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#crqc — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #crqc, aggregated by home.social.

  1. The modality with the most qubits (superconducting) may not reach CRQC first. The modality that solves the decoder bottleneck may.

    Trapped-ion systems with 100K qubits and real-time decoders could be more threatening than 1M superconducting qubits with a decoder that can't keep up. Qubit count alone misleads.

    postquantum.com/quantum-comput

    #CRQC #QEC #infosec

  2. The modality with the most qubits (superconducting) may not reach CRQC first. The modality that solves the decoder bottleneck may.

    Trapped-ion systems with 100K qubits and real-time decoders could be more threatening than 1M superconducting qubits with a decoder that can't keep up. Qubit count alone misleads.

    postquantum.com/quantum-comput

    #CRQC #QEC #infosec

  3. The modality with the most qubits (superconducting) may not reach CRQC first. The modality that solves the decoder bottleneck may.

    Trapped-ion systems with 100K qubits and real-time decoders could be more threatening than 1M superconducting qubits with a decoder that can't keep up. Qubit count alone misleads.

    postquantum.com/quantum-comput

    #CRQC #QEC #infosec

  4. How close is each quantum modality to breaking RSA-2048? I built the CRQC Scorecard: three metrics (LQC, LOB, QOT), four modalities, measured in orders-of-magnitude gap to target.

    Universal bottleneck: Logical Operations Budget: ~650,000× gap even for the best platforms.

    postquantum.com/post-quantum/c

    #CRQC #infosec #cryptography #quantum

  5. How close is each quantum modality to breaking RSA-2048? I built the CRQC Scorecard: three metrics (LQC, LOB, QOT), four modalities, measured in orders-of-magnitude gap to target.

    Universal bottleneck: Logical Operations Budget: ~650,000× gap even for the best platforms.

    postquantum.com/post-quantum/c

    #CRQC #infosec #cryptography #quantum

  6. How close is each quantum modality to breaking RSA-2048? I built the CRQC Scorecard: three metrics (LQC, LOB, QOT), four modalities, measured in orders-of-magnitude gap to target.

    Universal bottleneck: Logical Operations Budget: ~650,000× gap even for the best platforms.

    postquantum.com/post-quantum/c

    #CRQC #infosec #cryptography #quantum

  7. "Criminals will rent a quantum computer to break encryption." Most repeated claim in quantum security. But it's not going to work quite like that.

    CRQCs will be export-controlled, auth-gated, compliance-monitored. Cloud quantum access won't be on a credit card. The rental threat model assumes a market no government will permit.

    postquantum.com/post-quantum/c

    #threatmodeling #CRQC #infosec #PQC

  8. "Criminals will rent a quantum computer to break encryption." Most repeated claim in quantum security. But it's not going to work quite like that.

    CRQCs will be export-controlled, auth-gated, compliance-monitored. Cloud quantum access won't be on a credit card. The rental threat model assumes a market no government will permit.

    postquantum.com/post-quantum/c

    #threatmodeling #CRQC #infosec #PQC

  9. "Criminals will rent a quantum computer to break encryption." Most repeated claim in quantum security. But it's not going to work quite like that.

    CRQCs will be export-controlled, auth-gated, compliance-monitored. Cloud quantum access won't be on a credit card. The rental threat model assumes a market no government will permit.

    postquantum.com/post-quantum/c

    #threatmodeling #CRQC #infosec #PQC

  10. "Criminals will rent a quantum computer to break encryption." Most repeated claim in quantum security. But it's not going to work quite like that.

    CRQCs will be export-controlled, auth-gated, compliance-monitored. Cloud quantum access won't be on a credit card. The rental threat model assumes a market no government will permit.

    postquantum.com/post-quantum/c

    #threatmodeling #CRQC #infosec #PQC

  11. "Criminals will rent a quantum computer to break encryption." Most repeated claim in quantum security. But it's not going to work quite like that.

    CRQCs will be export-controlled, auth-gated, compliance-monitored. Cloud quantum access won't be on a credit card. The rental threat model assumes a market no government will permit.

    postquantum.com/post-quantum/c

    #threatmodeling #CRQC #infosec #PQC

  12. If quantum computers start breaking cryptography a few years from now, don't you dare come to me saying nobody warned you." - Aaronson, hours after NAS election.

    He names no lab. He's reporting what the builders are telling him: ~2029 for CRQC is now plausible.

    postquantum.com/security-pqc/a

    #PQC #CRQC #infosec #cryptography

  13. If quantum computers start breaking cryptography a few years from now, don't you dare come to me saying nobody warned you." - Aaronson, hours after NAS election.

    He names no lab. He's reporting what the builders are telling him: ~2029 for CRQC is now plausible.

    postquantum.com/security-pqc/a

    #PQC #CRQC #infosec #cryptography

  14. If quantum computers start breaking cryptography a few years from now, don't you dare come to me saying nobody warned you." - Aaronson, hours after NAS election.

    He names no lab. He's reporting what the builders are telling him: ~2029 for CRQC is now plausible.

    postquantum.com/security-pqc/a

    #PQC #CRQC #infosec #cryptography

  15. If quantum computers start breaking cryptography a few years from now, don't you dare come to me saying nobody warned you." - Aaronson, hours after NAS election.

    He names no lab. He's reporting what the builders are telling him: ~2029 for CRQC is now plausible.

    postquantum.com/security-pqc/a

    #PQC #CRQC #infosec #cryptography

  16. If quantum computers start breaking cryptography a few years from now, don't you dare come to me saying nobody warned you." - Aaronson, hours after NAS election.

    He names no lab. He's reporting what the builders are telling him: ~2029 for CRQC is now plausible.

    postquantum.com/security-pqc/a

    #PQC #CRQC #infosec #cryptography

  17. Too many Q-Day predictions are “by vibes.” I’ve updated my CRQC Capability Framework - the evidence-based method used by national security analysts for years.

    If you want to track Q-Day properly - QEC, connectivity, magic states, decoders, manufacturability - not hype, start here: postquantum.com/post-quantum/c

    #QDay #Y2Q #QuantumSecurity #PQC #CRQC

  18. Too many Q-Day predictions are “by vibes.” I’ve updated my CRQC Capability Framework - the evidence-based method used by national security analysts for years.

    If you want to track Q-Day properly - QEC, connectivity, magic states, decoders, manufacturability - not hype, start here: postquantum.com/post-quantum/c

    #QDay #Y2Q #QuantumSecurity #PQC #CRQC