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  1. Philosophy Of Mathematics

    The philosophy of mathematics studies the nature of mathematical truth, mathematical proof, mathematical evidence, mathematical practice, and mathematical explanation. Three philosophical views of mathematics are widely regarded as the ‘classic’ ones. Logicism holds that mathematics is reducible to principles of pure logic. Intuitionism holds that mathematics is concerned with mental constructions and defends a revision of classical mathematics and logic. Finally, formalism is the view […]

    skillssprouts8.wordpress.com/2

  2. In the mountains, I love exploring nature and climbing any little hidden corner.

    My academic interests include mathematics (#mathematics) and mathematical logic ( #mathematicallogic #logic), particularly model theory ( #modeltheory), category theory ( #categorytheory), higher-order logic and metalogic ( #metalogic), as well as the philosophy of mathematics and logic ( #philosophyofmathematics #philosophyoflogic), epistemology and ontology of them.

    #introduction

  3. In the mountains, I love exploring nature and climbing any little hidden corner.

    My academic interests include mathematics (#mathematics) and mathematical logic ( #mathematicallogic #logic), particularly model theory ( #modeltheory), category theory ( #categorytheory), higher-order logic and metalogic ( #metalogic), as well as the philosophy of mathematics and logic ( #philosophyofmathematics #philosophyoflogic), epistemology and ontology of them.

    #introduction

  4. In the mountains, I love exploring nature and climbing any little hidden corner.

    My academic interests include mathematics ( #mathematics) and mathematical logic ( #mathematicallogic #logic), particularly model theory ( #modeltheory), category theory ( #categorytheory), higher-order logic and metalogic ( #metalogic), as well as the philosophy of mathematics and logic ( #philosophyofmathematics #philosophyoflogic), epistemology and ontology of them.

    #introduction

  5. In the mountains, I love exploring nature and climbing any little hidden corner.

    My academic interests include mathematics ( #mathematics) and mathematical logic ( #mathematicallogic #logic), particularly model theory ( #modeltheory), category theory ( #categorytheory), higher-order logic and metalogic ( #metalogic), as well as the philosophy of mathematics and logic ( #philosophyofmathematics #philosophyoflogic), epistemology and ontology of them.

    #introduction

  6. Danuta Gierulanka (1909–1995) was a Polish mathematics educator, psychologist, philosopher, and translator. She was associated with #RomanIngarden and known for her work in #phenomenology and the #philosophyOfMathematics.

  7. This Topos Institute seminar (Kevin Carlson presenting) is an interesting topic -- do we actually need infinite sets to do mathematics? But, I think he takes a long and questionable route to the meat of the topic.

    youtu.be/bHKvT1ZACLY

    The fallacy here is that the answer to "why is there so much consensus in modern mathematics" cannot be a mathematical answer! It has to be grounded in something else: sociology, history, or psychology. It's all very well to point at the structural approach as a unifying point of agreement, but that by itself does not answer "why"?

    It could be: humans have some set-sense like they have a language-sense, and so building things on sense connects to a lot of people. That might be JP Mayberry's point, in his appeal to "Euclidean set theory." But that's not a mathematical claim!

    It could be: people who do not get on board with the structuralist approach don't succeed at being modern mathematicians.

    It could be: we are living in an era that encourages that consensus instead of discouraging it, for reasons that will be evident only in retrospect.

    I think part of the answer is that modern mathematics has achieved consensus by successfully eliminating "truth" as a topic of debate and instead making it a topic of study, in a very postmodernist way. You can insist to your dying day that you're a intuitionist or an ultrafinitist or whatever, and the only response you can get is mathematicians studying what is or isn't provable in your version of logic! It is no longer possible to disagree what mathematics is, because the modern conception swallows any such disagreement into a mathematical object.

    #PhilosophyOfMathematics #MathematicalFoundations

  8. This Topos Institute seminar (Kevin Carlson presenting) is an interesting topic -- do we actually need infinite sets to do mathematics? But, I think he takes a long and questionable route to the meat of the topic.

    youtu.be/bHKvT1ZACLY

    The fallacy here is that the answer to "why is there so much consensus in modern mathematics" cannot be a mathematical answer! It has to be grounded in something else: sociology, history, or psychology. It's all very well to point at the structural approach as a unifying point of agreement, but that by itself does not answer "why"?

    It could be: humans have some set-sense like they have a language-sense, and so building things on sense connects to a lot of people. That might be JP Mayberry's point, in his appeal to "Euclidean set theory." But that's not a mathematical claim!

    It could be: people who do not get on board with the structuralist approach don't succeed at being modern mathematicians.

    It could be: we are living in an era that encourages that consensus instead of discouraging it, for reasons that will be evident only in retrospect.

    I think part of the answer is that modern mathematics has achieved consensus by successfully eliminating "truth" as a topic of debate and instead making it a topic of study, in a very postmodernist way. You can insist to your dying day that you're a intuitionist or an ultrafinitist or whatever, and the only response you can get is mathematicians studying what is or isn't provable in your version of logic! It is no longer possible to disagree what mathematics is, because the modern conception swallows any such disagreement into a mathematical object.

    #PhilosophyOfMathematics #MathematicalFoundations

  9. This Topos Institute seminar (Kevin Carlson presenting) is an interesting topic -- do we actually need infinite sets to do mathematics? But, I think he takes a long and questionable route to the meat of the topic.

    youtu.be/bHKvT1ZACLY

    The fallacy here is that the answer to "why is there so much consensus in modern mathematics" cannot be a mathematical answer! It has to be grounded in something else: sociology, history, or psychology. It's all very well to point at the structural approach as a unifying point of agreement, but that by itself does not answer "why"?

    It could be: humans have some set-sense like they have a language-sense, and so building things on sense connects to a lot of people. That might be JP Mayberry's point, in his appeal to "Euclidean set theory." But that's not a mathematical claim!

    It could be: people who do not get on board with the structuralist approach don't succeed at being modern mathematicians.

    It could be: we are living in an era that encourages that consensus instead of discouraging it, for reasons that will be evident only in retrospect.

    I think part of the answer is that modern mathematics has achieved consensus by successfully eliminating "truth" as a topic of debate and instead making it a topic of study, in a very postmodernist way. You can insist to your dying day that you're a intuitionist or an ultrafinitist or whatever, and the only response you can get is mathematicians studying what is or isn't provable in your version of logic! It is no longer possible to disagree what mathematics is, because the modern conception swallows any such disagreement into a mathematical object.

    #PhilosophyOfMathematics #MathematicalFoundations

  10. This Topos Institute seminar (Kevin Carlson presenting) is an interesting topic -- do we actually need infinite sets to do mathematics? But, I think he takes a long and questionable route to the meat of the topic.

    youtu.be/bHKvT1ZACLY

    The fallacy here is that the answer to "why is there so much consensus in modern mathematics" cannot be a mathematical answer! It has to be grounded in something else: sociology, history, or psychology. It's all very well to point at the structural approach as a unifying point of agreement, but that by itself does not answer "why"?

    It could be: humans have some set-sense like they have a language-sense, and so building things on sense connects to a lot of people. That might be JP Mayberry's point, in his appeal to "Euclidean set theory." But that's not a mathematical claim!

    It could be: people who do not get on board with the structuralist approach don't succeed at being modern mathematicians.

    It could be: we are living in an era that encourages that consensus instead of discouraging it, for reasons that will be evident only in retrospect.

    I think part of the answer is that modern mathematics has achieved consensus by successfully eliminating "truth" as a topic of debate and instead making it a topic of study, in a very postmodernist way. You can insist to your dying day that you're a intuitionist or an ultrafinitist or whatever, and the only response you can get is mathematicians studying what is or isn't provable in your version of logic! It is no longer possible to disagree what mathematics is, because the modern conception swallows any such disagreement into a mathematical object.

    #PhilosophyOfMathematics #MathematicalFoundations

  11. Philosophy of maths questions:

    Say I want to ask for an explanation of some mathematical phenomenon (that is, to ask "Why is it true that <X>?"). You might offer a formal proof of <X>, but that doesn't feel like an explanation to me because a proof is essentially a statement that <X> is logically implied by the assumptions. So the proof, as an explanation, is equivalent to "because I chose these assumptions".

    Are proofs the only explanations that pure maths has to offer?

    Are there other forms of mathematical explanation (e.g. involving reference to assumptions outside the minimal axioms required for a formal proof)?

    Is it even sensible to ask these questions in the context of pure maths?

    Is it different when we shift to applied maths and have to recognise that the maths is a model of the system of interest (so there's a possibly fallible mapping between the maths and the system of interest and the mathematical axioms presumably correspond to assumed truths in the system of interest)?

    #math #maths #mathematics #philosophy #explanation #PhilosophyOfMathematics

  12. Philosophy of maths questions:

    Say I want to ask for an explanation of some mathematical phenomenon (that is, to ask "Why is it true that <X>?"). You might offer a formal proof of <X>, but that doesn't feel like an explanation to me because a proof is essentially a statement that <X> is logically implied by the assumptions. So the proof, as an explanation, is equivalent to "because I chose these assumptions".

    Are proofs the only explanations that pure maths has to offer?

    Are there other forms of mathematical explanation (e.g. involving reference to assumptions outside the minimal axioms required for a formal proof)?

    Is it even sensible to ask these questions in the context of pure maths?

    Is it different when we shift to applied maths and have to recognise that the maths is a model of the system of interest (so there's a possibly fallible mapping between the maths and the system of interest and the mathematical axioms presumably correspond to assumed truths in the system of interest)?

    #math #maths #mathematics #philosophy #explanation #PhilosophyOfMathematics

  13. Philosophy of maths questions:

    Say I want to ask for an explanation of some mathematical phenomenon (that is, to ask "Why is it true that <X>?"). You might offer a formal proof of <X>, but that doesn't feel like an explanation to me because a proof is essentially a statement that <X> is logically implied by the assumptions. So the proof, as an explanation, is equivalent to "because I chose these assumptions".

    Are proofs the only explanations that pure maths has to offer?

    Are there other forms of mathematical explanation (e.g. involving reference to assumptions outside the minimal axioms required for a formal proof)?

    Is it even sensible to ask these questions in the context of pure maths?

    Is it different when we shift to applied maths and have to recognise that the maths is a model of the system of interest (so there's a possibly fallible mapping between the maths and the system of interest and the mathematical axioms presumably correspond to assumed truths in the system of interest)?

    #math #maths #mathematics #philosophy #explanation #PhilosophyOfMathematics

  14. Philosophy of maths questions:

    Say I want to ask for an explanation of some mathematical phenomenon (that is, to ask "Why is it true that <X>?"). You might offer a formal proof of <X>, but that doesn't feel like an explanation to me because a proof is essentially a statement that <X> is logically implied by the assumptions. So the proof, as an explanation, is equivalent to "because I chose these assumptions".

    Are proofs the only explanations that pure maths has to offer?

    Are there other forms of mathematical explanation (e.g. involving reference to assumptions outside the minimal axioms required for a formal proof)?

    Is it even sensible to ask these questions in the context of pure maths?

    Is it different when we shift to applied maths and have to recognise that the maths is a model of the system of interest (so there's a possibly fallible mapping between the maths and the system of interest and the mathematical axioms presumably correspond to assumed truths in the system of interest)?

    #math #maths #mathematics #philosophy #explanation #PhilosophyOfMathematics

  15. Next week, I’m heading off to North America for a few talks. (I’d committed to these talks before last year’s election and I have mixed feelings about the trip, but I’m going, nonetheless.)

    If you're in the LA area, in or around Calgary, or New York, and you’re into philosophical logic, why not drop by? Details of the talks are here consequently.org/presentation/

    #philosophy #logic #philosophyOfMathematics #metaphysics

  16. Next week, I’m heading off to North America for a few talks. (I’d committed to these talks before last year’s election and I have mixed feelings about the trip, but I’m going, nonetheless.)

    If you're in the LA area, in or around Calgary, or New York, and you’re into philosophical logic, why not drop by? Details of the talks are here consequently.org/presentation/

    #philosophy #logic #philosophyOfMathematics #metaphysics

  17. Next week, I’m heading off to North America for a few talks. (I’d committed to these talks before last year’s election and I have mixed feelings about the trip, but I’m going, nonetheless.)

    If you're in the LA area, in or around Calgary, or New York, and you’re into philosophical logic, why not drop by? Details of the talks are here consequently.org/presentation/

    #philosophy #logic #philosophyOfMathematics #metaphysics

  18. Rovaniemellä syntynyt suomalainen matemaatikko Jouko Väänänen on päivittänyt SEP-entryään toisen asteen logiikasta, plato.stanford.edu/entries/log

    Jos ketä mietityttää, kuinka toisen asteen logiikka oikeastaan vertautuu vahvuuden puolesta ensimmäiseen asteeseen ja joukko-oppiin matematiikan perustana, eikä formaalikieli muutenkaan tyrki, niin tuossa olisi tarjolla jännittävää tarinaa ja juonen käänteitä (lapin) toviksi.

    #matematiikka #mathematics #logiikka #logic #sep #philosophyOfMathematics #rovaniemi #lappi

  19. Rovaniemellä syntynyt suomalainen matemaatikko Jouko Väänänen on päivittänyt SEP-entryään toisen asteen logiikasta, plato.stanford.edu/entries/log

    Jos ketä mietityttää, kuinka toisen asteen logiikka oikeastaan vertautuu vahvuuden puolesta ensimmäiseen asteeseen ja joukko-oppiin matematiikan perustana, eikä formaalikieli muutenkaan tyrki, niin tuossa olisi tarjolla jännittävää tarinaa ja juonen käänteitä (lapin) toviksi.

    #matematiikka #mathematics #logiikka #logic #sep #philosophyOfMathematics #rovaniemi #lappi

  20. Rovaniemellä syntynyt suomalainen matemaatikko Jouko Väänänen on päivittänyt SEP-entryään toisen asteen logiikasta, plato.stanford.edu/entries/log

    Jos ketä mietityttää, kuinka toisen asteen logiikka oikeastaan vertautuu vahvuuden puolesta ensimmäiseen asteeseen ja joukko-oppiin matematiikan perustana, eikä formaalikieli muutenkaan tyrki, niin tuossa olisi tarjolla jännittävää tarinaa ja juonen käänteitä (lapin) toviksi.

    #matematiikka #mathematics #logiikka #logic #sep #philosophyOfMathematics #rovaniemi #lappi

  21. #PhilosophyOfMathematics
    #PhilosophyOfLogic

    occasional sunday finding wrt the applicability of logic, worth noting and worth discussion.

    ... It serves little purpose to argue that logic exists outside mathematics. Whatever,
    outside mathematics, is reducible to pure logic is invariably found, on close inspection, to be nothing but a strictly mathematical scheme (mostly combinatorial), so devised as to apply to some concrete situation; one need
    only think e.g. of the classical syllogism (every man is mortal, Socrates is a man, etc.) to convince oneself of the truth of this statement. Outside mathematics, even in the physical sciences, there is no statement that does not have to be qualified by the knowledge, common to the speaker and to his audience, of some physical or mental context. ...
    [FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS FOR THE WORKING MATHEMATICIAN,
    N. BOURBAKI, JSL 1949]

  22. #PhilosophyOfMathematics
    #PhilosophyOfLogic

    occasional sunday finding wrt the applicability of logic, worth noting and worth discussion.

    ... It serves little purpose to argue that logic exists outside mathematics. Whatever,
    outside mathematics, is reducible to pure logic is invariably found, on close inspection, to be nothing but a strictly mathematical scheme (mostly combinatorial), so devised as to apply to some concrete situation; one need
    only think e.g. of the classical syllogism (every man is mortal, Socrates is a man, etc.) to convince oneself of the truth of this statement. Outside mathematics, even in the physical sciences, there is no statement that does not have to be qualified by the knowledge, common to the speaker and to his audience, of some physical or mental context. ...
    [FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS FOR THE WORKING MATHEMATICIAN,
    N. BOURBAKI, JSL 1949]

  23. #PhilosophyOfMathematics
    #PhilosophyOfLogic

    occasional sunday finding wrt the applicability of logic, worth noting and worth discussion.

    ... It serves little purpose to argue that logic exists outside mathematics. Whatever,
    outside mathematics, is reducible to pure logic is invariably found, on close inspection, to be nothing but a strictly mathematical scheme (mostly combinatorial), so devised as to apply to some concrete situation; one need
    only think e.g. of the classical syllogism (every man is mortal, Socrates is a man, etc.) to convince oneself of the truth of this statement. Outside mathematics, even in the physical sciences, there is no statement that does not have to be qualified by the knowledge, common to the speaker and to his audience, of some physical or mental context. ...
    [FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS FOR THE WORKING MATHEMATICIAN,
    N. BOURBAKI, JSL 1949]

  24. #PhilosophyOfMathematics
    #PhilosophyOfLogic

    occasional sunday finding wrt the applicability of logic, worth noting and worth discussion.

    ... It serves little purpose to argue that logic exists outside mathematics. Whatever,
    outside mathematics, is reducible to pure logic is invariably found, on close inspection, to be nothing but a strictly mathematical scheme (mostly combinatorial), so devised as to apply to some concrete situation; one need
    only think e.g. of the classical syllogism (every man is mortal, Socrates is a man, etc.) to convince oneself of the truth of this statement. Outside mathematics, even in the physical sciences, there is no statement that does not have to be qualified by the knowledge, common to the speaker and to his audience, of some physical or mental context. ...
    [FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS FOR THE WORKING MATHEMATICIAN,
    N. BOURBAKI, JSL 1949]

  25. CW: shameless self promotion 😂

    my current (still draft) paper is about

    object references in purportedly truth value definite sentences

    think there's something good in it ...
    😅 #nontology

    #PhilosophyOfLogic
    #AppliedLogic
    #PhilMath
    #PhilSci
    #PhilosophyOfMathematics
    #PhilosophyOfScience

    philarchive.org/rec/GRAOAN

  26. CW: shameless self promotion 😂

    my current (still draft) paper is about

    object references in purportedly truth value definite sentences

    think there's something good in it ...
    😅 #nontology

    #PhilosophyOfLogic
    #AppliedLogic
    #PhilMath
    #PhilSci
    #PhilosophyOfMathematics
    #PhilosophyOfScience

    philarchive.org/rec/GRAOAN

  27. CW: shameless self promotion 😂

    my current (still draft) paper is about

    object references in purportedly truth value definite sentences

    think there's something good in it ...
    😅 #nontology

    #PhilosophyOfLogic
    #AppliedLogic
    #PhilMath
    #PhilSci
    #PhilosophyOfMathematics
    #PhilosophyOfScience

    philarchive.org/rec/GRAOAN

  28. Silvia De Toffoli, telling us about Rigor, Intuition, and Diagrams, in a #SIFA2023 session on the use of diagrams in mathematical proof.

    #diagrams #proofs #PhilosophyOfMathematics

  29. Silvia De Toffoli, telling us about Rigor, Intuition, and Diagrams, in a #SIFA2023 session on the use of diagrams in mathematical proof.

    #diagrams #proofs #PhilosophyOfMathematics