/status/2066430617131377055

    #accountabiliy #armsManufacturers #chillingEffects #CivilLiberties #genocide #History #impunity #InternationalLaw #justice #Law #news #Palestine #politics #RuleOfLaw #warCrimes #warProfiteers
  12. Drawing the Line: Why the Palestine Action Case Matters for the Future of British Dissent & Direct Action!

    Yesterday’s Court of Appeal ruling in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [^1] isn’t just another dry legal headline. It marks a seismic shift in how the UK draws the line between passionate political protest and state-defined terrorism.

    By reversing a February High Court decision [^2] that had quashed the government’s ban on the protest group Palestine Action, the Court of Appeal has sanctioned something unprecedented: using the state’s heavy-duty counter-terrorism apparatus to outlaw a domestic, corporate-targeted direct-action group. [^3]

    For the first time, a group that does not target humans with physical violence has been officially proscribed—meaning it is now a criminal offense simply to belong to it, wear its emblems, or voice support for it. [^4] As the legal battle heads to the UK Supreme Court (#UKSC), the core of the argument isn’t just about one group; it’s about whether the British state is fundamentally rewriting the rules of democratic dissent.

    1. The Legal Tug-of-War: How We Got Here

    To understand why this is a massive deal, we have to look at how the Court of Appeal dismantled the High Court’s original, rights-protective ruling. The legal battle hinges on two main arguments.

    The Policy Flip-Flop

    When the High Court originally threw out the ban, it pointed out that the Home Secretary had violated her own explicit guidelines. [^5] Those guidelines state that the government shouldn’t just ban a group because they technically can under the broad wording of the Terrorism Act 2000. [^6] Instead, proscription is supposed to be a tool of last resort when ordinary policing fails. The High Court warned that using the automatic criminalization that comes with a ban as a shortcut to make policing easier was a dangerous, circular use of power.

    The Court of Appeal completely rejected this. Lady Chief Justice Sue Carr ruled that the Home Secretary is entirely entitled to look at the big picture. If a ban gives the police “additional operational levers” to shut down a disruptive group, that is a perfectly legitimate reason to use it. [^7]

    The Deference Trap

    The High Court had carefully weighed the group’s rights to free speech (Article 10) and free assembly (Article 11) against the disruption they caused. [^8] But the Court of Appeal decided the lower court didn’t give the government enough credit. The appellate bench emphasized that because Palestine Action used a “covert structure of secret cells” to evade local police, the judges should defer to the executive’s judgment on national security. [^9]

    The Government’s Stance (Court of Appeal)The Activists’ Stance (High Court & UKSC Appeal)Broad Definitions:
    Property damage designed to influence policy fits the legal definition of terrorism.Dangerous Precedent:
    Equating property damage with mass-casualty violence is an extreme overreach.Operational Need:
    Decentralized cells make ordinary policing ineffective; a total ban is required.Proportionate Policing:
    Hundreds of activists have already been successfully prosecuted under normal criminal law.Executive Deference:
    Courts must defer to the Home Secretary on matters of national security.Judicial Check:
    The judiciary must protect human rights (Articles 10 & 11) from executive overreach.

    2. The Activists’ Case for the Supreme Court

    As the defense team prepares to take this case to the highest court in the land, their arguments are designed to highlight what they view as a dangerous constitutional overreach.

    Argument I: The Ghost of the Suffragettes

    Under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, “terrorism” includes causing “serious damage to property” to advance a political or ideological cause. [^10] Activists argue that this creates a dangerous definition trap.

    By this metric, historical vanguard movements like the Suffragettes—who intentionally smashed windows and targeted property to force political change—would be legally classified as terrorists today. [^11] The defense will argue that upgrading symbolic, corporate-targeted property destruction to “terrorism” erases a vital historical distinction between property damage and actual, physical violence against human beings.

    Argument II: The Blanket Hammer vs. The Chilling Effect

    The immediate fallout of the ban has been swift. Police have already made thousands of arrests, often targeting people simply holding placards that say “I oppose genocide, I support Palestine Action.” [^12] Under the law, expressing support for a banned group carries a penalty of up to 14 years in prison. [^13]

    The problem with a total ban is that it is a blunt, indiscriminate weapon. Previous Supreme Court rulings, like DPP v Ziegler, [^14] established that the state must look at the specific, individualized proportionality of an arrest. A total ban bypasses that nuance entirely, creating a massive “chilling effect” where everyday citizens become terrified to voice anti-war or pro-Palestinian views for fear of being swept up in a counter-terrorism dragnet. [^15]

    3. The Unresolved Blindspots: Where the Supreme Court Battle Will Be Won

    If the activists’ legal team wants to win at the Supreme Court, they have to fix a few strategic blindspots that the Court of Appeal exploited.

    Deconstruct the “Secret Cell” Narrative:
    The Court of Appeal was clearly spooked by the group’s decentralized, horizontal structure. The defense must show that operating in decentralized groups is standard practice for modern social movements (like Extinction Rebellion or Just Stop Oil) to prevent heavy-handed, preemptive policing—not a sign of a clandestine terrorist syndicate. They must hammer home the fact that the state can and has successfully prosecuted these activists using ordinary criminal law. [^16]

    Leverage International Law:
    The Court of Appeal largely ignored warnings from the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism about the dangerous trend of Western states weaponizing national security laws against political dissenters. [^17] The Supreme Court must be reminded of European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, which consistently rules that while states can punish property damage under domestic criminal law, upgrading non-violent protest to “terrorism” violates the democratic minimums of a free society. [^18]

    Target the Original Intent:
    Relying only on a human rights argument gives the Supreme Court an easy out to defer to the government on national security. Instead, the legal team needs to challenge the interpretation of the law itself. They must argue that when Parliament passed the Terrorism Act 2000, its intent for the phrase “serious damage to property” was aimed at high-consequence attacks on critical infrastructure (like blowing up the National Grid), not protestors throwing red paint on a corporate weapons facility.

    If the Supreme Court doesn’t step in to narrow this definition, the line between aggressive political protest and terrorism will be permanently blurred. And that should concern anyone who believes in the right to stand up and disrupt the status quo.

    Footnotes

    [^1]: Ammori v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ (15 June 2026); see Judiciary of England and Wales Official Judgment.

    [^2]: R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin); see analysis on Public Law for Everyone.

    [^3]: See Haroon Siddique, ‘Ban on Palestine Action was lawful, court of appeal rules’, The Guardian (15 June 2026) The Guardian.

    [^4]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 11, s 12. Available at legislation.gov.uk.

    [^5]: Home Office, Proscription Policy Paper (27 February 2025).

    [^6]: Ammori [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin) at [91]-[95]; see also Doughty Street Chambers Case Commentary.

    [^7]: Ammori [2026] EWCA Civ, per Carr LCJ at [8].

    [^8]: Human Rights Act 1998, Sch 1, Part I, Art 10, Art 11. See legislation.gov.uk.

    [^9]: Ammori [2026] EWCA Civ at [12].

    [^10]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(1)(b).

    [^11]: Appellants’ skeleton argument summary; see historical parallels discussed in The Guardian (n 3).

    [^12]: Metropolitan Police Service enforcement data cited in The Guardian (n 3).

    [^13]: Terrorism Act 2000, s 11.

    [^14]: DPP v Ziegler [2021] UKSC 23, [2022] AC 408.

    [^15]: Liberty Policy Analysis, ‘Breaking down the Court of Appeal judgment on Palestine Action’s proscription’ (15 June 2026) Liberty.

    [^16]: Ammori [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin) at [140].

    [^17]: Written submissions of the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, intervening; noted in Doughty Street Chambers summary (n 6).

    [^18]: See e.g., Kudrevičius v Lithuania (2016) 62 EHRR 34.

    https://twitter.com/The_Aftershock_/status/2066430617131377055

    #accountabiliy #armsManufacturers #chillingEffects #CivilLiberties #genocide #History #impunity #InternationalLaw #justice #Law #news #Palestine #politics #RuleOfLaw #warCrimes #warProfiteers
  13. ‘Israel’ has global supply chains, and one of the most advanced, heavily funded militaries in the world. It also has a total disregard for humanity, and fails to comply with any international rules or norms. In reality, nothing threatens global peace and security more than the Israeli occupation. It a serious threat not only to regional and international peace and security. but the entire international legal framework.

    But as yet, the EU has taken no effective measures against the criminal state of “Israel” which, as of 4 June 2026, has killed 72,956 Palestinians in Gaza, and injured 173,043. It has sanctioned several illegal settlers, out of the more than 780,000 residing in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. But sanctioning a few of these is nothing more than theatre.

    #EUpol #Israel #Europe #Israel #Genocide #Hypocrisy #WarProfiteers #Economy #Military #Gaza #Palestine
    thecanary.co/opinion/2026/06/0

  14. ‘Israel’ has global supply chains, and one of the most advanced, heavily funded militaries in the world. It also has a total disregard for humanity, and fails to comply with any international rules or norms. In reality, nothing threatens global peace and security more than the Israeli occupation. It a serious threat not only to regional and international peace and security. but the entire international legal framework.

    But as yet, the EU has taken no effective measures against the criminal state of “Israel” which, as of 4 June 2026, has killed 72,956 Palestinians in Gaza, and injured 173,043. It has sanctioned several illegal settlers, out of the more than 780,000 residing in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. But sanctioning a few of these is nothing more than theatre.

    #EUpol #Israel #Europe #Israel #Genocide #Hypocrisy #WarProfiteers #Economy #Military #Gaza #Palestine
    thecanary.co/opinion/2026/06/0

  15. ‘Israel’ has global supply chains, and one of the most advanced, heavily funded militaries in the world. It also has a total disregard for humanity, and fails to comply with any international rules or norms. In reality, nothing threatens global peace and security more than the Israeli occupation. It a serious threat not only to regional and international peace and security. but the entire international legal framework.

    But as yet, the EU has taken no effective measures against the criminal state of “Israel” which, as of 4 June 2026, has killed 72,956 Palestinians in Gaza, and injured 173,043. It has sanctioned several illegal settlers, out of the more than 780,000 residing in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. But sanctioning a few of these is nothing more than theatre.

    #EUpol #Israel #Europe #Israel #Genocide #Hypocrisy #WarProfiteers #Economy #Military #Gaza #Palestine
    thecanary.co/opinion/2026/06/0

  16. ‘Israel’ has global supply chains, and one of the most advanced, heavily funded militaries in the world. It also has a total disregard for humanity, and fails to comply with any international rules or norms. In reality, nothing threatens global peace and security more than the Israeli occupation. It a serious threat not only to regional and international peace and security. but the entire international legal framework.

    But as yet, the EU has taken no effective measures against the criminal state of “Israel” which, as of 4 June 2026, has killed 72,956 Palestinians in Gaza, and injured 173,043. It has sanctioned several illegal settlers, out of the more than 780,000 residing in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. But sanctioning a few of these is nothing more than theatre.

    #EUpol #Israel #Europe #Israel #Genocide #Hypocrisy #WarProfiteers #Economy #Military #Gaza #Palestine
    thecanary.co/opinion/2026/06/0

  17. ‘Israel’ has global supply chains, and one of the most advanced, heavily funded militaries in the world. It also has a total disregard for humanity, and fails to comply with any international rules or norms. In reality, nothing threatens global peace and security more than the Israeli occupation. It a serious threat not only to regional and international peace and security. but the entire international legal framework.

    But as yet, the EU has taken no effective measures against the criminal state of “Israel” which, as of 4 June 2026, has killed 72,956 Palestinians in Gaza, and injured 173,043. It has sanctioned several illegal settlers, out of the more than 780,000 residing in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. But sanctioning a few of these is nothing more than theatre.

    #EUpol #Israel #Europe #Israel #Genocide #Hypocrisy #WarProfiteers #Economy #Military #Gaza #Palestine
    thecanary.co/opinion/2026/06/0

  18. #israel #palestine : #gaza / #genocide / #warprofiteers

    „ISRAELI #armscompany #ElbitSystems reported #recordprofits today, as Israel’s ongoing wars and remilitarisation drives across the world have boosted revenues.

    Elbit’s first-quarter revenues rose to almost $2.2 billion (£1.6bn) from just under $1.9bn (£1.4bn) in the same period last year, while profits were up 59 per cent on a year ago. The company has a backlog of orders worth over $30bn (£22.3bn).“

    morningstaronline.co.uk/articl

  19. #israel #palestine : #gaza / #genocide / #warprofiteers

    „ISRAELI #armscompany #ElbitSystems reported #recordprofits today, as Israel’s ongoing wars and remilitarisation drives across the world have boosted revenues.

    Elbit’s first-quarter revenues rose to almost $2.2 billion (£1.6bn) from just under $1.9bn (£1.4bn) in the same period last year, while profits were up 59 per cent on a year ago. The company has a backlog of orders worth over $30bn (£22.3bn).“

    morningstaronline.co.uk/articl

  20. #israel #palestine : #gaza / #genocide / #warprofiteers

    „ISRAELI #armscompany #ElbitSystems reported #recordprofits today, as Israel’s ongoing wars and remilitarisation drives across the world have boosted revenues.

    Elbit’s first-quarter revenues rose to almost $2.2 billion (£1.6bn) from just under $1.9bn (£1.4bn) in the same period last year, while profits were up 59 per cent on a year ago. The company has a backlog of orders worth over $30bn (£22.3bn).“

    morningstaronline.co.uk/articl

  21. #israel #palestine : #gaza / #genocide / #warprofiteers

    „ISRAELI #armscompany #ElbitSystems reported #recordprofits today, as Israel’s ongoing wars and remilitarisation drives across the world have boosted revenues.

    Elbit’s first-quarter revenues rose to almost $2.2 billion (£1.6bn) from just under $1.9bn (£1.4bn) in the same period last year, while profits were up 59 per cent on a year ago. The company has a backlog of orders worth over $30bn (£22.3bn).“

    morningstaronline.co.uk/articl

  22. #israel #palestine : #gaza / #genocide / #warprofiteers

    „ISRAELI #armscompany #ElbitSystems reported #recordprofits today, as Israel’s ongoing wars and remilitarisation drives across the world have boosted revenues.

    Elbit’s first-quarter revenues rose to almost $2.2 billion (£1.6bn) from just under $1.9bn (£1.4bn) in the same period last year, while profits were up 59 per cent on a year ago. The company has a backlog of orders worth over $30bn (£22.3bn).“

    morningstaronline.co.uk/articl

  23. This is not true. But it's accurate about the military business or Israel, thanks to disgusting criminals in Europe.

    Israel tourist and agriculture is in crisis, so is the hightech because of the large number of citizens who left the country in the past 2 years.

    economist.com/middle-east-and-

    #israel #economy #WarProfiteers #genocide #BDS #EUpol #Palestine

  24. This is not true. But it's accurate about the military business or Israel, thanks to disgusting criminals in Europe.

    Israel tourist and agriculture is in crisis, so is the hightech because of the large number of citizens who left the country in the past 2 years.

    economist.com/middle-east-and-

    #israel #economy #WarProfiteers #genocide #BDS #EUpol #Palestine

  25. This is not true. But it's accurate about the military business or Israel, thanks to disgusting criminals in Europe.

    Israel tourist and agriculture is in crisis, so is the hightech because of the large number of citizens who left the country in the past 2 years.

    economist.com/middle-east-and-

    #israel #economy #WarProfiteers #genocide #BDS #EUpol #Palestine

  26. This is not true. But it's accurate about the military business or Israel, thanks to disgusting criminals in Europe.

    Israel tourist and agriculture is in crisis, so is the hightech because of the large number of citizens who left the country in the past 2 years.

    economist.com/middle-east-and-

    #israel #economy #WarProfiteers #genocide #BDS #EUpol #Palestine

  27. This is not true. But it's accurate about the military business or Israel, thanks to disgusting criminals in Europe.

    Israel tourist and agriculture is in crisis, so is the hightech because of the large number of citizens who left the country in the past 2 years.

    economist.com/middle-east-and-

    #israel #economy #WarProfiteers #genocide #BDS #EUpol #Palestine

  28. The U.S. is considering asking Israel to redirect a portion of the approximately $5 billion in withheld Palestinian Authority tax revenues toward Trump’s post-war Gaza reconstruction plan.

    #Israel #Palestine #Gaza #Trump #Genocide #WarProfiteers

  29. The U.S. is considering asking Israel to redirect a portion of the approximately $5 billion in withheld Palestinian Authority tax revenues toward Trump’s post-war Gaza reconstruction plan.

    #Israel #Palestine #Gaza #Trump #Genocide #WarProfiteers

  30. The U.S. is considering asking Israel to redirect a portion of the approximately $5 billion in withheld Palestinian Authority tax revenues toward Trump’s post-war Gaza reconstruction plan.

    #Israel #Palestine #Gaza #Trump #Genocide #WarProfiteers

  31. The U.S. is considering asking Israel to redirect a portion of the approximately $5 billion in withheld Palestinian Authority tax revenues toward Trump’s post-war Gaza reconstruction plan.

    #Israel #Palestine #Gaza #Trump #Genocide #WarProfiteers

  32. The U.S. is considering asking Israel to redirect a portion of the approximately $5 billion in withheld Palestinian Authority tax revenues toward Trump’s post-war Gaza reconstruction plan.

    #Israel #Palestine #Gaza #Trump #Genocide #WarProfiteers

  33. "The single largest institutional emitter on planet Earth is the global military-industrial complex and nobody is permitted to mention it at a climate summit because the same countries that drop the bombs hold the seats." #australia #unitednations #climateemergency #globalwarming #fossilfuels #militaryindustrialcomplex #warprofiteers #warpigs
    substack.com/home/post/p-19487

  34. "The single largest institutional emitter on planet Earth is the global military-industrial complex and nobody is permitted to mention it at a climate summit because the same countries that drop the bombs hold the seats." #australia #unitednations #climateemergency #globalwarming #fossilfuels #militaryindustrialcomplex #warprofiteers #warpigs
    substack.com/home/post/p-19487

  35. "The single largest institutional emitter on planet Earth is the global military-industrial complex and nobody is permitted to mention it at a climate summit because the same countries that drop the bombs hold the seats." #australia #unitednations #climateemergency #globalwarming #fossilfuels #militaryindustrialcomplex #warprofiteers #warpigs
    substack.com/home/post/p-19487

  36. "The single largest institutional emitter on planet Earth is the global military-industrial complex and nobody is permitted to mention it at a climate summit because the same countries that drop the bombs hold the seats." #australia #unitednations #climateemergency #globalwarming #fossilfuels #militaryindustrialcomplex #warprofiteers #warpigs
    substack.com/home/post/p-19487

  37. "The single largest institutional emitter on planet Earth is the global military-industrial complex and nobody is permitted to mention it at a climate summit because the same countries that drop the bombs hold the seats." #australia #unitednations #climateemergency #globalwarming #fossilfuels #militaryindustrialcomplex #warprofiteers #warpigs
    substack.com/home/post/p-19487

  38. Ooopsies! #WhiteHouse accidentally releases video of #TrumpSucks saying the truth about #war's priority

    "In a closed door speech the White House apparently accidently published and then deleted (but not before it was downloaded and reshared), #DonaldTrump declared the inability of the federal government to provide for things like #daycare when his priority is #military strength, not the #welfare of the American public. Senator Chris Van Hollen joins to discuss."

    msn.com/en-us/news/politics/wh

    #USPol #KillThePoor #WarOnIran #TrumpsWar #WarCrimes #WarProfiteers #WorldPol

  39. Ooopsies! #WhiteHouse accidentally releases video of #TrumpSucks saying the truth about #war's priority

    "In a closed door speech the White House apparently accidently published and then deleted (but not before it was downloaded and reshared), #DonaldTrump declared the inability of the federal government to provide for things like #daycare when his priority is #military strength, not the #welfare of the American public. Senator Chris Van Hollen joins to discuss."

    msn.com/en-us/news/politics/wh

    #USPol #KillThePoor #WarOnIran #TrumpsWar #WarCrimes #WarProfiteers #WorldPol

  40. Ooopsies! #WhiteHouse accidentally releases video of #TrumpSucks saying the truth about #war's priority

    "In a closed door speech the White House apparently accidently published and then deleted (but not before it was downloaded and reshared), #DonaldTrump declared the inability of the federal government to provide for things like #daycare when his priority is #military strength, not the #welfare of the American public. Senator Chris Van Hollen joins to discuss."

    msn.com/en-us/news/politics/wh

    #USPol #KillThePoor #WarOnIran #TrumpsWar #WarCrimes #WarProfiteers #WorldPol