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#twilio — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #twilio, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Если клиент не идёт в больничку — телефонный бот для телемедицины

    Расскажу, как я писал телефонного бота для обзвона клиентов страховой компании. Как сокращал время ответа и боролся с подвисанием при вызове API.

    habr.com/ru/articles/1047236/

    #agentic_ai #voice_assistant #twilio #promptengineering #langgraph #cloudformation #aws

  2. Голосовой агент — это не чатбот с телефоном: 40 часов экономии и $100, сожженные на ботах

    Я однажды примерно за сутки сжег около $100 на голосовом агенте. Не на большом запуске. Не на огромной базе. Не на хитрой рекламной кампании. Просто на небольшом пуле холодных контактов, где агент периодически попадал на voicemail, IVR, секретарей и других ботов. В какой-то момент два не очень умных голосовых процесса могли довольно долго вежливо говорить друг другу что-то в духе:

    habr.com/ru/articles/1031148/

    #голосовые_агенты #voice_agents #LLM #Twilio #ElevenLabs #Retell #OpenClaw #STT #TTS #latency

  3. #Persona to "lider" w swojej działce. Sprawdziłem stronę www, korzystają z ich usług m. in.:
    #LinkedIn
    #OpenAI
    #Twilio
    #Reddit
    #Etsy
    #Udemy
    #Coursera

    Więc moja interpretacja jest taka, że do danych z tych serwisów #Palantir ma dostęp. A przez Palantir służby 🤷‍♂️

    Źródło: https://withpersona[.]com/customers

  4. #Persona to "lider" w swojej działce. Sprawdziłem stronę www, korzystają z ich usług m. in.:
    #LinkedIn
    #OpenAI
    #Twilio
    #Reddit
    #Etsy
    #Udemy
    #Coursera

    Więc moja interpretacja jest taka, że do danych z tych serwisów #Palantir ma dostęp. A przez Palantir służby 🤷‍♂️

    Źródło: https://withpersona[.]com/customers

  5. #Persona to "lider" w swojej działce. Sprawdziłem stronę www, korzystają z ich usług m. in.:
    #LinkedIn
    #OpenAI
    #Twilio
    #Reddit
    #Etsy
    #Udemy
    #Coursera

    Więc moja interpretacja jest taka, że do danych z tych serwisów #Palantir ma dostęp. A przez Palantir służby 🤷‍♂️

    Źródło: https://withpersona[.]com/customers

  6. #Persona to "lider" w swojej działce. Sprawdziłem stronę www, korzystają z ich usług m. in.:
    #LinkedIn
    #OpenAI
    #Twilio
    #Reddit
    #Etsy
    #Udemy
    #Coursera

    Więc moja interpretacja jest taka, że do danych z tych serwisów #Palantir ma dostęp. A przez Palantir służby 🤷‍♂️

    Źródło: https://withpersona[.]com/customers

  7. #Persona to "lider" w swojej działce. Sprawdziłem stronę www, korzystają z ich usług m. in.:
    #LinkedIn
    #OpenAI
    #Twilio
    #Reddit
    #Etsy
    #Udemy
    #Coursera

    Więc moja interpretacja jest taka, że do danych z tych serwisów #Palantir ma dostęp. A przez Palantir służby 🤷‍♂️

    Źródło: https://withpersona[.]com/customers

  8. 🚫📞 I finally killed voicemail. Instead of letting missed calls go to voicemail, I forward them to a Twilio number that simply plays a short message ("Please text or email me") and hangs up.

    Step-by-step instructions: lambda-files.crocodile.org/202

    #privacy #nocalls #twilio

  9. 🚫📞 I finally killed voicemail. Instead of letting missed calls go to voicemail, I forward them to a Twilio number that simply plays a short message ("Please text or email me") and hangs up.

    Step-by-step instructions: lambda-files.crocodile.org/202

    #privacy #nocalls #twilio

  10. Twilio finds businesses overestimate AI chatbot satisfaction by 31%: Twilio survey of 4,800 consumers and 457 business leaders shows 90% of organizations believe customers are satisfied with AI, but only 59% of consumers agree. ppc.land/twilio-finds-business #AI #Chatbots #CustomerSatisfaction #Twilio #BusinessInsights

  11. Learn what problems #Twilio had to solve to efficiently build a resilient & scalable asynchronous system to handle a complex workflow implementing A2P Messaging Compliance.

    Find out the advantages of adopting Workflow Orchestration in this must-read #InfoQ article: bit.ly/47DO1OD

    #AsynchronousArchitecture #Observability #Monitoring #Resilience #Performance #DevOps #CloudComputing

  12. Learn what problems had to solve to efficiently build a resilient & scalable asynchronous system to handle a complex workflow implementing A2P Messaging Compliance.

    Find out the advantages of adopting Workflow Orchestration in this must-read article: bit.ly/47DO1OD

  13. Sales scheduling platform Chili Piper raises $33M Series B funding led by Tiger Global - Chili Piper, which has a sophisticated SaaS appointment scheduling platform for sa... - feedproxy.google.com/~r/Techcr #artificialintelligence #gradientventures #managingpartner #base10partners #leadgeneration #foodanddrink #tigerglobal #co-founder #forrester #marketing #spotify #europe #intuit #twilio #sales #tc

  14. Atlassian’s co-CEO Scott Farquhar will join us at TC Sessions: Enterprise - Few companies have changed the way developers work as profoundly as Atlassian. Its tools like Jira a... more: feedproxy.google.com/~r/Techcr #tcsessions:enterprise2019 #startupcompany #accelpartners #scottfarquhar #sanfrancisco #confluence #atlassian #australia #companies #computing #economy #spotify #sydney #twilio #audi #jira #tc

  15. Vonage brings number programmability to its business service - Chances are you still mostly think of Vonage as a consumer VOIP player, but in recent years, the co... more: feedproxy.google.com/~r/Techcr #telecommunications #enterprise #developer #broadband #twilio #vonage #cloud #voip #api

  16. Protecting Against Credit Card Scams

    shkspr.mobi/blog/2012/07/prote

    I recently read about an innovative telephone call scam.

    A scammer rings the mark and asks for her credit card details. If the mark refuses, the scammer tells her to hang up the phone, then dial 999 and ask for "Sergeant Scammer of the Fraud Squad".

    The mark does so, and is connected to what they assume is the emergency services. However, because the scammer hasn't hung up at their end, the call is still active. So the mark isn't speaking to 999, but to the scammer.

    Pretty devious. Luckily, it can't work on mobile. But it got me thinking - how could you get someone to give you credit card details over the phone? I'm inspired by both Bruce Schneier's "Movie Plot Threat" competitions and Kevin Mitnick's work on Social Engineering.

    Trying to think like "the enemy" is a crucial part of understanding how nefarious people can exploit a situation. I think it should be considered the seventh "thinking hat".

    The Goal

    I want the victim to willingly give me her credit card details. I do not want her to be suspicious or report my activity to the police.

    The Strategy

    • The victim receives a text on her phone.
    • "Your Barclay's credit card (starting 4304) was recently used to buy £2,103.54 worth of goods in China. If you wish to dispute this transaction, please call 0113 496 0123."

    • The victim checks her BarclayCard - it does start 4304. Damn! She rings the number.
    • "Welcome to the BarclayCard fraud line," says the voice at the other end.
    • "To protect your security, please type in your sixteen digit card number," says the automated voice. So that's what the victim does.
    • ... after typing in several more details, the victim finally gets through to the scammer.
    • At this point, the scammer can attempt to get more information - such as home address - or simply assure the victim that the fraud has been reported.
    • "Unfortunately," the fraudster says, "the £2,103.54 will show up on your July statement. But you will see the refund on the August statement."

    How It Works

    There are a number of factors which go into making this a potentially successful scam.

    1. People are quite used to receiving texts from their card issuer.
    2. It's quite common to be asked to confirm a suspicious transaction.
    3. Credit cards number have a predictable start sequence. That's why credit card receipts often show you only the last few digits. This tricks the victim into thinking that the scammer knowa two crucial pieces of information; the credit card issuer and the credit card number.
    4. We're trained not to give details to strangers who ring us up. By contrast, we're expected to give details to people when we ring them!
    5. You can't argue or otherwise interrogate an IVR. You either have to give that disembodied voice your details or hang up.
    6. Again, we're quite used to typing in our credit card details and then pressing the hash key!
    7. If we do get through to a real person, the standard Social Engineering tricks all apply. Only, in this case, not only is the victim worried about the potential fraud, she has also primed herself into thinking she's speaking with her credit card provider.
    8. At this point, the scammer knows that they can use the card for a fraudulent purchase and the victim won't report it! It will only be after two statements have been received that the victim will notice that she hasn't been refunded.

    Problems

    Now, this fraud isn't without issue. The most notable being that you do not know who has a credit card issued by a specific provider. The scammer would either need some third party intelligence that their victims all use HSBC, or they could just go on a phishing expedition. Spam a few thousand numbers and there will bound to be a few which have the card which is being targeted.

    How To Do It

    Using services like Twilio and Tropo, it's quite easy to create a telephone menu. It can play back a recorded voice, save all the user's keypresses, then pass the call on to the scammer.

    They can even handle the automated sending of the text messages, playing back different messages depending on the caller - "Welcome to HSBC", "Welcome to American Express", etc.

    Defending Against This Scam

    There are three main strategies for defending against this scam - and they all boil down to trust

    Don't Trust An Unknown Phone Number

    Save your credit card provider's phone number in your address book. That is the only number you should ring. If someone rings you - tell them that you will take their name and call them back on the official number. If you receive a text - call the official number to check it is legitimate.

    Don't Trust Partial Information

    The first few numbers of your credit card are fairly generic. Trusting someone who guesses your Visa Electron starts with "4197" is like trusting a psychic who says "You were a bit of a handful growing up, especially in your teens." It's such general information as to be worthless.

    Don't Trust The Other Person

    I sometimes act deviously. When asked to give my address, I'll give an incorrect house number or post code. If the person at the other end doesn't pick up on the mistake, I assume I'm talking to a scammer. Similarly, you don't have to trust interactive menus. You can input incorrect information, and see if it is accepted without complaint - a sure sign of a scam. Or see if it gets you through to a human.

    Is This Scam Possible?

    One hurdle is targeting enough people who have the "correct" credit card. The scam would work without the credit card info, but may be less effective.

    The cost of sending out the texts is also a constraint. Although text bundles are relatively cheap now.

    Shutting down the numbers - or tracing them - is perhaps the biggest issue. Buying a disposable pre-pay SIM is virtually anonymous. A landline number is probably fairly easy to trace - assuming the police have the time and staffing levels to investigate such a scam.

    And that may be the deciding issue. If someone reports a suspicious text to the police or their credit card provider, how quickly can the number be shut down? If the scammer is sending out hundreds of fraudulent SMS an hour, it would only take a few responses to make the scheme worthwhile.

    Disclaimer

    Naturally, you should not attempt this. The penalties for credit card fraud a very serious. This is intended as a thought experiment.

    If you want people to willingly give up their credit card information - take a look at the morons on Twitter posting photos of their cards!

    #creditCard #fraud #scam #sms #tropo #twilio #voice
  17. Protecting Against Credit Card Scams

    shkspr.mobi/blog/2012/07/prote

    I recently read about an innovative telephone call scam.

    A scammer rings the mark and asks for her credit card details. If the mark refuses, the scammer tells her to hang up the phone, then dial 999 and ask for "Sergeant Scammer of the Fraud Squad".

    The mark does so, and is connected to what they assume is the emergency services. However, because the scammer hasn't hung up at their end, the call is still active. So the mark isn't speaking to 999, but to the scammer.

    Pretty devious. Luckily, it can't work on mobile. But it got me thinking - how could you get someone to give you credit card details over the phone? I'm inspired by both Bruce Schneier's "Movie Plot Threat" competitions and Kevin Mitnick's work on Social Engineering.

    Trying to think like "the enemy" is a crucial part of understanding how nefarious people can exploit a situation. I think it should be considered the seventh "thinking hat".

    The Goal

    I want the victim to willingly give me her credit card details. I do not want her to be suspicious or report my activity to the police.

    The Strategy

    • The victim receives a text on her phone.
    • "Your Barclay's credit card (starting 4304) was recently used to buy £2,103.54 worth of goods in China. If you wish to dispute this transaction, please call 0113 496 0123."

    • The victim checks her BarclayCard - it does start 4304. Damn! She rings the number.
    • "Welcome to the BarclayCard fraud line," says the voice at the other end.
    • "To protect your security, please type in your sixteen digit card number," says the automated voice. So that's what the victim does.
    • ... after typing in several more details, the victim finally gets through to the scammer.
    • At this point, the scammer can attempt to get more information - such as home address - or simply assure the victim that the fraud has been reported.
    • "Unfortunately," the fraudster says, "the £2,103.54 will show up on your July statement. But you will see the refund on the August statement."

    How It Works

    There are a number of factors which go into making this a potentially successful scam.

    1. People are quite used to receiving texts from their card issuer.
    2. It's quite common to be asked to confirm a suspicious transaction.
    3. Credit cards number have a predictable start sequence. That's why credit card receipts often show you only the last few digits. This tricks the victim into thinking that the scammer knowa two crucial pieces of information; the credit card issuer and the credit card number.
    4. We're trained not to give details to strangers who ring us up. By contrast, we're expected to give details to people when we ring them!
    5. You can't argue or otherwise interrogate an IVR. You either have to give that disembodied voice your details or hang up.
    6. Again, we're quite used to typing in our credit card details and then pressing the hash key!
    7. If we do get through to a real person, the standard Social Engineering tricks all apply. Only, in this case, not only is the victim worried about the potential fraud, she has also primed herself into thinking she's speaking with her credit card provider.
    8. At this point, the scammer knows that they can use the card for a fraudulent purchase and the victim won't report it! It will only be after two statements have been received that the victim will notice that she hasn't been refunded.

    Problems

    Now, this fraud isn't without issue. The most notable being that you do not know who has a credit card issued by a specific provider. The scammer would either need some third party intelligence that their victims all use HSBC, or they could just go on a phishing expedition. Spam a few thousand numbers and there will bound to be a few which have the card which is being targeted.

    How To Do It

    Using services like Twilio and Tropo, it's quite easy to create a telephone menu. It can play back a recorded voice, save all the user's keypresses, then pass the call on to the scammer.

    They can even handle the automated sending of the text messages, playing back different messages depending on the caller - "Welcome to HSBC", "Welcome to American Express", etc.

    Defending Against This Scam

    There are three main strategies for defending against this scam - and they all boil down to trust

    Don't Trust An Unknown Phone Number

    Save your credit card provider's phone number in your address book. That is the only number you should ring. If someone rings you - tell them that you will take their name and call them back on the official number. If you receive a text - call the official number to check it is legitimate.

    Don't Trust Partial Information

    The first few numbers of your credit card are fairly generic. Trusting someone who guesses your Visa Electron starts with "4197" is like trusting a psychic who says "You were a bit of a handful growing up, especially in your teens." It's such general information as to be worthless.

    Don't Trust The Other Person

    I sometimes act deviously. When asked to give my address, I'll give an incorrect house number or post code. If the person at the other end doesn't pick up on the mistake, I assume I'm talking to a scammer. Similarly, you don't have to trust interactive menus. You can input incorrect information, and see if it is accepted without complaint - a sure sign of a scam. Or see if it gets you through to a human.

    Is This Scam Possible?

    One hurdle is targeting enough people who have the "correct" credit card. The scam would work without the credit card info, but may be less effective.

    The cost of sending out the texts is also a constraint. Although text bundles are relatively cheap now.

    Shutting down the numbers - or tracing them - is perhaps the biggest issue. Buying a disposable pre-pay SIM is virtually anonymous. A landline number is probably fairly easy to trace - assuming the police have the time and staffing levels to investigate such a scam.

    And that may be the deciding issue. If someone reports a suspicious text to the police or their credit card provider, how quickly can the number be shut down? If the scammer is sending out hundreds of fraudulent SMS an hour, it would only take a few responses to make the scheme worthwhile.

    Disclaimer

    Naturally, you should not attempt this. The penalties for credit card fraud a very serious. This is intended as a thought experiment.

    If you want people to willingly give up their credit card information - take a look at the morons on Twitter posting photos of their cards!

    #creditCard #fraud #scam #sms #tropo #twilio #voice