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#ietf102 — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #ietf102, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Drafts SHOULD be implemented and MUST NOT have bugs #ietf102

  2. Is it ethical to post a picture of a cute kitten when you want your work to be adopted by the working group? #IETF102

  3. Back to #DNS stuff, with the second meeting of DNSOP, dedicated to new work.

    ATR (sending a truncated response immediately after the large response, in case broken stupid middleboxes block the large - possibly fragmented - response).

    #IETF102

  4. #QUIC #HumanRights review by Beatrice Martini. Among the good thing, it reduces the digital divide (improves things on high loss connections), it improves privacy (some transport information is now encrypted BUT there is the contentious issue of the spin bit).

    #IETF102

  5. Other #HumanRights review team work: SUIT, firmware update for #IoT devices (mostly #privacy issues). #IETF102

  6. Big discussion at the #IETF : even the Human Rights group talks about meeting venue choice. (gender-neutral restrooms, childcare like at the last #RIPE76, etc). #IETF102

  7. Funny: in China, a DPI #censorship device examines all the TCP flows (not just HTTP and DNS) so protocol Echo (RFC 862) sees censorship as well, which can be used to detect it. #IETF102

  8. One of the tricks of #Augur is to use "infrstructure" machines (such as routers) to do the #censorship measurements, to reduce the risk for individual users. #IETF102

  9. One of the issues of #censorship measurement is the risk for the people hosting a probe. #OONI, for instance, has a very detailed consent form. #ethics #IETF102

  10. Roya Ensafi on stage to talk about #censorship measurement. #IETF102

    Speaking of that, a french senator just proposed automatic censorship on the Internet nextinpact.com/news/106750-une

  11. Does anyone know where is the power switch in the Fairmont Queen Elizabeth? #IETF102

  12. Apparently, the network at #IETF102 runs on battery: traceroute still works. Still no power.

  13. Power failure in the #IETF102 hotel. Will this toot go through?

  14. Lessons: don't use short TTLs. Don't use Amazon #DNS resolvers, which cap TTL. Caching is your friend. #IETF102

  15. In the case of partially successful dDoS attacks, a good part of the requests received by auth. #DNS servers is friendly fire: resolvers keep retrying, adding their requests to the dDoS. #IETF102

  16. First test was the doomsday scenario (auth. servers 100 % down). With a less successful dDoS attack (10 % of requests serviced), experience shows that #DNS robustness works: all clients eventually get an answer (may be after a longer time). "DNS is good engineering" #IETF102

  17. Now, emulating a dDoS with iptables and measuring if #DNS caches really help. With a TTL of 60', 30 to 70 % of the clients still receive a reply during one hour.

    After one hour, it does not drop to 0 %: some clients still get stale answers.

    Executive summary: trust caching, and stop using ridiculously short TTLs.

    #IETF102

  18. Caches protect a lot during dDoS attacks, Even if all authoritative name servers are down, the data are still served. (Actual efficiency of caching measured with RIPE Atlas probes, "reality matches theory".) #DNS #IETF102

  19. Now, #DNS reliability "When the dike breaks"

    How does the DNS manage during a dDoS attack? by Giovane Moura During the attack against the root in 2015, no effect for users. During the Dyn attack, a lot. Why?

    #IETF102

  20. Brian Trammel detecting remotely the load of a network. (Send packet, note the RTT, and thanks to bufferbloat, you will know the load from the RTT.) #IETF102

  21. Also, reordering is just a minority of cases, but there is a long tail (old packets suddenly appearing). So, it is probably better to optimize at the start of a #QUIC session for no reordering, then to adjust. #IETF102

  22. Giovane Moura on stage for #Dmap "automating #DNS measurements" Many tools but hard to make them work together. Solution : dmap.sidnlabs.nl/ #IETF102

  23. Why not simply using #SASL for #EPP instead of reinventing the wheel with our own login framework? (Disclaimer: I never managed to understand SASL.) #IETF102

  24. Core infrastructure is aging and not designed to be underwater #IETF102 #anrw