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#clientsidescanning — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #clientsidescanning, aggregated by home.social.

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  1. Americans!

    Updates on "Internet Safety" bills:

    -Hawley and Durbin are trying to sneak the unconstitutional STOP CSAM Act into the FY27 NDAA. Hawley allegedly managed to get it included it in the manager's amendment. This means it has a higher chance than previous attempts at being successful.
    -Still, there's procedural roadblocks that the bill has to clear to survive until the final passage. The manager's amendment is reserved for uncontroversial amendments.
    -The Senate Commerce Committee has scheduled a markup for KOSA and the SCREEN Act for Wednesday, August 5th. There are other bills, but they're far less problematic than KOSA and the SCREEN Act.
    -Senate KOSA's fate in the House is still quite uncertain. The same goes for the KIDS Act's fate in the Senate.
    -The SCREEN Act's approval among Democrats is unknown at the moment.

    Call your Senators and Representatives ASAP!

    #Privacy #Censorship #DigitalRights #FreeSpeech #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #Section230 #KOSA #KidsOnlineSafetyAct #US #UnitedStates

  2. Americans!

    Updates on "Internet Safety" bills:

    -Hawley and Durbin are trying to sneak the unconstitutional STOP CSAM Act into the FY27 NDAA. Hawley allegedly managed to get it included it in the manager's amendment. This means it has a higher chance than previous attempts at being successful.
    -Still, there's procedural roadblocks that the bill has to clear to survive until the final passage. The manager's amendment is reserved for uncontroversial amendments.
    -The Senate Commerce Committee has scheduled a markup for KOSA and the SCREEN Act for Wednesday, August 5th. There are other bills, but they're far less problematic than KOSA and the SCREEN Act.
    -Senate KOSA's fate in the House is still quite uncertain. The same goes for the KIDS Act's fate in the Senate.
    -The SCREEN Act's approval among Democrats is unknown at the moment.

    Call your Senators and Representatives ASAP!

    #Privacy #Censorship #DigitalRights #FreeSpeech #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #Section230 #KOSA #KidsOnlineSafetyAct #US #UnitedStates

  3. In unkritischen Medienberichten - wie teilweise auch in dem verlinkten Zeit-Artikel - wird immer wieder gezielt das manipulative Narrativ des "Kinderschutzes" und "Kampf gegen Missbrauch" verbreitet, um die Chatkontrolle zu propagieren. Dabei warnen nicht nur Datenschützer*innen und Netzaktivisti sondern auch Kinderschutz-Organisationen vor der Chatkontrolle, die mit der angestrebten Massenüberwachung auch Kinder und Jugendliche gefährdet.

    zeit.de/news/2026-07/09/chatko

    archive.is/ULUjx

    #Chatkontrolle #Überwachung #Datenschutz #EU #Privacy #ClientSideScanning

  4. In unkritischen Medienberichten - wie teilweise auch in dem verlinkten Zeit-Artikel - wird immer wieder gezielt das manipulative Narrativ des "Kinderschutzes" und "Kampf gegen Missbrauch" verbreitet, um die Chatkontrolle zu propagieren. Dabei warnen nicht nur Datenschützer*innen und Netzaktivisti sondern auch Kinderschutz-Organisationen vor der Chatkontrolle, die mit der angestrebten Massenüberwachung auch Kinder und Jugendliche gefährdet.

    zeit.de/news/2026-07/09/chatko

    archive.is/ULUjx

    #Chatkontrolle #Überwachung #Datenschutz #EU #Privacy #ClientSideScanning

  5. >KIDS Act passed the House
    I had a feeling that KIDS Act (H.R.7757) was going to pass in the House since House GOP made a deal with House Dems to get it to the floor. That being said, the bill's fate in the Senate is uncertain at best. This is due to the fact that the Senate and House's versions of KOSA heavily differ.

    Here are the sources of contention:
    -KIDS Act: The Senate refuses to pass this bill in its current state due to the House removing the "Duty of Care" provisions from the included version of KOSA.
    -KOSA (Senate): The House refuses to pass this bill in its current state due to House GOP's concerns regarding free speech and giving the FTC that much power.

    So what will happen? I see one of two scenarios happening:
    1: The bills pass but in heavily altered/amended forms. The differences are simply too great for either bill to pass as they are currently written.

    2: The bills stall because the Senate and House cannot reconcile the differences in the remaining time the 119th Congress has.

    That being said, it'd be morbidly funny if these bills stall because they weren't shitty enough.

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #Censorship #DigitalRights #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #Encryption #KOSA #Internet #SocialMedia #US #UnitedStates

  6. I really do want that Hallmark movie moment. I want us to be able to successfully push back against all the mass surveillance and censorship legislation (Age Verification, Client Side Scanning, OSA-copycat bills, under 15/16 social media bans, making copyright law more draconian, etc.). But those chances are looking extremely slim at best (I mean they're forcing Chat Control through via underhanded tactics!).

    At this point, we have to hope that the laws will be struck down in court (which could take years/decades). But if US courts refusing to strike down SESTA-FOSTA and the current makeup of SCOTUS are any indication, this also has an incredibly slim chance of being successful. The courts will shit out some incredibly contrived reason why these laws are fine actually.

    We just have to accept the possibility that the free and open internet is on the verge of death.

    P.S. Multiple reports have confirmed that policies like Age Verification and Under 15/16 bans are ineffective at best at protecting women and minors. Keep this in mind.

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #Censorship #ChatControl #DigitalRights #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #Encryption #Under16Ban #Under15Ban #UnitedStates #Canada #UnitedKingdom #EuropeanUnion #Australia

  7. RE: ieji.de/@GalacticGoddess/11680

    Update: It also looks like members of the Senate are trying to put together their own packages as well:

    -One package would bundle Senate KOSA, the NO FAKES Act, and the App Store Accountability Act together in a compromise with big tech regarding GenAI regulation

    -Another is Hawley and Durbin trying to slip the DEFIANCE Act and STOP CSAM Act into a must pass bill (NDAA). They've tried this several times before but failed. Still it has a possibility of succeeding.

    Call your Senators and Representatives ASAP!

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #DigitalRights #Censorship #AgeVerification #KOSA #KidsOnlineSafetyAct #ClientSideScanning #Encryption #UnitedStates #USA

  8. RE: ieji.de/@GalacticGoddess/11680

    Update: It also looks like members of the Senate are trying to put together their own packages as well:

    -One package would bundle Senate KOSA, the NO FAKES Act, and the App Store Accountability Act together in a compromise with big tech regarding GenAI regulation

    -Another is Hawley and Durbin trying to slip the DEFIANCE Act and STOP CSAM Act into a must pass bill (NDAA). They've tried this several times before but failed. Still it has a possibility of succeeding.

    Call your Senators and Representatives ASAP!

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #DigitalRights #Censorship #AgeVerification #KOSA #KidsOnlineSafetyAct #ClientSideScanning #Encryption #UnitedStates #USA

  9. Signal llama «vigilancia masiva» al plan del Reino Unido de escanear dispositivos

    El primer ministro Keir Starmer anunció en la London Tech Week que Apple y Google deberán activar herramientas para detectar imágenes de desnudos en dispositivos de menores. Signal respondió con un documento titulado «La vigilancia no es seguridad», advirtiendo que el sistema sentaría las bases para el control estatal sobre cualquier contenido privado (Fuente Signal).

    El gobierno del Reino Unido quiere que cada teléfono y tablet se convierta en un punto de control de imágenes. Signal dice que eso es exactamente el problema. La propuesta de escaneo de dispositivos fue anunciada por el primer ministro Keir Starmer durante la London Tech Week. Bajo el plan, compañías como Apple y Google deberían activar funciones integradas en smartphones y tablets para detectar y bloquear imágenes de desnudos en dispositivos de menores.

    El alcance de lo que se pide es amplio. El gobierno quiere que las protecciones se apliquen en todo el dispositivo, incluyendo cámaras, aplicaciones de terceros, funciones de búsqueda y servicios de mensajería. Los adultos podrían seguir viendo o compartiendo contenido para adultos, pero solo después de pasar una verificación de edad. Si las empresas tecnológicas no actúan en un plazo de tres meses, el gobierno dice que impulsará una legislación con multas para las compañías y posible responsabilidad penal para sus ejecutivos.

    Apple ya tiene algo similar en funcionamiento. La compañía ofrece su función Communication Safety, que usa aprendizaje automático en el propio dispositivo para detectar fotos y videos de desnudos, difuminar el contenido y advertir a los menores antes de que lo vean o envíen. Apple recientemente presentó herramientas ampliadas de seguridad infantil en la WWDC26, aunque la propuesta del Reino Unido va más lejos al hacer el enfoque obligatorio y extenderlo más allá del ecosistema de Apple.

    La respuesta de Signal fue contundente. En un documento titulado «La vigilancia no es seguridad», la app de mensajería cifrada señaló que obligar a los residentes del Reino Unido a probar su edad o tener su contenido escaneado simplemente para comunicarse es una propuesta peligrosa. Aunque el escaneo ocurra en el dispositivo, Signal argumenta que el sistema normalizaría la inspección de contenido privado antes de que pueda enviarse o verse.

    El argumento central de los críticos no es técnico, sino político. «Sabemos que las capacidades de vigilancia masiva y censura, por más sinceras que suenen las promesas de quienes las inician, nunca permanecen acotadas de forma estrecha», escribió Signal. Una vez que los teléfonos estén obligados a inspeccionar contenido para una categoría de material, el mismo sistema puede expandirse a lo que los gobiernos consideren amenazas o contenido dañino.

    Signal también advirtió que el sistema fortalecería el control que Apple, Google y Microsoft ya tienen sobre la información más personal de los usuarios, y sostuvo que la verdadera seguridad infantil debería significar mejor educación financiada, servicios sociales más sólidos y salvaguardas reales en plataformas de IA, no escaneo predeterminado en cada dispositivo.

    No es la primera vez que el Reino Unido choca con las grandes plataformas de mensajería cifrada. WhatsApp y Signal habían dicho anteriormente que preferirían abandonar el país antes que debilitar el cifrado bajo la Online Safety Bill. Más recientemente, las reglas de verificación de edad de la Online Safety Act impulsaron un aumento en el uso de VPNs.

    #APPLE #ciberseguridad #cifrado #clientsidescanning #encriptacion #google #KeirStarmer #mensajeria #OnlineSafetyAct #PORTADA #privacidad #ReinoUnido #SeguridadInfantil #signal #Vigilancia
  10. Signal llama «vigilancia masiva» al plan del Reino Unido de escanear dispositivos

    El primer ministro Keir Starmer anunció en la London Tech Week que Apple y Google deberán activar herramientas para detectar imágenes de desnudos en dispositivos de menores. Signal respondió con un documento titulado «La vigilancia no es seguridad», advirtiendo que el sistema sentaría las bases para el control estatal sobre cualquier contenido privado (Fuente Signal).

    El gobierno del Reino Unido quiere que cada teléfono y tablet se convierta en un punto de control de imágenes. Signal dice que eso es exactamente el problema. La propuesta de escaneo de dispositivos fue anunciada por el primer ministro Keir Starmer durante la London Tech Week. Bajo el plan, compañías como Apple y Google deberían activar funciones integradas en smartphones y tablets para detectar y bloquear imágenes de desnudos en dispositivos de menores.

    El alcance de lo que se pide es amplio. El gobierno quiere que las protecciones se apliquen en todo el dispositivo, incluyendo cámaras, aplicaciones de terceros, funciones de búsqueda y servicios de mensajería. Los adultos podrían seguir viendo o compartiendo contenido para adultos, pero solo después de pasar una verificación de edad. Si las empresas tecnológicas no actúan en un plazo de tres meses, el gobierno dice que impulsará una legislación con multas para las compañías y posible responsabilidad penal para sus ejecutivos.

    Apple ya tiene algo similar en funcionamiento. La compañía ofrece su función Communication Safety, que usa aprendizaje automático en el propio dispositivo para detectar fotos y videos de desnudos, difuminar el contenido y advertir a los menores antes de que lo vean o envíen. Apple recientemente presentó herramientas ampliadas de seguridad infantil en la WWDC26, aunque la propuesta del Reino Unido va más lejos al hacer el enfoque obligatorio y extenderlo más allá del ecosistema de Apple.

    La respuesta de Signal fue contundente. En un documento titulado «La vigilancia no es seguridad», la app de mensajería cifrada señaló que obligar a los residentes del Reino Unido a probar su edad o tener su contenido escaneado simplemente para comunicarse es una propuesta peligrosa. Aunque el escaneo ocurra en el dispositivo, Signal argumenta que el sistema normalizaría la inspección de contenido privado antes de que pueda enviarse o verse.

    El argumento central de los críticos no es técnico, sino político. «Sabemos que las capacidades de vigilancia masiva y censura, por más sinceras que suenen las promesas de quienes las inician, nunca permanecen acotadas de forma estrecha», escribió Signal. Una vez que los teléfonos estén obligados a inspeccionar contenido para una categoría de material, el mismo sistema puede expandirse a lo que los gobiernos consideren amenazas o contenido dañino.

    Signal también advirtió que el sistema fortalecería el control que Apple, Google y Microsoft ya tienen sobre la información más personal de los usuarios, y sostuvo que la verdadera seguridad infantil debería significar mejor educación financiada, servicios sociales más sólidos y salvaguardas reales en plataformas de IA, no escaneo predeterminado en cada dispositivo.

    No es la primera vez que el Reino Unido choca con las grandes plataformas de mensajería cifrada. WhatsApp y Signal habían dicho anteriormente que preferirían abandonar el país antes que debilitar el cifrado bajo la Online Safety Bill. Más recientemente, las reglas de verificación de edad de la Online Safety Act impulsaron un aumento en el uso de VPNs.

    #APPLE #ciberseguridad #cifrado #clientsidescanning #encriptacion #google #KeirStarmer #mensajeria #OnlineSafetyAct #PORTADA #privacidad #ReinoUnido #SeguridadInfantil #signal #Vigilancia
  11. “Signal President Meredith Whittaker threatens again to pull the encrypted messaging app out of the UK”

    Signal will not compromise user privacy in order to satisfy the UK Government. They could withdraw from UK app-stores, but further: they could block any account with an associated “+44” phone number – me included.

    Such a “nuclear option” would beneficially put the burden of responsibility on the UK Gov’t without background narrative nitpicking about “side loading”, “1st amendment”, and other nerd distractions.

    Video at:

    https://x.com/business/status/2064752727033352241

    Article at:

    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-10/signal-s-whittaker-threatens-uk-exit-amid-phone-screening-plan

    #ageVerification #censorship #clientSideScanning #signal
  12. CW: UKPol kids and images and tech

    I see the prime minister and home secretary are lying, just blatantly lying, about the existence of technology which can tell how old someone is and whether an image is porn or not.

    They claim this technology already exists in phones and just needs to be turned on.

    I mean, judges at trials haven't been able to describe what is or isn't pornography, but apparently I guess they should have just turned on the software switch in their phones! Easy!

    No phone can know it's operator's age. Even if the phone's owner is registered, it can't know if it's being operated by it's owner or not.

    The PM and Home Sec are lying that they think there's no reporting, no data-collection, no spying, no monitoring, involved in their impossible imaginary tech they demand must be implemented in 3 months.

    They are lying that adults can turn it off without having to register the owner of the phone and it's ID with a central database.

    Never head anyone even mention the environmental consequences of burning power to pass every image a camera takes through a large neural network to have it be classified as porn or not, so at least they haven't had to lie about it being free and easy and not burning energy to classify every image taken in the UK.

    Good thing they have little chance of being in power when their deadline hits and the tech companies have failed to turn on the imaginary software switch to do impossible things.

    Sadly, Burnham's government will probably do much the same.

    #ukpol #tech #clientSideScanning #survelienceState

  13. CW: UKPol kids and images and tech

    I see the prime minister and home secretary are lying, just blatantly lying, about the existence of technology which can tell how old someone is and whether an image is porn or not.

    They claim this technology already exists in phones and just needs to be turned on.

    I mean, judges at trials haven't been able to describe what is or isn't pornography, but apparently I guess they should have just turned on the software switch in their phones! Easy!

    No phone can know it's operator's age. Even if the phone's owner is registered, it can't know if it's being operated by it's owner or not.

    The PM and Home Sec are lying that they think there's no reporting, no data-collection, no spying, no monitoring, involved in their impossible imaginary tech they demand must be implemented in 3 months.

    They are lying that adults can turn it off without having to register the owner of the phone and it's ID with a central database.

    Never head anyone even mention the environmental consequences of burning power to pass every image a camera takes through a large neural network to have it be classified as porn or not, so at least they haven't had to lie about it being free and easy and not burning energy to classify every image taken in the UK.

    Good thing they have little chance of being in power when their deadline hits and the tech companies have failed to turn on the imaginary software switch to do impossible things.

    Sadly, Burnham's government will probably do much the same.

    #ukpol #tech #clientSideScanning #survelienceState

  14. 🚀The Global War on End-to-End Encryption🔒
    Join Impractical Privacy as we delve into the coordinated global push to undermine digital privacy and security.

    Listen to learn about Client-Side Scanning, Compliance as a Vector, and the fight for mathematical sovereignty!🔑

    #C22Debate
    #ClientSideScanning
    #GlobalSurveillanceNet
    #KeepYourDataPrivate
    #TakeBackTheKey
    #OpenSourceFreedom
    #SecureCommunication
    #PrivacyRights
    #NoCompromisesOnSecurity
    #Privacy
    #Surveillance

    📻 Stream at ImpracticalPrivacy.com

  15. 🚀The Global War on End-to-End Encryption🔒
    Join Impractical Privacy as we delve into the coordinated global push to undermine digital privacy and security.

    Listen to learn about Client-Side Scanning, Compliance as a Vector, and the fight for mathematical sovereignty!🔑

    #C22Debate
    #ClientSideScanning
    #GlobalSurveillanceNet
    #KeepYourDataPrivate
    #TakeBackTheKey
    #OpenSourceFreedom
    #SecureCommunication
    #PrivacyRights
    #NoCompromisesOnSecurity
    #Privacy
    #Surveillance

    📻 Stream at ImpracticalPrivacy.com

  16. 🎉 Impractical Privacy: Episode 29 - The Global War on E2EE 🔒

    Today we dive deep into the global war on End-to-End Encryption, discussing Bill C-22, UK & Australian regulations, and the dangers of Client-Side Scanning.

    Tune in now to learn about the math of it all, sovereignty, and the future of privacy! 🔑🐘

    📻 Stream at ImpracticalPrivacy.com

    #Privacy
    #C22Debate
    #ClientSideScanning
    #GlobalSurveillanceNet
    #DigitalSovereignty
    #MathMatters
    #KeepYourDataPrivate
    #TakeBackTheKey
    #OpenSourceFreedom

  17. 🎉 Impractical Privacy: Episode 29 - The Global War on E2EE 🔒

    Today we dive deep into the global war on End-to-End Encryption, discussing Bill C-22, UK & Australian regulations, and the dangers of Client-Side Scanning.

    Tune in now to learn about the math of it all, sovereignty, and the future of privacy! 🔑🐘

    📻 Stream at ImpracticalPrivacy.com

    #Privacy
    #C22Debate
    #ClientSideScanning
    #GlobalSurveillanceNet
    #DigitalSovereignty
    #MathMatters
    #KeepYourDataPrivate
    #TakeBackTheKey
    #OpenSourceFreedom

  18. Aktuell wird auf EU-Ebene erneut über die verpflichtende anlasslose Chatkontrolle verhandelt.

    Bei der Chatkontrolle würde Client Side Scanning zum Einsatz kommen. In unseren Slides erfahren Sie, was es damit auf sich hat.

    Clide Side Scanning untergräbt die Ende-zu-Ende-Verschlüsselung und ist eine massive Gefahr für die sichere, private und freie Kommunikation.

    Unsere klare Position zur Chatkontrolle: mailbox.org/de/news/chatkontro

    #Chatkontrolle #CSS #ClientSideScanning #mailbox

  19. Aktuell wird auf EU-Ebene erneut über die verpflichtende anlasslose Chatkontrolle verhandelt.

    Bei der Chatkontrolle würde Client Side Scanning zum Einsatz kommen. In unseren Slides erfahren Sie, was es damit auf sich hat.

    Clide Side Scanning untergräbt die Ende-zu-Ende-Verschlüsselung und ist eine massive Gefahr für die sichere, private und freie Kommunikation.

    Unsere klare Position zur Chatkontrolle: mailbox.org/de/news/chatkontro

    #Chatkontrolle #CSS #ClientSideScanning #mailbox

  20. MEPs block tech firms from scanning for child sexual abuse material | POLITICO

    “perhaps there’s a different approach they could try taking, other than surveilling everybody’s messages?”

    https://www.politico.eu/article/european-parliament-rejects-child-sexual-abuse-bill-blocking-tech-firms-scanning-meta-google/

    #chatControl #clientSideScanning #csam #endToEndEncryption #surveillance
  21. Let Me Explain How a State Actor Could Perform a Denial-of-Service Attack on the Entire UK Government in the Wake of Ofcom “Online Safety Act” Client-Side Scanning

    1/ obtain a hash of abuse material that’s both known & banned; if pervasive as claimed this shouldn’t be hard

    2/ use algorithms from this paper to create a cat meme with the same hash

    3/ send the cat meme to all MPs & Civil Servants via SMS, E-Mail, WhatsApp (bonus if it goes viral)

    4/ watch as MPs are locked out & banned by platforms for possessing abusive material, preventing government

    Also: there is no mitigation by saying “all of these cases should be appealed” because by the time enough resources have been deployed to resolve the appeal claims, government will have been offline for 12 hours or more.

    Of course one could propose mitigations: the government could ex-ante inform all platform providers which accounts needed to be prevented from ever being blocked – to be given special treatment – however:

    1. Politically that will not fly well, and…
    2. It will immediately cast doubt upon any politician who has an unacknowledged backup social media profile, which will be visible to the platforms of course because of device cookie sharing and things like that, so…
    3. Such information will be a topic of extortion or leaks

    Also, there will be claims of “two-tier surveillance” and so forth.

    White-Box Attacks on PhotoDNA Perceptual Hash Function

    https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/486

    [*] note: strictly, it is not necessary to obtain the material, merely the hash; therefore a leak of the existing database of hashes – several million in size – would be catastrophic by providing material for an infinite sequence of attacks like this.

    #censorship #clientSideScanning #nationalSecurity #onlineSafetyAct #photoDna #surveillance
  22. Call me pessimistic, but I think we just have to make peace with the fact that the internet we've known for the past 30 years is coming to an end and we're entering a full on fascist surveillance state.

    We should make our preparations for this now and not right before the legislation takes effect.

    I'd like for things to work out and these bills either fail to pass or get struck down in court but I feel that ain't going to happen. So many people will get hurt because of this.

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #Censorship #DigitalRights #Internet #SocialMedia #KOSA #KidsOnlineSafetyAct #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #US #UnitedStates

    RE: https://sharkey.world/notes/ak1wfxs7bm0m0001

  23. Call me pessimistic, but I think we just have to make peace with the fact that the internet we've known for the past 30 years is coming to an end and we're entering a full on fascist surveillance state.

    We should make our preparations for this now and not right before the legislation takes effect.

    I'd like for things to work out and these bills either fail to pass or get struck down in court but I feel that ain't going to happen. So many people will get hurt because of this.

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #Censorship #DigitalRights #Internet #SocialMedia #KOSA #KidsOnlineSafetyAct #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #US #UnitedStates

    RE: https://sharkey.world/notes/ak1wfxs7bm0m0001

  24. Well, looks like we can't rely on Ted Cruz stonewalling bills anymore. They want to proceed with the Kids Online Safety Act, Children and Teens' Online Privacy Protection Act, and Kids Off Social Media Act (at minimum). Cruz wants to advance these bills "within the next six weeks" (i.e. factoring in recesses, it will either be the week of April 13th or the week of April 20th). I have no idea if Cruz is siding with the Senate version or the House version of KOSA as last I checked, he was on the fence (there will clearly be negotiation/butting heads as the two versions differ drastically).

    This has a greater chance of proceeding as scheduled as Cruz is the chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee. Though it could be delayed if the previous two calls for votes are anything to go by (Blumenthal wanted a vote on KOSA by late 2025 and Graham wanted a vote on various bills back in February).

    Please call your Senators and Representatives ASAP!

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #Censorship #DigitalRights #Internet #SocialMedia #KOSA #KidsOnlineSafetyAct #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #US #UnitedStates

    https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2026

  25. Well, looks like we can't rely on Ted Cruz stonewalling bills anymore. They want to proceed with the Kids Online Safety Act, Children and Teens' Online Privacy Protection Act, and Kids Off Social Media Act (at minimum). Cruz wants to advance these bills "within the next six weeks" (i.e. factoring in recesses, it will either be the week of April 13th or the week of April 20th). I have no idea if Cruz is siding with the Senate version or the House version of KOSA as last I checked, he was on the fence (there will clearly be negotiation/butting heads as the two versions differ drastically).

    This has a greater chance of proceeding as scheduled as Cruz is the chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee. Though it could be delayed if the previous two calls for votes are anything to go by (Blumenthal wanted a vote on KOSA by late 2025 and Graham wanted a vote on various bills back in February).

    Please call your Senators and Representatives ASAP!

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #Censorship #DigitalRights #Internet #SocialMedia #KOSA #KidsOnlineSafetyAct #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #US #UnitedStates

    https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2026

  26. There is an entire genre of tricking AI customer service bots into doing work; but few are pointing out the obvious…

    …that this is how all censorship circumvention works, and that content scanning will inevitably fail in the face of focused ingenuity.

    https://twitter.com/om_patel5/status/2032248004443287962?s=20

    #ai #censorship #clientSideScanning #onlineSafety #surveillance
  27. As I've said before, it's hard not to read this mass surveillance/censorship bullshit as our deeply reactionary governments getting the faintest whiff that an unchecked internet severely interferes with their ability to propagandize and decided the internet had to die.

    The UK and US in particular are absolutely speed-running this bullshit (with the EU, Australia, and South America not too far behind).

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #Censorship #DigitalRights #Internet #SocialMedia #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #UK #UnitedKingdom

    RE: https://social.openrightsgroup.org/users/openrightsgroup/statuses/116205495518019401

  28. As I've said before, it's hard not to read this mass surveillance/censorship bullshit as our deeply reactionary governments getting the faintest whiff that an unchecked internet severely interferes with their ability to propagandize and decided the internet had to die.

    The UK and US in particular are absolutely speed-running this bullshit (with the EU, Australia, and South America not too far behind).

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #Censorship #DigitalRights #Internet #SocialMedia #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #UK #UnitedKingdom

    RE: https://social.openrightsgroup.org/users/openrightsgroup/statuses/116205495518019401

  29. The state of the internet is a bunch of people who are on record for being child molesters (or are at least actively covering for said child molesters) telling you that artistic expression is immoral.

    "We need mass censorship and surveillance to protect the children, the same children that there are millions of pages of criminal report documents saying we brutally abused." -Lawmakers, Corporate Executives, Celebrities, Conservative Think Tanks, etc. unironically

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #Censorship #DigitalRights #Internet #SocialMedia #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #DigitalID

  30. The state of the internet is a bunch of people who are on record for being child molesters (or are at least actively covering for said child molesters) telling you that artistic expression is immoral.

    "We need mass censorship and surveillance to protect the children, the same children that there are millions of pages of criminal report documents saying we brutally abused." -Lawmakers, Corporate Executives, Celebrities, Conservative Think Tanks, etc. unironically

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #Censorship #DigitalRights #Internet #SocialMedia #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #DigitalID

  31. The state of the internet is a bunch of people who are on record for being child molesters (or are at least actively covering for said child molesters) telling you that artistic expression is immoral.

    "We need mass censorship and surveillance to protect the children, the same children that there are millions of pages of criminal report documents saying we brutally abused." -Lawmakers, Corporate Executives, Celebrities, Conservative Think Tanks, etc. unironically

    #FreeSpeech #Privacy #Censorship #DigitalRights #SocialMedia #Internet #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning

  32. The state of the internet is a bunch of people who are on record for being child molesters (or are at least actively covering for said child molesters) telling you that artistic expression is immoral.

    "We need mass censorship and surveillance to protect the children, the same children that there are millions of pages of criminal report documents saying we brutally abused." -Lawmakers, Corporate Executives, Celebrities, Conservative Think Tanks, etc. unironically

    #FreeSpeech #Privacy #Censorship #DigitalRights #SocialMedia #Internet #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning

  33. OFCOM update: so apparently the embargoed press-release email was circulated to one (more?) of their general discussion maillists, which I feel symbolic of their approach towards security

    Highlights are as follows:

    • they will be “fast-tracking” their decision to force apps and sites (“tech firms”, of course, because all apps and sites are “tech firms”) bringing the decision forward
    • their proposal will be that everyone be forced to use fuzzy-image-matching, which they dress up as “perceptual-” or “hash-matching”, but it’s an old tech wrapped up in legal agreements with inadequate oversight
    • they frame this as a means to combat non-consensual deep-fakes, even though those are not currently a large part of the extant “hash databases” in use by the likes of Meta, which are geared at CSAM and Terrorism
    • management of such databases, and likewise logging of the queries where those databases are offered as an “outsource service” — clearly this is where the money will be made — both lead to major security issues; this is not mentioned
    • they will decide in May and expect other legalities to be sorted by “this summer”
    #censorship #clientSideScanning #hashMatching #ofcom #surveillance
  34. RE: ieji.de/@GalacticGoddess/11565

    While I'm on the topic of bad internet bills in Canada, here are other bills you should call your Senators and House of Commons Representatives about!

    Bill C-12 just completed it's first reading in the Senate (2nd chamber for this bill)! Bill C-8 is due for another hearing later this week!

    Fight back against these bills while you still have the chance!

    #Privacy #FreeSpeech #Censorship #DigitalRights #Internet #SocialMedia #Canada #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #Immigration

  35. @Boerps "Die IT-Aufrüstung wirft die Frage auf, was mit der Technik passiert, wenn Trumps Amtszeit einmal vorbei ist. Am Ende könnte es wie so oft bei staatlichen Überwachungsprogrammen laufen: Ist die Technik einmal angeschafft, ist die Verlockung zu groß, sie weiterzunutzen – selbst wenn sich das politische Klima eines Tages ändern könnte."----Nicht nur dort !! --Der Fall der Gesichtserkennungssoftware »Mobile Fortify« zeigt, wie weitreichend die Datensammlung ist. Die App greift auf staatliche Datenbanken mit mehr als 200 Millionen Bildern zu. Viele davon waren eigentlich zur biometrischen Kontrolle bei der Einreise in den USA gedacht, etwa an den Einreiseschaltern von internationalen Flughäfen.

    spiegel.de/netzwelt/usa-werden

    #ice #Palantir #Vorratsdatenspeicherung #clientsidescanning #chatcontrol #chatkontrolle #noafd #Wehret_den_anfaengen

  36. Important point reiterated by @marcel_kolaja at #FOSDEM about the #ProtectEU #GoingDark attacks on encryption:

    "There is no 'technical lawful access to end-to-end encrypted communication without breaking privacy and security. Period!"
    #ClientSideScanning #ChatControl