#sorm — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #sorm, aggregated by home.social.
-
#SORM & Co.: Russland 🇷🇺 bei digitaler #Massenüberwachung an vorderster Front | heise online https://www.heise.de/news/SORM-Co-Russland-bei-digitaler-Massenueberwachung-an-vorderster-Front-9769990.html #surveillance #Überwachung #MassSurveillance #Datenschutz #privacy #Biometrie #biometrics #Gesichtserkennung #FacialRecognition
-
#SORM & Co.: Russland 🇷🇺 bei digitaler #Massenüberwachung an vorderster Front | heise online https://www.heise.de/news/SORM-Co-Russland-bei-digitaler-Massenueberwachung-an-vorderster-Front-9769990.html #surveillance #Überwachung #MassSurveillance #Datenschutz #privacy #Biometrie #biometrics #Gesichtserkennung #FacialRecognition
-
New revelations from #Snowden archive surface
A decade after Snowden exposed #NSA and British #GCHQ mass #surveillance, only 1% of documents have been published.
New: NSA backdoored #Cavium #CPU, NSA compromised #Russia's #SORM, NSA #PRISM tapped #Tibet!
The Guardian allowed GCHQ to destroy the copy of the archive in the #UK. The Intercept is no longer in possession of the documents. “I was informed that they destroyed their copy of the archive,” Appelbaum said https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366552520/New-revelations-from-the-Snowden-archive-surface #privacy -
New revelations from #Snowden archive surface
A decade after Snowden exposed #NSA and British #GCHQ mass #surveillance, only 1% of documents have been published.
New: NSA backdoored #Cavium #CPU, NSA compromised #Russia's #SORM, NSA #PRISM tapped #Tibet!
The Guardian allowed GCHQ to destroy the copy of the archive in the #UK. The Intercept is no longer in possession of the documents. “I was informed that they destroyed their copy of the archive,” Appelbaum said https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366552520/New-revelations-from-the-Snowden-archive-surface #privacy -
5. tra i sistemi di intercettazioni LEGALI europei compromessi dalla #NSA figura #SORM, il sistema di intercettazioni legali della #Russia, con disegno in cirillico: "Voi parlate, noi ascoltiamo":
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366552520/New-revelations-from-the-Snowden-archive-surface
-
5. tra i sistemi di intercettazioni LEGALI europei compromessi dalla #NSA figura #SORM, il sistema di intercettazioni legali della #Russia, con disegno in cirillico: "Voi parlate, noi ascoltiamo":
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366552520/New-revelations-from-the-Snowden-archive-surface
-
12. #JacobAppelbaum: unpublished #Snowden files reveal #NSA compromised #Russian #LawfulInterceptions system, #SORM and among example targets of its mass surveillance program, PRISM, the #NSA listed the domain of the #TibetanGovernmentInExile: tibet.net
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366552520/New-revelations-from-the-Snowden-archive-surface
-
12. #JacobAppelbaum: unpublished #Snowden files reveal #NSA compromised #Russian #LawfulInterceptions system, #SORM and among example targets of its mass surveillance program, PRISM, the #NSA listed the domain of the #TibetanGovernmentInExile: tibet.net
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366552520/New-revelations-from-the-Snowden-archive-surface
-
8. According to #JacobAppelbaum's doctoral thesis, Unpublished #NSA documents from the #Snowden archive list their compromise of the #Russian #SORM lawful interceptions infrastructure
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366552520/New-revelations-from-the-Snowden-archive-surface
-
8. According to #JacobAppelbaum's doctoral thesis, Unpublished #NSA documents from the #Snowden archive list their compromise of the #Russian #SORM lawful interceptions infrastructure
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366552520/New-revelations-from-the-Snowden-archive-surface
-
Mikhail Klemaryov shed some light on the capabilities used by the #Russia #SORM surveillance systems hyped by NYT recently, largely consistent with my analysis above:
- For mobile and landline phone conversations, FSB has access to all metadata and call contents in real-time, archiving all of them “just in case” for at least six months with automatic transcription and ability to search by keywords. For persons of interest this retention time is likely much longer. For that reason, Klemaryov recommends not using regular mobile and landline calls in Russia at all.
- For instant messengers, their capabilities are limited to correlation of call metadata between various Internet operators thanks to FSB real-time access to Internet connection metadata going through all Internet providers in Russia. For example, if you have a network stream seen by Alice’s mobile operator consistent with a Signal, WhatsApp or Telegram call that started exactly 09:21 and lasted exactly 39 seconds, you just need to find identical stream seen by Bob’s operator to be able to conclude that Alice talked to Bob. FSB doesn’t know the contents of these calls but only the fact they talked and when.
- These capabilities are further limited as they require access to full metadata logs on both operators. If one caller is abroad, this won’t work. If one caller uses VPN, it won’t work. For that reason Klemaryov recommends using VPN for all Internet traffic in Russia, not only when bypassing blocked content.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3wawFrozMQ
For #Telegram be sure to also read what @rysiek wrote in this thread!
-
Mikhail Klemaryov shed some light on the capabilities used by the #Russia #SORM surveillance systems hyped by NYT recently, largely consistent with my analysis above:
- For mobile and landline phone conversations, FSB has access to all metadata and call contents in real-time, archiving all of them “just in case” for at least six months with automatic transcription and ability to search by keywords. For persons of interest this retention time is likely much longer. For that reason, Klemaryov recommends not using regular mobile and landline calls in Russia at all.
- For instant messengers, their capabilities are limited to correlation of call metadata between various Internet operators thanks to FSB real-time access to Internet connection metadata going through all Internet providers in Russia. For example, if you have a network stream seen by Alice’s mobile operator consistent with a Signal, WhatsApp or Telegram call that started exactly 09:21 and lasted exactly 39 seconds, you just need to find identical stream seen by Bob’s operator to be able to conclude that Alice talked to Bob. FSB doesn’t know the contents of these calls but only the fact they talked and when.
- These capabilities are further limited as they require access to full metadata logs on both operators. If one caller is abroad, this won’t work. If one caller uses VPN, it won’t work. For that reason Klemaryov recommends using VPN for all Internet traffic in Russia, not only when bypassing blocked content.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3wawFrozMQ
For #Telegram be sure to also read what @rysiek wrote in this thread!
