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#clearfake — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #clearfake, aggregated by home.social.

  1. .ru serious? 🇷🇺 ccTLD .ru had an unbelievable +3741% ⏫ in #botnet C&C domains, placing it #1 for the most abused ccTLD in the latter half of 2025. This activity can be attributed almost entirely to #clearfake, a malicious JavaScript framework.

    Learn more in the Botnet Threat Update Jul - Dec 2025 ⤵️ ⤵️
    spamhaus.org/resource-hub/botn

    #ccTLD #BotnetCC #ThreatIntel

  2. TDR analysts published an analysis of the new #ClearFake variant that relies on compromised websites injected with the malicious JavaScript framework, the #EtherHiding technique, and the #ClickFix social engineering tactic.

    blog.sekoia.io/clearfakes-new-

  3. While investigating an infected website, we noticed call to BSC testnet contract 0x0967296defa0fd586c9ede5730380e2b059fab95 : testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x

    The contract’s content is clearly malicious and connects over WebSocket to suckerity[.]xyz (behind Cloudflare), not related to #ClearFake, but reminds us #Magecart related injections:

  4. While investigating an infected website, we noticed call to BSC testnet contract 0x0967296defa0fd586c9ede5730380e2b059fab95 : testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x

    The contract’s content is clearly malicious and connects over WebSocket to suckerity[.]xyz (behind Cloudflare), not related to #ClearFake, but reminds us #Magecart related injections:

  5. While investigating an infected website, we noticed call to BSC testnet contract 0x0967296defa0fd586c9ede5730380e2b059fab95 : testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x

    The contract’s content is clearly malicious and connects over WebSocket to suckerity[.]xyz (behind Cloudflare), not related to #ClearFake, but reminds us #Magecart related injections:

  6. While investigating an infected website, we noticed call to BSC testnet contract 0x0967296defa0fd586c9ede5730380e2b059fab95 : testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x

    The contract’s content is clearly malicious and connects over WebSocket to suckerity[.]xyz (behind Cloudflare), not related to #ClearFake, but reminds us #Magecart related injections:

  7. While investigating an infected website, we noticed call to BSC testnet contract 0x0967296defa0fd586c9ede5730380e2b059fab95 : testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x

    The contract’s content is clearly malicious and connects over WebSocket to suckerity[.]xyz (behind Cloudflare), not related to #ClearFake, but reminds us #Magecart related injections:

  8. #etherhiding (hiding malicious code in blockchain based smart contracts) is not only by #ClearFake related actors – but now also for #Magecart 👇

  9. #etherhiding (hiding malicious code in blockchain based smart contracts) is not only by #ClearFake related actors – but now also for #Magecart 👇

  10. #etherhiding (hiding malicious code in blockchain based smart contracts) is not only by #ClearFake related actors – but now also for #Magecart 👇

  11. #etherhiding (hiding malicious code in blockchain based smart contracts) is not only by #ClearFake related actors – but now also for #Magecart 👇

  12. Вредоносный код навсегда сохранили в блокчейне

    Один из старых хакерских трюков — распространять вредоносное ПО под видом обновления браузера . На взломанном сайте размещается плашка с утверждением, что для просмотра нужно обновить браузер. И кнопка для скачивания обновления, как на скриншоте с прошлогодней атаки ClearFake . Таким образом, жертва самостоятельно устанавливает вредоносное ПО на свой компьютер. В прошлом году злоумышленники разработали умный способ защитить вредоносный софт от уничтожения. Они разместили его в децентрализованном анонимном блокчейне . То есть интегрировали код в смарт-контракт, который навечно сохранился в открытом доступе.

    habr.com/ru/companies/globalsi

    #блокчейн #обновление_браузера #BSC #Binance_Smart_Chain #Binance #BNB #WordPress #ClearFake #BscScan #EtherHiding