#allanbohm — Public Fediverse posts

I have to say, I’m not a fan of Allan Behm (now with The Australian Institute) because, in this short article at least, he makes assertions that are light on defense and imply assumptions that are not divulged. In this case it is about #AUKUS of course, if a horse may be beaten to death, this one is surpisingly resilient.

“So, we are now left with huge investments focused on a single capability, without any consideration of the suite of capabilities Australia needs for its defence, and where just one of those capabilities — submarines — fits in.”

There are so many things wrong with the quoted segment above. I will only address the most important of these. There are valid strategic and tactical requirements for the RAN to field submarines. These were first identified after #Federation (our first subs arrived from the UK in 1914 and were deployed to our North against the German navy). and while a lot has changed since, the basic requirements were never made redundent given there have been many successful submarine procurements and deployments since WW One. So let no one question where these boats will ‘fit in’ lest it demonstrates an anomalous understanding of the matter (its kinder than saying erroneous). And Behm should know better if his resumé is any guide. There are a lot of thing to look at in this AUKUS Tier One *Deal* and much of it rightly ought to be brought to light and publically discussed, but whether Australia needs submarines or not is not one of them.

https://thepoint.com.au/opinions/260728-aukus-when-not-enough-is-still-too-much

I’ve said it before and I’m saying it again. I will always support ADF members in their requirements for the best platforms and weapon systems in order to give them the best odds of successfully carrying the tasks assigned to them by the govt of the day. And for submariners this is especially important.

#LestWeForget #SSN #SubSurfaceWarfare #Defence #ADF #AUKUStierOne #SovereignCapability #GeopoliticalStrategy #SilentService #SSN #Submarine #AustralianInstitute #NavalStrategy #Deterrence #AllanBohm

I have to say, I’m not a fan of Allan Behm (now with The Australian Institute) because, in this short article at least, he makes assertions that are light on defense and imply assumptions that are not divulged. In this case it is about #AUKUS of course, if a horse may be beaten to death, this one is surpisingly resilient.

“So, we are now left with huge investments focused on a single capability, without any consideration of the suite of capabilities Australia needs for its defence, and where just one of those capabilities — submarines — fits in.”

There are so many things wrong with the quoted segment above. I will only address the most important of these. There are valid strategic and tactical requirements for the RAN to field submarines. These were first identified after #Federation (our first subs arrived from the UK in 1914 and were deployed to our North against the German navy). and while a lot has changed since, the basic requirements were never made redundent given there have been many successful submarine procurements and deployments since WW One. So let no one question where these boats will ‘fit in’ lest it demonstrates an anomalous understanding of the matter (its kinder than saying erroneous). And Behm should know better if his resumé is any guide. There are a lot of thing to look at in this AUKUS Tier One *Deal* and much of it rightly ought to be brought to light and publically discussed, but whether Australia needs submarines or not is not one of them.

https://thepoint.com.au/opinions/260728-aukus-when-not-enough-is-still-too-much

I’ve said it before and I’m saying it again. I will always support ADF members in their requirements for the best platforms and weapon systems in order to give them the best odds of successfully carrying the tasks assigned to them by the govt of the day. And for submariners this is especially important.

#LestWeForget #SSN #SubSurfaceWarfare #Defence #ADF #AUKUStierOne #SovereignCapability #GeopoliticalStrategy #SilentService #SSN #Submarine #AustralianInstitute #NavalStrategy #Deterrence #AllanBohm

I have to say, I’m not a fan of Allan Behm (now with The Australian Institute) because, in this short article at least, he makes assertions that are light on defense and imply assumptions that are not divulged. In this case it is about #AUKUS of course, if a horse may be beaten to death, this one is surpisingly resilient.

“So, we are now left with huge investments focused on a single capability, without any consideration of the suite of capabilities Australia needs for its defence, and where just one of those capabilities — submarines — fits in.”

There are so many things wrong with the quoted segment above. I will only address the most important of these. There are valid strategic and tactical requirements for the RAN to field submarines. These were first identified after #Federation (our first subs arrived from the UK in 1914 and were deployed to our North against the German navy). and while a lot has changed since, the basic requirements were never made redundent given there have been many successful submarine procurements and deployments since WW One. So let no one question where these boats will ‘fit in’ lest it demonstrates an anomalous understanding of the matter (its kinder than saying erroneous). And Behm should know better if his resumé is any guide. There are a lot of thing to look at in this AUKUS Tier One *Deal* and much of it rightly ought to be brought to light and publically discussed, but whether Australia needs submarines or not is not one of them.

https://thepoint.com.au/opinions/260728-aukus-when-not-enough-is-still-too-much

I’ve said it before and I’m saying it again. I will always support ADF members in their requirements for the best platforms and weapon systems in order to give them the best odds of successfully carrying the tasks assigned to them by the govt of the day. And for submariners this is especially important.

#LestWeForget #SSN #SubSurfaceWarfare #Defence #ADF #AUKUStierOne #SovereignCapability #GeopoliticalStrategy #SilentService #SSN #Submarine #AustralianInstitute #NavalStrategy #Deterrence #AllanBohm

I have to say, I’m not a fan of Allan Behm (now with The Australian Institute) because, in this short article at least, he makes assertions that are light on defense and imply assumptions that are not divulged. In this case it is about #AUKUS of course, if a horse may be beaten to death, this one is surpisingly resilient.

“So, we are now left with huge investments focused on a single capability, without any consideration of the suite of capabilities Australia needs for its defence, and where just one of those capabilities — submarines — fits in.”

There are so many things wrong with the quoted segment above. I will only address the most important of these. There are valid strategic and tactical requirements for the RAN to field submarines. These were first identified after #Federation (our first subs arrived from the UK in 1914 and were deployed to our North against the German navy). and while a lot has changed since, the basic requirements were never made redundent given there have been many successful submarine procurements and deployments since WW One. So let no one question where these boats will ‘fit in’ lest it demonstrates an anomalous understanding of the matter (its kinder than saying erroneous). And Behm should know better if his resumé is any guide. There are a lot of thing to look at in this AUKUS Tier One *Deal* and much of it rightly ought to be brought to light and publically discussed, but whether Australia needs submarines or not is not one of them.

https://thepoint.com.au/opinions/260728-aukus-when-not-enough-is-still-too-much

I’ve said it before and I’m saying it again. I will always support ADF members in their requirements for the best platforms and weapon systems in order to give them the best odds of successfully carrying the tasks assigned to them by the govt of the day. And for submariners this is especially important.

#LestWeForget #SSN #SubSurfaceWarfare #Defence #ADF #AUKUStierOne #SovereignCapability #GeopoliticalStrategy #SilentService #SSN #Submarine #AustralianInstitute #NavalStrategy #Deterrence #AllanBohm