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#csto — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #csto, aggregated by home.social.

  1. During the #NagornoKarabakh conflict of 2022, #Armenia triggered the mutual defense clause of #CSTO. However #Moscow could not come to the aid of #Yerevan because of the on going #SpecialMilitaryOperation in #Ukraine.

    #US will be face something similar, soon. It will get entangled in a #Taiwan contingency. And when that happens, if another treaty ally or allies were to trigger the mutual defense clause of their treaty with #Washington they will be left to fend on their own.

    #NATO #GeoPolitics

  2. During the #NagornoKarabakh conflict of 2022, #Armenia triggered the mutual defense clause of #CSTO. However #Moscow could not come to the aid of #Yerevan because of the on going #SpecialMilitaryOperation in #Ukraine.

    #US will be face something similar, soon. It will get entangled in a #Taiwan contingency. And when that happens, if another treaty ally or allies were to trigger the mutual defense clause of their treaty with #Washington they will be left to fend on their own.

    #NATO #GeoPolitics

  3. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned that Armenia may lose its rights within the CSTO due to unpaid dues. This follows Armenia's decision to freeze its participation and pursue closer security ties with Western nations.

    bloomberg.com/news/articles/20

    #Ukraine #Russia #Armenia #Lavrov #CSTO

  4. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned that Armenia may lose its rights within the CSTO due to unpaid dues. This follows Armenia's decision to freeze its participation and pursue closer security ties with Western nations.

    bloomberg.com/news/articles/20

    #Ukraine #Russia #Armenia #Lavrov #CSTO

  5. The leaders of the former Soviet republics that are members of the CIS, the EAEU, and the CSTO military bloc will almost entirely ignore the Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9, 2026.

    ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/05/

    #Ukraine #Russia #CIS #EAEU #CSTO #Moscow

  6. The leaders of the former Soviet republics that are members of the CIS, the EAEU, and the CSTO military bloc will almost entirely ignore the Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9, 2026.

    ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/05/

    #Ukraine #Russia #CIS #EAEU #CSTO #Moscow

  7. Armenia’s parliamentary speaker Alen #Simonyan said his country would leave the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union if Russia raises the price of gas it supplies to the republic.

    meduza.io/en/news/2026/04/04/a

    #Ukraine #Russia #Armenia #EEU #CSTO

  8. Armenia’s parliamentary speaker Alen #Simonyan said his country would leave the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union if Russia raises the price of gas it supplies to the republic.

    meduza.io/en/news/2026/04/04/a

    #Ukraine #Russia #Armenia #EEU #CSTO

  9. How Might Russia Respond If Its ‘Technical Ally’ North Korea Came Under Attack?

    How Might Russia Respond If Its ‘Technical Ally’ North Korea Came Under Attack?

    By Andrew Korybko

    Each is the other’s ally, but within lesser practical limits than Russia is to its CSTO allies or the US to its NATO ones, which is an important distinction.

    Folks were earlier reminded that “Russia Was Never Iran’s ‘Ally’” in the sense of having mutual defence obligations to it like Russia does to the five countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that it leads: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It also has similar obligations to the former Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. All seven are located within the former USSR, which Russia considers to be its “Near Abroad”, a euphemism for “sphere of influence”.

    Unmentioned in the cited analysis above is that Russia has technically had mutual defence obligations to North Korea since the ratification of a relevant pact in late 2024 that updated their Soviet-era one. The document can be read here in Russian while North Korean media summarized it here. It wasn’t included in that analysis due to the implementation differing from what casual observers imagine mutual defense obligations to mean with respect to providing full and limitless support to one’s allies during a crisis.

    Article 3 calls on them to consult each other and coordinate “In the event of an immediate threat of an act of armed aggression against one of the Parties”, while Article 4 calls on them to “immediately provide military and other assistance with all means at its disposal” if war breaks out. In practice, North Korea didn’t provide “assistance with all means at its disposal” for helping Russia expel the Ukrainian invaders and their mercenary allies from Kursk, but what it did provide was still deeply appreciated.

    The form that it took was supplying ammo, troops, and then sappers (de-miners) afterwards, all of which indisputably helped Russia in the spirit of their mutual defence obligations but of course fell short of providing “all means at [North Korea’s] disposal”, though Russia likely didn’t request maximum support. After all, North Korea must understandably maintain its defences at home, thus explaining why it couldn’t send the bulk of what’s one of the world’s largest standing armies from Asia to Europe.

    In any case, the question that some have asked amidst the US-Israeli campaign against Iran is how Russia would respond to a similar US-led campaign against North Korea, the prospects of which are admittedly dim due to its nuclear deterrent but nevertheless still an intriguing thought exercise in this context. As with North Korea, Russia can’t realistically send the bulk of what’s also one of the world’s largest standing armies from Europe to Asia since it too must understandably maintain is defences at home.

    It’s possible that fighter pilots and jets could be provided just like during what would then be known as the First Korean War. Some have also speculated that Russia is already sending high-tech military equipment, including that which can be used for ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, and satellites, to North Korea in the spirit of this pact for deterrence purposes. In the event of an invasion, however, precedent suggests that Chinese troops would intervene instead due to China’s much greater interests.

    As such, Russia is expected to provide North Korea with equipment operators like fighter pilots and their assets if it comes under attack, but it’s unlikely to send the bulk of its forces just like North Korea didn’t send the bulk of its own to Kursk. Russia also likely won’t open up a European front for dividing the US’ forces since North Korea didn’t open up an Asian one for that purpose. Each is the other’s ally, but within lesser practical limits than Russia is to its CSTO allies or the US to its NATO ones, which is an important distinction.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

     

    #China #CSTO #Europe #Geopolitics #NATO #NorthKorea #Russia #USA
  10. @jessicaperthwa.bsky.social
    Which also makes it clear the #CSTO is dead.
    And cutting Russia off from Iran would be BIG in its impact on Russia.

  11. @jessicaperthwa.bsky.social
    Which also makes it clear the #CSTO is dead.
    And cutting Russia off from Iran would be BIG in its impact on Russia.

  12. Vance’s South Caucasus Trip Tightens The West’s Strategic Encirclement Of Russia

    Vance’s South Caucasus Trip Tightens The West’s Strategic Encirclement Of Russia

    By Andrew Korybko

    The timing amidst continued US-mediated talks between Russia and Ukraine suggests that the US expects this ramped-up pressure to raise the chances of coercing concessions from Russia.

    Vice President JD Vance’s trips to Armenia and Azerbaijan were aimed at advancing several interconnected strategic goals. The most immediate was making progress on implementing the “Trump Route for International Peace & Prosperity” (TRIPP), which is the planned trade corridor across southern Armenia unveiled after last August’s White House summit that ended the decades-long Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict. TRIPP isn’t just economically significant, however, since it’s also highly strategic.

    To begin with, it replaces Russia’s plan to pioneer a corridor along the same route that would be guarded by its forces, therefore challenging the Kremlin’s political influence in the post-war South Caucasus. Second, TRIPP serves as the means for optimizing Western logistical access to the resource-rich but landlocked Central Asian Republics on the other side of the Caspian, which is of interest for the US due to its critical minerals. The US signed MoUs with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan about this last November.

    On that topic, Vance proposed the creation of a critical minerals trading bloc during the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial that was attended by representatives of more than 50 countries, thus further contextualizing his trip to the South Caucasus a week later. His progress on implementing TRIPP will help to logistically open Central Asia’s critical mineral supply chain for the US. Having explained the political and economic aspects of TRIPP’s strategic significance, it’s now time to segue into the military one.

    By replacing Russia’s planned corridor across southern Armenia with one in which the US will have a controlling stake for the next 49-99 years and preventing the Kremlin from monitoring traffic across it, Turkiye can now clandestinely optimize its military-logistics to Central Asia. Four of its five states have some formal relationship with the Turkish-led “Organization of Turkic States” (OTS), while two of its members are also Russia’s CSTO mutual defence allies, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

    The OTS is increasingly taking on more security responsibilities, which can be interpreted as means of challenging Russia’s security influence along its vulnerable southern periphery. To make matters even more concerning from the Kremlin’s perspective, Kazakhstan announced its plans late last year to produce NATO-standard shells, likely emboldened by TRIPP facilitating the US’, Turkiye’s, and ultimately NATO’s military logistics to it in the event of a crisis with Russia. This was elaborated on here.

    Making progress on TRIPP’s implementation, which is assessed to be the purpose of Vance’s trips to Armenia and Azerbaijan, therefore tightens the West’s strategic encirclement of Russia along its entire southern periphery through the political, economic, and military means that this corridor unlocks. Vance undertook his voyage there amidst continued US-mediated talks between Russia and Ukraine, which suggests that this was timed to ramp up pressure on Russia for coercing concessions from it.

    Be that as it may, while Trump 2.0 has indeed intensified pressure upon Russia along its southern periphery as explained, along its western one via support for the EU’s militarization, and along the financial front by pressuring India to reduce its import of Russian oil, Russia still insists on achieving its goals in full. If it ever compromises, however, then that would be due to the US’ carrot and stick policy of a proposed resource-centric strategic partnership and the aforesaid tightening encirclement campaign.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

     

    #Armenia #Azerbaijan #CSTO #Geopolitics #Kazakhstan #OTS #Russia #SouthCaucasus #TheWest #Turkey #Turkiye #USA #Uzbekistan
  13. Ukrainian Drone Attacks On The CPC Threaten To Upend Kazakhstan And Reshape Russia’s Southern Flank

    Ukrainian Drone Attacks On The CPC Threaten To Upend Kazakhstan And Reshape Russia’s Southern Flank

    By Andrew Korybko

    Continued strikes across 2026 could lead to protracted disruptions that greatly reduce Kazakhstan’s budgetary revenue and result in social spending slashes for next year, which could prompt protests that spiral out of control just like January 2022’s one did for creating a crisis on Russia’s southern flank.

    Ukraine once again launched drone strikes against tankers connected to the partially US-owned Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which transits through Russia and serves as landlocked Kazakhstan’s oil export lifeline via which 80% of such sales are conducted. Energy exports account for around 35% of GDP, 75% of exports, and an estimated 30% of government revenue. With this data in mind, Bloomberg’s report about how Kazakh exports through the CPC plummeted by 45% over the past month is alarming.

    If the conflict continues and Ukraine feels emboldened by the US’ recent seizure of a Russian-flagged tanker to keep up the tempo of its strikes against the CPC, be it the export terminal at Novorossiysk and/or tankers, then Kazakhstan’s economic and therefore political stability might be threatened. It was earlier thought that “Ukraine Risked Trump’s Wrath After Bombing Partially US-Owned Oil Infrastructure In Russia” last February, but he did nothing afterwards to coerce it into discontinuing these attacks.

    This is in spite of the CPC being partially owned by US energy majors whose profits would be hit by the Kazakh oil export disruptions brought about by continued Ukrainian drone attacks. Moreover, Kazakhstan signed a MoU with the US on critical minerals last November and then joined the Abraham Accords even though it already recognizes Israel, shortly after which it announced plans to produce NATO-standard shells. These should have ordinarily been enough reasons for the US to get Ukraine to stop its strikes.

    The fact that Ukraine has continued to attack the CPC despite the aforementioned four interests that closely tie the US to Kazakhstan strongly suggests that Trump 2.0 might be playing a double game. If the conflict drags on, Ukrainian attacks against the CPC are ramped up, and Kazakhstan’s budgetary revenue for the coming year plummets as a result, then social spending for 2027 might be slashed. Protests could follow, thus leading to unrest, which might spiral out of control like what happened in January 2022.

    Unlike back then when Kazakhstan requested an intervention from the Russian-led CSTO, it might instead request such from the Turkish-led Organization of Turkic States (OTS). That’s because it might fear that Russia could exploit an intervention to punish it for its NATO-standard shell production and speculation that it allows Ukraine to use its territory to carry out drone strikes inside of Russia. This selfsame fear was recently exacerbated by the Washington Post claiming that Kazakhstan is Putin’s “next stop”.

    The deployment of NATO member Turkiye’s troops to CSTO member Kazakhstan, no matter how temporary their mission might officially be, could easily worsen Russian-Turkish tensions given Turkiye’s expected expansion of influence along Russia’s entire southern periphery. Russia could either accept its strategic encirclement, preempt it by cutting Kazakhstan off from the Caspian like a self-exiled Kazakh opposition figure speculated that it’s already plotting to do, or unilaterally intervene to confront Turkiye.

    None of these scenarios are ideal for Russia, but they could be catalysed by uncontrollable unrest caused by Kazakhstan slashing social spending if Ukrainian strikes against its oil export lifeline continue across 2026, which can’t be ruled out seeing as how the EU agreed to fund Ukraine for the next two years. A swift end to the conflict through military or political means could offset this sequence of events, however, ergo a compelling reason why Russia might agree to compromise on its maximalist goals.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

     

    #CPC #CSTO #Geopolitics #Kazakhstan #NATO #Russia #Turkey #Turkiye #Ukraine #USA

  14. Kazakhstan Might Have Just Placed Itself On An Irreversible Collision Course With Russia

    Kazakhstan Might Have Just Placed Itself On An Irreversible Collision Course With Russia

    By Andrew Korybko

    The production of NATO-standard shells hints that Kazakhstan plans to follow in Azerbaijan’s footsteps by having its armed forces conform with the bloc’s standards ahead of what its leadership might have been duped by the West to believe will be an inevitable crisis with Russia after the Ukrainian Conflict ends.

    Background Briefing

    Sputnik reported in early December that Kazakhstan will build four factories that’ll produce Russian- and NATO-standard shells, which prompted First Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defence Committee Alexei Zhuravlev to harshly condemn this development. In his words, “We try to ignore how a seemingly fraternal republic has swiftly abandoned not only the Russian language but also the Cyrillic alphabet. How they’re creating ‘yurts of invincibility’ while supporting Ukraine.”

    He added that “now they’re switching to NATO ammunition standards, clearly intending to abandon Russian weapons in the future, replacing them with Western ones. Astana may not have been the largest buyer of Russian military-industrial complex equipment, but the move itself is certainly unfriendly and must be responded to accordingly. We all know what such cooperation with NATO has meant for Kiev.” This is the latest manifestation of Kazakhstan’s pro-Western pivot that accelerated in recent months:

    * 30 September 2023: “Kazakhstan’s Pro-EU Pivot Poses A Challenge For The Sino-Russo Entente

    * 2 July 2025: “Why’d Erdogan Decide To Expand Turkiye’s Sphere Of Influence Eastwards?

    * 9 August 2025: “The TRIPP Corridor Threatens To Undermine Russia’s Broader Regional Position

    * 2 November 2025: “The West Is Posing New Challenges To Russia Along Its Entire Southern Periphery

    * 12 November 2025: “A US Think Tank Considers Armenia & Kazakhstan To Be Key Players For Containing Russia

    * 13 November 2025: “The US’ Central Asian Minerals Deals Could Put More Pressure On Russia & Afghanistan

    * 23 November 2025: “Why’d Kazakhstan Join The Abraham Accords When It Already Recognizes Israel?

    * 2 December 2025: “The ‘Community Of Central Asia’ Could Reduce Russia’s Regional Influence

    * 19 December 2025: “Turkish Curriculum’s Renaming Of Central Asia To Turkistan Is Turkiye’s Latest Soft Power Flex

    In brief, the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) will turbocharge the Turkish-led injection of Western influence along Russia’s entire southern periphery by creating a military logistics corridor between NATO member Turkiye and the Central Asian Republics. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are part of the Russian-led CSTO mutual defence bloc and the Turkish-led “Organization of Turkic States” (OTS) socio-economic one that’s recently begun discussing a joint military structure and drills.

    Azerbaijan, whose armed forces completed their conformation to NATO standards in early November, will help those two follow suit through its role in the “Community of Central Asia” (CCA, the newly rebranded annual Consultative Meeting of Heads of State) that it joined later that same month. The CCA is therefore expected to function as the means for the NATO-backed OTS to “poach” Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan from the CSTO for irreversibly shattering Russia’s “sphere of influence” in Central Asia.

    Grand Strategic Context

    The context within which these newly accelerated processes are occurring, which were unleashed by TRIPP (and its origins in turn stem from Nikol Pashinyan seizing the Armenian premiership in 2018 after his successful Colour Revolution that later led to the next Karabakh Conflict), is the Ukrainian peace talks. The US is essentially relying on the Azeri-Turkish Axis (ATA) to jointly pressure Russia along its entire southern periphery for raising the odds of Putin agreeing to a lopsided peace deal in Ukraine’s favour.

    He’s thus far refused, but Kazakhstan’s planned production of NATO-standard shells adds a sense of urgency to ending the special operation so as to refocus Russia’s strategic attention towards its entire southern periphery in the hopes of averting the irreversible shattering of its “sphere of influence” there. Ideally, the US would help manage Turkish-Russian tensions in this space through the five means described here as part of a grand deal detailed herehere, and here, but that can’t be taken for granted.

    Kazakhstan’s Anti-Russian Plans

    Russia must therefore prepare itself for the possibility of an inevitable crisis with Kazakhstan, and also ATA by extension that might then come to involve NATO as a whole due to Turkiye’s membership therein, after it just decided to build NATO-standard shells. Its new factories’ purpose is to stockpile these shells ahead of what Kazakhstan appears to have already concluded will be an inevitable crisis with Russia sparked by the undeclared plan to have its armed forces conform to NATO standards.

    The only reason why it’s setting this scenario sequence into motion is because its leadership has been duped by the West (including ATA and Ukraine) to believe that Russia will set its sights on historically Russian territory within Kazakhstan’s Soviet-drawn borders after the special operation ends. Kazakhstan thus no longer wants to be dependent on Russian military-technical equipment and has instead quietly decided to transition to NATO wares instead with ATA’s help.

    This is expected to occur in parallel with its armed forces conforming with NATO standards under the cover of closer cooperation within the OTS or at least within the CCA, which includes Azerbaijan with whom it, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan now jointly drill and consult each other. Conforming with NATO standards, transitioning to its wares, and stockpiling its shells are meant to help Kazakhstan’s armed forces hold out long enough in a conflict with Russia for more NATO-backed ATA support to arrive.

    ATA In Action

    If Turkish and/or Azeri troops (respectively formal and informal NATO troops who have mutual defence obligations) aren’t already deployed to Kazakhstan by the time that a crisis erupts, and such an advance deployment could also trigger a crisis, then they’d have to speedily be dispatched there afterwards. The only realistic way in crisis conditions is by air over the Caspian Sea, possibly under the cover of civilian airliners to deter Russia from shooting them down, but another supplementary route is also possible.

    Casual observers don’t know that ATA is allied with Pakistan, which can be considered an unofficial member of the OTS, so any troops that they might have already deployed there by that time could be airlifted from there to Kazakhstan. This could also be done under civilian cover to deter Russian jets from shooting them down from their airbase in Kyrgyzstan’s Kant. If Afghan-Pak ties stabilize and the PAKAFUZ railway is built by then, Pakistan could also ship military equipment to Kazakhstan that way too.

    As a means for either “deterring” or at least “restraining” Russia, ATA might also try to stir trouble in the North Caucasus, which could provoke a Russian response for invoking their mutual defence obligations and thus draw NATO member Turkiye and “Major Non-NATO Ally” Pakistan into the fray. A multi-front conflict with Turkiye in the Black Sea, Azerbaijan in the North Caucasus, it and Kazakhstan in the Caspian Sea, and Kazakhstan in Central Asia (with aid from ATA and Pakistan) could easily overextend Russia.

    Trigger Events

    The following events could contribute to sparking the worst-case scenario of a Russian-Kazakh crisis:

    * Kazakhstan making tangible progress on conforming its armed forces to NATO standards;

    * Its increased import of US, Turkish, Azeri, and/or Pakistani weaponry (all increasingly standardized);

    * More drills between its armed forces and the aforesaid countries’;

    * Freezing its membership in the CSTO just like already “poached” Armenia has done;

    * The deployment of US, Turkish, Azeri, and/or Pakistani advisors/troops (even under PMC cover);

    * The passing of Ukrainian-like discriminatory legislation against Kazakhstan’s Russian minority;

    * Pogroms against them;

    * And/or meddling in the “Orenburg Corridor” amidst the external revival of “Idel-Ural” separatism.

    Depending on what happens, Russia’s kinetic response could be framed as preventive or preemptive.

    Concluding Thoughts

    The Kazakh leadership’s threat perception of Russia that’s responsible for its decision to produce NATO-standard shells is based on the false premise that the Kremlin has revanchist plans for re-incorporating historically Russian land within Kazakhstan. This shows that they never took seriously Russia’s reason for the special operation, namely to neutralize Ukrainian-emanating threats from NATO precisely of the sort that Kazakhstan is now on the path to produce in the same mistaken belief that this will “deter” Russia.

    So long as Kazakhstan doesn’t pose a security threat to Russia and treats its minority with respect, Russia doesn’t care what else Kazakhstan does, but its decision to produce NATO-standard shells indisputably poses a latent security threat to Russia as explained. Kazakhstan therefore risks creating the same crisis with Russia that its aforesaid decision and consequent military-strategic trajectory are meant to avert all because it let itself be duped by the US, Turkiye, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine unless it soon changes course.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

     

    #Afghanistan #Azerbaijan #CentralAsia #CentralAsianRepublics #CSTO #Geopolitics #Kazakhstan #NATO #OrganizationOfTurkicStates #Pakistan #Russia #Turkey #Turkiye #Ukraine #USA

  15. 🇷🇺🇧🇾📞 Russia's President Vladimir Putin and President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko spoke over the phone.

    They agreed to pursue further contacts during the upcoming Summit of the #CSTO & the traditional meeting of the leaders of #CIS member countries.

    t.me/MFARussia/27248 search.app/5KCbr

  16. 🧐This analysis lacks discussion of the SCO increasingly being a counterweight to Russia-led #CSTO as seen in the 2022 #Kazakhstan unrests.

    #Laos embraces China, Russia🤔-led SCO amid frustration with #Asean
    "te #SCO emphasises #security concerns, while #Brics pursues broader #economic cooperation,” Yamada said. By turning to both groups, Laos hoped to secure international assistance in addressing security challenges ranging fr #drugs & #human #trafficking to #cybercrimes"
    scmp.com/week-asia/politics/ar

  17. In temporarily occupied #Crimea, 🇺🇦 destroyed 🇷🇺 radar station, two helicopters and a tugboat

    🇺🇦 SBU has charged Chechen 🇷🇺 leader Ramzan Kadyrov in absentia for #WarCrimes

    🇷🇺 GPS jamming forced the plane carrying 🇪🇺 Commission President to land in 🇧🇬 using paper maps

    Reports that 🇷🇺 radio & satellite interference on 🇪🇪 🇱🇻 🇱🇹 air & maritime communications has significantly escalated in recent months

    🇷🇺 occupied Komyshuvakha

    🇷🇺 advanced near Maliivka & Novoukrainka

    🇷🇺-led #CSTO exercises have begun in 🇧🇾

  18. In temporarily occupied #Crimea, 🇺🇦 destroyed 🇷🇺 radar station, two helicopters and a tugboat

    🇺🇦 SBU has charged Chechen 🇷🇺 leader Ramzan Kadyrov in absentia for #WarCrimes

    🇷🇺 GPS jamming forced the plane carrying 🇪🇺 Commission President to land in 🇧🇬 using paper maps

    Reports that 🇷🇺 radio & satellite interference on 🇪🇪 🇱🇻 🇱🇹 air & maritime communications has significantly escalated in recent months

    🇷🇺 occupied Komyshuvakha

    🇷🇺 advanced near Maliivka & Novoukrainka

    🇷🇺-led #CSTO exercises have begun in 🇧🇾

  19. 🇦🇲 ARMENIA
    🔴 Armenia Votes to Launch EU Membership Bid

    🔸 Parliament backs motion to begin EU accession process, 64–7.
    🔸 Move signals deeper break from Russia after Karabakh fallout.
    🔸 Russia warns of gas hikes, trade cuts & worker expulsions.
    🔸 Armenia joined ICC, froze CSTO ties, held US military drills.

    #Armenia #EU #Russia #Karabakh #Pashinyan #CSTO #ICC #Geopolitics #Caucasus

  20. 🇦🇲 ARMENIA
    🔴 Armenia Votes to Launch EU Membership Bid

    🔸 Parliament backs motion to begin EU accession process, 64–7.
    🔸 Move signals deeper break from Russia after Karabakh fallout.
    🔸 Russia warns of gas hikes, trade cuts & worker expulsions.
    🔸 Armenia joined ICC, froze CSTO ties, held US military drills.

    #Armenia #EU #Russia #Karabakh #Pashinyan #CSTO #ICC #Geopolitics #Caucasus

  21. ll #primoministro #armeno Nikol #Pashinyan ha dichiarato che, il ritorno del suo paese all’Organizzazione del Trattato di Sicurezza Collettiva (#CSTO) è impossibile.
    Mio articolo
    corrierepl.it/2024/12/05/larme

  22. Russian President Vladimir #Putin arrived in #Kazakhstan on Wednesday for a two-day visit aimed at strengthening ties with Central Asian countries amid tensions over the war in #Ukraine.

    themoscowtimes.com/2024/11/27/

    #russia #CSTO

  23. Russian President Vladimir #Putin arrived in #Kazakhstan on Wednesday for a two-day visit aimed at strengthening ties with Central Asian countries amid tensions over the war in #Ukraine.

    themoscowtimes.com/2024/11/27/

    #russia #CSTO

  24. The Armenian authorities have completely frozen their participation in all bodies of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (#CSTO), said Prime Minister of the Republic Nikol #Pashinyan.

    moscowtimes.ru/2024/08/31/arme

    #Ukraine #Russia #Armenia

  25. The Armenian authorities have completely frozen their participation in all bodies of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (#CSTO), said Prime Minister of the Republic Nikol #Pashinyan.

    moscowtimes.ru/2024/08/31/arme

    #Ukraine #Russia #Armenia

  26. Russian President Vladimir #Putin arrived in Baku on Aug. 18 for a two-day visit for talks with his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham #Aliyev. The trip marks #Putin's first visit there since invasion of #Ukraine.

    The talks, which the Kremlin says will focus on "international and regional problems," will likely largely center around strengthening relations, as well as reinforcing cooperation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (#CSTO).

    kyivindependent.com/putin-arri

    #Azerbaijan #Russia

  27. Russian President Vladimir #Putin arrived in Baku on Aug. 18 for a two-day visit for talks with his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham #Aliyev. The trip marks #Putin's first visit there since invasion of #Ukraine.

    The talks, which the Kremlin says will focus on "international and regional problems," will likely largely center around strengthening relations, as well as reinforcing cooperation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (#CSTO).

    kyivindependent.com/putin-arri

    #Azerbaijan #Russia

  28. "#Belarus actively aided #Azerbaijan’s armed forces between 2018 and 2022, as tensions peaked with #Armenia. The services offered included modernizing older artillery equipment and providing new gear used for electronic warfare and drone systems."
    #Caucasus #Russia #Artsakh #NagornyKarabakh #CSTO
    politico.eu/article/leaked-doc

  29. So #Armenia 🇦🇲 leaving #CSTO would be like #Albania 🇦🇱 exiting #NATO. It will not affect the security alliance drastically, but it is a loss nonetheless.

    Either way, this is an embarrassment for #Putin as #Russia 🇷🇺 never came to Armenia’s 🇦🇲 defense when #Azerbaijan 🇦🇿 attacked them (for the umpteenth time).

    👉🏾 Armenia Leaving CSTO, Russia's NATO, Damages Image Putin Wants: Experts - Business Insider businessinsider.com/armenia-le

  30. #Belarus delivered advanced weapons to #Armenia’s arch enemy even though both countries were supposedly allies in a Russian-led international defense pact.

    The cache of files sheds new light on Armenia’s decision this week to announce it will be leaving the military alliance, a dramatic turn that will weaken Russian President Vladimir #Putin’s authority with former Soviet nations.

    politico.eu/article/leaked-doc

    #Ukraine #Azerbaijan #Russia #CSTO

  31. The current Russia is unable of peace, the sooner we go all the way to Moscow the sooner this will end.

    #NATO #CSTO #WarInUkraine #WarInRussia #xp

  32. The current Russia is unable of peace, the sooner we go all the way to Moscow the sooner this will end.

    #NATO #CSTO #WarInUkraine #WarInRussia #xp