#natural-law — Public Fediverse posts

#TBT Blast from the 1990s past #NaturalLaw party is still on the ballot in #Michigan LOL 🗳️ ☑️ 😁 #Vote2026 #USPol #Politics

A quotation from Montaigne

The laws of conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom; every one, having an inward veneration for the opinions and manners approved and received among his own people, cannot, without very great reluctance, depart from them, nor apply himself to them without applause.
 
[Les loix de la conscience, que nous disons naistre de nature, naissent de la coustume : chacun ayant en veneration interne les opinions & mœurs approuvees & receues autour de luy, ne s’en peut desprendre sans remors, ny s’y appliquer sans applaudissement.]

Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) French essayist
Essays, Book 1, ch. 22 (1.22), “Of Custom and Not Easily Changing an Accepted Law [De la Coustume et de Ne Changer Aisément une Loy Receüe]” (1572) [tr. Cotton/Hazlitt (1877)]

More about (and translations of) this quote: wist.info/montaigne-michel-de/…

#quote #quotes #quotation #qotd #montaigne #behavior #conscience #custom #manners #moralcode #morality #mores #naturallaw #nature #publicopinion #tradition

The Birthday of the United States: Was the Declaration of Independence Legal?

The first major legal debate was held in the fall of 2011 at the American Phi…
#NewsBeep #News #US #USA #UnitedStates #UnitedStatesOfAmerica #4July #America #american #Americancolonies #Americanhistory #Americanindependence #arguments #declarationofindependence #FoundingFathers #GreatBritain #independence #naturallaw #Secession #Socialcontract #ThomasJefferson #UnitedStatesofAmerica
https://www.newsbeep.com/us/742614/

Chakotay and Seven clearly have some sort of survival kit in that case. It doesn’t have a first aid kit with a dermal regenerator in it?
#allstartrek #startrek #VOY #NaturalLaw

A quotation from Wallace Stegner

Order is indeed the dream of man, but chaos, which is only another word for dumb, blind, witless chance, is still the law of nature.

Wallace Stegner (1909-1993) American novelist
Crossing to Safety, ch. 13 (1987)

More about this quote: wist.info/stegner-wallace/8452…

#quote #quotes #quotation #qotd #stegner #wallacestegner #chaos #control #dream #expectations #humannature #naturallaw #nature #order

Kenya’s Structural Adjustment Programs (1980s–1990s)
>A noir‑forensic chronicle of fiscal collapse and foreign control.
From the Central Bank’s printing press to the Goldenberg scandal, from IMF austerity to crony privatization — each panel exposes how managed money and managed markets breed dependency.
> Hoppe’s insight echoes through history: only voluntary exchange and sound property rights can restore sovereignty.
#Kenya #Decolonization #NaturalLaw #AustrianSchool #EconomicFreedom

Lockwood’s Longshot:
The chances of getting eaten by a lion on Main Street aren’t one in a million, but once would be enough.
--John Lockwood, Washington, D.C.

#NaturalLaw #ShitHappens #BuyAnEstateLotteryTicket

God gave the land to the people!
#land #georgism #economics #theland #landreform #naturallaw #wealthinequality #rentseeking #naturalresources #landvaluetax

@EUCommission Shops ask for proof of age when buying alcoholic beverages for single use only. They don't request, retain, process or share a copy of your passport, address, contact details or any other personal information to use in own benefit.

You would not allow the shops to take a copy of your ID, the same like you would never give Apple a copy of your ID for the pretext of "age verification"

#digitalID #privacy #ageVerification #sovereignty #control #corruption #humanRights #naturalLaw

From Bureaucracy to Welfare: State Formation, Religious Authority, and Civic Transformation in Norway — Tor Arne Jørgensen (3)

Scott Douglas Jacobsen (Email: [email protected])

Publisher, In-Sight Publishing

Fort Langley, British Columbia, Canada

Received: December 16, 2025

Accepted: January 8, 2026

Published: March 22, 2026

Abstract

This interview with Tor Arne Jørgensen examines the evolution of Norwegian state formation from the centralized bureaucracy of Denmark–Norway to the development of a modern welfare state. It explores how administrative unevenness produced regional disparities, how Enlightenment and natural-law ideas reshaped sovereignty, and how constitutional contradictions around exclusion were gradually resolved. The discussion traces key legal and institutional reforms—including the Dissenters Act, educational expansion, press liberalization, and labor–capital compromises—that translated abstract constitutional ideals into civic competence and social equality. Together, these processes reveal the gradual detachment of civic identity from religious uniformity and the emergence of a negotiated, egalitarian political order grounded in participation, institutional capacity, and pragmatic compromise.

Keywords

bureaucracy, civic identity, Denmark-Norway, Enlightenment, natural law, Norway constitution 1814, religious dissent, state formation, welfare state, education reform

Introduction

The transformation of Norway from a peripheral component of a centralized Danish absolutist state into a modern constitutional democracy and welfare society reflects a layered process of institutional adaptation, intellectual change, and negotiated compromise. Rather than emerging through rupture, Norwegian political development proceeded through gradual reinterpretation of authority, rights, and belonging.

This interview with Tor Arne Jørgensen examines the structural dynamics underpinning that transformation. It situates early modern administrative disparities alongside Enlightenment thought, constitutional contradictions, religious reform, and socio-economic negotiation. The result is a longitudinal account of how abstract principles—sovereignty, rights, and equality—became embedded in institutions and practices.

Main Text (Interview)

Title: From Bureaucracy to Welfare: State Formation, Religious Authority, and Civic Transformation in Norway — Tor Arne Jørgensen (3)

Interviewer: Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Interviewees: Tor Arne Jørgensen 

Tor Arne Jørgensen is a Norwegian educator from Fevik, near Grimstad, in southern Norway. He teaches at secondary level and has written and spoken about history, religion, social studies, ethics, governance, and education for gifted students. He has participated in the international intelligence community since 2015 and is described as a member of 50+ high IQ societies. In 2019, the World Genius Directory named him “Genius of the Year – Europe.” He designs high-range IQ tests, including the site toriqtests.com, and is reported to have set Norway’s IQ score record twice. He is married and has two sons in Norway.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: How did Denmark-Norway’s centralized bureaucracy produce regional contrasts? The differences between coastal towns and frontier communities.

Tor Arne Jørgensen: The centralized bureaucracy of Denmark-Norway produced regional contrasts not through intentional differentiation but through uneven administrative reach. The apparatus was uniform in design, yet its capacity to penetrate daily life varied drastically between coastal towns and frontier communities. Copenhagen issued directives that applied equally to Bergen and to a valley settlement three days’ travel from the nearest parish church, but the social and institutional infrastructure required to enforce those directives existed only in some places, not in all.

Coastal towns had proximity to administrative centers, regular communication with royal officials, and economies integrated into transatlantic trade. A merchant in Kristiansand or Trondheim lived within a world where written contracts, shipping manifests, and correspondence with Copenhagen were routine. Literacy here was not merely religious—it was commercial, legal, bureaucratic. Writing was not optional; it was the operative medium of economic and civic life.

These towns also had the resources to sustain permanent schools, salaried teachers, and a clerical infrastructure capable of monitoring compliance with confirmation and schooling laws. The Church-State apparatus was visible, present, and capable of sustained oversight. It operated with a level of administrative density that made the system perceptible in daily routines.

Move inland, to frontier communities along the Swedish border or into the mountain valleys, and the picture changes. Here the traveling school might appear once a year, if it appeared at all. The catechism was still taught, confirmation still required—but enforcement depended on a single overworked parish priest covering vast distances, often relying on local farmers to act as makeshift instructors. The state’s presence was episodic rather than continuous.

And yet the system continued to function, because it was not purely coercive. It also conferred access: a framework of legibility, a way to be recognized as a subject of the kingdom. Confirmation granted rights—to marry, to inherit, to participate fully in the legal system. Even in remote areas, families complied not because soldiers stood at the door, but because exclusion from the system meant exclusion from the social order.

The result was a tiered reality. In coastal towns, populations became literate across multiple registers—religious, commercial, civic. In frontier communities, populations attained the minimum threshold: able to read the catechism, recite the required answers, and participate in the ritual economy of the Church. Both fulfilled the state’s requirements, but the competencies they acquired were fundamentally different.

These contrasts were not incidental; they were structural. The bureaucracy did not require uniform capability. It required universal legibility. Coastal elites needed one form of literacy to manage trade and governance. Rural populations needed another to verify their membership in the kingdom. The system accommodated both, because its aim was never universal empowerment but universal registration. 

Jacobsen: On the eve of 1814, which Enlightenment and natural-law ideas primed elites to rethink sovereignty and rights, even the church’s role?

Jørgensen: The ideas that circulated among Norwegian elites on the eve of 1814 did not arrive as a coherent program but as fragments of broader currents—Enlightenment rationalism, natural-law theory, and the contractual models of governance that had gained traction across Europe and the Atlantic. These concepts had been filtering into academic circles, legal discourse, and administrative thought for decades. What changed in 1814 was not the availability of the ideas but the opportunity to apply them.

Natural-law thinking had provided the intellectual foundation. The premise was straightforward: legitimate authority derived not from divine mandate alone but from principles accessible to human reason. Rights belonged to individuals prior to their incorporation into political communities, and governments existed to secure those rights rather than to bestow them. This was not a rejection of Christianity but a reframing of its relationship to political order. The sacred remained, but it no longer monopolized the language of legitimacy.

For elites trained in law and philosophy, this framework offered a vocabulary for reimagining sovereignty. The traditional model had placed authority in the crown, with the church serving as its spiritual counterpart. Natural law suggested a different configuration: sovereignty rooted in the people, with institutions—including the monarchy and the church—deriving their authority from consent rather than inheritance. The shift was subtle in some respects, radical in others. It did not eliminate hierarchy, but it altered the terms on which hierarchy could be justified.

The Danish absolutist state had left little room for such thinking to manifest in practice. Authority flowed downward, and the apparatus of government reinforced that flow. Yet the intellectual groundwork had been laid. University-trained officials, members of the urban merchant class, and clergy exposed to continental thought had absorbed these ideas even as the political structure they inhabited offered no mechanism for their realization. The dissolution of the union with Denmark created that mechanism.

The constitutional assembly at Eidsvoll drew heavily on this intellectual inheritance. The delegates debated the structure of government, the rights of citizens, and the extent to which popular sovereignty could be reconciled with monarchy. Natural-law principles shaped the contours of these discussions. Rights were articulated as universal rather than particular, grounded in reason rather than tradition. The resulting constitution reflected this: a framework that asserted limits on royal authority, established representative institutions, and codified freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition.

The church’s role became a point of tension. The Enlightenment had not discarded religion, but it had challenged the church’s claim to exclusive authority over moral and civic life. Natural-law theory suggested that ethical principles could be derived through reason, independent of revelation. This did not make the church irrelevant, but it raised questions about the basis of its influence. Should religious institutions retain their privileged status within the state, or should the principles of equality and consent apply to them as well?

The constitution preserved the connection between church and state. The Evangelical Lutheran faith was declared the public religion, and the king retained the obligation to uphold it. Yet the terms of that preservation mattered. The church’s authority was now framed within a constitutional order that placed limits on all institutions, ecclesiastical ones included. Religious uniformity was maintained, but the rationale had shifted. The church was no longer simply the spiritual arm of the crown; it was an institution embedded in a political system that claimed popular sovereignty as its foundation.

What the Enlightenment and natural law had done was to open space for contestation. The church could be questioned, its role debated, its authority subjected to the same scrutiny as other forms of power. This did not produce immediate transformation. The changes enacted in 1814 were structural rather than radical, and much of the old order persisted in modified form. Yet the intellectual groundwork had been laid for future challenges. Once sovereignty was understood as resting with the people, and once rights were framed as universal principles accessible through reason, the foundation for rethinking every institution—including the church—was in place.

The elites who gathered at Eidsvoll in 1814 were not revolutionaries in the French sense. They sought to preserve stability while incorporating new principles of legitimacy. The constitution they drafted reflected that balance: it acknowledged the power of ideas drawn from Enlightenment thought and natural law, yet it embedded those ideas within a framework that maintained continuity with the past. The result was not a rupture but a realignment. The church remained central to Norwegian life, but its centrality now existed within a political order that claimed a different source of authority. The tension between these two foundations—sacred and rational, inherited and reasoned—would persist long after the assembly concluded. 

Jacobsen: The 1814 Constitution mixed liberalism with exclusion. It banned Jesuits, Jews, and monastic orders. What were the justifications?

Jørgensen: The Constitution of 1814 articulated principles of popular sovereignty and individual rights, yet it carried within it provisions that directly contradicted those ideals. Article 2 barred Jesuits and monastic orders from entering the kingdom. It also prohibited Jews entirely. These exclusions were not accidental footnotes; they were deliberate choices, debated, and defended. What rationale could reconcile a document committed to liberty with measures so clearly restrictive?

The exclusion of Jesuits drew on longstanding Protestant anxieties and Enlightenment suspicion of ecclesiastical power. The Society of Jesus, though suppressed by the papacy in 1773, remained a symbol of loyalty to Rome rather than to the emerging Norwegian state. Jesuits were perceived as agents of a foreign authority, disciplined and hierarchical, their obedience above civic loyalty. In a newly independent nation, defining itself after centuries of Danish rule, this was framed as a potential threat to political cohesion. The concern was not merely theological—it was profoundly political.

Monastic orders faced similar censure. Their withdrawal from civic life, concentration of resources, and allegiance to transnational religious hierarchies placed them outside the state’s vision of a unified national community. The logic was consistent: religious difference equaled potential disloyalty. Yet even in this reasoning, tension appeared. How could a nation proclaim liberty and equality while systematically excluding those whose faith and vocation simply diverged from the majority?

The exclusion of Jews rested on overlapping anxieties, though of a slightly different nature. The debates at Eidsvoll revealed a mixture of religious prejudice, economic concern, and narrow notions of national belonging. Opponents argued that Jews could not fully integrate into a Christian state, that their religious practices marked them apart, and that their economic activity—especially in trade and finance—might destabilize existing social structures. These fears were not unique to Norway; they echoed across Europe. Yet the contradiction was stark: the constitution celebrated universal rights while simultaneously erecting boundaries that defined who belonged.

Some delegates justified these bans with an appeal to Enlightenment rationality. They claimed that national cohesion required a shared set of values and loyalties. Difference, they argued, justified exclusion: Jews were excluded because they were different, and their difference was itself the evidence of the necessity of exclusion. The circularity of the argument did not escape some observers, yet it prevailed in the majority vote. Only a minority contested it, insisting that universal principles could not be selectively applied.

The irony, of course, is that the constitution proclaimed liberal ideals while simultaneously codifying exclusion. Freedom was granted, but selectively. Equality was declared, but narrowly defined. The exclusions illuminated the incompleteness of the liberal project in 1814: the nation could envision rights, yet it could not yet imagine a polity in which difference did not threaten unity. Jews were not allowed entry until 1851, and the bans on Jesuits and monastic orders endured even longer.

In the end, the Constitution of 1814 was both forward-looking and constrained, progressive in its liberal ambitions yet shaped by the prejudices and anxieties of its framers. Its justifications reveal a delicate balancing act: the desire for national cohesion and the fear of religious difference, the promise of rights and the persistence of exclusion. One sees here, as in many moments of history, that ideals are often tempered by the realities—and fears—of the age. 

Jacobsen: Later repeals reshaped civic identity in 1851 and 1956: How, and why?

Jørgensen: The repeals of 1851 and 1956 did not occur in isolation. They reflected changing understandings of civic identity and growing pressure on the exclusions written into the 1814 constitution. The first opened the kingdom to Jews; the second removed the requirement that half the cabinet be Lutheran. Both marked shifts in how belonging and citizenship were defined.

Debate over Jewish entry had simmered since 1814. Henrik Wergeland became its central advocate, arguing that exclusion contradicted the constitution’s own natural-law foundations: if rights were universal, they could not be withheld on religious grounds. Opposition persisted—rooted in fears of economic disruption and concerns about religious cohesion—but the intellectual climate changed. By mid-century, liberal ideas had gained ground, the 1848 revolutions had sharpened the language of rights, and Norway’s expanding trade undermined the economic case for exclusion. A constitution proclaiming liberty while maintaining religious barriers appeared increasingly untenable.

The Storting’s 1851 repeal was narrow and contested, less an embrace of pluralism than an acknowledgment that the ban could no longer coexist with the constitutional framework. Civic identity began to shift from confessional uniformity toward participation in shared institutions. The change was formal more than attitudinal, but the principle was established.

The 1956 repeal addressed a subtler barrier: the requirement that a majority of cabinet members be Lutheran. Though less visible, it rested on the same assumption—that political authority required religious conformity. By the mid-twentieth century, that assumption had eroded. Occupation, resistance, and reconstruction had recast civic solidarity in terms that transcended confession, and postwar human-rights discourse made religious tests for office appear incompatible with modern governance. The restriction had become an anachronism.

The repeal passed with far less controversy than in 1851. The church remained the state church, and most citizens remained nominally Lutheran, but religious affiliation had lost its legitimacy as a criterion for political authority. Civic identity was increasingly understood in secular terms: citizenship and democratic participation rather than confessional loyalty.

Both repeals widened the boundaries of civic belonging. The first acknowledged that religious difference did not preclude membership in the political community; the second extended the same logic to political office. Neither dismantled the church’s institutional role, but both weakened the idea that civic identity and religious conformity were inseparable.

The process was neither linear nor inevitable, yet taken together the repeals traced a trajectory: from a polity rooted in religious uniformity toward one grounded in civic rather than confessional membership. The constitution of 1814 had inscribed exclusion; the repeals of 1851 and 1956 began the work of undoing it by reinterpreting the very principles the constitution claimed to uphold.

Jacobsen: How did the Dissenters Act of 1845 erode the Lutheran monopoly?

Jørgensen: The Dissenters Act of 1845 did not dismantle the Lutheran monopoly, but it weakened its foundations. The law permitted Christian congregations outside the state church, formalizing what enforcement had long failed to prevent. What had once been prohibited became tolerated, and what had been tolerated gained legal standing.

The pressure for change had accumulated over decades. Pietist revivals—most notably the Haugean movement—had shown that devotional life could flourish outside parish structures. Such gatherings had persisted despite the Conventicle Act, which forbade unsupervised religious meetings until its repeal in 1842. By the time the Dissenters Act reached the Storting, dissent was an established reality. The issue was no longer its existence but whether the state would continue to criminalize it.

The law extended recognition only under conditions. Dissenting congregations had to register with authorities and affirm the doctrines articulated in the Apostles’, Nicene, and Athanasian creeds. Their ministers were barred from performing marriages and other civil functions reserved to state-church clergy. The aim was to acknowledge religious difference without relinquishing the church’s institutional privileges. Diversity was permitted, but not on equal terms.

The immediate effects were modest. Most Norwegians remained within the state church, and dissenting communities grew slowly. Yet a principle had shifted. Religious belonging could now, in principle, be voluntary rather than compulsory. Full religious freedom remained distant—restrictions persisted, and the church retained its monopoly on crucial rites—but the structure that had dominated since the Reformation had developed its first sanctioned fissure.

The act also created precedent. Once the state accepted that Methodists, Baptists, and other groups could worship independently without threatening civic cohesion, the rationale for religious uniformity became harder to defend. The monopoly appeared less a necessity than a political choice. The argument that national order required a single ecclesiastical structure could no longer be asserted with the former certainty.

The erosion was gradual. The state church continued to dominate education, retained its nationwide parish system, and held the nominal allegiance of the population. Dissenters operated on the margins, often facing social stigma and legal constraints. Yet their mere existence altered the relationship between church and state. The monopoly persisted, but its legitimacy weakened.

Underlying these developments were ideas that had circulated since the Enlightenment. Concepts of individual conscience, voluntary association, and natural-law rights challenged the premise that religious authority flowed through institutional hierarchy alone. These ideas did not overturn the system outright, but they made it increasingly difficult for the state to enforce uniformity without contradiction.

Over time, the consequences became clearer. The Lutheran church remained the state church, but not the sole locus of religious life. Membership became a matter of principle rather than obligation. The Dissenters Act did not establish pluralism, but it made pluralism legally imaginable. Once the boundary between permitted and prohibited religious practice was redrawn, it continued to move.

By the late nineteenth century, dissenting congregations had expanded in number and visibility. The state church adapted, but it could no longer claim to embody the totality of Norwegian religious identity. The monopoly had not been abolished, but it had undeniably been breached. The framework established in 1537 was still standing, yet its internal cohesion had begun to give way. What the 1845 act initiated was a long, uneven process: the gradual detachment of civic identity from confessional uniformity, and the recognition that religious diversity could coexist with political stability.

Jacobsen: Which 19th-century schooling and press reforms translated constitutional ideals into civic competence?

Jørgensen: The constitutional ideals articulated in 1814 required more than declarations. Popular sovereignty presupposed a citizenry capable of participating in the political order the constitution envisioned. The measures that followed—particularly in schooling and the press—were not crafted as a unified program, yet together they supplied the practical conditions through which constitutional principles could be exercised.

The Folk School Act of 1827 formed the starting point. It mandated primary instruction for all children, extending literacy and basic religious teaching into rural districts that had previously relied on itinerant schooling. The curriculum was limited to reading, writing, arithmetic, and catechism, but the shift was significant. Education ceased to be the prerogative of those with resources or proximity to Latin schools. It became a public obligation, administered through the parish and funded locally. The act did not sever schooling from clerical oversight, yet it institutionalized the expectation that every child would gain the skills necessary to navigate a literate society.

The effects unfolded gradually. Rural schools struggled with inconsistent attendance and scarce resources. Still, literacy rates rose steadily by mid-century, and with literacy came access to printed material that had once been monopolized by urban elites. The constitution assumed citizens capable of understanding the issues placed before them; the schools provided the basic tools for that understanding.

Reforms to the press operated on another front. Article 100 had guaranteed freedom of the press, yet practical constraints persisted—censorship provisions, libel laws, and requirements for prior approval. Mid-century reforms reduced these restrictions. The 1842 revisions eased penalties for unauthorized publication, while the 1863 changes eliminated the need for government approval before founding a newspaper. The press widened accordingly. Newspapers multiplied, often aligned with political factions, but their proliferation created a broader arena for public argument. Debate moved into print, accessible to anyone who could read, and the press became a venue where constitutional principles were tested, contested, and interpreted.

Schooling and the press reinforced each other. Literacy enabled engagement; newspapers provided material worthy of engagement. A farmer in an isolated valley could follow debates in the Storting, consider disputes over taxation or trade, and develop informed judgments about his representatives. This did not ensure civic insight, but it made informed participation possible on a scale previously unimagined.

The church’s central role in education added complexity. The Folk School Act placed clergy at the heart of instruction, and the curriculum prioritized religious formation. Yet the skills acquired extended beyond the catechism. A population trained to read scripture could also read petitions, political tracts, and local newspapers. The church sought to shape believers; inadvertently, it helped shape citizens.

By the latter half of the century, the consequences were visible. Voter participation broadened, political associations formed, and public debate moved beyond narrow elite circles. The constitutional framework of 1814 had created formal mechanisms for representation; the reforms of the nineteenth century created the social infrastructure necessary for those mechanisms to function. Civic competence remained uneven—urban communities benefitted first and most—but it was no longer confined to a privileged minority.

What these reforms demonstrated was straightforward: constitutional rights require institutional support. Principles on paper do not operate on their own. The Folk School Act and the press reforms were not conceived as instruments of a coherent civic project, yet they collectively translated the ideals of 1814 into practices that shaped how Norwegians understood themselves as political actors. The constitution had declared popular sovereignty; the nineteenth century began the slower labor of making that sovereignty practicable.

Jacobsen: What labour–capital–state compromises built the egalitarian welfare order?

Jørgensen: The egalitarian welfare order that emerged in Norway was not the result of a single idea or a decisive moment. It grew out of a series of compromises—some deliberate, others more contingent—negotiated over several decades. Labor, capital, and the state each had something to lose if the balance tipped too far in the wrong direction, and something to gain from a workable stability. What developed was not harmony but a framework that made conflict manageable, allowing redistribution and economic growth to proceed without putting the social order at risk.

Its beginnings lay in the early decades of the twentieth century, when industrialization accelerated and the labor movement became increasingly coordinated. Workers voiced clearer demands: wages one could live on, working hours that did not grind people down, and a basic measure of security. Employers often responded with suspicion or outright resistance; these demands were seen as direct intrusions on property rights and managerial authority. The state found itself suspended in the middle—responsible for maintaining order yet pressured by an electorate that no longer consisted solely of the well-to-do. Whether these tensions would lead to breakdown or accommodation was far from certain.

A tentative compromise began to take shape in the 1930s, under economic conditions unlike anything the country had previously faced. The Depression made it impossible to pretend that markets could take care of everything. Unemployment soared, discontent spread, and political stability looked fragile. The Labour Party, which had steadily shifted from revolutionary rhetoric toward a more grounded reform program, entered government in 1935. Their aim was not to abolish capitalism but to restrain it. They sought regulation, not demolition; the expansion of social protections, not wholesale nationalization. The state would intervene where markets faltered, while the basic structure of private production would remain.

Employers gradually accepted this, partly because the alternatives seemed worse. Standing in perpetual conflict—or risking more radical upheavals—was more alarming than a system with predictable rules. The Main Agreement of 1935 provided such rules. It did not eliminate disagreement, but it moved disputes into structured, recognizable procedures. Strikes continued, but with protocols. Wage negotiations remained contentious, but they unfolded within a shared framework.

The war and the postwar years expanded the role of the state even further. Occupation and reconstruction made centralized coordination not just logical but necessary. Public investment drove developments in industry, housing, and infrastructure. Universal programs grew: pensions, healthcare, unemployment insurance, and education. They were funded by taxation that weighed most heavily on high incomes and corporate profits. The underlying principle was not redistribution for its own sake, but a recognition that widespread security strengthened both the economy and democratic life.

Workers gained greater security and political influence. Wage settlements, now covering entire sectors, ensured that the gains of growth were broadly shared. Welfare provisions reduced the vulnerability that had previously defined working-class existence. Yet the labor movement, too, had to yield ground. Militancy was balanced against a need for stability; demands had to be calibrated to the capacity of the wider economy. The compromise held only because concessions flowed both ways.

Employers retained ownership, investment authority, and substantial profits. They also accepted stricter regulations, higher taxes, and an institutionalized labor movement. Profitability remained possible—indeed, often strong—within this regulated system. Income differences did not vanish, but they shrank. The narrowing came not through expropriation but through progressive taxation and universal public services.

The state acted as mediator and guarantor. It enforced agreements, invested where private capital was insufficient, and absorbed risks that would otherwise have fallen heavily on specific groups. Its legitimacy depended on the ability to combine growth with stability—and for several decades, it managed to do exactly that.

The durability of the arrangement rested on its flexibility. It was never a final settlement but a practice renewed each time wages were negotiated or a national budget was drafted. No side achieved full victory, yet none was excluded. Through slow, sometimes uncomfortable negotiation, the system sustained a welfare state that was both efficient and relatively egalitarian.

The order that emerged was never inevitable. It demanded continual effort, bargaining, and a willingness to accept unsatisfying compromises. But it demonstrated that labor, capital, and the state could exist together in a system that was neither unrestrained class conflict nor unregulated capitalism. What developed was not a definitive solution but a way of working—one that reshaped Norwegian society and offered a model that others would later examine, admire, and attempt to emulate.

Discussion

The interview reveals a consistent pattern: Norwegian political development emerged not through abrupt transformation but through layered institutional adaptation. Administrative unevenness produced early structural inequalities, while Enlightenment ideas introduced conceptual tools for rethinking authority. Yet implementation remained constrained by existing social and political realities.

The resulting system was characterized by tension rather than resolution—between inclusion and exclusion, religious authority and civic identity, market forces and social protection. Over time, however, reforms in education, religion, and governance translated abstract principles into practical competencies. The welfare state, in particular, reflects a negotiated equilibrium rather than ideological dominance, demonstrating the capacity of institutions to mediate conflict without eliminating it.

Methods

This article is based on a structured interview conducted with Tor Arne Jørgensen. The transcript has been preserved verbatim, with only formatting adjustments for clarity and consistency. No substantive edits have been made to the interview content.

Data Availability

No datasets were generated or analyzed during the current article. All interview content remains the intellectual property of the interviewer and interviewee.

References

None submitted.

Journal & Article Details

Publisher: In-Sight Publishing

Publisher Founding: March 1, 2014

Web Domain: http://www.in-sightpublishing.com

Location: Fort Langley, Township of Langley, British Columbia, Canada

Journal: In-Sight: Interviews

Journal Founding: August 2, 2012

Frequency: Four Times Per Year

Review Status: Non-Peer-Reviewed

Access: Electronic/Digital & Open Access

Fees: None (Free)

Volume Numbering: 14

Issue Numbering: 1

Section: A

Theme Type: Discipline

Theme Premise: Nordic Legal and Religious History

Theme Part: None.

Formal Sub-Theme: None.

Individual Publication Date: March 22, 2026

Issue Publication Date: April 1, 2026

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Word Count: 4,173

Image Credits: Tor Arne Jørgensen

ISSN (International Standard Serial Number): 2369-6885

Acknowledgements

The author acknowledges Tor Arne Jørgensen for his time, expertise, and valuable contributions. His thoughtful insights and detailed explanations have greatly enhanced the quality and depth of this work, providing a solid foundation for the discussion presented herein.

Author Contributions

S.D.J. conceived the subject matter, conducted the interview, transcribed and edited the conversation, and prepared the manuscript.

Competing Interests

The author declares no competing interests.

License & Copyright

In-Sight Publishing by Scott Douglas Jacobsen is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
© Scott Douglas Jacobsen and In-Sight Publishing 2012–Present.

Unauthorized use or duplication of material without express permission from Scott Douglas Jacobsen is strictly prohibited. Excerpts and links must use full credit to Scott Douglas Jacobsen and In-Sight Publishing with direction to the original content.

Supplementary Information

American Medical Association (AMA 11th Edition)

Jacobsen SD. From From Bureaucracy to Welfare: State Formation, Religious Authority, and Civic Transformation in Norway — Tor Arne Jørgensen (3). In-Sight: Interviews. 2026;14(1). Published March 22, 2026. http://www.in-sightpublishing.com/from-bureaucracy-to-welfare-norway-state-formation-religion-civic-transformation-jorgensen-2026

American Psychological Association (APA 7th Edition)

Jacobsen, S. D. (2026, March 22). From Bureaucracy to Welfare: State Formation, Religious Authority, and Civic Transformation in Norway — Tor Arne Jørgensen (3). In-Sight: Interviews, 14(1). In-Sight Publishing. http://www.in-sightpublishing.com/from-bureaucracy-to-welfare-norway-state-formation-religion-civic-transformation-jorgensen-2026 

Brazilian National Standards (ABNT)

JACOBSEN, Scott Douglas. From Bureaucracy to Welfare: State Formation, Religious Authority, and Civic Transformation in Norway — Tor Arne Jørgensen (3). In-Sight: Interviews, Fort Langley, v. 14, n. 1, 22 mar. 2026. Disponível em: http://www.in-sightpublishing.com/from-bureaucracy-to-welfare-norway-state-formation-religion-civic-transformation-jorgensen-2026 

Chicago/Turabian (Author-Date, 17th Edition)

Jacobsen, Scott Douglas. 2026. “From Bureaucracy to Welfare: State Formation, Religious Authority, and Civic Transformation in Norway — Tor Arne Jørgensen (3).” In-Sight: Interviews 14 (1). http://www.in-sightpublishing.com/from-bureaucracy-to-welfare-norway-state-formation-religion-civic-transformation-jorgensen-2026 

Chicago/Turabian (Notes & Bibliography, 17th Edition)

Jacobsen, Scott Douglas. “From Bureaucracy to Welfare: State Formation, Religious Authority, and Civic Transformation in Norway — Tor Arne Jørgensen (3).” In-Sight: Interviews 14, no. 1 (March 22, 2026). http://www.in-sightpublishing.com/from-bureaucracy-to-welfare-norway-state-formation-religion-civic-transformation-jorgensen-2026 

Harvard

Jacobsen, S.D. (2026) ‘From Bureaucracy to Welfare: State Formation, Religious Authority, and Civic Transformation in Norway — Tor Arne Jørgensen (3)’, In-Sight: Interviews, 14(1), 22 March. Available at: http://www.in-sightpublishing.com/from-bureaucracy-to-welfare-norway-state-formation-religion-civic-transformation-jorgensen-2026 

Harvard (Australian)

Jacobsen, SD 2026, ‘From Bureaucracy to Welfare: State Formation, Religious Authority, and Civic Transformation in Norway — Tor Arne Jørgensen (3)’, In-Sight: Interviews, vol. 14, no. 1, 22 March, viewed 22 March 2026, http://www.in-sightpublishing.com/from-bureaucracy-to-welfare-norway-state-formation-religion-civic-transformation-jorgensen-2026 

Modern Language Association (MLA, 9th Edition)

Jacobsen, Scott Douglas. “From Bureaucracy to Welfare: State Formation, Religious Authority, and Civic Transformation in Norway — Tor Arne Jørgensen (3).” In-Sight: Interviews, vol. 14, no. 1, 2026, http://www.in-sightpublishing.com/from-bureaucracy-to-welfare-norway-state-formation-religion-civic-transformation-jorgensen-2026 

Vancouver / ICMJE

Jacobsen SD. From Bureaucracy to Welfare: State Formation, Religious Authority, and Civic Transformation in Norway — Tor Arne Jørgensen (3)  [Internet]. 2026 Mar 22;14(1). Available from: http://www.in-sightpublishing.com/from-bureaucracy-to-welfare-norway-state-formation-religion-civic-transformation-jorgensen-2026 

Note on Formatting

This document follows an adapted Nature research-article format tailored for an interview. Traditional sections such as Methods, Results, and Discussion are replaced with clearly defined parts: Abstract, Keywords, Introduction, Main Text (Interview), and a concluding Discussion, along with supplementary sections detailing Data Availability, References, and Author Contributions. This structure maintains scholarly rigor while effectively accommodating narrative content.

The Blunt Edge of Ockham's Razor. What are the risks?

https://philosophics.blog/2026/02/14/the-trouble-with-ockhams-razor/?utm_source=masto&utm_medium=social

I needed to take a break from video editing. No Judas Priest references inside.

#philosophy #logic #simplicity #grammar #language #sufficiency #ontology #metaphysics #blog #podcast #aphorism #heuristic #naturallaw #humility #razor

To be libertarian is to view the world from the lens of Nature; to regard the human as a dignified being with rights that shall not be impinged upon, but merely defended; to hold our authorities, who are subject to the laws of Nature, to account; and not by least, to liberate the mind from all barriers to critical thinking, thus allowing it to nurture its reasoning and cut through arguments. I will never be the same person that I was six years ago.

#libertarianism #naturalLaw #negativeLiberty

Classical Republicanism and Stoicism refutes Racial Hierarchies

Classical Republicanism, as articulated in ancient Greek and Roman political philosophy emphasizes the pursuit of the common good for the CIVITAS through civic virtue, balanced governance, and participation in public life, without grounding these ideals in biological or racial hierarchies as understood in modern terms. Far from being inherently racist, its foundational texts reveal a focus on cultural, ethical, and institutional factors, often challenging notions of inherent inferiority. The ancient world lacked a concept of “race” as defined in post-Enlightenment biological categorization underlying modern racism. Instead, distinctions like “Greek” versus “barbarian” are primarily linguistic and cultural attachments, with “barbarian” deriving from onomatopoeic imitation of foreign speech (see Herodotus, Histories, 1.58). This cultural framing allowed for assimilation and mobility, refuting any systematic ancient state racism. Moreover, classical philosophers provided arguments that systematically undermine both ancient prejudices and contemporary race realism, the pseudoscientific claim of inherent racial differences in traits like intelligence through appeals to reason, nature, and empirical evidence.

ANCIENT STATE RACISM REFUTED WITH CLASSICAL SOURCES

Ancient republics, such as Athens and Rome did not structure their polities around racial exclusion but around citizenship tied to law, custom, and participation. In Greece, citizenship was often limited to free-born males of Athenian parentage, yet this was not racial. Foreigners (metics) could contribute economically and militarily, and exceptional individuals like the philosopher Anacharsis, a Scythian “barbarian,” were celebrated for wisdom (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 1.101-105). Aristotle, a key figure in republican thought, critiqued rigid hierarchies in his Politics, noting that some argue “for one man to be another man’s master is contrary to nature, because it is only convention that makes the one a slave and the other a freeman and there is no difference between them by nature” (Aristotle, Politics, 1253b20-23).

Plato acknowledges that slavery often results from war or force, not innate racial traits; and he warns against assuming all non-Greeks are natural slaves, as Greeks themselves could become enslaved if defeated (Aristotle, Politics, 1255a28-32). This cripples any claim of inherent state-sanctioned racism, emphasizing contingency over biology.

In Rome, republicanism evolved into an even more inclusive framework as elaborated in Aegean Origins and History of the Fasces: Minoan Crete to Revolutionary Republicanism. Cicero, in De Re Publica, defines the republic as “an association of many, united by a common sense of right and a community of interest” (Cicero, De Re Publica, 1.39), without restricting this to ethnic Romans. Roman citizenship expanded progressively: from the Social War (91-88 BCE) granting it to Italian allies, to Julius Caesar extending it to provincials, culminating in Emperor Caracalla’s Edict of 212 CE, which conferred citizenship on all free inhabitants of the empire regardless of origin (Cassius Dio, Roman History, 78.9.4-5).

This universalism reflected republican ideals of justice and utility, not racial purity. Polybius, praising the Roman constitution, attributes its success to a mixed government blending monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, crediting adaptability and incorporation of diverse peoples rather than exclusion (Polybius, Histories, 6.3-18).

Stoic philosophy, deeply intertwined with Roman republicanism, further dismantles prejudicial notions through cosmopolitanism. Influenced by Cynics like Diogenes, who declared himself “a citizen of the world” (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 6.63), Stoics viewed all rational beings as equal citizens of a cosmic polity governed by universal reason (LOGOS). Chrysippus argued that true kinship lies in shared rationality, not blood or locality, rejecting conventional ties that divide humanity (Plutarch, On the Fortune of Alexander, 329a-b). Cicero writes of this in De Legibus, stating that “there is no difference in kind between man and man; for if there were, one definition could not be applicable to all men” (Cicero, De Legibus, 1.29-30).

Seneca reinforces the position:

“Nature bids me do good to all mankind… Wherever there is a human being, there is room for kindness” (Seneca, De Vita Beata, 24.3).

Epictetus, himself a former slave of non-Roman origin, taught that all humans are “sons of Zeus” and brothers, bound by divine reason irrespective of status or ethnicity (Epictetus, Discourses, 1.13.3-5). These ideas, elemental to republican governance under figures like Marcus Aurelius, promoted ethical universalism, directly countering ethnocentric biases and showing that classical republicanism prioritized virtue and reason over birth.

Ancient prejudices existed, such as Aristotle’s view that some barbarians lack deliberative faculty (Aristotle, Politics, 1252b5-9), but these were contested within the tradition itself and framed culturally, not racially. Environmental determinism, as in Hippocrates’ Airs, Waters, Places, make connections between temperament and climate, implying malleability through relocation or education, not fixed inheritance (Hippocrates, “Airs, Waters, Places,” 12-24). This fluidity allowed “barbarians” like the Persian Cyrus to be idealized as virtuous rulers (Xenophon, Cyropaedia, 1.1.4), demonstrating that ancient republicanism was not inherently tied to racism but to improvable human potential.

Classical republicanism’s emphasis on universal reason and civic inclusion, bolstered by scientific evidence of human genetic unity and environmental determinants invites a politics of shared humanity, not division. I urge you to take your proper roles in the development of civilization, instead of relinquishing the future to technological advancements and its ever-increasing demands on our time and ‘sense of will.’

STOICISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM

In the discussion of Classical Republicanism and its refutation of racial hierarchies, Stoic philosophy plays pivotal philosophical role through its emphasis on universal reason (LOGOS), shared humanity, and cosmopolitanism —the idea that all people are citizens of a single, rational world order. This is the metaphysical boundary of a republic. These ideas influenced Roman republican thinkers and view humanity as united by virtue and reason, not divided by birth.

When asked where he came from, Diogenes the Cynic stated:

‘I am a citizen of the world [kosmopolitês].’ (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 6.63)

Diogenes of Sinope (c. 412-323 BCE), though a Cynic philosopher, profoundly influenced Stoicism, particularly its founder Zeno of Citium, who studied under Cynic teachers. This anecdote appears in Diogenes Laertius’s biographical compendium, which compiles stories about philosophers’ lives and sayings. Diogenes, an exile from Sinope, lived as a wandering beggar in Athens, rejecting conventional attachments to city-states, family, or social norms. His declaration came in response to questions about his origins, challenging the parochial loyalties of Greek poleis (city-states) during an era of interstate rivalries and xenophobia.

This phrase “cosmopolitan” was coined from kosmos meaning world or universe and politês meaning citizen. It rejects ethnic or national boundaries, asserting that true identity stems from participation in a universal community governed by nature and reason. For Stoics, this evolved into the idea that all rational beings share a divine spark or fragment of the One Element, making divisions like “Greek vs. barbarian” not of necessity. In refuting racism, it promotes a borderless ethics where kindness and justice extend to all, anticipating modern human rights concepts (see Our Pre-Stoic Roots in Human Rights Theory in the United States). Diogenes’s life exemplified this, and despite being seen as a “barbarian” from the Black Sea region, he thrived in Greek intellectual circles, showing cultural barriers are surmountable through virtue.

FOR CHRYSIPPUS OF SOLI THERE IS TRUE KINSHIP IN SHARED RATIONALITY

In Plutarch’s On the Fortune of Alexander (329a-b), the idea is articulated through reference to Stoic principles, often attributed to Chrysippus (though the text cites Zeno directly): “Our household arrangements should not be based on cities or parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all men as our fellow-citizens and local communities, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing together nurtured by a common law.” Plutarch contrasts this with Alexander’s conquests, but Chrysippus elaborated it as: “Life in agreement with nature means not doing anything that is forbidden by the common law, which is right reason pervading everything.”1 Chrysippus of Soli (c. 279-206 BCE), the third head of the Stoic school after Zeno and Cleanthes, systematized Stoicism in over 700 works (mostly lost). We are able to draw from his ethical fragments, preserved in Plutarch’s Moralia (c. 100 CE), where Plutarch praises Alexander the Great for embodying Stoic ideals by uniting diverse peoples. Chrysippus built on Zeno’s Republic, envisioning a world polity where reason (logos) is the “common law” binding humanity, rejecting tribal or ethnic divisions. So, it has been the tactic of the modern racist (particularly the “race realist”) to depict “non-White people” as incapable of reason (logos) or of “understanding higher subjects.”

Firstly, Chrysippus argues that rationality, not ancestry or locality, defines human bonds! Humans are like a “herd” under one natural law, implying equality and mutual care. This directly counters ancient biopolitics (e.g., viewing non-Greeks as inferior) and modern race realism by emphasizing that differences are superficial. The universally-diffused shared logos makes all capable of virtue (see Roots of the “Divine Spark” in African Religious and Philosophical Traditions).

In REPUBLICANISM, this supported inclusive citizenship, as seen in Rome’s expansions, promoting a politics where “fellow-citizens” include all rational beings, fostering anti-racist universalism.

THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN KIND BETWEEN MAN AND MAN IN CICERO’S PHILOSOPHY

“But there is no difference in kind between man and man; for if there were, one definition could not be applicable to all men; and indeed reason, which alone raises us above the level of the beasts and enables us to infer, by a process of reasoning, that certain things are so which our senses have not perceived, is common to all men, and though varying in what it learns, at least in the capacity to learn it is invariable.” (Cicero, De Legibus, 1.29-30)

“For it is impossible that the divine mind should exist without reason; and divine reason must necessarily be possessed of a power to determine what is virtuous.”

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE), a Roman statesman and philosopher, wrote De Legibus (On the Laws) around 52 BCE as a dialogue on natural law and ideal governance, modeled after Plato’s Laws. Here, in Book 1, Cicero (as a character) discusses human nature with his brother Quintus and friend Atticus, arguing for a universal law rooted in reason, drawing heavily from Stoic sources like Panaetius. Cicero asserts that reason is the defining human trait, universally shared and invariant in potential, making all people fundamentally equal regardless of external differences. This universal definition for humanity refutes hierarchies based on race or origin, as education and environment can equalize knowledge. In my view, from my studies , I observe multiple other factors in detail that can equalize knowledge, because it is not simply the environment that influences. It is the manner in which one reflects their relation to self and that environment. Society and culture in ancient Rome also radically differs from that of the modern American and even the present-day American from a century ago. There are many unfortunate factors that affect environments today in which, e.g., Black kids learn and develop — from the cradle through schooling. However, in the anti-racism context, it undermines claims of innate inferiority, which is mainly obsessively and tactfully focused on Black people, aligning with scientific views that genetic variation doesn’t create categorical differences in cognitive capacity. Cicero’s republicanism applied this to law, advocating justice for all, influencing later thinkers like Locke on natural rights.

SENECA ON NATURE BIDDING US DO GOOD TO ALL MANKIND

“Nature bids me do good to all mankind. What difference does it make whether they are slaves or freemen, freeborn or emancipated, whether their freedom is legally acquired or bestowed by friends? Wherever there is a human being, there is room for kindness (beneficentia).” (Seneca, De Vita Beata, 24.3)

Nature compels me, Seneca states, to be of use to all mankind. Lucius Annaeus Seneca (c. 4 BCE–65 CE), a Roman Stoic and advisor to Nero, wrote De Vita Beata (On the Happy Life) around 58 CE as a dialogue defending Stoic ethics against Epicurean pleasure-seeking. In Chapter 24, Seneca addresses beneficence, arguing that virtue involves active goodwill toward others, rooted in nature’s being.

Seneca extends kindness universally, ignoring social statuses like slavery or birth, which were rampant in Rome. This “room for kindness” wherever a human exists is cosmopolitan duty, countering exclusionary prejudices. It refutes racism by mandating ethical treatment based on shared humanity, not group identity, and supports environmental explanations for differences (e.g., through nurturing), as virtue is cultivable in all.

EPICTETUS ON ALL HUMANS AS BROTHERS AND SONS OF ZEUS

“Will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus for his progenitor, and is like a son from the same seeds and of the same descent from above? But if you have been put in any such higher place, will you immediately make yourself a tyrant? Will you not remember who you are, and whom you rule? That they are kinsmen, that they are brethren by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus?” (Epictetus, Discourses, 1.13.3-5)

The chapter continues: “But I have purchased them, and they have not purchased me. Do you see in what direction you are looking, that it is towards the earth, towards the pit, that it is towards these wretched laws of dead men? But towards the laws of the gods you are not looking.” Epictetus (c. 50–135 CE), a former slave turned Stoic teacher, delivered his Discourses (recorded by student Arrian) as lectures on practical ethics. In 1.13, titled “How everything may be done acceptably to the gods,” he critiques a slave-owner’s attitude, using it to illustrate reverence for divine order through respect for others. Epictetus, of non-Roman (possibly Phrygian) origin and enslaved, speaks from experience, equating all humans as “brethren by nature” and divine offspring. This kinship through Zeus, symbolizing universal reason supercedes man-made hierarchies like slavery or ethnicity. It dismantles racism by prioritizing “laws of the gods” (natural equality) over “laws of dead men” (social constructs), aligning with evidence that disparities stem from environment, not biology, and urging ethical republicanism through mutual respect.

Stoicism’s doctrines on reason, nature, and virtue foster an inclusive worldview, and is integral to Classical Republicanism’s anti-hierarchical ethos. They provide timeless arguments against division, emphasizing perfectibilism and shared potential in all people, in the commonwealth, in the nation.

FOOTNOTES

1. See also Plutarch’s broader discussion in the essay, emphasizing that true kinship is not by blood but by shared reason. ↩︎

Among the Unalienable Rights
https://consortiumnews.com/2025/12/19/among-the-unalienable-rights/
Nothing will chill Tucker Carlson’s exercise of the freedom of speech, writes Andrew P. Napolitano. But that does not absolve Chuck Schumer and the U.S. Senate. By Andrew P. Napolitano CN at 30 Last week, Sen. Charles Schumer, the leader of…
#Politics #Commentary #FreeSpeech #U.s. #U.s.Congress #U.s.Constitution #AndrewP.Napolitano #DeclarationOfIndependence #FirstAmendment #JamesMadison #NaturalLaw #NickFuentes #TuckerCarlson

Here's a valid addition to the +190,000-page US Code of Federal Regulations: a requirement for regulators to only enforce laws and amendments passed by Congress and in ways that minimally impinge on our natural rights. Regulate regulation. Until then, feel free to take the rules to court if and whenever they tread on *your* rights.

#ChecksAndBalances #CommonLaw #NaturalLaw #overregulation #regulation #SeparationOfPowers

I respect people who are into TM, David Lynch is my primary hero in life afterall, but my God John Hagelin in these campaign interviews I've watched for the Natural Law Party comes off as like not even a good conman, really mid-tier in his fantasy math about TM eliminating repeat offenders or preventative care being the main health care reform we need.

#thirdparty #naturallaw #history #uspol #uspolitics

" MMM ", a single (and song) taken from the album by Virtual Alien and Old Nick (X1 and his alter ego X2) / Nick Peterson.

Hiding behind the veil of dementia and utter insanity.

#X1 #X2 #VirtualAlien #OldNick #music #NaturalLaw

Apple music

https://music.apple.com/np/album/mmm-single/1846389623

A quotation from Marcus Aurelius

Injustice is a kind of blasphemy. Nature designed rational beings for each other’s sake: to help — not harm — one another, as they deserve. To transgress its will, then, is to blaspheme against the oldest of the gods.
 
[Ὁ ἀδικῶν ἀσεβεῖ: τῆς γὰρ τῶν ὅλων φύσεως κατεσκευακυίας τὰ λογικὰ ζῷα ἕνεκεν ἀλλήλων, ὥστε ὠφελεῖν μὲν ἄλληλα κατ̓ ἀξίαν βλάπτειν δὲ μηδαμῶς, ὁ τὸ βούλημα ταύτης παραβαίνων ἀσεβεῖ δηλονότι εἰς τὴν πρεσβυτάτην τῶν θεῶν.]

Marcus Aurelius (AD 121-180) Roman emperor (161-180), Stoic philosopher
Meditations [To Himself; Τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν], Book 9, ch. 1 (9.1) (AD 161-180) [tr. Hays (2003)]

More info about (and translations of) this quote: wist.info/marcus-aureleus/8034…

#quote #quotes #quotation #qotd #marcusaurelius #marcusaureliusmeditations #blasphemy #harm #impiety #injustice #knavery #loveyourneighbor #meaningoflife #naturallaw #nature #sin

We will claim our power. Rise up, all you Warriors of Love. ❤️‍🔥✊️❤️‍🔥 #GENERALSTRIKEUS #SOLIDARITY #NaturalLaw

RE: https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:rtc4q3att7stuobmlnwgukno/post/3lymsqgshgi2i

What does it mean to live a good life? 🌿✨
#EthicalTheories #PhilosophyAndLife #PoeticBipolarMind #MoralPhilosophy #CulturalRelativism #Utilitarianism #Deontology #DivineCommandTheory #NaturalLaw #EthicsAndArt #MentalHealthAndPhilosophy

https://poeticbipolarmind.blog/beyond-right-and-wrong/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=jetpack_social

No predictions. #Snakes & #Lions don’t mix! #Religions #ideology or #Beliefs that promote #Death go extinct. Truth isn’t based on politics! #Obama #Trump #Epstien Who knows the #future ? Cause & Effect is #NaturalLaw #Conspiracy is #Treason : Not related to “spin” open.spotify.com/track/51czDX...

Snakes and Lions

Nate's reference to C2K made me chuckle about my eclectic road. I'm #Calvinist and #TwoKingdoms, but my 2K theology came by way of #Luther. I'm a Calvinist who believes in #NaturalLaw, but my natural law theology came by way of Thomas. In every theological circle, I speak with an accent.

#ThomasAquinas #Thomism #MartinLuther #Calvinism #Christianity

The True Meaning Of Anarchy
#NaturalLaw #naturallaw #governmentisslavery #freedom

Dark Occultist VS Order Follower Karmic Debt
#NaturalLaw #naturallaw #governmentisslavery #freedom

What Is Really Satanism?
#NaturalLaw #naturallaw #governmentisslavery #freedom

God and the #NaturalLaw

#God and #Morality, eds. J. Hare and D. Baggett (#OxfordUniversityPress, forthcoming 2026)

27 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2025 Last revised: 26 Jan 2025
Francis Joseph Beckwith

#BaylorUniversity - Department of #Philosophy

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5111465

Finally caught the film #Flow last night and I now have loads of thoughts swirling in my head! Ideas about #ohana and #harmony with #nature (and #NaturalLaw), about how the #Stoics were wrong about humanity having an inherent depravity (but instead are burdened with the weight of morally considering our actions while lacking the proper perspective to understand that morality)… what an excellent little film worthy of its #Oscars win!

Also detailed was Bierling's close personal relationship with Curt Doolittle of the hyper-violent 'Natural Law Institute', and his direct contributions to this deliberate perversion of #Indigenous #FirstNations #NaturalLaw with an Aryan #WhiteSupremacist militaristic doctrine.

A quotation from Feynman, Richard:

«
The whole question of imagination in science is often misunderstood by people in other disciplines. They try to test our imagination in the following way. They say, “Here is a picture of some people in a situation. What do you imagine will happen next?” When we say, “I can’t imagine,” they …
»

Full quote, sourcing, notes:
https://wist.info/feynman-richard/71547/

#quote #quotes #quotation #consistency #science #imagination #hypothesis #naturallaw #nature #speculation

"It’s why same-sex marriage was bad. It’s why trans people are bad. It’s why IVF is bad. If you have a worldview that assumes everything in the natural world was created with a specific purpose, the logical next step is to lament anyone and anything that violates that purpose. It is a tool for control."

#JDVance #NaturalLaw #women #gender #GenderRoles #trans #SameSexMarriage
/11

Joe Ragazzo notes that J.D. Vance's agreement with a declaration that "the purpose" of post-menopausal women is to care for children is rooted in the kind of natural law theology popular in the right-wing Catholic circles Vance has inhabited since he became Catholic"

"This appeal to Natural Law rears its ugly head a lot in the religious segments of the right."

#JDVance #NaturalLaw #women #gender #GenderRoles
/10

https://talkingpointsmemo.com/the-weekender/jd-vances-purpose

#Scripture-quoting #Alabama judge in #IVF case bridges #naturallaw and #Christiannationalism

https://flip.it/Bd5bgN

Wow, just had a weird flashback pass through my mind.
Does anyone else remember the Natural Law Party?

#politics #PoliticalParties #NaturalLaw

Friends in the #unitedkingdom #uk you have the natural law

https://lbry.tv/@EverydaySuccess:1/fundamentals-of-common-law:e

#naturallaw #law #protest #petition #politics #governments #thevoice