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Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] · 2026-04-01 · 22:12 UTC

Op-Ed: So Much for Efficiency: The Empty Promise of Prabowo’s Diplomatic Travels, Tempo.co

So Much for Efficiency: The Empty Promise of Prabowo’s Diplomatic Travels

Tempo.co Editorial, April 1, 2026

When it comes to overseas trips, Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto stands as an example of a leader who does not practice what he preaches. On a number of occasions, he has instructed his subordinates to cut back on overseas travel under the pretext of promoting budget efficiency. Cutting the costs of overseas service, he has argued, is a key way to save on unproductive budget outlays.

Instead of leading by example, however, Prabowo has gone back on his own word. On the contrary, he has frequently traveled abroad during the first 17 months of his government. Currently, he is visiting Japan and South Korea. Just a month ago, he was on a trip to the US, the UK, Jordan, and the UAE.

Counting from his inauguration in October 2024, Prabowo has conducted 49 overseas trips—the highest number of all previous presidents. During the same time frame, Joko Widodo went on 22 overseas visits, while Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono made 15 overseas trips.

These overseas visits clearly constitute a squandering of public funds—a practice Prabowo has loudly claimed he is actively eradicating. The Center of Economic and Law Studies (Celios) has estimated the cost of a single presidential overseas visit can reach Rp. 20 billion ($1.2 million), covering everything from aircraft operational costs, accommodation, meals, and logistics, to protocol services.

During Prabowo’s time in office, the budget allocated for overseas official travel has ballooned. This is not solely due to the frequency of his trips, but also because of the sheer size of the entourage that accompanies him. When he first took office, he consistently utilized two aircraft configured for first-class travel. One plane was reserved for President Prabowo and his inner circle—his closest aides—such as Foreign Minister Sugiono and Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya. The second plane has been designated for the bureaucrats and diplomats accompanying the delegation. Prabowo has turned a blind eye to the situation, continuing his travels abroad even as the nation’s finances has come under pressure. By February 2026, the government had incurred a deficit of Rp 135 trillion ($8.1 billion). Meanwhile, the economic situation facing the public continues to be precarious. Yet, Prabowo has chosen to travel, incurring costs amounting to tens of billions of rupiah for a single trip.

As a result of these overseas trips, Prabowo has frequently neglected domestic issues that in reality demand priority attention from the central government. On several occasions, he has even chosen to fly to friendly nations despite critical domestic crises unfolding at home.

In early December 2025, he traveled to Pakistan and Russia just as floods and landslides were ravaging the regions of Aceh and North Sumatra. Prior to that, in August 2025, he decided to depart for China, even though demonstrations demanding the dissolution of Indonesia’s House of Representatives had just erupted in Jakarta and other major cities.

Prabowo claims his overseas visits are undertaken in the interest of the people and to boost the country’s economy. On his return from each trip, Prabowo and his team have asserted they have secured investment commitments totaling hundreds of trillions of rupiah. However, the cooperative agreements achieved have only been Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs); there has been no evidence of any tangible investment benefiting the Indonesian public.

The problem is it is difficult to realize these bilateral agreements when Prabowo acts on the diplomatic stage in isolation, making decisions entirely on his own. It has become common knowledge among diplomats that Prabowo and his team never involve career bureaucrats in their processes. He does not even share the details of agreements concluded for subsequent follow-up action.

If the success of overseas visits is to be measured by the yardstick of economic diplomacy, Prabowo could be deemed a complete failure. This is evident in the trade agreements reached with the United States; the reciprocal tariff agreement, in fact, ended up yielding greater benefits for the US.

Rather than shuttling back and forth across the globe without producing any concrete results, Prabowo should be focusing his efforts on resolving the myriad domestic issues facing the country. If Prabowo’s stated reason for traveling is to boost investment, he ought to first address the regularity environment, law enforcement, and governance issues—absolute prerequisites for facilitating ease of doing business and improving the investment climate.

Investment will flow in naturally once the variety of business bottlenecks are resolved, rendering it unnecessary for the President to frequently travel to other nations.

Without domestic reforms, Prabowo’s overseas tours will only serve to reinforce a widely held belief: that he simply enjoys traveling and is trying to establish his presence alongside other world leaders.

This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/diplomasi-indonesia-prabowo-subianto-2125784.

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Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] · 2026-03-19 · 21:25 UTC

Gaza ISF: Indonesia Outlines Caveats for Involvement, Tempo.co

Indonesia Outlines Four National Caveats for an ISF Mission in Gaza, Tempo.co

Indonesia has been selected as the deputy commander of the ISF in the Gaza Strip.

By Dani Aswara for Tempo.co, February 23, 2026

Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced four national caveats for Indonesia’s involvement in any International Stabilization Force (ISF) in the Gaza Strip. These caveats are conditions for Indonesia’s participation in a mission.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Yvonne Mewengkang said the government had determined the guidelines for involvement from the outset. Mewengkang claimed Indonesia has established clear national caveats from the outset.

“First, Indonesia’s participation is to be non-combat and non-demilitarization, and it will not participate in disarmament,” Mewengkang told Tempo on Monday, February 23, 2026.

Second, Indonesia will not engage in direct confrontation with any party.

Third, the deployment of Indonesian personnel is limited to the Gaza Strip and must obtain the approval of the Palestinian Authority.

Fourth, the use of force is permitted only for self-defense and to maintain the mandate. This use must be proportional, gradual, a last resort, and in accordance with international law and the Rules of Engagement.

Yvonne explained that the focus of Indonesia’s participation in an ISF is protecting civilians, providing humanitarian and medical assistance, reconstruction, and strengthening the capacity of the Palestinian civil authority through training for the Palestinian civil police.

Hikmahanto Juwana, Professor of International Law at the University of Indonesia, questioned the effectiveness of the national caveats that the government has reportedly issued on Indonesia’s involvement in a mission in Gaza. The issue is whether these national boundaries will truly be considered and used as a basis for mobilizing Indonesian troops, he said. “Will the national caveats be considered and used as a basis for mobilizing our troops or not?” Hikmahanto asked when contacted on Sunday, February 22, 2026.

He believes that after a country contributes troops, operational control can rest with the mission command. In that situation, he said, it is possible that the command will declare the national caveats solely an internal matter for the sending country, while troop movement decisions remain with the command.

Hikmahanto also reminded the government to be cautious regarding the appointment of Indonesia as Deputy Commander. He believes this position could be a strategy to get Indonesia to continue contributing the largest number of troops, considering that Indonesia currently has the largest contribution of the five countries contributing troops.

Dani Aswara, a graduate of the Political Science Study Program at Andalas University in Padang, West Sumatra, began his career in journalism at Tempo in 2024. He writes about political, legal, and crime issues.

This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/politik/ini-empat-batasan-nasional-indonesia-untuk-misi-isf-di-gaza-2117229. Featured image credit: Burnt out car of a Brigadier A W S Mallaby, Surabaya 1945.

In related news:

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/3/22/why-the-world-should-worry-about-israels-nuclear-doctrine

In related news:

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Interaksyon [Unofficial] @[email protected] · 2026-03-09 · 10:36 UTC

Emman Atienza’s ‘PBB’ audition video shared by Kim Atienza, draws heartfelt reactions

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://interaksyon.philstar.com/celebrities/2026/03/09/310276/emman-atienza-pbb-audition-video-heartfelt-reactions/

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Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] · 2026-03-04 · 11:59 UTC

Indonesia Should Withdraw from BoP: Indonesian Ulema Council

US-Israel Attack on Iran: MUI Urges Indonesian Government to Withdraw from Board of Peace for Gaza

Indonesian Ulema Council, March 1, 2026

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) officially urged the Indonesian government to withdraw from the US Board of Peace (BoP) for Gaza, in a statement released March 1, 2026. The statement was issued by the MUI in response to the US-Israeli attacks on Iran on February 28, 2026.

The MUI said the US, which is playing a central role in the management of the Palestinian conflict through the BoP, faces a major question. Is this strategy really aimed at a just peace, or just strengthening an unequal security architecture, and burying Palestinian independence?

“For this reason, the MUI urges the Indonesian government to revoke its membership of the BoP, and believes it has been ineffective in realizing true independence in Palestine,” the MUI said in a statement issued on Sunday March 1, 2026.

MUI statement No. Kep-28/DP-MUI/III/2026 was signed by MUI Chair KH Anwar Iskandar and Secretary General Buya Amirsyah Tambunan.

The MUI believes in fact the opposite is occurring. US President Donald Trump is carrying out a joint attack against Iran with Israel, triggering a regional war involving a number of countries, both directly and through proxies.

The MUI calls on Muslims around the world to continue to pray for Almighty God’s assistance and protection for Muslims experiencing hardship, oppression, and disaster in different parts of the world.

“The MUI calls on the UN and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to take maximum steps to stop the war and respect international law. The MUI believes that war will bring global harm,” said the statement.

The US-Israeli attacks on Iran have resulted in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader. The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) expresses its deep condolences for the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader and prays for his eternal rest.

The MUI condemned the US-backed Israeli attacks because they conflict with humanitarian values and the Preamble to Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution which countries “to participate in establishing a world order based on freedom, eternal peace, and social justice.”

The MUI understands that Iran’s attacks against Gulf states are retaliation for the US and Israeli attacks targeting military bases. According to the MUI, Iran’s retaliatory attacks are justified, and protected by international law.

“Therefore, to avoid a wider escalation, the US and Israel must halt attacks on Iran as they violate Article 2 (4) of the UN Declaration.”

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) considers the Israeli and US military attacks on Iran, which Iran has subsequently responded to, constitute a serious escalation with the potential to drag the Middle East into a wider conflict.

Not an isolated incident

“This situation should not be viewed as an isolated incident, but rather it should be seen as part of a larger geopolitical configuration. It is the duty and responsibility of all countries to achieve peace in order to provide maximum protection for civilians,” it stated.

Strategic motive

The MUI believes the strategic motive behind the attacks is a systematic attempt to weaken Iran’s strategic position in the region, and limit Iranian support for the struggle for Palestinian independence.

In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the MUI encourages countries to act as peacemakers in order to prevent military attacks with the potential to serve as instruments of political pressure aimed at securing Israel’s regional dominance over Palestine.

This post is based on https://mui.or.id/baca/berita/as-dan-israel-serang-iran-mui-desak-pemerintah-ri-mundur-dari-board-of-peace and https://mui.or.id/baca/berita/as-israel-serang-iran-majelis-ulama-indonesia-sampaikan-10-tausiyah. Featured image credit: Protesters outside the US Embassy urge the Indonesian government to revoke its membership of the Board of Peace on March 3, 2026. Photo: REUTERS via The Straits Times.

In related news:

In earlier news…

Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble

By Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera, February 16, 2025

(Excerpt) President Prabowo Subianto’s government said on February 10 that Indonesia is preparing to deploy up to 8,000 troops to a proposed multinational Gaza stabilization force under Donald Trump’s so-called Board of Peace (BoP). The troop proposal forms part of Jakarta’s broader decision to participate in the BoP framework, an initiative conceived and driven by Trump. Together, these steps signal a significant shift in Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy posture. At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility, Jakarta appears to be committing itself to a project shaped around a single, deeply polarizing political figure. The decision raises a fundamental question: is Indonesia advancing its national interests and diplomatic credibility, or allowing its foreign policy direction to be shaped by an external agenda?

Geopolitics is not a theater for symbolic proximity to power but a disciplined calculation of national interest and sovereign credibility. Indonesia’s decision to engage with the BoP appears less like a carefully calibrated strategic choice and more like a reactive impulse that risks weakening the philosophical foundations of its diplomacy, built over decades. Indonesia’s international influence has historically rested on strategic equidistance rather than personal alignment with controversial leaders.

There is a growing sense that Jakarta risks acting out of geopolitical urgency. Yet the initiative Indonesia has chosen to support is led by a figure known for transactional diplomacy and disregard for international consensus. The implications extend well beyond Middle East peace initiatives. What is at stake is Indonesia’s reputation as an independent stabilizing actor in global diplomacy.

If Indonesia proceeds with troop deployment under the BoP framework, the risks become even more acute. Gaza is not a conventional peacekeeping theater. It is one of the most volatile and politically contested conflict environments in the world, where humanitarian imperatives and hard security objectives frequently collide. Deploying thousands of troops into such an arena without an inclusive multilateral mandate risks drawing Indonesia into a conflict environment where neutrality would be difficult to sustain.

Erosion of the ‘Free and Active’ doctrine

The most serious concern is the gradual erosion of Indonesia’s “Free and Active” foreign policy doctrine, the intellectual backbone of its diplomacy since the Djuanda Declaration and the Bandung Conference. Indonesia has historically positioned itself as a mediator, rather than a follower of personalized diplomatic agendas.

By participating in an institution closely identified with Donald Trump, Jakarta risks legitimizing unilateral approaches that often conflict with established international norms. “Free” diplomacy implies independence, and “active” diplomacy implies engagement driven by national priorities rather than external pressure.

Indonesia also risks being reduced to a symbolic endorsement of a United States-centered foreign policy outlook. If Jakarta drifts too far into this orbit, its leverage with other major actors, including China, Russia and ASEAN partners, could weaken. Indonesia’s leadership in Southeast Asia has depended on its credibility as a neutral stabilizing force. That credibility may erode if it is seen as participating in great-power security agendas.

Indonesia’s respected record in United Nations peacekeeping has historically rested on internationally recognized neutrality under UN command structures. Participation in a BoP framework, which sits outside established multilateral systems, risks shifting Indonesia from neutral arbiter to participant in a political security architecture shaped beyond globally recognized peacekeeping norms.

More troubling is the precedent this sets. If foreign policy principles become negotiable in exchange for economic or strategic promises, Indonesia risks undermining the coherence of its diplomatic identity. Its constitutional commitment to promoting global peace and social justice depends on preserving policy independence.

The Palestine paradox

Indonesia’s participation in the BoP also creates a visible moral and constitutional tension. The Indonesian constitution explicitly rejects all forms of colonialism and emphasizes international justice. Participation in an initiative led by the architect of policies historically skewed in Israel’s favor creates a contradiction that is difficult to reconcile.

Trump’s record in the region remains controversial. His decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem altered decades of diplomatic consensus and drew widespread criticism across the Muslim world. For Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and a consistent supporter of Palestinian statehood, association with this framework carries significant political sensitivity….

Read the whole piece at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/16/indonesias-gaza-gamble. Featured image credit: Protesters outside the US Embassy urge the Indonesian government to revoke its membership from the Board of Peace on March 3, 2026. Photo: REUTERS via The Straits Times. Image Credit: Excerpt – US President Donald Trump gestures towards Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, during a charter announcement for his Board of Peace in Davos, Switzerland, January 22, 2026. [Denis Balibouse/Reuters via Al-Jazeera] Per Al-Jazeera Ronny P Sasmita is a senior international affairs analyst at the Indonesia Strategic and Economics Action Institution, a Jakarta-based think tank focused on geopolitics and geoeconomics. His commentary has appeared in leading Indonesian outlets and a number of international English-language publications. He regularly contributes analysis on international political economy, China’s economy, and global geoeconomic trends.

In related news:

***

The Illusion of Trump’s Board of Peace

By A.D. Agung Sulistyo, for Tempo.co January 30, 2026

Indonesia’s decision to join President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza is anything but neutral. It bristles with ethical problems.

This choice, made by Indonesia to participate in the Board of Peace for Gaza established by President Trump, is framed in familiar clichés: active involvement, a commitment to global stability, and a dedication to peace.

However, Indonesia’s membership in this U.S.-controlled peace forum actually presents a dilemma: stand firm in upholding the rules-based international order or participate and risk gradually diminishing the significance of the United Nations Charter.

Since World War II, peace has never stood alone as a goal in international law. It has always been accompanied by procedures, mandates, and limitations on power. Pursuing peace without a legal framework is akin to establishing a new, subtler form of domination. Consequently, the responsibility for maintaining peace is entrusted to the Security Council. This is not because the institution is perfect, but because its authority is anchored in collective representation and legitimacy.

Photo by Ahsanul Haque Z on Pexels.com

When the White House describes the Trump Board of Peace for Gaza as an initiative aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 2803, a more fundamental question arises: Is world peace still governed by law, or is it beginning to be determined by those in power who are merely using legal language as a diplomatic facade?

A policy may appear to align with the UN’s objectives, but that does not automatically confer legal validity. A UN Security Council resolution is not a blank check. If a resolution does not explicitly establish a body—including its structure, mandate, and accountability—then legally that body does not exist.

Herein lies the tenuous nature of the White House’s claim. UN Security Council resolutions—under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—has never created new bodies through vague interpretations or ulterior motives. International organizational law recognizes the principle of express mandate which asserts that authority must be explicitly stated and cannot be assumed. Without this clarity an action is ultra vires—an action beyond the limits of legal authority.

Article 24 of the UN Charter clearly asserts that the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council. This is not merely a division of administrative duties; it is a constitutional rule in the post-1945 world order. If this function were carried out by another mechanism outside the authority, oversight, and accountability of the UN Security Council, it would amount to a tacit takeover.

What we are witnessing now is a hollowing out of the UN’s functions. The Charter is still cited, and resolutions are still referenced, but crucial decisions about peace are being transferred to a forum serving the interests of the powerful. This represents a new form of defiance against international law.

Indonesia’s decision to join is clearly not a neutral step. By participating, Indonesia indirectly acknowledges that peace can be discussed outside a mutually agreed legal framework. This involvement also indirectly reinforces the notion that the UN Charter is merely one option, no longer the primary foundation for international relations.

The Indonesian government’s policy is fundamentally problematic. For years, Indonesian diplomacy has consistently emphasized multilateralism and international law—not just as rhetoric, but as a core identity maintained since the dawn of independence.

By engaging in a peace mechanism outside the UN Charter, that position becomes tenuous. How can Indonesia assert its support for a rules-based order while simultaneously normalizing peace negotiated outside the law?

International legal theorists have long warned of the dangers of hegemonic multilateralism. It may appear benign—multilateral on the surface—but it is controlled by one party. The Trump Gaza Board of Peace exemplifies this pattern clearly. The initiative originates from the United States, leadership resides with Trump, the agenda is set in Washington, membership is selectively chosen, financial contributions are the price of entry, and there is no accountability to the UN General Assembly, which is meant to be representing the international community.

If peace is determined by the party who leads, funds, and wields informal veto power, it is fair to ask: Is this a global Board of Peace or merely the Board of America dressed up to appear legitimate?

In international legal theory, the UN is often regarded as a constitutional instrument of the international community. Its Charter is no ordinary treaty; it is the lex superior, the primary framework governing the exercise of power on a global scale. When mechanisms like the Board of Peace operate outside this framework, we witness what Martti Koskenniemi describes as the fragmentation of international law.

This fragmentation is not merely an academic concern; it reflects a tangible reality. Today, one major country forms a Board of Peace. Tomorrow, another could establish a Board of Stability or a Coalition for Order and claim alignment with UN resolutions. In such a scenario, the UN Charter gradually transforms from binding law into mere symbolism—referenced but no longer respected.

Supporters of the Board of Peace will undoubtedly argue that the world needs a quick solution, claiming that the UN is too slow, complicated, and often paralyzed. This argument has some merit. However, international law does not promise speed; it offers legitimacy and accountability.

Peace without a legal framework, even if at first blush it appears stable, is always tenuous from a normative perspective. History has shown that stability without legitimacy rarely endures.

The world is indeed changing, and international law must adapt. The question is whether Indonesia is prepared to build a world where peace is maintained not by law, but by the balance of power alone.

A.D. Agung Sulistyo is a researcher specializing in transnational law and public policy. He has previously worked as a researcher at both the PARA Syndicateand the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate. This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/ilusi-dewan-perdamaian-donald-trump-2111160.

PDIP Affirms Commitment to World Peace and Palestinian Rights Through the UN, Not Other Channels 31 Januari 2026 https://m.jpnn.com/news/pdip-tegaskan-komitmen-perdamaian-dunia-dan-hak-palestina-lewat-pbb-bukan-jalan-lain

In related news:

Virdika Rizky Utama. “Indonesia Should Reconsider Decision to Join Trump’s Board of Peace.” Nikkei Asia, 27 Jan. 2026, asia.nikkei.com/opinion/indonesia-should-reconsider-decision-to-join-trump-s-board-of-peace.
Hendrik Yaputra and Wibowo, E.A. (2026). Soal Dewan Perdamaian, PDIP: Indonesia Harus Bebas Aktif. [online] Tempo. Available at: https://www.tempo.co/politik/soal-dewan-perdamaian-pdip-indonesia-harus-bebas-aktif-2111541
Tangkilisan, Yuda B. “Sovereignty on Seas: The Making of the Declaration of Djuanda 1957.” Www.atlantis-Press.com, Atlantis Press, 29 May 2023, www.atlantis-press.com/proceedings/ahs-aprish-19/125987317.
Nidžara Ahmetašević. “Gaza Is on Its Way to Becoming a Semi-Protectorate, Just like Bosnia.” Al Jazeera, Feb. 2026, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/1/gaza-is-on-its-way-to-becoming-a-semi-protectorate-just-like-bosnia
“Op-Ed: Prabowo Government’s Directionless Diplomacy, Tempo.” Stories from Indonesia, 13 July 2025, storiesfromindonesia.com/2025/07/13/op-ed-prabowo-governments-directionless-diplomacy-tempo/

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Interaksyon [Unofficial] @[email protected] · 2026-02-26 · 02:56 UTC

Angel Locsin defends stepson Joaquin Arce amid ‘nepo baby’ criticisms

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://interaksyon.philstar.com/celebrities/2026/02/26/309790/angel-locsin-stepson-joaquin-arce-nepo-baby-criticisms/

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Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] · 2026-02-18 · 10:39 UTC

Op-Ed: Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble by Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera