#stanfordinternetobservatory — Public Fediverse posts

Der verlorene Kampf gegen Desinformation
In den USA tobt ein politischer Kulturkampf um Desinformation, Faktenprüfungen und Plattformregeln. Was als technische Frage der Moderation begann, ist zu einem Angriff auf Institutionen geworden, die Falschinformatio
https://www.apfeltalk.de/magazin/news/der-verlorene-kampf-gegen-desinformation/
#News #Desinformation #ElonMusk #Faktenprfung #JimJordan #MattTaibbi #Meinungsfreiheit #NinaJankowicz #SozialeNetzwerke #StanfordInternetObservatory #USA

…included among the nearly 60 individuals & orgs caught up in #DarrenBeattie’s information dragnet are #BillGates; the #opensource #journalism outlet #Bellingcat; fmr #FBI special agent #ClintWatts; #NancyFaeser, #Germany’s interior minister; #DanielFried, a career #State ofcl & fmr US ambassador to Poland; #RenéeDiResta, an expert in online #disinformation who led research at #StanfordInternetObservatory; & #NinaJankowicz, a researcher who briefly led the #DHS Disinformation Governance Board.

The document, originally shared in person w/roughly a dozen #State Dept employees in early March, requested staff emails & other records with or about a host of individuals & organizations that track or write about foreign #disinformation — including #Atlantic #journalist #AnneApplebaum @anneapplebaum, fmr US #cybersecurity official #ChrisKrebs, & the #StanfordInternetObservatory — or have criticized #Trump & his allies, such as the conservative anti-Trump commentator #BillKristol.

The document, originally shared in person w/roughly a dozen #State Dept employees in early March, requested staff emails & other records with or about a host of individuals & organizations that track or write about foreign #disinformation — including #Atlantic #journalist #AnneApplebaum @anneapplebaum, fmr US #cybersecurity official #ChrisKrebs, & the #StanfordInternetObservatory — or have criticized #Trump & his allies, such as the conservative anti-Trump commentator #BillKristol.

The document, originally shared in person w/roughly a dozen #State Dept employees in early March, requested staff emails & other records with or about a host of individuals & organizations that track or write about foreign #disinformation — including #Atlantic #journalist #AnneApplebaum @anneapplebaum, fmr US #cybersecurity official #ChrisKrebs, & the #StanfordInternetObservatory — or have criticized #Trump & his allies, such as the conservative anti-Trump commentator #BillKristol.

The document, originally shared in person w/roughly a dozen #State Dept employees in early March, requested staff emails & other records with or about a host of individuals & organizations that track or write about foreign #disinformation — including #Atlantic #journalist #AnneApplebaum @anneapplebaum, fmr US #cybersecurity official #ChrisKrebs, & the #StanfordInternetObservatory — or have criticized #Trump & his allies, such as the conservative anti-Trump commentator #BillKristol.

The document, originally shared in person w/roughly a dozen #State Dept employees in early March, requested staff emails & other records with or about a host of individuals & organizations that track or write about foreign #disinformation — including #Atlantic #journalist #AnneApplebaum @anneapplebaum, fmr US #cybersecurity official #ChrisKrebs, & the #StanfordInternetObservatory — or have criticized #Trump & his allies, such as the conservative anti-Trump commentator #BillKristol.

»The #StanfordInternetObservatory is being #dismantled: House Republicans attacked the lab’s reports on #misinformation and #electionintegrity — and now #Stanford is pulling the plug.« https://www.platformer.news/stanford-internet-observatory-shutdown-stamos-diresta-sio/?eicker.news #tech #media

"It is just much harder for a volunteer-run, distributed system to roll out protections like E2EE than a centralized company."

#AlexStamos, #SaraShah, #StanfordInternetObservatory, 2023

https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/common-abuses-mastodon-primer

Explain the logic underlying that conclusion. Counterexample, the Matrix network. A distributed system, much of which is volunteer-run.

#E2EE #decentralisation

"It is just much harder for a volunteer-run, distributed system to roll out protections like E2EE than a centralized company."

#AlexStamos, #SaraShah, #StanfordInternetObservatory, 2023

https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/common-abuses-mastodon-primer

Explain the logic underlying that conclusion. Counterexample, the Matrix network. A distributed system, much of which is volunteer-run.

#E2EE #decentralisation

"It is just much harder for a volunteer-run, distributed system to roll out protections like E2EE than a centralized company."

#AlexStamos, #SaraShah, #StanfordInternetObservatory, 2023

https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/common-abuses-mastodon-primer

Explain the logic underlying that conclusion. Counterexample, the Matrix network. A distributed system, much of which is volunteer-run.

#E2EE #decentralisation

"It is just much harder for a volunteer-run, distributed system to roll out protections like E2EE than a centralized company."

#AlexStamos, #SaraShah, #StanfordInternetObservatory, 2023

https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/common-abuses-mastodon-primer

Explain the logic underlying that conclusion. Counterexample, the Matrix network. A distributed system, much of which is volunteer-run.

#E2EE #decentralisation

"Mastodon users probably aren’t aware of CSAM on the platform unless it leaks into their federated timelines. This can happen when a fellow user on their instance follows an account posting CSAM. Ways to handle this problem are few. Though users who follow CSAM-disseminating accounts can be suspended from an instance by administrators, they can easily set up a new account on another..."

#AlexStamos, #SaraShah, #StanfordInternetObservatory, 2023

https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/common-abuses-mastodon-primer

#CSAM

(1/2)

"Mastodon users probably aren’t aware of CSAM on the platform unless it leaks into their federated timelines. This can happen when a fellow user on their instance follows an account posting CSAM. Ways to handle this problem are few. Though users who follow CSAM-disseminating accounts can be suspended from an instance by administrators, they can easily set up a new account on another..."

#AlexStamos, #SaraShah, #StanfordInternetObservatory, 2023

https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/common-abuses-mastodon-primer

#CSAM

(1/2)

"Mastodon users probably aren’t aware of CSAM on the platform unless it leaks into their federated timelines. This can happen when a fellow user on their instance follows an account posting CSAM. Ways to handle this problem are few. Though users who follow CSAM-disseminating accounts can be suspended from an instance by administrators, they can easily set up a new account on another..."

#AlexStamos, #SaraShah, #StanfordInternetObservatory, 2023

https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/common-abuses-mastodon-primer

#CSAM

(1/2)

"Mastodon users probably aren’t aware of CSAM on the platform unless it leaks into their federated timelines. This can happen when a fellow user on their instance follows an account posting CSAM. Ways to handle this problem are few. Though users who follow CSAM-disseminating accounts can be suspended from an instance by administrators, they can easily set up a new account on another..."

#AlexStamos, #SaraShah, #StanfordInternetObservatory, 2023

https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/common-abuses-mastodon-primer

#CSAM

(1/2)

"While large platforms with robust trust & safety teams are able to be more discerning in their moderation..."

#AlexStamos, #SaraShah, #StanfordInternetObservatory, 2023

https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/common-abuses-mastodon-primer

Are they though?

Centralised moderation teams often lack the context to know what they're looking at. Fediverse admins each take care of a small, well-defined bit of overall moderation; the bit that affects accounts on their server. They know what's acceptable in their community.

(1/3)

#moderation

"While large platforms with robust trust & safety teams are able to be more discerning in their moderation..."

#AlexStamos, #SaraShah, #StanfordInternetObservatory, 2023

https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/common-abuses-mastodon-primer

Are they though?

Centralised moderation teams often lack the context to know what they're looking at. Fediverse admins each take care of a small, well-defined bit of overall moderation; the bit that affects accounts on their server. They know what's acceptable in their community.

(1/3)

#moderation

"While large platforms with robust trust & safety teams are able to be more discerning in their moderation..."

#AlexStamos, #SaraShah, #StanfordInternetObservatory, 2023

https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/common-abuses-mastodon-primer

Are they though?

Centralised moderation teams often lack the context to know what they're looking at. Fediverse admins each take care of a small, well-defined bit of overall moderation; the bit that affects accounts on their server. They know what's acceptable in their community.

(1/3)

#moderation

"While large platforms with robust trust & safety teams are able to be more discerning in their moderation..."

#AlexStamos, #SaraShah, #StanfordInternetObservatory, 2023

https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/common-abuses-mastodon-primer

Are they though?

Centralised moderation teams often lack the context to know what they're looking at. Fediverse admins each take care of a small, well-defined bit of overall moderation; the bit that affects accounts on their server. They know what's acceptable in their community.

(1/3)

#moderation