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#usss — Public Fediverse posts

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  1. 🟡 Security Precaution | 6/10
    🇺🇸 🇹🇷

    Trump says Secret Service ordered plane switch during Turkey trip
    US President Donald Trump stated that the Secret Service ordered a switch to a different plane during his trip to Turkey for security reasons.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #Trump #USSS #Security #Turkey

  2. 🟡 Security Precaution | 6/10
    🇺🇸 🇹🇷

    Trump says Secret Service ordered plane switch during Turkey trip
    US President Donald Trump stated that the Secret Service ordered a switch to a different plane during his trip to Turkey for security reasons.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #Trump #USSS #Security #Turkey

  3. 🟡 Security Precaution | 6/10
    🇺🇸 🇹🇷

    Trump says Secret Service ordered plane switch during Turkey trip
    US President Donald Trump stated that the Secret Service ordered a switch to a different plane during his trip to Turkey for security reasons.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #Trump #USSS #Security #Turkey

  4. Spending millions and completely closing down the heart of New York City just so you can get booed by everyone else at a basketball game is next level delusion. Achievement unlocked, Donald Trump! #nyc #newyork #potus #manhattan #nypd #mamdani #trump #knicks #spurs #nba #djt #usss #fbi

    No walking allowed in heart of...

  5. Spending millions and completely closing down the heart of New York City just so you can get booed by everyone else at a basketball game is next level delusion. Achievement unlocked, Donald Trump! #nyc #newyork #potus #manhattan #nypd #mamdani #trump #knicks #spurs #nba #djt #usss #fbi

    No walking allowed in heart of...

  6. Spending millions and completely closing down the heart of New York City just so you can get booed by everyone else at a basketball game is next level delusion. Achievement unlocked, Donald Trump! #nyc #newyork #potus #manhattan #nypd #mamdani #trump #knicks #spurs #nba #djt #usss #fbi

    No walking allowed in heart of...

  7. Spending millions and completely closing down the heart of New York City just so you can get booed by everyone else at a basketball game is next level delusion. Achievement unlocked, Donald Trump! #nyc #newyork #potus #manhattan #nypd #mamdani #trump #knicks #spurs #nba #djt #usss #fbi

    No walking allowed in heart of...

  8. Spending millions and completely closing down the heart of New York City just so you can get booed by everyone else at a basketball game is next level delusion. Achievement unlocked, Donald Trump! #nyc #newyork #potus #manhattan #nypd #mamdani #trump #knicks #spurs #nba #djt #usss #fbi

    No walking allowed in heart of...

  9. Beautiful weather for takeoff from Koltsovo airport airport in Yekaterinburg area (Russian Federation) “METAR USSS 160630Z 17002MPS CAVOK 27/08 Q1018 R08R/CLRD60 NOSIG RMK QFE743/0991” : See what it means on bigorre.org/aero/meteo/usss/en #koltsovoairportairport #airport #yekaterinburg #russianfederation #usss #svx #metar #aviation #aviationweather #avgeek vl

  10. Beautiful weather for takeoff from Koltsovo airport airport in Yekaterinburg area (Russian Federation) “METAR USSS 160630Z 17002MPS CAVOK 27/08 Q1018 R08R/CLRD60 NOSIG RMK QFE743/0991” : See what it means on bigorre.org/aero/meteo/usss/en #koltsovoairportairport #airport #yekaterinburg #russianfederation #usss #svx #metar #aviation #aviationweather #avgeek vl

  11. Beautiful weather for takeoff from Koltsovo airport airport in Yekaterinburg area (Russian Federation) “METAR USSS 160630Z 17002MPS CAVOK 27/08 Q1018 R08R/CLRD60 NOSIG RMK QFE743/0991” : See what it means on bigorre.org/aero/meteo/usss/en #koltsovoairportairport #airport #yekaterinburg #russianfederation #usss #svx #metar #aviation #aviationweather #avgeek vl

  12. Beautiful weather for takeoff from Koltsovo airport airport in Yekaterinburg area (Russian Federation) “METAR USSS 160630Z 17002MPS CAVOK 27/08 Q1018 R08R/CLRD60 NOSIG RMK QFE743/0991” : See what it means on bigorre.org/aero/meteo/usss/en #koltsovoairportairport #airport #yekaterinburg #russianfederation #usss #svx #metar #aviation #aviationweather #avgeek vl

  13. Beautiful weather for takeoff from Koltsovo airport airport in Yekaterinburg area (Russian Federation) “METAR USSS 160630Z 17002MPS CAVOK 27/08 Q1018 R08R/CLRD60 NOSIG RMK QFE743/0991” : See what it means on bigorre.org/aero/meteo/usss/en #koltsovoairportairport #airport #yekaterinburg #russianfederation #usss #svx #metar #aviation #aviationweather #avgeek vl

  14. JFC

    I see the #Trump admin is supplying “only the best people” for his predecessors’ #security.

    A #US #SecretService special agent on former first lady #JillBiden’s security detail accidentally shot their own leg at the Philadelphia International Airport [#PHL] Friday morning, an agency official said.

    #Biden #USSS
    cnn.com/2026/03/27/politics/ji

  15. JFC

    I see the #Trump admin is supplying “only the best people” for his predecessors’ #security.

    A #US #SecretService special agent on former first lady #JillBiden’s security detail accidentally shot their own leg at the Philadelphia International Airport [#PHL] Friday morning, an agency official said.

    #Biden #USSS
    cnn.com/2026/03/27/politics/ji

  16. JFC

    I see the #Trump admin is supplying “only the best people” for his predecessors’ #security.

    A #US #SecretService special agent on former first lady #JillBiden’s security detail accidentally shot their own leg at the Philadelphia International Airport [#PHL] Friday morning, an agency official said.

    #Biden #USSS
    cnn.com/2026/03/27/politics/ji

  17. JFC

    I see the #Trump admin is supplying “only the best people” for his predecessors’ #security.

    A #US #SecretService special agent on former first lady #JillBiden’s security detail accidentally shot their own leg at the Philadelphia International Airport [#PHL] Friday morning, an agency official said.

    #Biden #USSS
    cnn.com/2026/03/27/politics/ji

  18. JFC

    I see the #Trump admin is supplying “only the best people” for his predecessors’ #security.

    A #US #SecretService special agent on former first lady #JillBiden’s security detail accidentally shot their own leg at the Philadelphia International Airport [#PHL] Friday morning, an agency official said.

    #Biden #USSS
    cnn.com/2026/03/27/politics/ji

  19. Ich glaube, nachdem nun selbst einige Medien aus dem InfoSec-Bereich die stark nach Humbug riechende SIM-Farm-Geschichte des USSS völlig unkritisch übernommen haben, bin ich wohl gezwungen, den Medienkonsum einiger Medien zu überdenken.

    Positiv erwähnt sei Seytonic.

    #USpol #USSS #UNGA #NYC #NewYork #SIMFarm #Infosec #Security

  20. Ich glaube, nachdem nun selbst einige Medien aus dem InfoSec-Bereich die stark nach Humbug riechende SIM-Farm-Geschichte des USSS völlig unkritisch übernommen haben, bin ich wohl gezwungen, den Medienkonsum einiger Medien zu überdenken.

    Positiv erwähnt sei Seytonic.

    #USpol #USSS #UNGA #NYC #NewYork #SIMFarm #Infosec #Security

  21. Ich glaube, nachdem nun selbst einige Medien aus dem InfoSec-Bereich die stark nach Humbug riechende SIM-Farm-Geschichte des USSS völlig unkritisch übernommen haben, bin ich wohl gezwungen, den Medienkonsum einiger Medien zu überdenken.

    Positiv erwähnt sei Seytonic.

    #USpol #USSS #UNGA #NYC #NewYork #SIMFarm #Infosec #Security

  22. @kevinrns I am sorry to see that you are confused.

    The point is: This is not what the #USSS makes it out to be. Yet, many publications have, uncritically, copied the verbiage of the USSS.

    When someone cryies "WOLF!" and you point out that it is really a cat, the exact cat breed is of lesser importance.

  23. @kevinrns I am sorry to see that you are confused.

    The point is: This is not what the #USSS makes it out to be. Yet, many publications have, uncritically, copied the verbiage of the USSS.

    When someone cryies "WOLF!" and you point out that it is really a cat, the exact cat breed is of lesser importance.

  24. @kevinrns I am sorry to see that you are confused.

    The point is: This is not what the #USSS makes it out to be. Yet, many publications have, uncritically, copied the verbiage of the USSS.

    When someone cryies "WOLF!" and you point out that it is really a cat, the exact cat breed is of lesser importance.

  25. @kevinrns I am sorry to see that you are confused.

    The point is: This is not what the #USSS makes it out to be. Yet, many publications have, uncritically, copied the verbiage of the USSS.

    When someone cryies "WOLF!" and you point out that it is really a cat, the exact cat breed is of lesser importance.

  26. @kevinrns I am sorry to see that you are confused.

    The point is: This is not what the #USSS makes it out to be. Yet, many publications have, uncritically, copied the verbiage of the USSS.

    When someone cryies "WOLF!" and you point out that it is really a cat, the exact cat breed is of lesser importance.

  27. @kevinrns Good question. Maybe the #USSS only found 10%!

    Same result. Manhattan alone has 4 mio people on a normal day, and probably more M2M-SIMs on top. An extra million "nefarious" SIMs means ~+10% for the networks.

    Also, it makes no sense to build such a complex "attack" system. He who wants to disrupt mobile networks would use cheap jammers from multiple locations (remember it's 3D).

    If they want to wreak sophisticated chaos, they would deploy fake cell sites. Not #SIM farms.

  28. @kevinrns Good question. Maybe the #USSS only found 10%!

    Same result. Manhattan alone has 4 mio people on a normal day, and probably more M2M-SIMs on top. An extra million "nefarious" SIMs means ~+10% for the networks.

    Also, it makes no sense to build such a complex "attack" system. He who wants to disrupt mobile networks would use cheap jammers from multiple locations (remember it's 3D).

    If they want to wreak sophisticated chaos, they would deploy fake cell sites. Not #SIM farms.

  29. @kevinrns Good question. Maybe the #USSS only found 10%!

    Same result. Manhattan alone has 4 mio people on a normal day, and probably more M2M-SIMs on top. An extra million "nefarious" SIMs means ~+10% for the networks.

    Also, it makes no sense to build such a complex "attack" system. He who wants to disrupt mobile networks would use cheap jammers from multiple locations (remember it's 3D).

    If they want to wreak sophisticated chaos, they would deploy fake cell sites. Not #SIM farms.

  30. @kevinrns Good question. Maybe the #USSS only found 10%!

    Same result. Manhattan alone has 4 mio people on a normal day, and probably more M2M-SIMs on top. An extra million "nefarious" SIMs means ~+10% for the networks.

    Also, it makes no sense to build such a complex "attack" system. He who wants to disrupt mobile networks would use cheap jammers from multiple locations (remember it's 3D).

    If they want to wreak sophisticated chaos, they would deploy fake cell sites. Not #SIM farms.

  31. @kevinrns Good question. Maybe the #USSS only found 10%!

    Same result. Manhattan alone has 4 mio people on a normal day, and probably more M2M-SIMs on top. An extra million "nefarious" SIMs means ~+10% for the networks.

    Also, it makes no sense to build such a complex "attack" system. He who wants to disrupt mobile networks would use cheap jammers from multiple locations (remember it's 3D).

    If they want to wreak sophisticated chaos, they would deploy fake cell sites. Not #SIM farms.

  32. 6/6
    ...so theoretically, it should be easy to block all #911 calls coming from that #telecom provider if they suddenly feed 100k 911 calls at once. That would affect that provider's legit customers, but not the overall network, and 911 would continue to work for everyone else.

    The confiscated #SIM farms were surely used for an untoward purpose like spam, fraud, difficult to trace nefarious calls and maybe drug deals. So yeah, shut them down.

    The real success for the #USSS is their #PR show.

  33. 6/6
    ...so theoretically, it should be easy to block all #911 calls coming from that #telecom provider if they suddenly feed 100k 911 calls at once. That would affect that provider's legit customers, but not the overall network, and 911 would continue to work for everyone else.

    The confiscated #SIM farms were surely used for an untoward purpose like spam, fraud, difficult to trace nefarious calls and maybe drug deals. So yeah, shut them down.

    The real success for the #USSS is their #PR show.

  34. 6/6
    ...so theoretically, it should be easy to block all #911 calls coming from that #telecom provider if they suddenly feed 100k 911 calls at once. That would affect that provider's legit customers, but not the overall network, and 911 would continue to work for everyone else.

    The confiscated #SIM farms were surely used for an untoward purpose like spam, fraud, difficult to trace nefarious calls and maybe drug deals. So yeah, shut them down.

    The real success for the #USSS is their #PR show.

  35. 6/6
    ...so theoretically, it should be easy to block all #911 calls coming from that #telecom provider if they suddenly feed 100k 911 calls at once. That would affect that provider's legit customers, but not the overall network, and 911 would continue to work for everyone else.

    The confiscated #SIM farms were surely used for an untoward purpose like spam, fraud, difficult to trace nefarious calls and maybe drug deals. So yeah, shut them down.

    The real success for the #USSS is their #PR show.

  36. 6/6
    ...so theoretically, it should be easy to block all #911 calls coming from that #telecom provider if they suddenly feed 100k 911 calls at once. That would affect that provider's legit customers, but not the overall network, and 911 would continue to work for everyone else.

    The confiscated #SIM farms were surely used for an untoward purpose like spam, fraud, difficult to trace nefarious calls and maybe drug deals. So yeah, shut them down.

    The real success for the #USSS is their #PR show.

  37. 5/n
    Maybe. That depends on the routing setup and mitigation efforts the service provider, the mobile network, any intermediary provider, and the #911 call centre itself have.

    I don't know how well the various 911 callcentres in the #Tristate area around #Manhattan are prepared for Denial of Service attacks. But the overall #telecom infrastructure wouldn't be affected.

    It seems that many (all?) of the #SIM cards confiscated by the #USSS were from the same company. So it should be easy...

  38. 5/n
    Maybe. That depends on the routing setup and mitigation efforts the service provider, the mobile network, any intermediary provider, and the #911 call centre itself have.

    I don't know how well the various 911 callcentres in the #Tristate area around #Manhattan are prepared for Denial of Service attacks. But the overall #telecom infrastructure wouldn't be affected.

    It seems that many (all?) of the #SIM cards confiscated by the #USSS were from the same company. So it should be easy...

  39. 5/n
    Maybe. That depends on the routing setup and mitigation efforts the service provider, the mobile network, any intermediary provider, and the #911 call centre itself have.

    I don't know how well the various 911 callcentres in the #Tristate area around #Manhattan are prepared for Denial of Service attacks. But the overall #telecom infrastructure wouldn't be affected.

    It seems that many (all?) of the #SIM cards confiscated by the #USSS were from the same company. So it should be easy...

  40. 5/n
    Maybe. That depends on the routing setup and mitigation efforts the service provider, the mobile network, any intermediary provider, and the #911 call centre itself have.

    I don't know how well the various 911 callcentres in the #Tristate area around #Manhattan are prepared for Denial of Service attacks. But the overall #telecom infrastructure wouldn't be affected.

    It seems that many (all?) of the #SIM cards confiscated by the #USSS were from the same company. So it should be easy...

  41. 5/n
    Maybe. That depends on the routing setup and mitigation efforts the service provider, the mobile network, any intermediary provider, and the #911 call centre itself have.

    I don't know how well the various 911 callcentres in the #Tristate area around #Manhattan are prepared for Denial of Service attacks. But the overall #telecom infrastructure wouldn't be affected.

    It seems that many (all?) of the #SIM cards confiscated by the #USSS were from the same company. So it should be easy...

  42. 4/n
    In high-rise environments like #Manhattan, mobile #telecom networks are designed in 3D.

    If you have a few thousand SIM cards on, say, the 20th floor, you can take out the local cell, probably affect the 19th and 21st floor as well, and maybe the offices on a similar level across the street. But down on the sidewalk, nobody would take note.

    But you sure can't attack the mobile networks inside the UN from a few blocks over.

    Could someone block #911 by fielding 100k calls at once?

    #USSS

  43. 4/n
    In high-rise environments like #Manhattan, mobile #telecom networks are designed in 3D.

    If you have a few thousand SIM cards on, say, the 20th floor, you can take out the local cell, probably affect the 19th and 21st floor as well, and maybe the offices on a similar level across the street. But down on the sidewalk, nobody would take note.

    But you sure can't attack the mobile networks inside the UN from a few blocks over.

    Could someone block #911 by fielding 100k calls at once?

    #USSS

  44. 4/n
    In high-rise environments like #Manhattan, mobile #telecom networks are designed in 3D.

    If you have a few thousand SIM cards on, say, the 20th floor, you can take out the local cell, probably affect the 19th and 21st floor as well, and maybe the offices on a similar level across the street. But down on the sidewalk, nobody would take note.

    But you sure can't attack the mobile networks inside the UN from a few blocks over.

    Could someone block #911 by fielding 100k calls at once?

    #USSS

  45. 4/n
    In high-rise environments like #Manhattan, mobile #telecom networks are designed in 3D.

    If you have a few thousand SIM cards on, say, the 20th floor, you can take out the local cell, probably affect the 19th and 21st floor as well, and maybe the offices on a similar level across the street. But down on the sidewalk, nobody would take note.

    But you sure can't attack the mobile networks inside the UN from a few blocks over.

    Could someone block #911 by fielding 100k calls at once?

    #USSS

  46. 4/n
    In high-rise environments like #Manhattan, mobile #telecom networks are designed in 3D.

    If you have a few thousand SIM cards on, say, the 20th floor, you can take out the local cell, probably affect the 19th and 21st floor as well, and maybe the offices on a similar level across the street. But down on the sidewalk, nobody would take note.

    But you sure can't attack the mobile networks inside the UN from a few blocks over.

    Could someone block #911 by fielding 100k calls at once?

    #USSS

  47. 3/n
    Yes, but no one would notice. Most of these cells are tiny, covering a very small area, which is also covered by several additional cells. Such mobile network cells go offline all the time, to save power, for maintenance, to improve reception in other areas, due to equipment failure, etc. Users don't notice.

    Now in a place like #Manhattan, mobile network cell design is a different beast. Due to high-rise buildings, #telecom networks can't be designed in 2D.
    #USSS

  48. 3/n
    Yes, but no one would notice. Most of these cells are tiny, covering a very small area, which is also covered by several additional cells. Such mobile network cells go offline all the time, to save power, for maintenance, to improve reception in other areas, due to equipment failure, etc. Users don't notice.

    Now in a place like #Manhattan, mobile network cell design is a different beast. Due to high-rise buildings, #telecom networks can't be designed in 2D.
    #USSS

  49. 3/n
    Yes, but no one would notice. Most of these cells are tiny, covering a very small area, which is also covered by several additional cells. Such mobile network cells go offline all the time, to save power, for maintenance, to improve reception in other areas, due to equipment failure, etc. Users don't notice.

    Now in a place like #Manhattan, mobile network cell design is a different beast. Due to high-rise buildings, #telecom networks can't be designed in 2D.
    #USSS

  50. 3/n
    Yes, but no one would notice. Most of these cells are tiny, covering a very small area, which is also covered by several additional cells. Such mobile network cells go offline all the time, to save power, for maintenance, to improve reception in other areas, due to equipment failure, etc. Users don't notice.

    Now in a place like #Manhattan, mobile network cell design is a different beast. Due to high-rise buildings, #telecom networks can't be designed in 2D.
    #USSS

  51. 3/n
    Yes, but no one would notice. Most of these cells are tiny, covering a very small area, which is also covered by several additional cells. Such mobile network cells go offline all the time, to save power, for maintenance, to improve reception in other areas, due to equipment failure, etc. Users don't notice.

    Now in a place like #Manhattan, mobile network cell design is a different beast. Due to high-rise buildings, #telecom networks can't be designed in 2D.
    #USSS

  52. 2/n
    Sure, in a village such as Oberzögersdorf, you can bring down one of the networks with a DOS-attack if you have a couple thousand SIM cards.

    But such bucolic areas have few, large mobile #network cells, planned in 2D.

    In densely populated areas, that doesn't fly. There are many many cells, on very different frequencies, running in parallel, atop one another, in complex hierarchical topographies.

    Could you take one down with a few thousand #SIM cards?

    #USSS
    #Telecom

  53. 2/n
    Sure, in a village such as Oberzögersdorf, you can bring down one of the networks with a DOS-attack if you have a couple thousand SIM cards.

    But such bucolic areas have few, large mobile #network cells, planned in 2D.

    In densely populated areas, that doesn't fly. There are many many cells, on very different frequencies, running in parallel, atop one another, in complex hierarchical topographies.

    Could you take one down with a few thousand #SIM cards?

    #USSS
    #Telecom

  54. 2/n
    Sure, in a village such as Oberzögersdorf, you can bring down one of the networks with a DOS-attack if you have a couple thousand SIM cards.

    But such bucolic areas have few, large mobile #network cells, planned in 2D.

    In densely populated areas, that doesn't fly. There are many many cells, on very different frequencies, running in parallel, atop one another, in complex hierarchical topographies.

    Could you take one down with a few thousand #SIM cards?

    #USSS
    #Telecom

  55. 2/n
    Sure, in a village such as Oberzögersdorf, you can bring down one of the networks with a DOS-attack if you have a couple thousand SIM cards.

    But such bucolic areas have few, large mobile #network cells, planned in 2D.

    In densely populated areas, that doesn't fly. There are many many cells, on very different frequencies, running in parallel, atop one another, in complex hierarchical topographies.

    Could you take one down with a few thousand #SIM cards?

    #USSS
    #Telecom

  56. 2/n
    Sure, in a village such as Oberzögersdorf, you can bring down one of the networks with a DOS-attack if you have a couple thousand SIM cards.

    But such bucolic areas have few, large mobile #network cells, planned in 2D.

    In densely populated areas, that doesn't fly. There are many many cells, on very different frequencies, running in parallel, atop one another, in complex hierarchical topographies.

    Could you take one down with a few thousand #SIM cards?

    #USSS
    #Telecom

  57. Kudos to the US Secret Service #USSS for their big success!

    No, not the dismantling of five #SIM farms, but the almost complete domination of the media sphere: " #Telecom threat", "crippling" "DANGER to the UNITED NATIONS!!!"

    Of course it is bullshit, mostly.

    Think about it: They found some 100k SIM cards at 5 locations distributed over an area about the size of Cyprus. But the most densely populated part of North America, which includes #Manhattan .

    1/n